Note: The translations of articles from the Hebrew press
are prepared by the Government Press Office
as a service to foreign journalists in Israel.
They express the views of the authors.
Hamas Activity Has Not Been Blocked
(Analysis by Zvi Barel, "Ha'aretz", Sept 1, 1999, p. A7)
Until the beginning of August, Hamas's representatives in Jordan were
secure in their positions up to the point where Khaled Masha'al, the
director of Hamas's Political Department could declare, two weeks ago,
that the Jordanian government had not asked, and was unlikely to ask, the
organization to cease its activities in Jordan. Senior administration
officials said, "As long as the organization operates within legal limits,
and does not lend its hand to terrorist attacks, the government has no
interest in shutting it down."
The Jordanian security forces preferred to allow Hamas to operate openly
as long as they could ensure effective control over its representatives
and actions, rather than cause them to go underground. The Royal Court
also found it politically difficult to order the Hamas office closed in
the wake of the failed Israeli attempt on the life of Khaled Masha'al.
Jordan did not want to be seen as the agent of the Israeli Mossad.
But several things happened in August, which pushed the Jordanian
government into taking this drastic step. The American administration - to
which Jordan appealed for aid to overcome its delay in paying its external
debts - made it clear to King Abdallah when he visited Washington, that it
would find it difficult to transmit such a request to Congress, as long as
Hamas enjoyed freedom of action in Jordan. This American position rested
on the claims of members of Congress who had been briefed by the Jewish
lobby.
An additional factor was Danny Yatom's visit to Jordan during his trip of
forgiveness and as the official responsible for the contacts with Jordan.
He gave detailed information to the Jordanians regarding Hamas
representatives' links and contacts with foreign countries, including
Syria and Iran. According to Jordanian sources, Yatom warned against the
possibility of a political takeover by Hamas of the Jordanian Parliament,
in cooperation with the Jordanian Islamic Front and the Muslim
Brotherhood.
This Israeli assessment did not surprise the Jordanians, who had been
monitoring the deepening relationship between the extremist wing of the
Muslim Brotherhood and Jordanian Hamas, for some time. Hamas personnel had
taken to appearing at the Muslim Brotherhood's offices, using their
services and trying to formulate what they called a "tangible opposition
to the Jordanian policy of supporting the Oslo Agreements."
The heads of Jordanian intelligence summoned the leads of the Muslim
Brotherhood and warned them against excessive closeness to Hamas. This was
precisely during a period in which the Jordanian government was trying
work with the Islamic bloc, and was even prepared to amend the election
law in order to make it easier for them to gain political strength in the
next elections. But in exchange for these actions, Jordan demanded that
the Islamic Front neutralize the extremist elements.
Simultaneously, there has been a sharp struggle between the Hamas
organization in the territories, especially Gaza (internal Hamas), and the
Hamas leadership in Jordan and Syria (external Hamas) for several months
now. Things had deteriorated to the point where leaflets and reports were
being issued to the press about the large-scale embezzlement of
organization funds; external Hamas accused internal Hamas of cooperating
with the Zionist enemy and the United States, and counter-accusations that
external Hamas was hiding behind the Jordanian regime which had signed a
peace agreement with Israel.
The substantive agreement is over the source of authority. External Hamas
sees internal Hamas as being subordinate to it. This rivalry caused
Jordanian Hamas in recent weeks, to maintain contacts with Iran and Syria
in order to settle the question of subordination. Jordan, like Yasser
Arafat, was not perturbed by the internal rivalry within Hamas, until the
concern arose that the rivalry was liable to spur a wave of terrorism not
only in the territories and Israel, but in Jordan as well.
Jordan was also angered by the fact that Hamas's senior representatives in
Jordan were received with considerable ceremony by Syrian Vice-President
Abd El-Halim Khaddam and Foreign Minister Farouk A-Shara'a. Jordan, which
for years had habitually angered Syria by giving sanctuary and refuge to
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, saw the Syrian gesture as an attempt to pay
Jordan in kind, precisely at a time when relations between the two
countries were deepening. How much more so when Syria itself is ordering
the rejectionist organizations to refrain from military actions. When the
senior Hamas representatives continued on to Iran, Jordan saw this as an
opportunity to close their offices.
It is possible that Jordan would not have hurried to close the offices now
if it was not for Madeleine Albright's upcoming visit and the desire not
to be seen by the Americans as a country that gives shelter to anti-Oslo
activities. It is also possible that the $50 million check, which Jordan
received in debt payment assistance, hastened the process. But the step
does not mean that Hamas activity in Jordan has been completely blocked.
The Hamas leaders are Jordanian citizens who can vote for, and be elected
to, governing institutions; their continued political activity need not be
under the "Hamas" label.