PRESS BRIEFING WITH THE ISRAELI DELEGATION
TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 30, 1993
BRIEFERS:
ITAMAR RABINOVICH, CHRMN OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION TO THE TALKS WITH
SYRIA
URI LUBRANI, CHRMN OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION TO THE TALKS WITH LEBANON
MS. YARON: Welcome to this press conference, which will be summing up
our 10th session of the Israeli peace talks. We are going to be starting
with our head to the talks with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation,
Mr. Eli Rubinstein, to be followed by Mr. Lubrani, the head of our
negotiation to Lebanon, and then by Professor Itamar Rabinovich, the
head of our delegation to the talks with Syria.
We will start with Mr. Rubinstein.
MR. RUBINSTEIN: Well, good afternoon everybody. Just a brief description
of where we are in the talks with the Jordanians and the Palestinians.
This is Mr. Eliahu Avidan from the Foreign Ministry, who is a
obviously from the Israeli Foreign Ministry who is a member of our
delegation and also liaisoning our press activities. And, of course, you
know Ms. Yaron.
I'll start with the Jordanian track. The talks with the Jordanians have
been solid in terms of in comparison to all other tracks at least by
the fact that we've reached a common agenda which is kind of an
agreement on principle that was a few months ago on the principles
of how to continue these negotiations. And although they did not
officially ratify it, we work from that agenda and we are working on a
number of issues in basically three committees. One is on economy and
refugees, the other is on water, environment and energy, and the third
one on security and borders.
The good news is that there is a negotiation, there's an engagement. The
other news are that Jordan seems to have taken the line or the policy
as a policy decision we have great respect for the Jordanians, but
they have taken the line of not rushing in the negotiations because of
the other tracks, and mainly in view of what's going on in the
Palestinian track. So there's a lot of motion in the negotiation,
there's less movement than we would like it to show.
I would say, for instance, that on issues which are not politically
sensitive but are very, very vital and important to both sides, and
maybe the Jordanians could have benefitted also or to a great extent
from promoting them, like water or environmental matters, if more had
been done in the real sense we would have been happier. Nevertheless
and there are other points which should be promoted to a greater extent,
like banking in the territories. And at the end of the day, we look
forward to continuing these negotiations with the hope that there will
also get the practical spin of moving ahead in such vital areas as I
discussed before, water, for instance.
The other thing is, before I move to the Palestinian track, there are
areas which are kind of overlapping or have a connection to both the
Jordanians and the Palestinians. For instance, what will happen on the
bridges as we have the interim self-government arrangement, the bridges
on which through which you go to Jordan and come back from Jordan.
What about the human dimension? What about economic dimensions? These
matters and others should be discussed in a wider frame of
Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli. And, in fact, this morning we had
what we called a general meeting under the umbrella of the joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. For instance, our delegation, in which
we raised those issues and we handed over a list of prospective subjects
to discuss bridges being one (inaudible) being another one, and
there are a number of other issues.
The Palestinian track obviously we would have loved it to move more.
Let me say plainly what's on the table now in terms of materials in this
track is enough to sustain reasonable self-government arrangements
interim self-government arrangements. There's a lot of material in all
relevant respects, and that could be done.
Unfortunately, the few areas in which the Palestinians have developed
the positions in this round in way that or in this session rather
now it's called sessions to avoid the pre-negotiations before every
round that we had before which took a lot of diplomacy and energy for
very little benefit to keep on negotiating the next round. So the
Palestinians' principle of push the Jerusalem issue to the top of the
agenda, we feel it has been a mistake. There is enough to do and enough
to promote the interim self-government arrangements that's on the table,
and there are enough problems yet, and instead of shrinking the gap, the
gap has been widened in this respect.
Jerusalem, from the very start of the process (inaudible) it
cannot be included in the negotiations, and from this point of view, the
raising of this subject you know, in the Jewish in the (south ?)
we have a verse saying let's put Jerusalem at the top of our (joy ?). If
you want to promote these negotiations, Jerusalem shouldn't be put on
the top of anything. And by the way, our position on Jerusalem has not
changed. It has been an Israeli policy forever, Jerusalem has been
capital of Israel, united not be divided, and historically, we are
the only nation that's ever had Jerusalem as its capital, and I think
this should be just remembered occasionally. We do not by any means
disrespect attachments that the Palestinians have to Jerusalem and
others have to Jerusalem from (family stories ?), from religious point
of view. We respect that, we're doing our best to accommodate that, but
the political future of Jerusalem is known and will remain so.
