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OPERATION GRAPES OF WRATH - SELECTED ANALYSES FROM THE HEBREW PRESS - 21-Apr-96

21 Apr 1996
 
  OPERATION "GRAPES OF WRATH" - SELECTED ANALYSES FROM THE HEBREW PRESS

21 April 1996

HA'ARETZ, (pp. 1-2) Commentary by Aluf Ben Yesterday, the United States began the senior-level shuttle diplomacy between Damascus and Jerusalem, that Israel has expected since the outset of Operation "Grapes of Wrath." At the beginning of the negotiations, the Americans made it clear that their goal was complete quiet in Lebanon, and that any settlement which would achieve less than this would be doomed to crack and collapse just as happened to the Operation "Accountability" understandings. The administration reached the conclusion that the continuation of the fighting in the security zone is liable to lead to an escalation, which would again shatter the understandings.

The Americans are demanding that Hafez al-Assad rein in Hizbullah, by means of a quiet agreement which would enable it to maintain its honor and continue with its rhetoric, which supports resistance to the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon. It is possible that the ceasefire would continue for some time, without explicit understandings.

It is being demanded of Israel that it give up the IDF's freedom of action, and agree that Operation "Grapes of Wrath" be the last retaliatory operation. The balance between the sides would be enforced by means of a supervisory mechanism headed by the United States. The calm which would be achieved would enable the Americans to resume the talks between Syria and Israel, and bring in Lebanon.

Peres has been left with no bargaining chips after the killing that the IDF caused in Kana. Indeed, Peres refrained from defining political goals for the operation at its outset, and told the Cabinet that it was his desire to obtain quiet and stop the Katyusha fire. But his government colleagues led by Foreign Minister Ehud Barak promised that the operation would lead to "new rules of the game in Lebanon" and expanded freedom of action for the IDF. There is nothing left of these promises, and Peres is now pinning his hopes on the Americans: that the latter will succeed in pressuring Assad and presenting him with the choice of either peace or terrorism. In order to goad them, Peres over the weekend sharpened his statements regarding Syria, and revealed its involvement in supplying Katyushas to Hizbullah at the peak of the operation.

At the beginning of their shuttle diplomacy, the Americans assessed that Assad would be a hard nut to crack: Syria was not the aggressor, and would not be enthusiastic about throwing away the strong card of spilling Israeli blood in Lebanon. Over the weekend, Assad celebrated his political victory, and turned Damascus into a center of political activity. All those who participated in the Sharm a-Sheikh conference which demonstrated Syria's isolation have turned to him, as the one who holds the key to a settlement.

Over the weekend, it became clearer how much political damage the operation has inflicted on Israel:

Kana has become a milestone in the Arab-Israeli conflict, alongside Deir Yassin, Kafr Kassem, and Sabra and Shatila.

The international siege that Israel had sought to place on Iran, has been broken. The French and Italian foreign ministers went to meet with their Iranian counterpart who was portrayed as a peacemaker [only] a few weeks after the European Union decided to pressure Iran to stop supporting terrorism, in the wake of the suicide attacks in Israel.

Russia and France which, in recent months, had demanded greater involvement in the peace process as supporters of the Arabs, as a counter-weight to the American support for Israel, and until the operation, had been pushed back by the Americans have now determined as a fact their presence in the diplomatic contacts. This is likely to lead to the implementation of their initiative for a "Madrid II Conference," which Israel has opposed.

The United States will show less warmth for Peres, during his visit to Washington next week. In Israel, it was believed that the administration would moderate the joint statement that Clinton and Peres will issue. The first indication of this was given last Friday, when the American draft of the agreement for the war on terrorism reached Jerusalem; it contained language that was less binding than what Israel had proposed.

MA'ARIV, (p. 2) Commentary by Chemi Shalev Operation "Grapes of Wrath" gave Syrian President Hafez Assad one of the happiest days of his life. Five foreign ministers arrived in Damascus, to turn to him for help. The international community is waiting with great anticipation on what he has to say. His word is what will determine whether the firing in Lebanon will stop or whether the battles will continue. From a political standpoint, this is a shining comeback, from the lonely days of the Sharm a-Sheikh, conference to a world-wide season of courting, in the wake of the tragedy in Kafr Kana.

Assad needs to decide between three basic packages for resolving the situation. The first package includes an immediate ceasefire, without new understandings, which would create a "balance of fear" in Lebanon; any firing by Hizbullah at the northern communities would be answered by counter-bombings by the IDF across the length and breadth of Lebanon.

