NASRALLAH AND THE SEVENTY SUICIDE BOMBERS
Article by Naomi Levitsky "Yediot Ahronot" - 19 April 1996
(Shabbat supplement, pp. 10-12)
Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah Commander, Began His Career As A
Terrorist At The Age of 15 * His Training Began in the Shiite
Organization Amal, And Continued In Iraq And Iran * Today At Age
36, He Stands At The Head Of An Intense Organization, Well
Organized, With Political Committees, Supply Teams and Training
Bases * The Muscle Flexing He Demonstrated This Week On TV With His
Suicide Bomber Squad, Was Essentially An Exercise In Public
Relations * Israel For Him Is Just A Lever For Recruiting Support,
On The Way To Turning Lebanon Into A Fundamentalist State.
He appears nightly on the TV screen, armed with eyeglasses, a small beard
and an Islamic turban. He continues to launch threats in the direction of
Israel. Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hizbullah, employs against
us excactly the same methods we employ against him. If the IDF calls on
the residents of Southern Lebanon to evacuate their villages, he evacuates
the residents of Kiryat Shmona.
From the start of Operation Grapes of Wrath, hundreds of katyushas have
landed in the Galilee. In spite of the hardships, amid shellings and
bombings of the IDF, this militia has succeeded in turning the life of the
north of the country to hell. Fifty, sixty, and even seventy missiles a
day. Unbearable hell in the Galilee, unbearable hell in South Lebanon,
civilian populations groaning on both sides of the border. All the while,
Nasrallah, the 36-year-old boss of Hizbullah, with a high hand, plays
conductor over all of this.
Capable, smart, wily like a fox and frighteningly brutal, he is conducting
now, along with this war, a fear campaign no expert in psychological
warfare would be ashamed of. If he doesn't have a public relations expert,
it would seem he has native talents for the matter. This talent reached a
climax when he released to the media this week, the astonishing clip "Ali
Baba And The Seventy Suicide Bombers." That was the best show in town.
The Hizbullah doesn't have a military team of suicide bombers. What
appeared in the clip was one of the organization's commando units, in a
practical demonstration. The real group of suicide bombers in Hizbullah
numbers between 10 and 20 potential suicides. They exploit private-family
problems, mix into this blend a heaping portion of religious preaching,
and send some poor soul to paradise. Quite murderous, but Nasrallah
understands it doesn't photograph well, and Nasrallah wanted a picture.
He was born in August, 1960, in a refugee camp north of Beirut. As a
child, he moved with his family to the area of Tyre, to a village called
Bazoria. Already at a young age he revealed unusual interest in "Shiite
Public Activity" and when he was 15 joined the organization Amal. In those
days, Lebanon was being cut and savaged between opposing militias and
bitter poverty. Amal, then the Shiite militia, recruited young actvists
into its ranks.
A year later, possibly seeking asylum, Nasrallah travelled to Iraq, to the
Shiite center, Najaf. This period in Iraq fashioned, to a large extent,
his world view and path in life. There in the Shiite center he made
friends with some of his present colleagues, and also with Abas Musawi,
from whom he inherited the position as Secretary General.
Only after two years, in 1978, Iraq expelled the Lebanese students,
including Nasrallah's group, from Najaf. He returned to Lebanon and joined
a small extremist organization, El Rava "The Mission". Sheikh Fadlallah
then stood at the head of the organization. This was a group of young men,
militant students of religion, who tied themselves around a man of
religion, and created a sort of court around him.
Nasrallah stood out among the members of the Sheikh's court, he grew and
flourished, and very quickly showed military inclinations. There, for the
first time, he started recruiting young men for an army-like militia.
There also, for the first time, he marked Israel as a target. To the
extent it is known, Nasrallah himself was occupied in terror. At this
stage he did not bother to complete his studies. He decided that he was a
fighter and not a man of religion.
In 1982, as a reaction to the Lebanon War, the small Islamic militia
groups, among them El Rava, tied themselves together around extremist
religious sages, and set up the Hizbullah. Nasrallah was one of the
youngest founders. In those days, with fateful timing, the Iranians came
to Beirut, for all intents and purposes, to aid Syria against the Israeli
invasion in Lebanon.
The Iranians saw the fresh Hizbullah organization, smelled the potential
inherent there and went right to work. Financial assistance on one hand,
organizational assistance from the other. The ties between Hizbullah and
Iran got closer and closer. Nasrallah again stood out in the new
organization, in the military sphere, and started to rise in ranks of
command. In 1985 he was already responsible for the area of the Bikaa, a
short time after he was the senior man in charge of Beirut.
Hizbullah, as an organization, turned its gaze towards controlling the
concentrations of Shiites in Lebanon, traditionally the role of the Amal
movement. During the 1980s, battles erupted between the two organizations.
