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OPERATION GRAPES OF WRATH - 14-Apr-96

14 Apr 1996
 
  OPERATION "GRAPES OF WRATH"

SELECTED ANALYSES FROM THE HEBREW PRESS

14 April 1996

PERES FOCUSING PRESSURE ON LEBANESE GOVERNMENT Commentary by Aluf Ben - "Ha'aretz", 14 April 1996 - p. 1

Prime Minister Shimon Peres is refraining from spelling out political objectives for operation "Grapes of Wrath," in order not to be tied to ambitious goals, which will drag Israel into a long-term confrontation in Lebanon. Peres aspires to achieve quiet on the northern border, for as long a period as possible, apart from which he has not determined the conditions for a ceasefire. No one in Israel has illusions that the operation will bring about the elimination of Hizbullah as a military organization.

Yesterday, Israeli spokesmen spoke of patience, and said that Jerusalem was waiting for a phone call: if Syria and Lebanon suggest creating new understandings, Israel would agree, but would demand a complete end to firing Katyushas at the Galilee, and clear responsibility for honoring the understandings in the future. The American government supports this demand, and has, for the meantime, given Peres a free hand.

The political leadership is talking about establishing "new rules of the game," according to Deputy Defense Minister Uri Orr. The new rules were determined by Peres' decision to send the air force to Beirut - a step not taken since 1982. By this, Israel sought to rehabilitate its aggressive image, which has been tarnished in recent years, and to demonstrate its ability to exact an unacceptable price from Lebanon for firing Katyushas at Kiryat Shmona. In "Operation Accountability," Israel refrained from carrying out attacks deep into Lebanon, and made do with shelling the southern villages. This time, the IDF set out on "Operation Accountability plus Beirut."

Peres chose to focus the pressure on the government of Lebanon, so that it would accept responsibility for fulfilling the understandings in the future, and so that it would seek guarantees from the "bosses" in Damascus, in order to do so. The combat helicopters were sent, after all, to the Hizbullah neighborhood in Beirut, and not to the presidential palace in Ba'abda, although continuing attacks will threaten the city's economic rehabilitation under the eyes of Prime Minister Rafik al-Harari and will chase away foreign investors. In Israel, there is hope that in Damascus as well, there will be concern over the threat to the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Syrians who work in Lebanon. The economic threat, together with the the pressure of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the south, is intended to convince Hariri to turn to Assad, and the Syrians to ask the Americans to become involved.

The United States has decided to back Israel, and has placed responsibility for the escalation on Hizbullah. The administration is not rushing to act; Ambassador Indyk makes do with updates from Foreign Minister Ehud Barak. The Americans are interested in knowing how long Israel will continue its attacks, but are not requesting that they stop. The government sees this as an achievement, compensation for Israel's patience in the weeks preceding the operation, and as the fruit of the political coordination with Washington.

Peres enjoys support for his decisions from within his government, after the skeptics among the ministers were convinced that there was no alternative to a military operation. Minister Yossi Sarid warned of complications, and asked to ensure that the operation would be focused and accurate, and not be protracted due to illusions of a decisive military victory, which is impossible.

Yesterday, the assessment in Israel was that another day or two would pass, before serious diplomatic efforts to end the operation would begin. The decision-making process in Damascus is drawn out, and Syria is wavering between between its desire for an open channel to Washington, and its desire to continue the alliance with Teheran and Hizbullah. In the meantime, the shelling and air attacks will continue.

* * *

CLOSURE BY SHELLING Analysis by Alex Fishman - "Yediot Ahronot", 14 April 1996 - pp. 1, 29.

The aerial chapter which began on Thursday constituted the first stage of the IDF operation in Lebanon. The Katyusha barrages which landed in the Galilee Friday morning, gave the opening signal for the second more prolonged chapter: "Grapes of Wrath." Were it not for the Katyushas, it is reasonable to assume that we would have been left with the first stage only.

The start of the second chapter on Friday morning was in question, due to the expected worsening in weather conditions, which reduced the air force's activity, mainly in the grey area the district of towns and villages to the north of the security zone.

Simultaneously, the artillery shelling plan was introduced into the same grey area. As of now, this is pre-emptive shelling intended to disturb and annoy, i.e. shelling directed at the village's outskirts, designed to prompt the residents of the area to evacuate, shelling whose goal is to obstruct and prevent Katyusha fire.

The pace of the shelling, which has been going on since Friday through the present, is defined as slow-paced, or according to one of the commanders on the ground "we have not even moved into second gear yet." The shells stacked next to the IDF cannon, indicate preparations for shelling which could continue even beyond the ten days that OC Northern Command Amiram Levine mentioned.

According to the "Grapes of Wrath" file, the first part of the second chapter is concentrating on the expulsion of the residents of 41 villages in southern Lebanon northwards. On Friday afternoon, the army sought and received approval to add six more villages to the list. It will be recalled that "Operation Accountability" also began with the expulsion of the residents of 47 villages, a number which later grew to 70 villages.

But in contrast to "Operation Accountability," this time the IDF did not require the two-day's worth of disturbing shelling to start the northward movement of refugees. Even now, the routes toward Beirut are clogged with a flood of refugees, which is supposed to be one of the heavy pressures exerted on the Beirut government to begin to act to rein in Hizbullah.

The second lever which has been applied since the weekend on the Beirut government, is the naval blockade of the south Lebanese coast up to Beirut. The significance of the blockade is mainly economic pressure.

The air force helicopter attack on Friday on a Hizbullah target in the Hai A-Salloum neighborhood in Beirut, which was carried out despite the difficult weather conditions, shows that the file of aerial targets in Lebanon is still full to overflowing, and waiting for clearer skies. Today, the forecasters promise that the skies will clear, something that can ensure aerial activity which will contribute its special weight to the pressure being put on the Beirut government.

