SOON, THEY WILL BE GOSSIPING ABOUT FINANCIAL IRREGULARITIES
by Danny Rubinstein, 'Ha'aretz', May 27, 1994, p.3B
THE FAILURES OF ARAFAT AND THE PLO IN THE INTERIM STAGE WILL NECESSARILY
LEAD TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE ONLY POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE - A TURN TO
JORDAN, WHICH IS A PALESTINIAN STATE, NOT JUST ACCORDING TO ARIEL SHARON.
The first stage of establishing Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip and
Jericho is likely to fail. Jamil al-Hamami, one of Hamas' Jerusalem
activists, said recently that not much needs to be done in order to cause
the arrangement to fail. 'The Agreement will collapse on its own because it
is built on shaky foundations and contains the seeds of its own
destruction,' he said in an interview with a Saudi television station.
Many Palestinians, and more than a few Israelis, feel similarly. The
disillusionment expected very soon, on both sides, is almost inevitable.
There is almost no chance that the economic situation in Gaza will improve.
Economists are sure that the situation will become even worse, at least
initially. The admiration for the Palestinian police force and the few
symbols of independence will quickly wear off and will give way to a
bitterness that will find expression in continued acts of terrorism against
the settlements, and also in complaints against the new PLO regime. One does
not need an overly-active imagination in order to predict that, shortly
after the first funds begin reaching Gaza and the West Bank, accusations of
irregularities will start to be heard.
The objective difficulties will lead to a further erosion in the status of
the leadership headed by Arafat, already at a low ebb. There is no chance
that it will be replaced by democratic means simply because Arafat will not
permit it. Even now, most of the activists in the territories are doubtful
if general elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will indeed be held
as is set out in the Agreement. Arafat, aided by Palestinian leaders from
Tunis and the Palestinian diaspora, will not agree that the first
Palestinian leadership in history be headed by 'local' people chosen only by
the inhabitants of the territories. He will argue: What about the
Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria and the refugee camps in Jordan and other
Arab countries? Are they also not part of the problem?
The assessment is that if elections are held in the territories, they will
be for local authorities only. In other words, the PLO will recognize the
right of the residents of Nablus, Jenin, Gaza, and Rafiah to elect municipal
authorities to administer limited local affairs only, but not to administer
the Palestinian National Authority. A severe struggle is expected on this
issue, one that will continue to harm the new administration's status. And
if this is not enough, it is clear that the (unsolvable) issues of Jerusalem
and the settlements are already on the agenda, and even if a miracle occurs
and everything else is worked out, these two alone will be enough to torpedo
the agreement.
In light of this chilling picture, it is possible to hear, even now, a few
people, Palestinians and Israelis alike, whispering about a way out of the
morass. Its main point: a return to the Jordanian option. Foreign
journalists who have recently visited Amaan are saying that this is already
being openly discussed in the royal palace. There, they understood from the
start that Arafat would exhaust himself in the negotiations with Israel.
Over the years, King Hussein had feared to turn his contacts with Israel
into official and open negotiations because he knew that all negotiations
entail concessions and compromises - and he was not capable of making them.
Therefore, he preferred that Arafat and the PLO make them.
Only the PLO is recognized as sole spokesman of Palestinian nationalism and
as its loyal fighter, and no labels of treason can be affixed to it.
The Jordanian expectation was that the PLO would quickly lose the
considerable stock of nationalist prestige at is disposal, is now being
realized. It is possible that even Israeli politicians, veteran supporters
of the Jordanian option like Shimon Peres, expected such a development. One
way or another, the failures of Arafat and the PLO in the interim stage in
Gaza and the West Bank will necessarily lead to the consideration of the
only possible alternative - a turn to Jordan, which is a Palestinian state,
and not just according to Ariel Sharon.
Jordan and Israel well know that they can not initiate such a step. The
initiative must come from within the Palestinian national camp. Only the
Palestinians themselves, mainly the residents of the territories, are the
people who understand that the concessions made by Arafat and the PLO have
not brought them any benefit, and it is they who will demand their
replacement.
It is difficult to know exactly how the dynamic that will push the West Bank
and Gaza Strip towards the Jordanian option will be produced, but is clear
enough who in the territories will do this: it will be all those
conservative circles who, today, partly identify with the Islamic movement.
We are not talking about the extremist fanatics of the Izadin el-Kassam
gangs, but the large camp of the urban and rural middle classes in the
territories, whose hostility to the PLO has recently become a recognized
phenomenon. They reject the PLO's 'secular revolutionary' image. They
remember Arafat's connections with the former Soviet Union and his
association with the marxist organizations who are the enemies of the
Islamic tradition.
The traditional regime of King Hussein, a descendant of the Prophet
Muhammad, who respects religious and family values, is much closer to their
hearts. The days when King Hussein was thought to be a puppet of imperialism
and an agent of the colonial powers are gone. Today he is seen as a
representative of the future, as opposed to the 'revolutionary' rulers who
relied on the Soviet Union and belong to the past.
But the main reason for turning to the Jordanian option is likely to be the
fact that will become clear to the Palestinians that this option will
achieve for them much more than their own national authority. After the
memories of the tumult and the embarrassment of the negotiations with the
PLO, the negotiations with the Jordanians will seem much more serious and
dignified. It will be more balanced, between two states, and even easier.
Even though there will be the same difficult problems, such as the fate of
Jerusalem and the settlements, it will feel different when a recognized
sovereign state, with its own organized independent institutions, and
control over widespread territory, comprises the Arab partner. The Israeli
readiness to make concessions is likely to be substantially different than
it is today. In Jerusalem, for example, the picture will be different. The
PLO is demanding to establish its capital in east Jerusalem. There is no
chance that they will compromise, and agree that their capital be moved to
Gaza, Jericho, or Ramallah.
With the Jordanians, the situation is different. They already have a capital
city. Even if we assume for a moment that Israel would be prepared place the
city's Arab neighborhoods under Arab sovereignty, such a concession would be
seen as completely different if made in order to establish an Arab capital
in the city or if it is made for the honor and welfare of Muslim and
Christian residents of the city citizens who have another capital city. This
also holds true for the settlements. The PLO's agreement to let Ariel or
Gush Etzion, remain where they are, is a concession over the very heart of
the state that they are seeking to establish and over a large part of its
territory.
In contrast, negotiations with Jordan on the settlements issue would be less
irksome, inasmuch as these are marginal areas for the Kingdom, and not its
heart. This is not to say, of course, that a solution is at hand. Egypt did
not agree to concede one centimeter of Sinai and conducted stubborn
negotiations over Taba's single square kilometer. But the room for
maneuvering and the ability to show flexibility, on both sides, would be
very much greater if the negotiations were Israeli-Jordanian instead of
Israeli-Palestinian.
As much as it is possible to follow the behavior of the Palestinians' in the
territories, it is still too early to speak about all of this. None among
them is running to request that King Hussein save them from the concessions,
from the capitulation, from the suffering, and from the degradations of
Arafat's administration. Among Jordan's supporters in the territories, this
is merely a heartfelt wish that they can not yet express openly, but it is
certainly likely to be realized.