I will, nevertheless, also state that the closure that Palestinian
colleagues have cited as a reason for their raising the Jerusalem issue
has not been a Jerusalem matter. It has been a security matter, not a
political statement, and in fact, we're doing our best to get people who
want to enter Jerusalem for whatever needs, to ease and to make as much
comfort as we can in terms of the situation, subject to security.
We came up with an idea which we've developed on the early empowerment.
Few people understand it. Let me say a word about it. What we suggest is
simple, as a first installment, so to speak. Instead of waiting for the
full-fledged agreement on the interim self-government arrangement,
please consider that's what we said to the Palestinians getting
now we'll transfer to you now the administration and the running of a
major number of issues under the civil administration now, which are
spheres that you will be running for instance, health, education,
labor, welfare, tourism. We say to them this is 75 percent, for
instance, of the (manpower ?). This a majority, maybe a majority plus,
of the more than a majority, (or a small one ?), of the budget. Take
it and start doing it without at this point any (cuts ?) from your point
of view.
This is not meant to fragmentize. We say this is not a substitute for
the interim self-government arrangement, it is not instead of the
interim self-government arrangement, it is meant for one purpose, to
inject momentum, dynamics into the process. They have rejected it,
arguing that this is a fragmentation. But we say it is not. We don't ask
you to agree to anything beyond starting running these things. We
believe that it is a pity that this offer and we know that there are
Palestinians who are interested in this has not been taken on.
Basically, there is what could have happened in this round. We worked
with them, and I should say in a positive note in the last few days
we've been talking about elements of the Declaration of Principles, and
while we have not gone into drafting, we have had the sense that there
is more engagement, and if this continues, it could be a good omen. It
has not found its public expression by our Palestinian colleagues, but
it has been definitely something which we like in the negotiations.
We've also been talking about, as you know, land and water issues,
humanitarian affairs and human rights. This is ongoing.
I'd like to recognize Ambassador Eitan Bentsur, who is (the deputy head
?) of our delegation, who just joined us.
So, basically, we look forward to continuing these negotiations. What
about the American (angle ?)? The US has taken an interest as a full
partner to help out in the negotiations. They now share with us ideas
orally and in writing, and we have transmitted them to our government to
look into, and I understand that Mr. Ross and the members of the peace
team will be coming soon, which is a step that could help in terms of
augmenting the direct negotiations, which must continue and which are
the core of the effort.
Thank you very much.
Q I'm Mary Curtius of the Boston Globe. (Off mike) put forward their
own version of what a joint declaration of principles could look like or
should look like by the Israelis and the Palestinians, and if you could
just allow me to continue for a second. Do you believe that the trip by
Mr. Ross is an indication of the failure of this round of talks, that
the Americans are going to a higher political level seeking decisions
they feel cannot be made here by the delegations?
MR. RUBINSTEIN: Well, as far as the first part of the question, I don't
think I should characterize the document because I feel that my first
duty is to report to the government, which (we ?) have been doing the
last couple of hours since we got this the American ideas. And I'll
reserve on that just out of normal, appropriate ways of functioning.
As far as the second part of your question, I don't think it's the
question of the delegations as such. Of course, the delegations
communicate with their government, their constituencies as needed, and
of course, they they do what they have to do, and they report and
they get instructions. The I think that this (part ?) is to really do
to have conversations with higher levels, also to send their ideas,
to talk to them. I think this is something which is normal, has been
done in diplomacy, is augmenting whatever is done here.
The negotiations among the delegations must continue because there's a
lot of work on details on a number of issues, for instance, with the
Palestinians. We have not yet been able to convince our colleagues to go
into economy. There are a great number of economic problems which,
whatever model you take in this in this interim self-government
arrangement, you have to tackle. So and the Palestinians have
insisted on their basic territorial territorial jurisdiction, and we
have come up with our model, which is functional with a lot of land
aspect and but and a lot of functions, but the economy has not
been tackled for for some reason. Well and we proposed that this
can only be done this way. The same with many other issues.
So I wouldn't say these things contradict each other. They complement
each other, basically.
Q (Off mike) working paper, and did they mention Jerusalem in this
document or not?
MR. RUBINSTEIN: I said before, Mr. Hamdi, with respect, I'm not going to
characterize the America ideas or to go into their conference. We've
just reported back to our government, and I think it's just our duty to
wait until we have the opportunity to discuss it with the government.
Q (Off mike)
MR. RUBINSTEIN: I wouldn't like to add beyond what I just said.