Since the expiration of the deadline set by the IDF for the residents of the grey area to abandon their communities, last Friday afternoon, a "closure-by-shelling" has, in practice, been imposed on the area north of the red line, from the air and from the ground. Attack helicopters are firing towards suspicious vehicles moving on the roads, and at certain houses inside the villages. Last Friday evening, the air force Commander reported that up until then, the helicopters had destroyed 13 structures in various villages. At the same time, the artillery fire closed the traffic routes and suspicious sites both inside and outside the villages.

At the moment, this closure-by-shelling is marked by Hizbullah's launching Katyushas in response. On Friday, Hizbullah succeeded in launching only 27 Katyushas. On Saturday, only in the evening hours, was an additional barrage launched. In comparison, during "Operation Accountability," Hizbullah launched 273 Katyushas, most of them in the first days of the operation.

Even the nature of the firing over the last two days indicates the difficulty that the closure-by-shelling has created. We are not seeing as in the past barrages of eight-to-ten missiles in one go, but much smaller barrages. Occasionally, there is a cluster of Katyushas or even a single Katyusha. The firing is lessening in its accuracy, and all signs point to this being hasty firing. A vehicle with launchers travels on a road, stops, fires, and takes off. Those doing the firing cannot reach the launch sites that they have demarcated for themselves in advance in order to ensure a hit. There is an additional phenomenon: hasty firing from inside a village and concealment in structures there.

Hizbullah members are also firing anti-aircraft fire including "Strella" missiles at the IDF attack helicopters. At the same time, reports are coming in of minimal reinforcements several dozen isolated Hizbullah members reaching the south. IDF positions are also prepared for the possibility of Hizbullah attempts to carry out desperate attacks against the positions.

At the same time, it is still early to talk about signs of our opponent falling apart. The dominos are starting to fall, but the important ones - the governments of Lebanon and Damascus - are still standing. Syria, one of whose soldiers was killed and others wounded two days ago in an air attack in the Beirut area, is maintaining a poker face. There are no signs of anti-aircraft activity from the direction of Syria, or signs of movement by the Syrian division stationed in Lebanon.

Apparently, the Syrians are digging into a waiting position, letting Israel have free reign, taking care not to give it an excuse to widen its activities, and are relying on the international pressure that will inevitably be focused on Israel soon. In the meantime, they have clean hands, as it were, outside of the matter.

The second chapter, "Grapes of Wrath," has only taken its first steps. Now, it is a test of patience and resolve in the face of the sphinx Assad. A great deal of psychological warfare on both sides will characterize the current phase, at whose center are many photographs of the suffering of refugees, destroyed houses, and stories about attacks on ambulances and hospitals. This, in addition to threats promising unusual attacks, and not only within the borders of Israel.

The possibility of fundamentalist suicide bombers coming from the territories, alone justifies the continuation of the strict closure on the West Bank and Gaza. The foreign suicide bomber, who was killed two days ago in a "work accident," in a hotel in eastern Jerusalem may be the first indication of this sort.

* * *

SIGNS OF STRESS IN HIZBULLAH Analysis by Ze'ev Schiff, "Ha'aretz", 14 April 1996 - pp. 1-2.

Operation "Grapes of Wrath" will continue despite the wintry weather, and the IDF intends with the approval of the political leadership to continue its attack on Hizbullah targets in all areas of Lebanon, at every available opportunity. Even the selective blockade of Lebanese ports, including the port of Beirut, will continue.

By design since it is not likely that economic activity in the Galilee will be frozen due to the Katyusha fire, while in Beirut intensive, uninterrupted activity continues an increase can be expected in certain actions which are likely to harm economic activity in Lebanon.

The wintry weather in the Galilee and Lebanon was a delaying-factor in IAF operations over the past two days. Were it not for this, the IDF would have certainly expanded its attacks. Today, an improvement in the weather is expected. More intensive fire can also be expected.

The Katyusha barrages fired by Hizbullah yesterday included the launching of almost 40 rockets. There is no doubt that the organization has a huge stockpile of Katyusha rockets which its members have long since hidden in many places. It is capable of continuing to exchange fire for a relatively long time, unless many launchers and people are hit.

One of the signs of Hizbullah's distress is its announcements regarding false Katyusha attacks toward the Galilee. The same thing occurred at the end of Operation Accountability. In general, Hizbullah is meticulous regarding relatively exact announcements. It avoids giving full details, including the number of its losses, only when it is being hit.

In many ways, Operation Grapes of Wrath is a repeat of Operation Accountability from July 1993. This time as well, Israel is exerting indirect pressure through the population, primarily in southern Lebanon. Operation Accountability was concluded with understandings, only after hundreds of thousands of refugees streamed to Beirut and after the Lebanese government screamed for Syrian aid. A similar process has begun this time as well the number of refugees is already estimated at close to 200,000, but the Lebanese government is attempting to direct most of them to other cities, and not to the economically thriving capital. Another type of pressure has been imposed via the naval blockade, but this is aimed more against the wealthy and the upper classes. This is a slower form of pressure.

It is already clear that the Syrians and the Lebanese government are ready to resume negotiations, but it is not yet clear how the Iranians will act. They have recently poured a great deal of money into Hizbullah and have demanded as they have from the Palestinian terrorist organizations proof of operations against Israel as a condition for receiving aid.

The headquarters of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Lebanon has been more active than usual recently. A new commander with the rank of general has been appointed as head of the Lebanese Beka Valley headquarters and is also working from the Iranian embassy in Beirut. News agencies have reported that the Iranians have also adopted a cautious approach, apparently from concern over attacks by Israel. According to one of the reports, most of the embassy employees left over the weekend.

 
 
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