PUBLIC OPINION POLL - THE PEACE INDEX- OCT-NOV 1995 - 05-Dec-95

("Ha'aretz", December 5, 1995)

SUPPORT [FOR THE PEACE PROCESS] IS INCREASING

In the days following the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, there was a considerable rise in public support in Israel both for the peace process and for the Oslo Agreements. This move was stronger than any other registered since June 1994. It will be recalled that the "Peace Index" had maintained its stability even after serious terrorist strikes or, conversely, after events which indicated a substantive advance in the political process, for example the signing ceremony for Oslo 2.

Three and a half weeks after the assassination, there was a certain drop in the high level of support for the peace process, but that did not apply to support for the Oslo Agreements, which stayed at the level of the beginning of November.

These findings result from three telephone surveys: one was on October 29, a few days before Rabin was killed; the second was on November 8, four days after the assassination; and the third was on November 29. The October survey of the general Peace Index had shown 54.9 points, in other words, support for the peace process was what it had been two months before that.

On November 8, however, the Index sprang up to 73.1 points, while toward the end of that month, it declined to 65.7 points. The Oslo Agreements Index in October was 46.9 points, and at the start of November jumped to 57.9 points, while at the end of the month it stayed at that level 58.0 points.

It is easy to explain the dramatic rise in the Index at the start of November: firstly it appeared to be a reaction of emotional identification with what was perceived by the public in this country as "the political testament" of Yitzhak Rabin. Secondly, it is very likely that a mechanism of social conformity operated here; i.e., the tendency of those interviewed not to depart from what was perceived as a social consensus, and perhaps their concern at voicing opposition to the process, lest that opposition be understood as supporting the deed of Yigal Amir, or not expressing reservations about it.

The sharp rise in support of the general peace process in contrast to the more moderate rise in supporting the Oslo Agreements, is consistent with previous findings, relating to the relative stability of the general Peace Index, and the lesser support for Oslo in comparison with support for the general process.

These differences arise from the fact that while the general Peace Index deals with a more abstract subject, which is not obligatory, the Oslo index refers to a concrete agreement, whose significance in terms of the political and territorial cost is clearer. This difference also explains the fall at the end of November in the general Peace Index compared with the stability in the Oslo Index.

SINCE THE MURDER, the question of the legitimacy of the use of violence as a means of political struggle has been the focal issue of the national agenda and debate. In a survey in September, 94.2 percent of those responding thought citizens who think government policy on the peace process harms Israel's national interest should be permitted to protest within the framework of the law; 20.3 percent said it was permitted to use methods of non-violent civil disobedience; and 13.3 percent justified violent civil rebellion.

Right after the assassination, the percentage of those who would allow (or those ready to say they would allow) the use of the three forms of protest, fell considerably: 86.4 percent justified legal means of protest, 8.2 percent non-violent civil disobedience, and 4.9 percent the use of violent civil rebellion. At the end of November, the levels of support for these categories were respectively, 87.5, 11.0 and 4.7 percent.

It appears that the impact of the trauma on relating to different modes of protest remained intact, at least for the time being, and there was a substantial fall in public legitimation of protests on the whole and both civil non-violent or violent uprisings in particular.

THE ASSASSINATION and the lessons learned from it caused a broadening of preventive actions by the security authorities, including increased protection for politicians and public figures, and investigations of circles identified with the extreme Right, both secular and religious. Against this backdrop, a degree of readiness by the public was discerned to increasing surveillance of extremist groups and limiting the freedom of expression for extremist views.

In fact, in the survey at the beginning of November, 53.9 percent supported the imposition of severer censorship on the media, 71.6 percent supported banning demonstrations by extremist bodies; and 74.6 percent even supported giving a free hand to the security services "without worrying too much about the restrictions of the law." At the end of November, while there was a considerable drop in the public's willingness to engage in these steps, 44.8 percent still advocated banning demonstrations by extremist groups and 63.1 percent favored a free hand for the security services.

The high support for employing these measures can be attributed to strong collective emotional feeling. At the same time, it must not be overlooked that this support is problematic from the point of view of democracy, especially as regards wide consent for allowing the security authorities to use even non-legal methods.

THE CHANGES in public attitudes after the assassination of the Prime Minister also became evident in the degree of support for the struggle of [Israeli] residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza [JSG] against the government's policy. While, in August, 44.8 percent of those questioned supported that struggle, against 36.7 percent who opposed it (the remainder had no clear stand), at the end of November only 27.4 percent supported the struggle [of the Israeli residents in JSG] and 40.1 percent opposed it.

It therefore appears that a considerable part of the public linked the assassination of Rabin with that struggle, and thus there was a substantial drop in support for it.

THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS in the political arena, along with the data provided above, raise the question of whether there has been a change in political priorities of the public here vis-a-vis peace versus repairing the national split. To clarify this, those interviewed were asked to choose between two claims: one declared that the peace process should be slowed down to ease national reconciliation, while the other said it should be continued at the planned pace, even if it sharpens the split in the people.

It became apparent that opinions on these were divided: 50 percent said the process should be slowed, while 41 percent thought it should be continued as scheduled (5 percent argued there was no connection between the unity of the people and the peace process; and the remainder had no opinion on the issue).

Accordingly, it appears that despite the fact that, today, there is a Jewish majority in Israel in favor of the peace process and the Oslo pacts, there is no such majority about whether the price of continuing the process at the current rate means deepening the national split.