WILL IT BE GOOD?
(Article by Gideon Eshet, 'Yediot Ahronot', Oct. 28, 1994. pp.3-7)
IN ANOTHER FEW YEARS, WHEN THE DUST OF ALL THE TALKING SETTLES AND THE
PEACE PROGRAMS ARE SPELLED OUT, WE WILL BE ABLE TO SEE A CASINO IN THE
DESERT, AN UNDERWATER PARK, HIGHWAYS, EXPRESS TRAINS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND
GAS PIPELINES FROM QATAR. IN THE MEANTIME, THE JORDANIANS HAVE NO MONEY
FOR OUR PRODUCTS; WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN THEIRS. TOURISTS WILL BE OUR MAIN
EXPORT; PICKLED CUCUMBERS WILL BE THEIRS.
One of the widespread mistakes, primarily in newspapers' economic
sections, is that peace between enemies is supposed to pay off from an
economic standpoint as well. This is fairly surprising, considering the
fact that our first peace with Egypt over the last 16 years, lacks
all 'utility' in the commercial meaning of the word. And despite this
situation, peace still stands on its own merits. Now, let us discuss the
economists and their narrow accounts.
Several weeks ago, I participated in a seminar of economics journalists
from Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Autonomy, which was initiated by
the European Union (the former Common Market) as a result of the good will
and money to bring a little economic utility to the political moves. The
disagreements quickly became clear: we, the Israelis, spoke economics. Our
neighbors to the east spoke politics. As unpleasant as this is, it
understandable.
Why, then, will the economic fruits of the peace agreement be modest?
Following are several explanations:
A. Politics. For now, we have three peace agreements, but very little
peace. A foreign investor and that is the the person whom we all want
to see, finally, wandering around the Middle East would currently
prefer to invest in China, Indonesia, Malay sia and India. Not, God
forbid, because of anti-Semitism, but because the politics of our region
are perhaps moving in the right direction, but have yet to arrive at the
hoped for destination. For example, handling popular Islam.
B. Sociology. One of the Jordanian journalists who participated in the
seminar took pains to explain to the Israelis the problematic Jordanian
position regarding Israel. For decades, the journalist explained, the
Hashemite regime based itself on a massive recruiting of 'Jordanians' for
the public sector. Only a small number of Palestinians were able to
exercise this option. The political system is in the hands of those same
'Jordanians', and it is with them that Israel negotiated.
However, they do not control the economy. The Palestinians, who did not
have the option of integrating into the political-public system, invested
all of their energy in the business sector. For example, the largest bank
in Jordan, the Arab Bank, is under Palestinian control. The political
sensitivity of the Palestinians in Jordan for their brethren across the
river is tremendous. As long as we have not completed the arrangement with
the Palestinian Authority, their brethren to the east will keep their
distance from us.
C. Legal hurdles. Regarding the territories, the legal situation is
'anti-economics.' We would do well to remember that no Israeli investment
in Ariel, Netzarim or Ofra was carried out without state guarantees. As
long as the occupation is in force, a foreign investor will be deterred by
the legal arrangements, especially the property arrangements, which exist
in those same territories. Our arguments with the Palestinians over
authority, the lack of success of the Palestinian Authority, and the lack
of clarity regarding who will rule what, and regarding the legal systems
all of these are deterrents to proper economic relations. It is also
worth remembering that the Jordanian legal system prohibits economic
relations with Israel. It could be that the parliament will reverse the
legislation it is a Jordanian commitment in the framework of the
agreement, but we must wait and see the timetable for implementation.
D. Standards. The State of Israel is full of standards. Some are to
protect the consumer and some are to protect local production. It could be
that most of our standards really are good and necessary, but that is not
what is important. To the manufacturer from the West Bank and Gaza, and to
the manufacturer from Jordan who are used to a free and unsupervised
system our standards appear to be one more obstacle set up by the
Israeli economic giant to fair economic relations. Our neighbors do not
understand that some of our standards are actually to their benefit.
Whoever manufactures a product which does not meet an Israel standard,
should forget about meeting a European standard. However, people over
there are not exactly dreaming of Europe.
E. Trade. Aryeh Arnon and Jimmy Weinblatt, of the University of Beersheva,
recently published the results of research regarding trade possibilities
between Israel, Jordan and the Autonomy. Today, Israel exports $1 billion
worth a year to the territories and imports $250 million worth. According
to the researchers, trade will decrease. We will export only half a
billion. One of the reasons: part of our exports today are 'forced
export.' The possibility for the Palestinians to buy products from other
countries, as well as the lifting of limitations for independe t
production, will decrease the demand for Israeli products.
The situation with Jordan does not seem much better. Here we are talking
about $250 million worth of exports a year. All of these numbers are
nothing compared with Israel's overall exports.
Why? In principle, Jordan and the Autonomy do not have the buying
capability needed to purchase items from Israel. On the other hand, they
also do not have the qualitative capability to sell large quantities of
their own products in Israel. As a rule, the rich trade among themselves.
The poor (the per capita income in Jordan and the territories is one-tenth
of that in Israel) have little to buy and little to sell.
This is, in my opinion, what the next two years hold in store. The
economic fruits may come from one of the two following scenarios:
The first scenario: if an agreement is signed with Syrian and Lebanon in
the future, and all of the political problems are dealt with, interest
from private economic initiators will increase. Also, it important to
remember, the Middle East will be considered a small market in comparison
with the growing nations in South-East Asia. According to Arnon and
Weinblatt, over the next thirty years, we can expect an increase in trade
of 10% a year between Israel and Jordan.
The second scenario: in the absence of private initiators, public
initiative can only move things along very slowly. If a regional bank is
established this week in Casablanca; if western countries grant
substantial guarantees for private investment; if the region's governments
replace their security costs with infrastructure costs the public
sector could bear any fruits.
The public sector needs, despite the economists' point of view, to invest
in projects which at first glance appear uneconomical. It is worthwhile to
remember that Dead Sea Works was established through government funding
and showed only losses for at least the first 15. In the absence of real
peace, and in the absence of real buying power and a good judicial system,
a private initiator will require too much profit to invest in the region.
Finance and foreign ministers quarrelled this week about Israel's
'contribution' to the intended regional bank. Peres wanted our commitment
to be up to $500 million for investments. Shohat was startled by the
huge numbers, and convinced Rabin. Shohat is wrong. In order for Israel to
'waste' $500 million (at least half inside Israel), other countries have
to waste $9.5 billion. If it were possible to establish such large-scale
projects, the Middle East would look totally different after a decade.