ALL SIDES CLAIM VICTORY
(Commentary by Aluf Ben, "Ha'aretz", April 28, 1996, p. 1,2)
Shimon Peres demonstrated great satisfaction and self-confidence over the
weekend, and he had two good reasons for this. Today, he will arrive in
Washington, having accomplished two central missions that he earmarked for
election season: the amendment of the Palestinian Covenant, and bringing
calm to the northern border, while also resuming talks with Syria. In two
days, he will complete another mission, when he stands on the dais with
President Clinton, and together, they announce a further strengthening of
strategic relations between Israel and the United States.
Peres' grand plan for a military campaign integrated with a political
effort has been implemented, and has produced a new, written document of
understandings that is more detailed that its predecessor, and in which
Syria participates in maintaining quiet along Israel's northern border.
Peres proved that he is capable of going into Lebanon, and of leaving, on
a predetermined course. The price he paid was in stopping the Sharm
a-Sheikh process, in which regional states were harnessed to the war
against terrorism, as well as a certain degree of damage to Israel's
relations with Jordan and North Africa. This week, Peres and Clinton will
discuss ways to restore the atmosphere of peace within the Arab world.
The political coordination with the United States the result of the
weeks of restraint that preceded the operation was the main card in
Peres' hand. The United States backed the decision to embark on "Operation
Grapes of Wrath," and its support for Israel did not wane even after the
civilians were killed in Kana. The American crutch allowed Peres to insist
on his positions and even to threaten to escalate, up to the final moment.
The IDF remains in Lebanon even after the agreement, as the new
understandings will not put an end to the war of attrition in the security
zone. It is believed in Israel that Hizbullah will test this, and now
focus its attacks in an effort to bring about the collapse of the SLA. In
order to guarantee the IDF's freedom of response, the United States
drafted an accompanying letter for Israel, allowing it to strike at
Hizbullah anywhere. On the other hand, Hizbullah can also carry out
attacks abroad, far from the realm of the understandings.
The monitoring committee supervising compliance with the understandings
will serve as an arbitrator, ruling on complaints of violations by either
side. In setting up the committee, Israel made it clear that it is willing
to accept restrictions on freedom of military action in return for
cooperation in maintaining security on both sides of the border. Peres
certainly views this as an expression of his collective security concept.
The agreement reached allows all parties to claim victory Israel,
Syria, Hizbullah and Iran, whose foreign minister spoke of the accord
yesterday as an expression of the "weakness of the Zionist regime."
During the negotiations, the Syrian president acted just as Kissinger and
Baker remembered him. He was stubborn until the eleventh hour, mocking his
guests, and showing them that he holds the key to a settlement. The
operation extracted Syria from the isolation which it endured in the wake
of the Sharm a-Sheikh conference, demonstrating that Assad can conduct a
double dialogue with the United States and with Iran while
preserving his stature on both fronts.
The political echelon in Israel now believes that the IDF attacks in
Lebanon, the forced movement of the residents of the south and the
shelling of infrastructure facilities were not particularly successful
vis-a-vis Assad, even though those who planned the operation believed that
these means would be successful. The assessment in Israel is that Assad
has become more flexible in order not to stretch his relations with the
United States. Assad sought to preserve Syria's standing in Lebanon, in
light of the manifestations of independence being exhibited by the Beirut
government, and of Lebanon's return to the political process with Israel.
But Syria is yet to pay any real price, and will be able to demonstrate
that the war to oust the IDF from southern Lebanon will continue shortly.
Warren Christopher, who has never been greatly admired in the Middle East,
was doubly criticized this week for acceding to Assad's humiliating
antics. But he proved that his method can also bring achievements, by
focusing on the objective, and ignoring formal issues of honor. The main
lesson for the future of negotiations with Syria is that protracted
shuttle diplomacy by the US Secretary of State, determined to reach an
agreement, appears to bring far more successful results than it has during
his previous, shorter visits.
