8-APR-1992
THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS - PROGRESS REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
At the Madrid conference (Oct. 30 - Nov. 3, 1991) direct bilateral peace
negotiations were launched between Israel and some of its Arab
neighbors. Since that time, four rounds of bilateral talks have taken
place, one in Madrid and three in Washington D.C. In addition, a series
of multilateral talks concerning regional issues was launched in Moscow.
The following points should be kept in mind when considering the present
peace process:
I. ISRAEL INITIATED THIS PROCESS
Today's peace process is the direct result of the Israeli government's
Peace Initiative of May 1989, whose four points form the basis of the
process.
II. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE ARE BINDING
The terms of reference are the result of compromises by all sides. They
cannot now be changed without the mutual consent of the parties
concerned.
III. THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING CONFERENCE WAS TO LAUNCH BILATERAL TALKS
The three-day opening conference in Madrid was meant only to launch
direct talks between Israel and the Arabs.
IV. A JOINT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION IS BASIC TO THE PROCESS
The Palestinians were invited to attend "as part of a joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation". Palestinian efforts to remove themselves from
the joint delegation contradict the terms of reference.
V. TALKS ARE ABOUT INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, NOT THE FINAL STATUS OF JS&G
The present talks with the Palestinians are about "interim
self-government arrangements" (ISGA). Talks on the permanent status of
the territories will only start in the third year of the ISGA. The
Palestinian attempt to predetermine final status issues now is contrary
to the process.
VI. MID-EAST PEACE TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE MID-EAST
Future rounds of talks should be held in the region. This would
facilitate quicker progress, and send a message to the region that peace
is at hand.
VII. ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO OPEN CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WERE REJECTED
Israel has repeatedly tried to set up contacts with the Arabs in order
to solve outstanding issues between rounds. These attempts have been
rebuffed.
VIII. SYRIA STILL REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST
Syria is unwilling to discuss a contractual peace with Israel, or to
admit Israel's legitimacy, stating that these issues cannot even be
raised until Israel agrees to withdraw from the Golan Heights.
IX. THE AIM OF THE TALKS WITH LEBANON IS PEACE, NOT RESOLUTION 425
Israel seeks to negotiate a peace treaty with Lebanon, which would
include security for the border and civil relations. Lebanon, however,
wants to limit the talks to the implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 425.
X. ISRAEL IS TAKING THE TALKS SERIOUSLY AND MAKING REAL PROPOSALS
Israel's conduct at the negotiating table illustrates its earnest
approach to the negotiations. It has made substantial proposals, and has
included experts within the delegations to present and detail these
proposals.
XI. ISRAEL IS COMMITTED TO CONTINUING THE PROCESS, UNTIL PEACE IS
REACHED
Israel's commitment to the peace process is independent of any other
issue. It will make every effort to promote the process. The present
wave of brutal terrorism against its citizens at home and abroad will
not deter Israel in its pursuit of peace.
THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS - PROGRESS REPORT
POINTS IN FULL:
I. ISRAEL INITIATED THIS PROCESS
The Madrid process is the direct result of the Israeli government's
Peace Initiative of May 1989. Israel's initiative contains the following
four points:
1) Using the Camp David Accords as a cornerstone for enlarging the
circle of Arab-Israeli peace.
2) Direct bilateral talks with the Arab countries aimed at the
establishment of peace with Israel.
3) Negotiations with representatives of the Arab inhabitants of
Judea/Samaria and Gaza (JS&G) regarding a 5-year transitional
period of self-rule, to be followed at a later phase by talks on
the territories' final status.
4) International multilateral efforts to rehabilitate the Arab
refugees in JS&G, in which Israel will take part.
These four points form the basic formula of the present peace process
which was launched at Madrid. The implementation of the Israeli
initiative came about as the result of intensive shuttle negotiations
carried out by US Secretary of State James Baker, which involved eight
separate trips to the region between April and October 1991.
II. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE ARE BINDING
The terms of reference for the present peace process are the result of
compromises by all sides, and cannot now be changed without the consent
of all parties. These terms of reference were established only after
extensive contacts and exhaustive shuttle diplomacy on the part of
Secretary Baker among all the participants. These ground-rules,
detailing the participants and the procedures of the process, are
spelled out in the invitation to the opening of the negotiations in
Madrid which was issued on October 17, 1991 by the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. In short, they are referred to as the "Madrid Formula". These
terms of reference apply to the entire process, including the opening
conference, the bilateral negotiations and the multilateral talks.
The Arabs have made a number of unsuccessful attempts to circumvent
these terms of reference. In Madrid, Syria tried to avoid the start of
bilateral talks with Israel, and boycotted the scheduled first meeting.
After several hours of behind-the-scenes contacts, Syria finally
relented, and the session was rescheduled for that night. The
Palestinians have also acted to undermine the terms of reference. During
the first two rounds of Washington talks, they refused to enter into the
negotiating room as part of the joint Jordanian- Palestinian delegation,
as specified in the invitation. Also, at the opening of the multilateral
negotiations in Moscow, the Palestinians sought to add members to their
delegation from outside JS&G, which is contrary to the Madrid terms of
reference. When they were prevented from doing so, they boycotted the
talks entirely.
III. THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING CONFERENCE WAS TO LAUNCH BILATERAL TALKS
In the Madrid invitation, the objective of the entire peace process is
defined as the establishment of "real peace" to be achieved through
"direct bilateral negotiations" to take place "on the basis of [U.N.
Security Council] Resolutions 242 and 338".
The purpose of the three-day opening conference in Madrid was to launch
direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. It has always
been Israel's position that direct face-to-face negotiations are the
best way to bring about the establishment of peace between Israel and
the Arabs. The Arab states, except for Egypt, had long objected to
bilateral negotiations, preferring to have a settlement imposed upon
Israel by an 'international conference'. The Madrid forum itself was
meant only to ease the way for the Arabs to direct negotiations, by
providing them with the semblance of an international umbrella.
According to the invitation, the conference forum was given "no power to
impose solutions on the parties" and "no ability to vote on issues".
After the three-day opening forum, the conference was disbanded, and it
can only reconvene "with the consent of all the parties".
IV. A JOINT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION IS BASIC TO THE PROCESS
According to the terms of reference, which are valid for the entire
process, the Palestinians were invited to attend "as part of a joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation". The beginning of bilateral
negotiations with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was unjustifiably
delayed until the end of the second round of Washington talks, due to a
Palestinian attempt to change the terms of reference regarding the joint
framework. Finally, procedural ground-rules were agreed upon between the
two delegations, establishing that negotiations between Israel and the
joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation be conducted on three levels: the
General Meeting, the Jordanian component, and the Palestinian component.
* The General Meeting: This forum consists of the Israeli delegation
and the complete Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Its purpose is
to discuss procedural and other matters, and it can convene upon
the request of either party.
* The Israel-Jordan Track: This track of negotiations concentrates on
Jordanian-Israeli issues, with the Jordanian side represented by
nine Jordanians and two Palestinians from Judea/Samaria & Gaza.
* The Israel-Palestinian Track: The purpose of this track of talks is
defined as the negotiation of "interim self-government
arrangements" (ISGA) for the Arab inhabitants of Judea/Samaria and
Gaza. In this track, Israel is conducting negotiations with nine
Palestinian members and two Jordanian members of the joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
V. TALKS ARE ABOUT INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, NOT THE FINAL STATUS OF JS&G
The terms of reference described in the Madrid invitation specify that
"negotiations with the Palestinians who are part of the joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation ... will be conducted in phases,
beginning with talks on interim self government arrangements" (ISGA).
The invitation envisions that these arrangements "will last for a period
of five years". The second phase of negotiations, regarding the
permanent status of Judea/Samaria and Gaza will only commence "beginning
the third year of the period of self-government arrangements."
This two-phased approach is premised upon the principle that while
negotiations on the final status of JS&G at this time would be too
divisive to sustain the peace process, an interim settlement can now be
achieved. Interim arrangements could provide the time needed to foster
trust and coexistence between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs, before
permanent status issues are negotiated. The interim period presents an
opportunity for each side to test the goodwill of the other, and to
learn to live together on the same soil. This interim period would not
prejudice the final status of the territories which is to be negotiated
at a later stage.