Q (Off mike)
Q (Name inaudible) Agence France Press. You said that the fact that
the Palestinians brought the argument about Jerusalem was not
constructive and that Jerusalem should not be on the agenda. Is Israel
prepared to consider that it would be on the agenda on the permanent
when it will be the discussion of the permanent status?
MR. RUBINSTEIN: I wouldn't add to what has been said in our in
Jerusalem on this by our political level. I will leave it at that. Our
position on Jerusalem is very clear and has been stated time and again.
What I want to say, we came here with a mission. The mission is to
establish interim self-government arrangements. This is doable provided
everybody deals with what's on the table in terms of the material in
in a constructive way. If this happens, we will (have/help ?) them. We
are trying to send a message, let's do the doable.
Thank you very much.
MS. YARON: Okay, I will ask for your patience for one minute while Mr.
Lubrani is making his way downstairs.
If I can have your attention, please, we will continue with Mr. Uri
Lubrani, our chief negotiator to the negotiation with Lebanon.
AMB. LUBRANI: Good afternoon to you. I am afraid I can't report dramatic
progress on our track at the end of this 10th round or meeting.
Nevertheless, I think that we have had occasion during the meeting to
clarify and to sharpen and to condense the positions of each party. We
have tried during this meeting to make some progress on the proposal
which we tabled concerning the establishment of the joint military
working group. This proposal, as you may remember, pertains to an
attempt on our part to skirt around the position of principle of both
parties and to find a way to discuss and elucidate on the centerpiece of
the problems resting between our two countries, and these are the
security problems which relate to both to Security Council Resolution
425, which is the position of the Lebanese party and our position, which
maintains that we've come here to discuss a peace process.
Both positions have in them the element of security, and we feel that,
while we can deal with them in an unprejudiced way, we will save some
time in the future when the time comes when the political contours are
right for progress in our talks. Now, so far, we have made little
progress. We have received in the process a Lebanese paper, which in
essence contains the rigid position of Lebanon in very clear terms. We
have not yet quite exhausted our response to this paper, and I hope to
be in a position to do so in our next meeting tomorrow morning. We have
by doing so, I will make it clear again what our objective is on this
track and how we feel we can make progress.
I think I'll stop here and see whether you have any question to ask me.
Yes?
Q Going back a couple of rounds, the issue of Ron Arad was raised. Do
you recall? Several rounds ago? Has that ever come back up? Did they
ever give you the information about his whereabouts? You indicated that
they might.
AMB. LUBRANI: I haven't heard you. I'm afraid I have
Q Several rounds ago, there was some discussion about Ron Arad.
AMB. LUBRANI: I understand the question now. His name is Ron Arad. We
have been approached by the Lebanese delegation concerning the
detainees, Lebanese detainees, which are detained in the security zone
and in Israel. And we have responded by making it clear that we feel
that this problem is a mutual one, and we have our own missing in action
and specifically, Ron Arad and soldiers Kurtz (sp), Feldman (sp), and
Bowmel (sp), who are missing and that we see this as a subject which
has to discuss both the Lebanese detainees in Israel and in the
security zone and those who are in Lebanon or elsewhere. And we haven't
come at this session to the point of returning to this subject. But we
do hope that in a future session, this subject will reemerge.
Q Did I understand you correctly when you said that the Lebanese have
come to discuss 425, but the Israelis have come to discuss the peace
process? Can you explain this to me?
AMB. LUBRANI: Well, the peace process is the essence of our meeting
here. We will we have come here
Q I mean on what basis? On what basis? Which basis?
MR. LUBRANI: We have come to discuss the peace agreement. We are in the
peace process, but we have come here to discuss a peace agreement. We
have not come here to discuss the fulfillment of Security Council
Resolution that or the other.
Thank you.
MR. RABINOVICH: Good afternoon. Let me begin with a brief statement
about the developments in the Israeli-Syrian track during this past
session, and it will be brief for two main reasons. One is, as you may
have noticed, I am losing my voice, and the other is there isn't all
that much to report, unfortunately.
The pattern should be familiar to you from earlier rounds. To just
refresh our memories, last summer, at the end of August, we galvanized
the negotiations by introducing the element of withdrawal as applicable
to the peace negotiations between Syria and Israel. Syria responded
initially to that, the negotiations began to pick up and began to do
well. During September and part of October, and then at some point in
October, the Syrians began to insist on Israeli acceptance of the Syrian
demand for full withdrawal early on as a virtual precondition for any
progress or any elaboration on other issues from on Syria's part. We
have explained to the Syrians that we wanted to move the negotiations
forward by introducing this element in contradistinction to the policy
of the preceding Israeli government, but that we were not about to
elaborate on the extent of that potential withdrawal before we
understood clearly from the Syrians what their position on the three
other main issues: namely the nature of peace, the nature of the
projected security arrangements, and the comprehensive the
relationship between our track and the comprehensive quest or the
quest for a comprehensive settlement (that worked ?).
