LOTS OF FLAGS, BUT NO ECONOMY
by Pinchas Inbari, 'Al-Hamishmar', May 30, 1994, p.11
THE WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA IS ONE OF THE OSLO AGREEMENTS' MOST IMPORTANT
ACHIEVEMENTS, BUT THE REST OF THE ROAD IS FRAUGHT WITH GRAVE DANGERS
TOGETHER WITH GOOD OPPORTUNITIES; IT IS FOR ISRAEL TO CAREFULLY EXAMINE THE
OPTIONS THAT LIE BEFORE IT. ARAFAT'S CALL FOR A JIHAD IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO
CHANGE INTERLOCUTORS. JUST AS, IN THE PAST, HUSSEINI WAS REPLACED BY ARAFAT,
IT IS NOW POSSIBLE TO SWITCH TO ANOTHER WAGON. THIS, ON THE CONDITION THAT
THE JOURNEY'S GOAL BE, FIRST AND FOREMOST, THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN THE TERRITORIES.
IN CHOOSING THE OPTION FOR CONTINUING DOWN THIS PATH, INTER-ARAB
CONNECTIONS, SUCH AS THE SYRIAN POSITION, MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
Political developments on the Palestinian issue are full of surprises;
whoever believed that the day would come when the conditions would be
created for a tacit pact between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Army
(PLA), let him stand up. It can be assumed that many people will remain
seated, since it is difficult to accept, even as it takes place before our
very eyes.
It is still difficult to determine the efficacy of the PLA. The soldiers in
the ranks are likely to come up with surprises, and not necessarily good
ones, but the senior officers are working well with the IDF leadership. It
is not hard to receive positive assessments of the PLA's officer corps from
the leadership of Israel's security establishment. It seems that the links
being created between the two senior officer corps are stronger, in many
ways, than either side's links with the PLO-Tunis.
In the middle of the week, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin hosted a group of
journalists in his office at the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv, and devoted
most of his remarks to the Palestinian issue. The key sentence was: we have
found allies among the Palestinians and it is not their chief speaker; in
other words, Yasser Arafat. This followed the praise heard from various
'security sources' (before Rabin made his remarks), regarding the activities
of the PLA in its new incarnation as the Palestinian Police. One security
source also proposed that ways in which Israel could give financial support
to the Palestinian administration be considered, since a collapse of the
agreements would bring Israel a heavier cost in blood.
Israel has already realized one of the most important achievements of the
Oslo agreements: withdrawal from Gaza. However, the rest of the road is
fraught with grave dangers, together with good opportunities, and we must
break free of existing ways of thinking, in order to closely examine which
way should be chosen.
The starting point for examining the political options facing Israel, after
it completes its partial withdrawal from Gaza, must be the determination
that the agreement carried out last week was not the original Oslo
Agreement. Perhaps it is in name, but not in content or substance. The main
objective of Israeli policy, from here on in, must be to return to the
original basis of the previous Oslo agreements. If not, then the Palestinian
Autonomy will not be able to survive, and the Israeli Government will fall
along with it.
In a television news story a week ago, we had a rare opportunity to peak
into the actual atmosphere which accompanied those who put together the Oslo
Agreement, at the modest signing ceremony in the Norwegian capital. Abu Ala,
emotional, and on the verge of tears, said: 'Now we can turn to the work of
Palestine's economic recovery;' Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said, during
those same days, that the Oslo agreements are agreements of 'much economics,
and not many flags.' Peres' immediate instinct then was to organize economic
aid for the Palestinians. Economics is the key to the success, or failure,
of the new stage.
Unfortunately, even on the day that the agreements were signed in
Washington, on 13 September 1993, the PLO Leader altered its original
course, and those who know about the running-around behind-the-scenes at the
signing ceremony at the White House, should not be surprised over the
embarrassing incident which Arafat caused at the signing ceremony in Cairo.
Even in Washington, Arafat had sought, at the last minute, to make changes
in the agreed upon text, and threatened to cancel the ceremony. On the basis
on this precedent, it was possible to predict, fairly accurately, what
occurred in Cairo.
