OPERATION "GRAPES OF WRATH" - SELECTED ANALYSES FROM THE HEBREW PRESS
21 April 1996
HA'ARETZ, (pp. 1-2) Commentary by Aluf Ben Yesterday, the United
States began the senior-level shuttle diplomacy between Damascus and
Jerusalem, that Israel has expected since the outset of Operation "Grapes
of Wrath." At the beginning of the negotiations, the Americans made it
clear that their goal was complete quiet in Lebanon, and that any
settlement which would achieve less than this would be doomed to crack and
collapse just as happened to the Operation "Accountability"
understandings. The administration reached the conclusion that the
continuation of the fighting in the security zone is liable to lead to an
escalation, which would again shatter the understandings.
The Americans are demanding that Hafez al-Assad rein in Hizbullah, by
means of a quiet agreement which would enable it to maintain its honor and
continue with its rhetoric, which supports resistance to the Israeli
occupation in southern Lebanon. It is possible that the ceasefire would
continue for some time, without explicit understandings.
It is being demanded of Israel that it give up the IDF's freedom of
action, and agree that Operation "Grapes of Wrath" be the last retaliatory
operation. The balance between the sides would be enforced by means of a
supervisory mechanism headed by the United States. The calm which would be
achieved would enable the Americans to resume the talks between Syria and
Israel, and bring in Lebanon.
Peres has been left with no bargaining chips after the killing that the
IDF caused in Kana. Indeed, Peres refrained from defining political goals
for the operation at its outset, and told the Cabinet that it was his
desire to obtain quiet and stop the Katyusha fire. But his government
colleagues led by Foreign Minister Ehud Barak promised that the
operation would lead to "new rules of the game in Lebanon" and expanded
freedom of action for the IDF. There is nothing left of these promises,
and Peres is now pinning his hopes on the Americans: that the latter will
succeed in pressuring Assad and presenting him with the choice of either
peace or terrorism. In order to goad them, Peres over the weekend
sharpened his statements regarding Syria, and revealed its involvement in
supplying Katyushas to Hizbullah at the peak of the operation.
At the beginning of their shuttle diplomacy, the Americans assessed that
Assad would be a hard nut to crack: Syria was not the aggressor, and would
not be enthusiastic about throwing away the strong card of spilling
Israeli blood in Lebanon. Over the weekend, Assad celebrated his political
victory, and turned Damascus into a center of political activity. All
those who participated in the Sharm a-Sheikh conference which
demonstrated Syria's isolation have turned to him, as the one who holds
the key to a settlement.
Over the weekend, it became clearer how much political damage the
operation has inflicted on Israel:
Kana has become a milestone in the Arab-Israeli conflict, alongside
Deir Yassin, Kafr Kassem, and Sabra and Shatila.
The international siege that Israel had sought to place on Iran, has
been broken. The French and Italian foreign ministers went to meet with
their Iranian counterpart who was portrayed as a peacemaker [only] a
few weeks after the European Union decided to pressure Iran to stop
supporting terrorism, in the wake of the suicide attacks in Israel.
Russia and France which, in recent months, had demanded greater
involvement in the peace process as supporters of the Arabs, as a
counter-weight to the American support for Israel, and until the
operation, had been pushed back by the Americans have now determined as
a fact their presence in the diplomatic contacts. This is likely to lead
to the implementation of their initiative for a "Madrid II Conference,"
which Israel has opposed.
The United States will show less warmth for Peres, during his visit to
Washington next week. In Israel, it was believed that the administration
would moderate the joint statement that Clinton and Peres will issue. The
first indication of this was given last Friday, when the American draft of
the agreement for the war on terrorism reached Jerusalem; it contained
language that was less binding than what Israel had proposed.
MA'ARIV, (p. 2) Commentary by Chemi Shalev Operation "Grapes of
Wrath" gave Syrian President Hafez Assad one of the happiest days of his
life. Five foreign ministers arrived in Damascus, to turn to him for help.
The international community is waiting with great anticipation on what he
has to say. His word is what will determine whether the firing in Lebanon
will stop or whether the battles will continue. From a political
standpoint, this is a shining comeback, from the lonely days of the Sharm
a-Sheikh, conference to a world-wide season of courting, in the wake of
the tragedy in Kafr Kana.
Assad needs to decide between three basic packages for resolving the
situation. The first package includes an immediate ceasefire, without new
understandings, which would create a "balance of fear" in Lebanon; any
firing by Hizbullah at the northern communities would be answered by
counter-bombings by the IDF across the length and breadth of Lebanon.
