WITHDRAW OR ATTACK -- WHAT TO DO IN LEBANON - 10-Feb-97

WITHDRAW OR ATTACK -- WHAT TO DO IN LEBANON?

(Analysis by Yossi Levi and Daniel Dor, "Ma'ariv", Feb 10, 1997, pp. 4-5)

THE HELICOPTER DISASTER AND RECENT INCIDENTS IN THE SECURITY ZONE HAVE PRESENTED THE ISSUE OF IDF ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON IN ALL ITS HARSHNESS. WHAT POSSIBILITIES STAND BEFORE ISRAEL TODAY, WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EACH?

POSSIBILITY #1: WHAT WAS, WILL BE

The situation on the northern border is unparalleled in its complexity, but two basic facts predominate, like landmarks in the field: On the one hand, no one in either the political or military networks believes that the current situation is optimal; All agree, theoretically, that things cannot continue this way and that something must change. But on the other hand and perhaps because the issue is so complex and fraught with controversy there is more than a little chance that the reality in the security zone will remain more or less the same: IDF squads will remain spread out in the security zone and will continue to conduct routine operations in the field, and to the best of their ability will foil the attempts by Hizbullah units to attack northern communities and will continue much to our sorrow to pay a heavy, continuous price in human life.

It is not hard to understand why the overall agreement that the situation cannot continue as is, has become entrenched: Minister Avigdor Kahalani said last week that IDF troops in Lebanon are like sitting ducks. He suffered a torrent of criticism, but his statement reflected the harsh public feeling that the IDF is not engaged in an offensive and creative war against Hizbullah but rather in an attempt to dodge roadside bombs and ambushes and not always successfully.

The way to change this harsh reality will not be easy: In complicated circumstances, there is always the inclination to preserve the existing situation (thus making it possible to refrain from tough decisions); It is difficult to change a work routine that has developed over the years; It is very hard to reach an overall agreement on the preferred alternative; and there is also the conception, which says as always that holding on to the line in the security zone is the only way to guarantee the security of the northern communities.

POSSIBILITY #2: GOODBYE, AND WE WON'T BE SEEING YOU - UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL

This proposal is based on several assumptions: Lebanon is trouble and we have nothing to look for there; there cost in human life and financial terms to our presence there and the operational power of the IDF is eroded; and the effectiveness of holding onto the line is insubstantial because Hizbullah terrorists are capable of also launching katyusha rockets from a distance beyond the reach of the IDF. Aside from this, chances of reaching an arrangement with Hizbullah are weak, and agreements with the Lebanese government are meaningless. Therefore, Israel must leave the security zone soon and unilaterally, without attempting to reach agreements, return to the international borders and protect the north from there.

On paper, this suggestion may have several advantages: IDF soldiers will no longer be targets for attack; the IDF will determine when and how the withdrawal will take place; the IDF will not be bound by agreements with the other side and will conduct war against Hizbullah as it wants to; the withdrawal is likely to save lives, money and the deterioration of the IDF's power; Israel may profit in the international arena.

In reality, no one is willing to seriously entertain this alternative: members of the military and politicians across the board have clarified that, in their opinion, unilateral withdrawal is more laden with dangers than opportunities: The war will resume along line of the northern communities (the Hizbullah secretary general stated as much); the enemy will interpret the withdrawal as capitulation to terror; and withdrawal will make the lives of the SLA worthless.

POSSIBILITY #3: CHANGE IN DEPLOYMENT

This is an alternative which appears to have a practical chance: The IDF will remain deployed in the security zone, in more or less the same pattern, but will change the nature of its activity in the field.

Until now, IDF operations in the security zone have been a combination of defensive and offensive measures. Much effort has been invested in protecting the forces, while offensive operations have also been conducted, such as raids and ambushes. The defense establishment has recently suggested reorganizing the forces in Lebanon such as the denser deployment of outposts, at a line closer to the international border.

A senior security source recently said that the IDF must maintain fewer forces in fewer outposts, and send mobile forces deep into the area for a number of hours to carry out initiated offensive operations.

POSSIBILITY #4: THE SYRIANS SHOULD PAY A PRICE

MK Ephraim Sneh, a Brigadier General in the reserves, periodically reiterates this position: the Syrians are behind the Hizbullah operations and the time has come for Israel to react to the Hizbullah attacks by striking at those who send them. This does not imply a direct strike at the Syrian army, but rather an intentional and selective attack on Syrian economic interests in Lebanon. The Syrians have, until now, succeeded in getting away with this, and the time has come to make their lives a little more difficult.

The chances of success depend upon, among other things, whether the Syrians can truly stop Hizbullah activity, and upon the more difficult question will hurting Syrian economic interests in Lebanon turn Shi'ite terror into something not worthwhile for Damascus.

The danger in this plan, on the other hand, is remarkably clear: sliding into an overall confrontation with the Syrians.