At the start of the latest round of talks, Israel presented a detailed
10-page document outlining ideas for the ISGA which involve the
delegation of responsibility in most spheres of daily life to the local
population in JS&G. The areas to be discussed include administration of
justice, local courts, civil service, agriculture, education and
culture, budget and taxation, health, industry, commerce, tourism,
social services, local police, transportation, communication, municipal
affairs, religious affairs, and many other aspects of self-government.
These powers would be gradually delegated to appropriate administrative
organs as determined in the negotiations. Primarily, the only powers
retained by Israel in its ISGA proposal would be those concerned with
the maintenance of security.
The Palestinian side, however, flatly rejected the Israeli proposal,
their spokesperson calling it "an insult to anyone's intelligence". An
unidentified member of the delegation was quoted as stating that whoever
presented the proposal deserves "to have their neck broken". Adding
insult to injury, when asked to explain this call to violence, the
Palestinian spokesperson's only reaction was that "it's very unfortunate
it was reported". It is noteworthy that the single regret of the
Palestinians was that the statement found its way to print.
After more than a week of publicly ridiculing the Israeli proposals,
systematically leaking them and other Israeli negotiating documents to
the press, the Palestinian side presented a document of their own,
outlining what they call 'PISGA' (the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing
Authority). The document was simply a proposal for the establishment of
a Palestinian state in all its attributes except in name, stating that:
"with the start of the interim phase, and the abolition of the
Israeli military government and civil administration, Israel shall
cease to enjoy all these powers, which shall be assumed by the
PISGA... There shall be no limitations on the powers and
responsibilities of the PISGA..."
Thus, the Palestinians totally disregarded the basic terms of reference
which call for talks on interim arrangements. Instead, they seek to
pre-empt the establishment of a Palestinian state by forcing a
determination of final status issues already at this first phase of
talks.
VI. MID-EAST PEACE TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE MID-EAST
So far, the bilateral peace talks have taken place in Washington DC.
Israel appreciates the efforts made by the US to promote the peace
process and host the talks. However, Israel strongly feels that the
talks should be held closer to the region, for two reasons. First, a
nearby location would facilitate quicker progress by allowing the
parties the opportunity of communicating directly with their respective
governments without having to break off talks for weeks at a time. The
negotiations deal with issues of vital national concern, and as the
talks advance, the importance of receiving prompt instructions from home
will become even more crucial to the process.
Secondly, the sight of Israeli delegations being hosted in Arab cities,
and Arab delegations in Israel, would provide a powerful message to the
people of the region. The visit of Egyptian President Sadat to Jerusalem
in 1977, and Prime Minister Begin's reciprocal visit to Egypt had an
overwhelming psychological effect on the peoples of the two countries.
Today, such an exchange of delegations would signal to the population of
the region that Arab-Israeli peace is no longer a matter of conception,
but rather just a matter of time.
VII. ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO OPEN CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WERE REJECTED
During the course of the negotiations, the Israeli delegations made
repeated efforts to establish standing channels of communication with
their Arab counterparts in order to facilitate the discussion of simple
procedural issues, such as the scheduling and venue of further talks,
between negotiating sessions. Numerous Israeli attempts were made to
pass notes through the respective Arab embassies, exchange telephone
numbers, and even to send facsimile messages directly to the Arab
delegations. However, none of these Israeli initiatives have been
successful. The Arabs have refused to allow themselves to be contacted
directly by Israel between the rounds of talks, and have also avoided
serious discussion on the time and site of future negotiations. This has
left Israel in the untenable position of trying to coordinate
negotiating dates and places through third parties in faraway locations,
even though its Arab partners live less than half an hour's drive away.
In an attempt to find a solution to this problem of venue, the US has
suggested that each party submit a list of ten possible locations for
future talks. The lists would then be compared and overlapping sites
would be chosen, without infringing on the preferences of any side.
Israel promptly provided such a list. The Arab reply, however, was not
forthcoming.