The second package includes a continuation of the fighting until new
understandings are formulated, which would be achieved in the framework of
an American shuttle mission.
The third and most ambitious package, combines a ceasefire and new
understandings with what is now being called an "interim arrangement" in
Lebanon, in the framework of which the Syrians would authorize the
Lebanese army to move south and take control over Hizbullah, and at the
same time Israel would announce its readiness, in principle, to withdraw
from the security zone, simultaneously with the Lebanese assumption of
control over the area and the disarming of Hizbullah.
The first package an unconditional ceasefire could bring an end to
Operation "Grapes of Wrath" within hours, but this is not Assad's
approach. The third package an "interim arrangement" would take from
the Syrian president the most important card in the overall bargaining
over an Israeli-Syrian settlement and a withdrawal from the Golan Heights.
The assessment in Jerusalem last night, therefore, was that Assad would go
with the second package, and demand new understandings which would prevent
"Israeli attacks" on Lebanese civilians. According to this scenario, U.S.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher will spend the coming days traveling
between Damascus and Jerusalem, while at the same time trying to
neutralize the damaging influence of Russia, France and the European
Union, which are proposing to Assad and Lebanon solutions which are indeed
easier, but which have no chance of being accepted by Israel.
Assad's decisions will also influence the election campaign in Israel. The
longer Operation "Grapes of Wrath" lasts, the more Assad will strengthen
Prime Minister Shimon Peres' standing among the Jewish public, which seeks
a strong stand, despite the tragedy at Kafr Kana.
At the same time, lengthening the operation would deepen the rift between
Peres and his party and the Arab public, which has until now served
as a rock of support in the Labor Party's electoral strategy. After all
the talk about Iran's and Hamas' desire to influence Israeli domestic
politics, it has again become clear that the key actor in both policy
and politics is the veteran fox of Damascus.
HA'ARETZ (pp. 1-2) Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff It has been ten days
since the start of Operation "Grapes of Wrath," and with Hizbullah firing
more than 500 Katyusha missiles at the Galilee and the security zone, it
is clear that neither the IAF nor the IDF's artillery has succeeded in
stopping the Katyusha fire. Although inaccurate, dozens of them continue
to fall daily, paralyzing life in the Galilee. Clearly, the current
approach is not enough to stop the Katyusha shelling.
From an analysis of the firing, it is also clear that Hizbullah has, for
quite some time, been preparing warehouses full of Katyushas and that the
supply of missiles has not slowed down even during the operation. It is
possible to assume with certainty that in the past few days, Hizbullah has
been reinforced with additional Katyushas. It appears therefore, that the
IDF has not succeeded in damaging or locating these warehouses or damaging
their supply routes. In general, the Katyushas arrive from Syria and
deliveries from Iran are made only with Syrian permission.
Since the start of the campaign, dozens of Katyusha rockets have been
fired at the Galilee and the security zone. Slightly more than 10% have
fallen on the security zone. On the fourth day of the operation, 81
Katyushas were fired. The day in which the fewest number were fired 34
was the day on which the Lebanese citizens were injured near Kafr Kana.
The IDF, and the IAF in particular, have made a considerable effort to
damage the launchers and those operating them. Helicopters and airplanes
carrying precision-guided munitions have been employed to accomplish this
important objective. Sophisticated observation equipment was employed and
gunners used state-of-the-art artillery radar to locate the sources of the
firing. Additionally, a significant amount of artillery was employed,
including 175-mm. guns with a range of about 32 kms.
What has been accomplished so far is that Katyushas are being fired from
the edge of their range. The range of a Katyusha with a 122-mm. diameter
is 20.6 kms. However, they [the IDF] have not succeeded in pushing them
back a few more kilometers.
There was an even greater, though insufficient, success in the western
sector opposite Nahariya, but even that did not suffice, and Katyushas
continue to fall in the region from time to time. The accuracy of the
Katyushas has indeed declined, but even these dozens of missiles suffice
to paralyze a considerable portion of life as usual in the stricken areas.
In circumstances such as this, it is impossible to send children to school
or operate factories and work freely in the fields. From an operational
standpoint, the determining fact is that Katyushas continue to fall in the
Galilee.
When Scuds were fired at on Israel during the Gulf War, there was
criticism among Israelis that the Americans should have known that an air
operation was not enough and that commando forces should have also been
employed in western Iraq to attack the launchers. The IDF knew for some
time that attacking the Katyushas from the air was more difficult because
the target is smaller than a Scud launcher. The conclusion is that with
the method which the IDF has employed up until now in this operation, it
is extremely difficult to eliminate the threat of Katyushas.