The Syrians refused to do that. They occasionally afforded us glimpses
into what that might mean, but not more than occasional glimpses, and
essentially, this track has not moved in any substantial way since
October. This does not mean that time was entirely wasted. We have
during this period conducted several interesting sessions in which
interesting exchanges took place in which we did gain, and I believe we
also offered some very useful insights into the way the Syrians see our
relations and our future relationship, and in which we see the Syrians.
This has been the case, and I must notice that our ability to resume on
April 27 after a hiatus of almost five months at exactly the point at
which we had left in mid-December, our ability to conduct difficult
negotiations based on a great deal of disagreement in a very
businesslike fashion, and yet to afford each other some important
glimpses and insights, all encouraging even the earlier lengthy
history of Syrian-Israeli relations.
And the 10th session, which ends tomorrow, is the second session held
since the resumption of the negotiations in late April.
And unfortunately, as I said earlier, the pattern that was thus
established in late October was not broken. We we are at the same
point which we tried to persuade the Syrians to reverse the order, not
to follow a wrong sequence, to offer us full and satisfactory
explanations on the issues that are of interest to us, at which point we
promised to elaborate on the extent of withdrawal. This has been to
to no avail.
We spent much of today's session listening to the Syrian version of the
history of these negotiations and to a Syrian explanation of why things
went wrong, and you you will guess correctly if you guessed that
their explanation is different than mine. And we will devote tomorrow's
briefer session to to our version, our explanations as to what is
fundamentally wrong with the Syrian approach to these negotiations and,
more importantly, what should and can be done in order to ensure that
when we reconvene, hopefully in about a month from now, it will become a
more fruitful engagement.
Thank you very much.
MS. YARON: Questions?
Q Several wire service stories this morning quoted an Israeli diplomat
as saying that Israel has no claim on the Golan but is there for
purposes of self-defense and not for reasons of claim on sovereignty. Is
this, indeed, the case?
AMB. RABINOVICH: I I'm not familiar with the statement and with
with the quote, but I I can surmise that such an Israeli explanation
would be given to to draw a by way of, let's say, drawing a
distinction between the Israeli attitude to the West Bank and Gaza and
to the Golan Heights. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza, there is
open sovereignty and there are powerful historic and other claims by the
Jewish people to to those parts. The situation with regard to the
Golan is different, and the the accent of the Israeli position with
regard to the Golan is on security and on the nature of the relationship
nature of the relationship that could be established between Syria
and Israel.
Of course, if belligerency is the order of the day and if belligerency
is not to come to an end, then Israel views the Golan as the as a
territory that has immense security and other importance. If a
relationship of real, genuine peace is a real prospect, then obviously
the Israeli view of the Golan alters as the nature of the relationship
is subject to alteration.
Q I'm sorry, can I just follow it. How does how does that view square
with the 1981 annexation of the Golan by the Israeli government?
AMB. RABINOVICH: There was no annexation. There was an extension of
Israeli law to the to the Golan Heights. You will notice that with
regard to Jerusalem was annexed, and in the case of the Golan Heights
there was an extension of Israeli law to the Golan Heights.
Q Could you please extend the contrast by bringing in Jerusalem and
Israel's view of Jerusalem?
AMB. RABINOVICH: No, I
Q But you you just
AMB. RABINOVICH: I'm I'm here to I'm here to report on
negotiations on the Syrian track, and I think Jerusalem is not in the
Golan Heights, and I don't think I want to expand on the issue of
Jerusalem.
Q The West Bank isn't the Golan Heights, either. You were you were
saying you were making
AMB. RABINOVICH: No, but
Q Look, you can you don't have to answer the question if you don't
want to. You were using the Golan Heights and contrasting it to Israel's
a contrasting view with the West Bank and Golan Heights. And for
logic's sake I thought you might also want to contrast Israel's claim or
lack of claim to the Golan Heights to Israel's claim to Jerusalem. But
it's all right. I just thought you
AMB. RABINOVICH: No, I'll
Q might want to square the circle, that's all.