VIII. SYRIA STILL REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST
Syria constitutes the single most potent military threat among Israel's
enemies and the most adamant in its refusal to recognize Israel's right
to exist. The simple fact that face-to-face negotiations are taking
place at all, after over four decades of animosity devoid of dialogue,
is of great significance.
However, the Syrian side is unwilling to discuss the conclusion of a
peace treaty with Israel, and is still unwilling to admit Israel's
legitimacy and its right to exist at all. It insists that such issues
are irrelevant to the present negotiations, and that they cannot even be
discussed until Israel agrees to a withdrawal from the Golan Heights.
The Israeli delegation explained that a recognition of Israel's
legitimacy and right to exist constitutes the basis for successful peace
negotiations. Israel also holds that "withdrawal" is not a prerequisite
for the peace talks. The territorial aspect of the conflict should be
raised in the context of a peace treaty which also addresses other
issues, such as security and peaceful relations between the two
countries.
IX. THE AIM OF THE TALKS WITH LEBANON IS PEACE, NOT RESOLUTION 425
Israel seeks to negotiate a full-fledged peace treaty with Lebanon,
which would include mutual security arrangements and civil relations
between the two countries. Lebanon, on the other hand, is trying so far
to limit the talks exclusively to the implementation of the 1978 UN
Security Council Resolution 425, which calls for "strict respect for the
territorial integrity" of Lebanon, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces.
Such a limited focus would not address the pressing issues of security
and terrorism which have plagued Israel's border with Lebanon for the
past two decades.
In the course of the talks, Israel has stressed its concerns regarding
Arab terrorism emanating from Lebanese territory, and the military
threat posed by the Syrian occupation of over two-thirds of Lebanon's
soil. Without a halt to terrorist activities against its border and
without addressing the threat emanating from the more than 35,000 Syrian
troops in Lebanon, it would be difficult to achieve a peace settlement
between the two countries.
X. ISRAEL IS TAKING THE TALKS SERIOUSLY AND MAKING REAL PROPOSALS
Israel's serious approach to the peace talks can be seen in its
productive and earnest attitude at the negotiating table. For example,
in the last round of negotiations with the Jordanian track, both parties
exchanged formal proposals for a draft common agenda, incorporating the
agenda preferences of each side. Although the gaps in the proposals
remain large, the mutual effort to achieve common ground is substantial
and constructive. In addition, informal contacts took place between the
parties regarding issues of common interest such as energy and water.
Israeli experts presented proposals for future cooperation between the
countries which could be developed in the framework of the peace talks.
Israel has also included a number of prominent experts to its delegation
in the ISGA track, in order to provide details and answer questions on
the actual implementation of its proposals. An expert on industry and
commerce gave a presentation on the ramifications of the proposed
economic system in JS&G, and an expert in public health provided details
on the operation and administration of the local health system,
including hospitals, clinics, and sanitation services.
XI. ISRAEL IS COMMITTED TO CONTINUING THE PROCESS, UNTIL PEACE IS
REACHED
Israel remains determined to continue pursuing the bilateral peace
negotiations and to advance the process toward the establishment of
peace with each of its Arab neighbors.
Israel's commitment to the peace process is self-evident and independent
of any other issue. Since its inception as a state, Israel has extended
its hand in peace to its neighbors, and it is the Israeli Peace
Initiative of 1989 which now serves as the basis for the present talks.
The Israeli delegation is fully prepared to continue substantive talks
regardless of Israel's upcoming elections and with no connection to
other outstanding issues. Israel will continue to present detailed and
serious proposals and make every effort to promote the process.
Israel will remain adamant in its pursuit of peace, even in the face of
a new savage wave of Arab terrorism against Israelis at home and abroad,
which has so far claimed the lives of over 45 Israelis and non-Israeli
bystanders, and has caused over 500 injuries since the peace talks were
launched at Madrid. This terrorism is carried out with the express aim
of halting the peace process and undermining any possible compromise
between Israel and the Arabs.
Israel can only hope that the Arab states will demonstrate the same
level of determination and commitment to the peace process as has the
Israeli delegation. Although the differences are great and the conflict
is deep-rooted, Israel firmly believes that true peace can be achieved
through direct serious face-to-face negotiations in which the concerns
of each side are raised and its needs are addressed in an equitable
fashion.