Nasrallah was one of the military commanders. He was injured lightly in a
batttle with Amal in South Lebanon.
The battles introduced politics into the picture. Iran supported
Hizbullah, Syria backed Amal. When the fighting was about to go out of
control, Syria and Iran forced the warring factions to accept political
agreements. The two agreements were concluded: Damascus 1 and Damascus 2.
Nasrallah was opposed to both.
As an act of protest, Nasrallah again left Lebanon. This time he went to
the Iranian city Qum, one of the three central Shiite cities, where the
religious sages sit. Here his political savvy revealed itself very well
indeed. As a senior member of a Shiite orgaization he understood very well
that in order to be a real leader, he also had to be a religious figure.
The decision-makers in extremist religious organizations are always
relgious figures. The others are just operations men.
Nasrallah returned to Qum, to the benches and the learning. His religious
studies, which are supposed to take years, he completed in a short time.
Western experts in Islamic religious teachings express doubt about the
deapth of his studies. He passed a sort of refresher course, they say.
Nasrallah is an extremist religious figure, but is not considered a man of
religion in the full sense of the word. He knows how to use religion as a
political lever. But for example, he does not establish rulings of Islamic
Law.
Nasrallah spent one year in Qum, and then, when the fighting between
Hizbullah and Amal started again, he returned to Lebanon. From this point,
his star rose, and he became a leader at the national level.
Dr. Martin Kramer, head of the Dayan Center, an expert on Hizbullah, says
that he has found in Nasrallah a very impressive ability to analyze
political situations. "It's very hard to pull him by the tongue." He says,
"I don't see in him the bombastic approach that Saddam Hussein has. He is
constantly interviewed and I never saw him slip. He is capable, knows how
to make very deep strategic analysis and he understands the Israeli
political set-up. He definitely follows what goes on here, knows to bore
into the weak spots."
Nasrallah worries very much about preserving his privacy and secrecy. They
say he is married and the father of a few daughters. When he moves from
place to place he travels in a large convoy, well guarded. Often they take
diversionary measures. It was no accident that he appeared late for the TV
broadcast this week, on the day the Israeli Air Force bombed a Hizbullah
target in Beirut.
He doesn't abstain from public appearances. On the contrary, he is
interested in being seen. He just does it with caution. Since the
assassination of his predecessor, Abbas Musawi, he is even more cautious.
He appears in processions, seen at events and demonstrations, always
surrounded by a tight ring of guerillas.
At the beginning of the '90s, Nasrallah was appointed to a senior position
on the organization's management council. From this point the road was
already paved for him. When the Secretary General's position opened he was
a natural candidate. The Secretary General of Hizbullah is chosen for the
job by a council of religious sages. Nasrallah has been chosen already
twice, once in 1993 and once in 1995. Against him stood Tupeili, older,
more conservative, extremely opposed to every speck of integration into
the Lebanese political framework. Compared to this Tupeili, Nasrallah is
considered a pragmatist.
In the four years he has presided as Secretary General of Hizbullah,
Nasrallah has undergone a transformation. From an extremist who wanted to
continue fighting against Amal, and vigorously opposed contact with Syria,
to one who understands that he has to cooperate with Syria, and in certain
circumstances even with Amal. Syria, of course, helped him understand.
When Syria entered Beirut, there was one bunker with Hizbullah men that
did not evacuate at the expected pace. The Syrians, without much
deliberation shot all twenty Hizbollah fighters. Afterwards, they loaded
the bodies on a vegetable truck and sent it to the Hizbullah headquarters
in Beirut. Message received.
Nasrallah willingly accepts subordination to Iran and recognizes, without
alternative, the dominance of Syria in Lebanon. He calls the Iranians "my
brother", regarding the Syrians he is dependent and suspicious. With Iran
he works like a real partner, with Syria he has a system of
understandings, but he and Iran understand that Syria is the central power
in Lebanon. Forty thousand Syrian soldiers, and also the Lebanese Army,
are subject to Syria's authority. Whoever wants to live knows that he
needs to consider the views of Damascus. Be that as it may, the morale in
Hizbullah went down a lot during the good times of negotiations with the
Syrians.
Nasrallah meets frequently with the Syrians. With Azhi Kenan, the Syrian
intelligence commander in Lebanon he has regular meetings. Vice President,
Hadam, is a regular partner. Recently, he had meetings with Basher Assad,
who seems to have received orders from his father to learn the Lebanese
situation. Meetings with Assad are extremely rare. When they meet, every
point of discussion is already prepared and agreed on in advance.