The main change which Arafat demanded in Washington related to 'flags', not
to the 'economy'. The Cairo crisis also related to 'flags' and not to the
'economy' (the Palestinian policeman on the Jordan River bridge). Both of
these crises are only symptoms of a comprehensive effort by Arafat, which
has completely altered the Oslo process. The result is that the Palestinians
have many flags; but have no economy whatsoever. After funds were found (no
small part of which came from Nabil Sha'ath's own pocket), to transport PLA
soldiers to the territories, the next immediate threat to the continued
existence of the Palestinian Police, the lack of a budget for its operation,
emerged. About funding development plans for establishing the infrastructure
of a state for the Palestinians, there is nothing to be said.
What is the root of this evil? Why have the Palestinians not succeeded in
raising the funds they require for the Palestinian Police to function, and
for funding Palestine's economic revival?
To tell the truth, the budgets exist and are ready to be tapped. The problem
is that the Palestinians have not established the tools required of them to
absorb these funds, in line with the conditions set by the countries
donating the aid. The criteria for determining the success of the political
process is the Palestinians' central economic institution, the Palestinian
Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction PECDR. About $5
billion is waiting, for the moment when the Palestinians set up the
institution. It does exist on paper, though not according to World Bank
requirements. The aid donors are demanding a professional economic
institution, run by economists and technocrats from the territories: Arafat
has established a political institution, headed by himself and his deputy,
Faruk Kadumi, a declared opponent of the Oslo agreements.
In discussions I held last week with American officials, it became clear
that Washington has new thoughts regarding PECDR. Instead of being stubborn
with Arafat, and thereby endangering the Autonomy, the Americans have
decided to give the institution, in its current makeup, some sort of aid,
though not extravagant, in order to test its functioning. The test period
could possibly be about half a year. If the institution fails, then the
money for the Palestinians would be transferred by way of the non-
governmental organizations operating in the territories. When the total aid
is determined, aid given via these organizations would be deducted from the
total.
The emergency funds required for the Palestinians to strengthen the existing
administration, would be deducted from the allocations for development
plans. This is good news for Arafat. However, the failure of PECDR would
increase the determination of international actors to conduct general
elections in the territories.
Arafat's decision to transfer the administration of the national authority's
monetary affairs to a private accountants' office in New York, has aroused
surprise. The aid grant conference, which was supposed to have been convened
by now in Cairo, has again been postponed, this time for three weeks; and
this will apparently not be the last time.
If this is the case, what is the alternative to the current situation? The
agreement with the Palestinians achieved one of its important objectives, a
withdrawal from Gaza, if only a partial one. Now, serious consideration is
being given to the question of whether to continue on the path with Arafat,
or with other Palestinian leaders, as Meretz leader Shulamit Aloni
suggested. Arafat's call for a 'jihad' which, by the way, could also have
been easily predicted provides an opportunity to change interlocutors.
Just as at a certain point, Husseini was replaced by Arafat, at this new
junction, it is possible to transfer to another 'wagon'. This, on condition
that the journey's objective will be, first and foremost, the creation of
conditions for Palestinian economic development.
It was interesting to hear that, just as American officials spoke of a
'trial period' for Arafat, so too, the 'security sources' spoke of a test,
or trial, period not so much regarding Arafat, but rather regarding the
PLA. It is still too early to properly evaluate this army, but the good ties
which have been created between its commanders and those of the IDF, open up
tremendous possibilities regarding the future. The possibility exists, for
example, that this army may join the Palestinian leadership inside [the
territories].
In any case, the first stop on this long road is halting the intifada. Not
long ago, two Palestinian leaders in the territories, Husseini and Zakut,
called for halting the intifada strikes, so that it would be possible to
channel national energies into building Palestine. Husseini also spoke about
the need to rebuild the Fatah organization, in a manner suitable to a period
of economic reconstruction: in other words, not in the manner of an armed
struggle.
Husseini's wagon already carries the slogan, and the question for
Palestinians is whether to board it, in order to reach the destination. The
answer is both yes and no. Unlike the period preceding Oslo, we cannot come
back to Faisal Husseini as a central Palestinian personality in the
territories, but rather as one power in a broad spectrum. Along the fringes
of the Oslo process, an effort was made by Husseini to draw conclusions from
his mistakes, mainly his failure to establish an internal Palestinian power
base, not based solely on the academic center of Bir Zeit University. Rather
it would be based on establishing strong ties with the other power centers
in the West Bank as well, Nablus and Hebron. Apparently, Husseini has
succeeded in this matter to no small degree.
