WHO WILL SUBDUE THE KATYUSHA - 30-Apr-96

(Article by Ami Ettinger, "Ma'ariv", April 30, 1996, pp.6-7)

In science fiction movies, one can create an invisible energy force-field as a defense against enemy missiles. Reality is far more difficult and complicated. In the Middle East, which is becoming congested with all types and sizes of missiles from short-range Katyushas and middle-range Scuds to long-ranger Nudongs the problem facing Israel is more tangible. The Persian Gulf war proved the need for a defense against ballistic missiles. "Operation Grapes of Wrath" proved the need to find a response to primitive Katyushas.

The military understandings, set out in agreements signed by Prime Minister Shimon Peres and US Secretary of Defense William Perry in the United States two days ago, try to offer a response if only partial to these problems.

As for a strategic defense capable of defending Israeli air-space against long-range ballistic missiles, the solution is to continue developing the Arrow missile and its radar systems, a project to which President Clinton has allocated another $200 million. Further, it was decided to create a joint American-Israeli working group in order to deal with theater-wide defense by integrating anti-missile missiles such as the Israeli Arrow, and the American-made THAAD and Patriot-3. The aim is to combine these missiles in a more comprehensive system involving orbiting warning systems, that is, satellites, and ground-based ones such as the radar component of Israel's "Homa" program.

The Arrow's objective is to offer a battery-level defensive response, capable of independently acquiring targets, and controling the intercept and firing functions together with advanced warning systems that can identify enemy missiles within minutes, even before the inbound vehicles reach Israel, as well as calculate launch points and determine the striking coordinates of the Arrow missiles launched to intercept them.

Elta has developed the giant, sophisticated weapons control radar system mounted on a truck, which is capable of both detecting the launch of enemy missiles before they land in Israel, and making the required calculations to order an Arrow counter-launch. The radar is positioned in the test field at the IAF's Palmachim base, but did not participate in the first experimental launch of the Arrow-2. So far, $158 million has been invested in the first phase of the Arrow program; $330 million are budgeted for its current stage, and now Clinton has provided an additional $200 million.

As for the short-range, it was agreed that development of the "Nautilus" the laser system designed to intercept Katyushas will continue, at a cost of $160 million. The system has already been tested twice, experimentally, in the United States. The principle is that, once the target has been located, a focussed laser beam is directed at the approaching Katyusha, destroying it. The problem is that the beam eventually disperses, over the long-range, losing its focus and diminishing its strength. In order to transmit a long-range laser pulse, one needs an energy source of awesome power requiring the construction of huge facilities able to produce energy strong enough to launch deadly laser beams toward in-flight missiles.

This sort of installation has not been established, and a mobile battery of deadly lasers is still the stuff of science fiction. The US Secretary of Defense estimates that it will be possible to deploy a single experimental "Nautilus" system in Israel by 1997; still, even after this, an operational model will be a long way off.

As an interim solution, it was decided to attempt the creation of a "defense ring" against Katyushas around Kiryat Shmona employing "Phalanx" guns, which are in service in both the US and Israeli navies, and are designed to intercept very short-range sea-to-sea missiles. The heart of the system is a radar-directed "gatling" gun with six 20 mm barrels. When a sea-to-sea missile approaches a ship, at a height of only a few meters, and generally at sub-sonic speed, the radar locks onto the missile and immediately activates the cannon that fires a "lead screen" of shells made from depleted uranium, which hit the missile and explode it.

In other words, the "Phalanx" is built for a defined mission, for which it is considered effective. But the interception of Katyusha missiles, on a high speed ballistic course, is another matter entirely. The American teams coming to Israel are supposed to investigate the possibility of adapting the "Phalanx" for this new mission. Experts believe that, until this happens (if it does), the positioning of a "Phalanx" ring around Kiryat Shmona will be of exclusively psychological value.

The IDF's anti-aircraft crews use a slightly similar gun called the "Vulcan," built around the same cannon as the Phalanx, but with a very limited radar capability. The "Vulcan" is intended to counter low-flying aircraft, but is actually used against ground-based targets as well; even during the Lebanon war, there were pictures of the "Vulcan" firing directly at buildings containing terrorist positions. The "Vulcan" can, for instance, hit motorized gliders; it is incapable of intercepting Katyushas.

If naval solutions are already being suggested in the war against Katyushas, another possibility may be examined the adaptation of the "Barak" missile (an anti-missile missile employed on Navy ships) to also intercept Katyushas. Again, like the "Phalanx," this would be an attempt to alter a system that exists for one purpose, toenable it to perform another function. In fact, a ground-based version of the "Barak," called the "Adams," was once used against aircraft, but can it intercept Katyushas? The answer to this question is difficult to know.

And there is always the traditional way to counter Katyushas gathering real time information and striking at the launchers with artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters.

Israel is considered a world leader in the development of pilotless drones, having gained much operational experience in the skies of Lebanon. Today, the development of more effective drones, such as the "Sheddon"

(manufactured by BTA Automatic Piloting Systems) and the unmanned vehicle now in its first stages of development at IAI. These drones are designed to be used by units ranging in size from small field units to batallions, but they are not appropriate for use by higher levels where "Hunters," employed by the IDF during "Operation Grapes of Wrath," are currently used.

A new generation of smaller and more silent drones, operated by teams of three (not 15, as is the "Hunter"), is much more capable of showing soldiers and installations hidden in concealed areas such as gorges and of directly reporting, in real time, to lower operational levels, in the field itself. These qualities will greatly enhance the ability to provide a rapid response, possibly even enabling the destruction of Katyushas even before they are launched.