The final beneficiary of the crisis was the French foreign minister who
honorably performed the mission he was given by his president to drive
a French wedge in the peace process. Despite the antagonism and dismissive
jokes which he encountered in Israel, and the open resistance of the
United States, he succeeded in bringing his country into the supervisory
and rehabilitation mechanisms to be created in Lebanon. Now, the French
also want to get into the Syrian track. The Europeans also took advantage
of the operation to justify their controversial dialogue with Iran, and to
reject American pressure to stop to these discussions.
Ma'ariv (p.1) Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff In contrast to the past,
the written agreement of understandings, that was reached after Operation
"Grapes of Wrath", gives the communities of Israel and Lebanon
including the security zone better protection from attack than had
existed in the past. Despite this, the issue of continued fighting in the
security zone, between the IDF, SLA and Hizbullah is still largely an open
question. The potential for a new outbreak exists and both parties will
claim the right to self-defense.
Leaving the Iranian element in Lebanon intact was a clear failure on the
part of the Americans. No serious effort was made to force the government
of Lebanon to demand a complete withdrawal of the Revolutionary Guard from
the country. The guards are the Iranian military arm in Lebanon, which
supports Hizbullah militarily and financially, and trains its members.
Also, no serious effort was made to convince Syria to stop passing Iranian
munitions and arms to Hizbullah through Damascus airport. This is
primarily an American failure, since Washington views Iran as a negative
force which is attempting to torpedo the peace process, acquire nuclear
weapons and threaten American interests. Israel also had a lack of success
in convincing the Americans to be more insistent on the Iranian issue in
Lebanon. The result is that the pact between Damascus and Teheran did not
crack in the wake of this campaign.
The most prominent accomplishment of the agreement of understandings deals
with civilian communities on both sides of the boarder. It was agree that
launching Katyushas or firing of any weapon into Israeli territory is
strictly forbidden. This is a sharper and clearer version and in
writing than the understandings of July 1993. This prohibition also
applies to Israel and the SLA they are forbidden from firing any weapon
at civilians or at civilian sites in Lebanon.
The SLA is not specifically mentioned, but then neither is the name
Hizbullah. Instead, the agreement talks about armed groups in Lebanon.
There is an advantage to this version, since it is designed to prevent
Hizbullah from hiding behind the names of other groups, and prevents
shooting by similar organizations, such as Jibril's.
On the last day of negotiations, Israel tried to achieve commitments by
Hizbullah not to carry out military activities, such as maintaining arms
warehouses, headquarters, communications centers or observation points, in
villages. It did not go over well. The Syrians agreed that attacks from
villages and communities would not be carried out. The amended version is
that communities and populated areas, as well as industrial areas and
power stations, will not become a cover for offensive operations.
The assessment in the IDF is that fighting will resume in the areas
outside the villages in southern Lebanon. No section of the agreement
prohibits the use of car bombs and land mines, attacks on IDF and SLA
patrols and shelling of outposts. Nevertheless, the agreements talk about
the right of self-defense granted to both sides. It can be understood from
this, that the IDF has the right to fire at the sources of shooting, but
not at civilian settlements. Israel did not make do with this. In an
accompanying letter, signed by Israel and the United States, there is a
clarification of the freedom to take military action as demanded by
Israel, in the event of attacks against its forces with roadside
explosives or other offensive means.
In the event of a violation of the agreement, anywhere, Israel views
itself as permitted according to the accompanying letter to act
against Hizbullah, as an organization, anywhere in Lebanon. According to
the Israeli interpretation, this also applies in the event of an attack
against an Israeli target abroad.
As in other agreements, particularly unsigned understandings, the parties
will certainly interpret the agreement differently, and maybe even in a
contradictory fashion. Events in the field will be the determining factor.
The question is whether Hizbullah will again try to attack IDF and SLA
forces. The first test of the agreement will be whether the Syrians agree
to meet with the Israelis on the supervisory committee on which Israel,
Syria and Lebanon are joined by the United States and France.