There is room for concern that Jibril Rajoub's return may open a struggle
over the leadership between Husseini and Rajoub. A way must be found to
convince the two not to fight, that they will be able to come to terms with
each other, and that one does not necessarily have to achieve prominence
over the other. Hussein has an advantage over Rajoub, from the standpoint of
using the world media, and bringing the situation of Palestinians in the
territories to the world's attention.
Rajoub is capable of ensuring Orient House security protection from the
rejectionist organizations. The nucleus of a local leadership can be
established around Husseini, Rajoub and the Nablus leadership, which would
be our primary partner for the next stages of the peace process.
Israel does not need to intervene openly in the Palestinians' internal
affairs, but a decision on whom to speak to is imperative. As Israel decided
in Oslo to favor the PLO over the territories' leadership, it can once again
decide to deal with local leaders. A decision to return to the territories'
leadership would require preliminary contacts, to attempt to ensure that
their internal conflicts would not undermine the move. Israel also needs to
follow closely the possibility that PLA officers may join the local
leadership.
Two weeks ago, Foreign Minister Peres met with Yasser Arafat in Oslo, in
order to plan the next moves with him. After Arafat explained his statements
in Johannesburg as, 'a jihad through peaceful means,' Peres said that,
'there is no choice we need to continue onward.' However, there may be a
choice: a return to the leadership in the territories, and this option
should be examined well.
One of the most important considerations in choosing the course for the
future must be the inter-Arab connection. It is no secret that Syria has
'gotten cold feet', just as President Assad had warned President Mubarak at
their recent meeting in Cairo. There are several reasons for Syria's
reservations, one of the most important being its lack of desire to join a
move in which Arafat is the main star. It is possible that Syria is waiting
for Arafat to fail, before it joins.
The competition between Syria and Egypt has great importance in all of these
considerations. Assad hopes that the failure of the current stage will
damage Egypt's standing and give Syria an advantage in the unending
competition for the leadership of the Arab world. It is in Israel's great
interest to preserve President Mubarak's standing, and so a decision about a
change on the Palestinian track should be coordinated with Egypt. President
Mubarak should be allowed a certain amount of time in which to improve his
relations with Assad, and forge ties with the leadership inside the
territories. Actually, Egypt began just such a move when Prime Minister Atef
Sideki was sent to Amman on the eve of the Cairo ceremony, in order to
resume the activity of the joint Egyptian-Jordanian committee.
On Saturday, King Hussein met with President Assad, and it can be assumed
that they discussed overall strategy, in which Egypt would join the Syrian-
Jordanian axis, as a preliminary move to renewed reliance on the leadership
inside the territories. Two weeks ago Saturday, the daily newspaper
'A-Nahar' reported that, immediately following King Hussein's arrival at
President Assad's office, President Mubarak called them on the telephone and
joined in their discussion. If so, then this was a three-way summit between
Assad, King Hussein and their new friend, President Mubarak, after Arafat
spoiled the Cairo ceremony.
One of the lessons which Faisal Husseini learned from his failure was to
strengthen his ties with the Arab countries, such as Syria and Jordan. It
was interesting to listen to him when he left his meeting with U.S.
Secretary of State Christopher in Jericho. Unlike in the past, when he spoke
he used the code-words favored by Damascus: 'comprehensive arrangement',
'Arab coordination', etc. That same day, he was interviewed on Radio Monte
Carlo, and this aspect of his new approach was much more pronounced.
It should be recalled that the PLA was not connected to the PLO-Tunis, but
rather to the various Arab countries which hosted its units. This connection
still exists today, and the same army may not necessarily listen to Arafat,
but rather may respond to an all-Arab effort, if it coalesces. It was not
Arafat who came to bid farewell to the Al-Aqsa and Badr forces at the gates
of Jericho, but King Hussein. The soldiers and officers shouted to the king:
one people, not two; one blood not two.