The second package includes a continuation of the fighting until new understandings are formulated, which would be achieved in the framework of an American shuttle mission.

The third and most ambitious package, combines a ceasefire and new understandings with what is now being called an "interim arrangement" in Lebanon, in the framework of which the Syrians would authorize the Lebanese army to move south and take control over Hizbullah, and at the same time Israel would announce its readiness, in principle, to withdraw from the security zone, simultaneously with the Lebanese assumption of control over the area and the disarming of Hizbullah.

The first package an unconditional ceasefire could bring an end to Operation "Grapes of Wrath" within hours, but this is not Assad's approach. The third package an "interim arrangement" would take from the Syrian president the most important card in the overall bargaining over an Israeli-Syrian settlement and a withdrawal from the Golan Heights.

The assessment in Jerusalem last night, therefore, was that Assad would go with the second package, and demand new understandings which would prevent "Israeli attacks" on Lebanese civilians. According to this scenario, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher will spend the coming days traveling between Damascus and Jerusalem, while at the same time trying to neutralize the damaging influence of Russia, France and the European Union, which are proposing to Assad and Lebanon solutions which are indeed easier, but which have no chance of being accepted by Israel.

Assad's decisions will also influence the election campaign in Israel. The longer Operation "Grapes of Wrath" lasts, the more Assad will strengthen Prime Minister Shimon Peres' standing among the Jewish public, which seeks a strong stand, despite the tragedy at Kafr Kana.

At the same time, lengthening the operation would deepen the rift between Peres and his party and the Arab public, which has until now served as a rock of support in the Labor Party's electoral strategy. After all the talk about Iran's and Hamas' desire to influence Israeli domestic politics, it has again become clear that the key actor in both policy and politics is the veteran fox of Damascus.

HA'ARETZ (pp. 1-2) Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff It has been ten days since the start of Operation "Grapes of Wrath," and with Hizbullah firing more than 500 Katyusha missiles at the Galilee and the security zone, it is clear that neither the IAF nor the IDF's artillery has succeeded in stopping the Katyusha fire. Although inaccurate, dozens of them continue to fall daily, paralyzing life in the Galilee. Clearly, the current approach is not enough to stop the Katyusha shelling.

From an analysis of the firing, it is also clear that Hizbullah has, for quite some time, been preparing warehouses full of Katyushas and that the supply of missiles has not slowed down even during the operation. It is possible to assume with certainty that in the past few days, Hizbullah has been reinforced with additional Katyushas. It appears therefore, that the IDF has not succeeded in damaging or locating these warehouses or damaging their supply routes. In general, the Katyushas arrive from Syria and deliveries from Iran are made only with Syrian permission.

Since the start of the campaign, dozens of Katyusha rockets have been fired at the Galilee and the security zone. Slightly more than 10% have fallen on the security zone. On the fourth day of the operation, 81 Katyushas were fired. The day in which the fewest number were fired 34

was the day on which the Lebanese citizens were injured near Kafr Kana.

The IDF, and the IAF in particular, have made a considerable effort to damage the launchers and those operating them. Helicopters and airplanes carrying precision-guided munitions have been employed to accomplish this important objective. Sophisticated observation equipment was employed and gunners used state-of-the-art artillery radar to locate the sources of the firing. Additionally, a significant amount of artillery was employed, including 175-mm. guns with a range of about 32 kms.

What has been accomplished so far is that Katyushas are being fired from the edge of their range. The range of a Katyusha with a 122-mm. diameter is 20.6 kms. However, they [the IDF] have not succeeded in pushing them back a few more kilometers.

There was an even greater, though insufficient, success in the western sector opposite Nahariya, but even that did not suffice, and Katyushas continue to fall in the region from time to time. The accuracy of the Katyushas has indeed declined, but even these dozens of missiles suffice to paralyze a considerable portion of life as usual in the stricken areas. In circumstances such as this, it is impossible to send children to school or operate factories and work freely in the fields. From an operational standpoint, the determining fact is that Katyushas continue to fall in the Galilee.

When Scuds were fired at on Israel during the Gulf War, there was criticism among Israelis that the Americans should have known that an air operation was not enough and that commando forces should have also been employed in western Iraq to attack the launchers. The IDF knew for some time that attacking the Katyushas from the air was more difficult because the target is smaller than a Scud launcher. The conclusion is that with the method which the IDF has employed up until now in this operation, it is extremely difficult to eliminate the threat of Katyushas.

 
 
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