ALL SIDES CLAIM VICTORY - 28-Apr-96

(Commentary by Aluf Ben, "Ha'aretz", April 28, 1996, p. 1,2)

Shimon Peres demonstrated great satisfaction and self-confidence over the weekend, and he had two good reasons for this. Today, he will arrive in Washington, having accomplished two central missions that he earmarked for election season: the amendment of the Palestinian Covenant, and bringing calm to the northern border, while also resuming talks with Syria. In two days, he will complete another mission, when he stands on the dais with President Clinton, and together, they announce a further strengthening of strategic relations between Israel and the United States.

Peres' grand plan for a military campaign integrated with a political effort has been implemented, and has produced a new, written document of understandings that is more detailed that its predecessor, and in which Syria participates in maintaining quiet along Israel's northern border. Peres proved that he is capable of going into Lebanon, and of leaving, on a predetermined course. The price he paid was in stopping the Sharm a-Sheikh process, in which regional states were harnessed to the war against terrorism, as well as a certain degree of damage to Israel's relations with Jordan and North Africa. This week, Peres and Clinton will discuss ways to restore the atmosphere of peace within the Arab world.

The political coordination with the United States the result of the weeks of restraint that preceded the operation was the main card in Peres' hand. The United States backed the decision to embark on "Operation Grapes of Wrath," and its support for Israel did not wane even after the civilians were killed in Kana. The American crutch allowed Peres to insist on his positions and even to threaten to escalate, up to the final moment.

The IDF remains in Lebanon even after the agreement, as the new understandings will not put an end to the war of attrition in the security zone. It is believed in Israel that Hizbullah will test this, and now focus its attacks in an effort to bring about the collapse of the SLA. In order to guarantee the IDF's freedom of response, the United States drafted an accompanying letter for Israel, allowing it to strike at Hizbullah anywhere. On the other hand, Hizbullah can also carry out attacks abroad, far from the realm of the understandings.

The monitoring committee supervising compliance with the understandings will serve as an arbitrator, ruling on complaints of violations by either side. In setting up the committee, Israel made it clear that it is willing to accept restrictions on freedom of military action in return for cooperation in maintaining security on both sides of the border. Peres certainly views this as an expression of his collective security concept.

The agreement reached allows all parties to claim victory Israel, Syria, Hizbullah and Iran, whose foreign minister spoke of the accord yesterday as an expression of the "weakness of the Zionist regime."

During the negotiations, the Syrian president acted just as Kissinger and Baker remembered him. He was stubborn until the eleventh hour, mocking his guests, and showing them that he holds the key to a settlement. The operation extracted Syria from the isolation which it endured in the wake of the Sharm a-Sheikh conference, demonstrating that Assad can conduct a double dialogue with the United States and with Iran while preserving his stature on both fronts.

The political echelon in Israel now believes that the IDF attacks in Lebanon, the forced movement of the residents of the south and the shelling of infrastructure facilities were not particularly successful vis-a-vis Assad, even though those who planned the operation believed that these means would be successful. The assessment in Israel is that Assad has become more flexible in order not to stretch his relations with the United States. Assad sought to preserve Syria's standing in Lebanon, in light of the manifestations of independence being exhibited by the Beirut government, and of Lebanon's return to the political process with Israel. But Syria is yet to pay any real price, and will be able to demonstrate that the war to oust the IDF from southern Lebanon will continue shortly.

Warren Christopher, who has never been greatly admired in the Middle East, was doubly criticized this week for acceding to Assad's humiliating antics. But he proved that his method can also bring achievements, by focusing on the objective, and ignoring formal issues of honor. The main lesson for the future of negotiations with Syria is that protracted shuttle diplomacy by the US Secretary of State, determined to reach an agreement, appears to bring far more successful results than it has during his previous, shorter visits.

The final beneficiary of the crisis was the French foreign minister who honorably performed the mission he was given by his president to drive a French wedge in the peace process. Despite the antagonism and dismissive jokes which he encountered in Israel, and the open resistance of the United States, he succeeded in bringing his country into the supervisory and rehabilitation mechanisms to be created in Lebanon. Now, the French also want to get into the Syrian track. The Europeans also took advantage of the operation to justify their controversial dialogue with Iran, and to reject American pressure to stop to these discussions.

Ma'ariv (p.1) Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff In contrast to the past, the written agreement of understandings, that was reached after Operation "Grapes of Wrath", gives the communities of Israel and Lebanon including the security zone better protection from attack than had existed in the past. Despite this, the issue of continued fighting in the security zone, between the IDF, SLA and Hizbullah is still largely an open question. The potential for a new outbreak exists and both parties will claim the right to self-defense.

Leaving the Iranian element in Lebanon intact was a clear failure on the part of the Americans. No serious effort was made to force the government of Lebanon to demand a complete withdrawal of the Revolutionary Guard from the country. The guards are the Iranian military arm in Lebanon, which supports Hizbullah militarily and financially, and trains its members.

Also, no serious effort was made to convince Syria to stop passing Iranian munitions and arms to Hizbullah through Damascus airport. This is primarily an American failure, since Washington views Iran as a negative force which is attempting to torpedo the peace process, acquire nuclear weapons and threaten American interests. Israel also had a lack of success in convincing the Americans to be more insistent on the Iranian issue in Lebanon. The result is that the pact between Damascus and Teheran did not crack in the wake of this campaign.

The most prominent accomplishment of the agreement of understandings deals with civilian communities on both sides of the boarder. It was agree that launching Katyushas or firing of any weapon into Israeli territory is strictly forbidden. This is a sharper and clearer version and in writing than the understandings of July 1993. This prohibition also applies to Israel and the SLA they are forbidden from firing any weapon at civilians or at civilian sites in Lebanon.

The SLA is not specifically mentioned, but then neither is the name Hizbullah. Instead, the agreement talks about armed groups in Lebanon. There is an advantage to this version, since it is designed to prevent Hizbullah from hiding behind the names of other groups, and prevents shooting by similar organizations, such as Jibril's.

On the last day of negotiations, Israel tried to achieve commitments by Hizbullah not to carry out military activities, such as maintaining arms warehouses, headquarters, communications centers or observation points, in villages. It did not go over well. The Syrians agreed that attacks from villages and communities would not be carried out. The amended version is that communities and populated areas, as well as industrial areas and power stations, will not become a cover for offensive operations.

The assessment in the IDF is that fighting will resume in the areas outside the villages in southern Lebanon. No section of the agreement prohibits the use of car bombs and land mines, attacks on IDF and SLA patrols and shelling of outposts. Nevertheless, the agreements talk about the right of self-defense granted to both sides. It can be understood from this, that the IDF has the right to fire at the sources of shooting, but not at civilian settlements. Israel did not make do with this. In an accompanying letter, signed by Israel and the United States, there is a clarification of the freedom to take military action as demanded by Israel, in the event of attacks against its forces with roadside explosives or other offensive means.

In the event of a violation of the agreement, anywhere, Israel views itself as permitted according to the accompanying letter to act against Hizbullah, as an organization, anywhere in Lebanon. According to the Israeli interpretation, this also applies in the event of an attack against an Israeli target abroad.