Relations with Iran stand on a completely different basis. The Hizbullah
does practically nothing without asking Teheran. In the left-hand corner
of the Hizbullah newspaper, appear the pictures of Ayatolla Khomeini and
Ali Khameini, present President of Iran. Nasrallah has frequent meetings
with Iranian leaders, but the most prominent contact is through the
Iranian Embassy in Beirut and through the Revolutionary Guards. In 1982
when the Revolutionary Guards came to Beirut, they came in their hundreds.
Today, it seems there are a few score. Their basic role - to offer
logistic aid to Hizbullah, supply training.
The Revolutionary Guards are essentially an Iranian military force, a
political/military foothold for Iran in Lebanon. Assad is far from being
happy with this, but correct until today, he is prepared to swallow it.
One doubts this arrangement will continue if a peace agreement is reached
with Israel.
As a pragmatic Secretary General, Nasrallah is leading the Hizbullah, with
Iranian encouragement, of course, towards integration in the Lebanese
political framework. This is still in its infancy, Hizbullah
representatives in Parliament are on the second or third tier, but
Nasrallah is already preparing the ground for the event of a peace
agreement between Syria and Israel. He has also pushed Amal aside from its
superior status in the Shiite struggle in Lebanon.
As a politician, Nasrallah has proven that he has very keen instincts.
After the death of Khomeini, he supported Khameini, opposing his friend
and patron Fadlallah. In return he later received, along with another
Hizbollah man, an appointment as Khameini's representative in Lebanon.
This is an important religious appointment, that bestows an extra value on
his leadership. Fadlallah's power, in contrast, has weakened.
"Nasrallah," says Dr. Kramer, "has a strategy for various ranges. For the
short term, survival of the movement. For the mid-range, removing Lebanon
from the peace circuit with Israel. For the long term, he wants to see
Syria weakened." The final objective, needles to say, is to turn Lebanon
into a religious Muslim state, in the style of Iran.
"In the current situation," says Kramer, "they are still far from being
ready for a real political process. Following operation Grapes of Wrath
they must not reach understandings with Hizbullah. The understandings must
be with the Lebanese Goverment and the Syrian Government. Because
Nasrallah will try to find every hole and crack in the new understandings
in order to light the fuse again, to upset any chance of a settlement.
"The great worry is that if they restrict Hizbullah to the Israeli
border, it will go outside and move into acts of terror such as the ones
in Buenos Aires. One must clarify to Iran, behind the scenes, that
international terror can boomerang on her. They also have embassies.
Nasrallah took over an orderly Hizbullah organization, but he has added
sophistication and turned it into a real establishment. The management of
the organization consists of twelve men on a decision-making council.
Under it, as in every orderly organization, there is an operations
council, a sort of action committee. Alongside, operates a political
office, a sort of Politbureau.
Subordinate to the operations council, is a set of groups that can be
compared to committees for specific matters. Welfare, health, and so on.
Nasrallah controls everything, including the operations council, which is
broken down into missions in the various regions. The senior appointments
in every mission are outstanding Nasrallah men.
This is a very well-founded orderly organization. It is very far from the
gang-like image that was affixed to it in the past. An organized militia
with complete control from the center. There is no independent activity on
mission. There are orderly supply routes, professional army units. Army
men undergo training in Iran and afterwards become instructors themselves.
Today, training is already taking place in Lebanon.
When Nasrallah spoke this week about the men who are firing katyushas into
the Galilee, he called them "Fire Assistance Units." This is not some
activist from the south who succeeds in firing a katyusha from a wagon.
Therre are supply units, there is manpower management, and there is
equipment and weaponry - mortars, launchers, and many many katyushas. They
estimate the military force of Hizbullah at a few thousand, among them a
few hundred quality fighters, something along the lines of elite units.
Nasrallah also doesn't suffer from financing problems. Iran invests
capital in exporting the revolution. It has special pools of funds for
this purpose, and the Hizbullah enjoys a particularly fat hunk of that. In
Beirut there is an Iranian bank and cash and funds also make their way in
suitcases through diplomatic mail.
In the last period Hizbullah also built its own mini-economic
infrastructure. It has a share in a chain of restaurants and investments
in factories. The rumors tell also that the organization is involved in
cultivating drugs in the Bekaa and in marketing them. They accuse them
also of counterfeiting dollars.
Poverty and lack of education are the basis for recruiting support for
Hizbullah. The struggle over the Israeli presence in South Lebanon is the
lever. Nasrallah well knows that the day will come when he will be
required to abandon the armed struggle against Israel, to change
direction. "We cannot now reveal what we will do," Nasrallah said a while
ago, "but it is clear that we will struggle against normalization with all
the means at our disposal."
This is the man, on one hand a dangerous terrorist with no inhibitions,
and on the other, a seasoned politician. Western Nasrallah experts believe
he will one day by a Minister in the Lebanese Goverment.