TERRORISM AND ECONOMICS THE MEASURES OF SUCCESS
(Analysis by Ze'ev Schiff, 'Ha'aretz', 18.2.94, p.B1)
On the eve of the signing of the Cairo Agreement, I posed a similar
question to both an Israeli and a Palestinian who deal with security
matters: What will be the most difficult security matter for
implementing the Agreement? I asked each one separately.
On the Israeli side, the problem focuses on the roads leading to the
Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip. IDF Chief-of-Staff Ehud Barak has
also emphasized that this could be the most difficult problem. According
to the Declaration of Principles, Israelis have the right to travel on
all the main roads in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area; not only
on the three roads which will be under the IDF's responsibility. The
fear is not over an attack on the settlements, but rather on the Israeli
vehicles traveling to and from the settlements. According to the
Palestinians as well, it was agreed that the Israeli right to
self-defense will not be limited to the road itself, but will also
extend several hundred meters on either side of the road into the Strip.
The Israeli forces will have the right of hot pursuit, to an as yet
undetermined distance.
The Palestinian security man views things in a different light. To him,
the most difficult security problem is connected with the settlers, not
only on the roads, but as a target for the Palestinians and as trouble
makers. This problem could develop as early as in the first stage of the
Agreement and grow several times larger in the following stages. It
appears that the Palestinian security man's assessment is more precise
than the Israeli assessment.
It is also possible to learn from the Palestinian assessment that Fatah
is not convinced, as it was in the past, that the Palestinian police
force will be able to contend easily with the the security problems
connected with the settlers. If the settlers decide to make problems,
this could be a very complex test for both the Palestinian entity and
for Israel. Among the Palestinians, there is apparently a fear that they
will not succeed in taking control of the situation on the ground, and
that they will be unable to prevent extremist Palestinian elements
such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad from attacking Israelis. This,
more or less, matches the assessment by Israeli security elements that
after the Agreement, and with the beginning of the withdrawal, we can
expect an increase in terrorism.
A bloodbath in the Gaza Strip may not necessarily result from clashes
between Fatah and the rejectionist organizations, led by Hamas. If
bloody clashes are to take place among the Palestinians, they may happen
within the ranks of Fatah itself, in a struggle over key positions.
As'ad Siftawi and attorney Mahmud Abu Sha'aban, who were murdered [in
Gaza] several months ago, were apparently the first to pay with their
lives over appointments by Arafat to senior posts without consulting
Fatah leaders in the Gaza Strip.
Against this background, there are rumors among the Palestinians that
Israel is flooding the territories with weapons in order to promote
fighting among the Palestinians. This claim has been vehemently denied
by various Israeli security sources. Israeli officials have been
surprised at the quantity of weapons being smuggled into the
territories. Now, many Palestinians are making an effort to acquire
weapons in order to protect themselves after the Israeli withdrawal. The
Israeli underworld has stepped into this vacuum. Some of the weapons are
smuggled in from Egypt. Most, however, apparently come from Israelis who
sell them to the Palestinians.
The assessment regarding an increase in terrorist activity in the first
stages after the implementation of the Agreement and the Israeli
withdrawal is based on the assumption that Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and
other rejectionist organizations will seek to attack Israelis. They will
aim their weapons not against Arafat's men but rather against Jews, in
order to undermine the Agreement. This will, in fact, be the biggest
test of the Agreement with the PLO.
There are two main measures for the Agreement's success, both in its
initial stages and in general. To the Palestinians, the test for now is
not whether or not they will succeed in establishing the infrastructure
for their state. The test is first of all economic: will Arafat succeed
in feeding the hundreds of thousands of mouths of the Palestinians
living without a serious economic infrastructure in the Gaza Strip?
Clearly, the solution cannot be based solely on handouts and a flow of
grants from the outside world. Arafat has promised the residents of the
territories that they will not pay taxes for 1-2 years. If the
Palestinians had looked at what happened to the financial commitments
which the West gave Russia and other countries, they would not rely too
much on such miracles. About two years passed from the time that the
European Common Market undertook to establish a housing fund for the
Palestinians in the territories until the frames of the first buildings
were seen on the ground.
An honest assessment of Arafat's chances for success, based only on the
the first stage of the Agreement (the Gaza Strip and Jericho area),
yields an unequivocally negative conclusion. The Israelis, too, would
not have succeeded in building a viable entity in the Gaza Strip, 60
percent of whose residents are refugees. Only an assured application of
the following stages of the arrangement is likely to enable its success.
By itself, the Strip, even with Jericho, is a formula for economic
disaster and failure.
For Israel, the measure of success for the Agreement is completely
different: will terrorism against Israelis continue and will the new
Palestinian self-governing authority cooperate with Israeli security
elements to defeat terrorism? If Palestinian terrorism does not stop, or
even gains momentum from within the areas evacuated by the IDF, the
Agreement should then be viewed as resting on shaky foundations. If
Israelis continue to be killed as they were in the period prior to the
signing of the Agreement (and that is the current situation), many
Israelis will ask of what benefit is the political process, especially
since it is already clear that after the withdrawal the General Security
Service's ability to prevent attacks will be reduced.