AMB. RABINOVICH: No. I I'd I'd say this: there's really very
little point in elaborating on these issues now when when the
question of peace and security, these questions have yet to be answered
by the Syrians, and there's no point in engaging in premature putative
hairsplitting.
MS. YARON: (Off mike)
Q You said that the (conference moves on ?) (inaudible) peace, the
nature of security, et cetera, but you said that in the course of these
talks there had been flashes of insight, that each side had allowed the
other into generally what's on their mind. Can you elaborate on that?
AMB. RABINOVICH: Not really. It's not been my custom to bring out
details from the negotiating room into the open, particularly if if
they could become meaningful at some point, I I am very mindful of
our need and desire to brief you as fully as we can, but our primary
commitment is to the success of the negotiations, and I am afraid that
any details that I bring out in this question might harm the progress of
the negotiations at a future point.
Q (Off mike.)
MR. RABINOVICH: Yes. You know, I described for you, I think, a
situation of difficulty in the negotiations, but I hope I did not
portray a bleak picture, and if the picture is not bleak, it is because
there are these glimpses that leave roomion that there could be some
very serious progress once these difficulties are resolved.
MS. YARON: (Off mike.)
Q There has been talk lately about changing or modifying the Madrid
format. Have you discussed this further with the Syrians, and do you
think such a change is warranted at this time?
MR. RABINOVICH: We have not discussed it further and we have not
discussed it initially. There has been no discussion of any changes in
the Madrid format with the Syrians. I would say this about the Madrid
format: that it's not ideal, but it's the one format, first ever in the
history of this conflict, that the parties have been able to agree upon.
And therefore, even if we see some (inaudible word) in the format,
we would not hasten to introduce changes. But there are parties who
advocate or demand changes in this or that aspect of the Madrid format,
and our answer to them is that you cannot change just one particular
aspect, you then have to reexamine the whole format.
Also, you may notice that in the Madrid (written ?) to the Madrid
format is the ability of the parties to agree to a change of pattern,
and if you observe the pattern in which the American peace team has
functioned recently, it's different from what it had been in earlier
rounds, but this was mutually acceptable to the parties and this is, I
think, an instructive illustration of how some flexibility can be added
into the Madrid format.
MS. YARON: (Off mike.)
Q Mr. Ambassador, the Americans seem to have gotten more directly
involved in the Israel-Palestinian track in the last day or so. Has
there been any similar involvement in your track?
MR. RABINOVICH: No. The brief answer is no. The touch of the State
Department, of the US peace team on our track has been light. I think it
has been the judgment that the conditions of (frankness ?) for a higher
profile have not developed, and it would have been premature to do it at
this time. So, the answer is a clear and simple no.
Q Mr. Ambassador, do you think that Dennis Ross and the rest of the
peace team will be able to make any headway with President Assad? And
what do you see as his the points with him on which they can push?
MR. RABINOVICH: On the assumption that an American group of diplomats
headed by Dennis Ross will be they have announced it already? Okay.
So, this having been announced, I'm not sure that President Assad will
be the interlocutor of the American team, and therefore, I would say
with the Syrians rather than President Assad. Yes, I think they can make
headway. I answered with a brief no to Mr. (Hempstead's ?) question
earlier that referred to the role until now, but should they choose to
increase their involvement, I think it could lead to some positive
results, and continuing in the vein that I've used earlier, as long as
this is mutually accepted by the parties to the negotiations. But I
think we have been pleased with the way the US team has introduced some
life and results into the Palestinian track, and I expect that with
mutatis mutandis, that is to say with all the pertinent differences, we
can also benefit from their help in the Syrian-Israeli track.
One last question.
Q Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, during the winter and spring early
spring, there were a lot of stories about how Syria and Israel are
getting closer together and it looked like there might be a
breakthrough. And now we hear that since October there has been no
change in the Syrian position. And I'm wondering whether the Syrian
position about withdrawal first and then we'll talk later about Israeli
problems, is connected with the Palestinian issue, or whether the
Palestinian issue was connected with the Syrian issue. How do we get to
that?
MR. RABINOVICH: Yes, I agree, as I said earlier, there was hope in the
late fall generated by some real progress in the negotiations that this
will continue. And then the Syrian position froze and the same degree of
progress did not occur immediately afterwards, and then we became locked
in place.
But I think it has very little to do with the other tracks. It has to
do, first and foremost, with the Syrian view of this track, with what
they hope to be able to obtain and with what they are willing or are not
willing to offer. It's a very limited relationship with other tracks.
Thank you very much.
END