POSSIBILITY #5: LEBANON FIRST: LEAVING IN AN ORGANIZED FASHION

This is the plan: Israel achieves an arrangement of one sort or another with the deciding factors in Lebanon perhaps with the help of outside intervention passing control of the area to an international or Pan-Arab police force and leaving Lebanon in an organized fashion.

This is the most frequently talked about alternative in recent days. The MKs who met two days ago, in the home of MK Gideon Ezra in Kochav Ya'ir, advised that they support different versions of this idea.

The advantages and disadvantages of this alternative will depend on whether there is someone with whom to close this deal. If Israel achieves the arrangement it wants, and the agreement will be honored, it could achieve all the hoped for results: Israel will leave Lebanon, save human life, money and the operational deterioration; The peace and quiet of the northern residents will be assured by the agreement and by the police force; And the fate of SLA members in southern Lebanon will not become a free for all.

The problem is that chances of reaching an arrangement of this type in Lebanon, separate from an unfolding arrangement with Syria on the issue of the Golan Heights, are very weak. As is known, the Lebanese government has little interest in signing an agreement such as this with Israel. In any event, there is no possibility of getting this type of agreement with the consent of Syria and Iran, and the quagmire in Lebanon serves Syrian and Iranian interests. In this situation, no country has as yet volunteered to send its troops to do the dirty work for us.

POSSIBILITY #6: EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY ZONE

The idea is simple: if Hizbullah terrorists are located north of the Security Zone, and from there threaten IDF soldiers (via attacks and ambushes) as well as the residents of the north (via firing of missiles), IDF forces must proceed North, to expand the Security Zone and uproot the ability of the terrorists to hit the northern communities every time the IDF takes the initiative against them.

The effective range of the new katyusha missiles which the terrorists have received from the Iranians according to publications is 42 kilometers. In order to prevent the terrorists from firing them towards the northern communities, the terrorists have to be pushed back to a line beyond 42 kilometers one beginning in the west just a bit south of Sidon, climbing from there north and east past Jezzine and Mashara. In this situation, IDF forces will be deployed on the boundary of the Security Zone. In other words, closer to Beirut than to the international border, a situation we have already been in. The bitter lessons of the Lebanese War teach us that these forty kilometers do not promise a thing: expanding the Security Zone expands, accordingly, the territory in which IDF soldiers are exposed to the Hizbullah's guerrilla warfare. More than that, the basic equation of the Katyusha's range has no boundary: as technology improves, the effective ranges increase, and it is difficult to assume that the IDF will continue to expand its control over wider parts of Lebanon every time the Iranians supply the terrorists with better quality missiles.

POSSIBILITY #7: SYRIA FIRST, LEBANON AFTERWARDS

Israel continuously reiterates that the key to a solution in Lebanon is in Syria's hands. By assuming that the attempts to organize an arrangement with the formulation of "Lebanon First" fails, it is possible to assume that the full, basic, solution to the Lebanese problem will be possible only within a general framework of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria.

Because this type of peace agreement will rise or fall on the fateful question regarding the Golan Heights, it is possible to say that the fate of the diplomatic agreement in Lebanon depends on the fate of the Golan Heights. Thus, in the end, the choice between various operational methods is first and foremost a diplomatic issue.

The logic in this proposal says that the Syrians are the real rulers in Lebanon, and they direct the war of the Hizbullah so that it is a continuation of the policies (regarding the Golan) by other means. Therefore, the solution to our problem with Syria, brings as a side effect the solution to our troubles in Lebanon.

The problem is that all of the operational variants detailed here, from a unilateral evacuation through a directed attack on Syrian economic targets in Lebanon are based on the assumption that there is no real chance to achieve an overall peace agreement with Syria in the foreseeable future.

It is clear to everyone that the ideas that have been brought here, are in the best instance, only problematic partial solutions and immeasurably complicated.

POSSIBILITY #8: COMPREHENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION IN LEBANON

This concept appears to be simple and efficient: the IDF enters Lebanon, with huge numbers, captures an extensive area, rids it of terrorists, reduces the Hizbullah infrastructure to its foundations, strengthens SLA control over strategic points, installs an intelligence infrastructure in the area and returns home.

This alternative has, obviously, been attempted already several times, beginning with the Litani Operation (it was then still called a war against the Palestinian Terrorist organizations), through the difficult and costly Operation Peace for Galilee, which went on and turned into the Lebanon War, through Operation Accountability and until [operation] Grapes of Wrath. On paper, the advantages of such an operation are clear and meaningful: Israel sends an unequivocal message to the government of Lebanon, to Syria and the Hizbullah, that it has no intention of sitting idly by while taking blows; the terrorists suffer a harsh and concentrated blow, and the area remains clear for a substantial period of time; by the time the Hizbullah organization recovers and this could take many months the IDF and the northern communities enjoy a period of calmness.