Further clarification of the cabinet's decision regarding talks with Jordan and the Palestinian issue, are contained in the following foreign policy and security excerpts of this interview.
Q: The Jordanian-Palestinian question was discussed for the first time this week by the Israel government, and the government's concept regarding solution of the issue was published. Can the matter actually be implemented, and are you prepared to spell out what is your own concept regarding this issue?
A: Perhaps I ought to open with a few preliminary sentences. The fact of our having dealt with the Palestinian-Jordanian subject stemmed, to my mind at least, not from its relative importance, but from its topicality. One of the important things generally in approaching any issue, should be the attitude that first we must know the relative importance of the issue within the complex of the entire system. My point of departure was - and from this aspect it has not changed - that the Palestinian issue is not, as others describe it, the focal point of the Israel-Arab conflict. To my mind, the central issue in the Israel-Arab conflict is the system of relations between the Arab states and Israel. They have the strength, they have the ability, and they also possess the capacity to achieve political settlements, and eventually also a peace agreement. They also possess the ability to decide on a different direction -that of war.
In other words. First let us place the Palestinian issue in the right frame. As I see it, it is not the central issue. It may possibly have been so twenty or thirty years ago. At present it is not so. I am now dealing with the entire complex of the Israel-Arab problem, and the Palestinian issue to my mind is therefore secondary in the system of Israel-Arab relations. At the same time, this is one of the issues which require solving and which must determine our approach to the entire complex - and that is how we see it. The fact of the Israel government having dealt with the Palestinian issue just now, stems from its topicality and not from its relative importance in the scale of priorities within the complex of Israel-Arab relations.
My approach to the Palestinian issue is based principally on three points: The first is that solution of the Palestinian issue must be included within the framework of the system of relations between Israel and Jordan. That is to say, should you ask me who is the negotiating partner with whom a solution must be worked out for the issues preferred to as Palestinian, the answer is Jordan.
A second point: I see no room for a third state between Israel and Jordan, since a separate state for the Palestinians - fundamentally and by its very nature - would strive for the destruction of Israel. Its very establishment would imply a priori acceptance that one is setting up an element that is bound to strive for a clash with one - the inference being both in Israel and in Jordan.
And this leads me to the third conclusion: If the first two assumptions are correct, I see no point to political talk of a political solution with a Palestinian body, and it is pointless to say that I am seeking Palestinians who are prepared to talk with me (assuming such exist at all) if I have reached the conclusion that I oppose the establishment of a separate Palestinian state. In fact, we are in daily dialogue with the Palestinians, or with Arabs residing in Judea and Samaria and with the visitors to the country from other Arab countries. But a distinction must be made between this dialogue and political negotiation with them as an independent political entity.
This is my fundamental approach. Moreover: Even if we were to state today that we were prepared for political dialogue with a Palestinian body, it would be illusory to assume that we would be allowed to determine who that body was to be. As aforementioned, however, to me this is a secondary issue, since my point of departure is that there is no room for a separate Palestinian state.
It should be recalled that Jordan is the only Arab state in which the Palestinians became fully integrated before and after the Six-Day War. Nowadays, the Palestinians constitute an integral part - one which is well-nigh inseparable from the life texture - of the kingdom of Jordan. To the best of my recollection, seven of the eleven members of the Jordanian delegation which arrived in Geneva were Palestinians. But they appeared as a Jordanian delegation. This is the fundamental point of departure I mentioned of importance to me: There is no separate Palestinian state, and there is therefore no point to separate Palestinian representation and separate political negotiations.
Q: Certain people claim that there is a substantial difference of wording between your Knesset appearance on 3 June and your statements in the cabinet. We have heard it stated that whereas in the Knesset you laid strong emphasis on the impossibility of a third Arab state, when the vote was held in the cabinet your position was defeated and you remained in a minority. Is this true?
A: There was not a single cabinet member expressing himself in favour of a third state. The question was how to word it - ' whether in a positive or a negative manner. But there were no differences of opinion in the cabinet on this point, that there is no room for a separate Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan. In this there was absolute consensus among all cabinet members who had anything to say on the matter.
Q: What did the Mapam ministers says?
A: It is not customary to say more than I have said.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, will the political discussion held in the cabinet this week lead to a substantial change in the Israel position, which has so far held that continuation of negotiations with Egypt should take precedence, the discussion with Jordan being postponed to a later date?
A: It must be borne in mind that it does not depend on us alone with whom and when negotiations are to be conducted. What we have to set for ourselves are primarily directions of action. When I view the four Arab states bordering on Israel, it stands out that the simplest thing is to open peace negotiations with Lebanon, with whom we have no territorial argument. I am convinced that Israel and Lebanon have a top priority interest to achieve peace. But to come with such a proposal now, would be like attempting to scale a blank wall - for the matter is not realistic. The second state is Syria, whose attitude is more extreme and whose political positions leave no prospect for any positive development. As for Jordan - with her there is a possibility to hold a discussion, should she so desire. With Egypt we have a greater range of manoeuverability - with regard to the ways to promote peace - than with any one of the other three Arab states I have listed. Therefore, were you to ask me what my own position was, I would sum it up as follows: Israel is prepared in principle to enter negotiations for a peace settlement with any Arab state without prior conditions.
I could content myself with that. But I believe that generalized definitions are not enough, and one must decide which directions provide greater prospects. As far as positions and possibilities of range of political manoeuverability are concerned, at present I see two directions: Egypt and Jordan. From past experience, it seems to me that the Arab world has so far not proved itself capable of moving one step towards a settlement with Israel unless Egypt was leading it. I recall no different case throughout the 26 years of Israel's existence. But should it transpire tomorrow that there is a practical possibility of achieving talks with Jordan, or even with Lebanon, we will have to distinguish between hypothetical assumptions and a realistic approach, and look for the practical possibilities. Conclusion: Egypt thus appears to be a candidate for negotiation with a greater degree of probability, followed by Jordan, which in turn is followed by Lebanon and Syria.
When one speaks of the need for Israeli political initiative, it would be advisable to understand that striving for an examination of possibilities does not necessarily have to be done by public proclamations. The correct way is to seek contacts with the Arab states through diplomatic channels. We have no possibility at the moment of achieving direct dialogue with the Arabs, and we are doing it by means of other bodies. Admittedly, this makes the process of dialogue more cumbersome and burdensome.
Q: The government's statement on the Jordanian-Palestinian question says, inter alia: "The government of Israel will work towards negotiations with Jordan." Is this to be interpreted as meaning that Israel will take special steps towards dialogue with Jordan?
A: The initiative, to my mind, is important and should always be examined in a most sober fashion. I do not think that there is a change in this week's cabinet decision on the Jordanian-Palestinian issue. That is to say, there is greater emphasis on readiness, since the impression has been created - rightly. or wrongly - as though Israel does not want negotiations with Jordan. We are prepared to talk with Jordan. The Separation-of-Forces Agreement with Egypt notes that this is a first step towards lasting peace in the Middle East. The government therefore deemed it appropriate to stress that although there is no agreement on separation of forces with Jordan, she, too, is a serious candidate for Israeli peace initiative.
Q: When referring to talks with Jordan, is the implication talks without a separation of forces or concurrently with a separation of forces?
A: At present, the reference is (to talks) with Jordan in the direction of a political settlement, and what are the possibilities? The Jordanian proposal with which we are acquainted via the United States, deals with a geographical separation of forces. Such a separation of forces with Jordan does not appear feasible to us: As may be recalled, it was published that Hussein proposed an Israeli withdrawal to a depth of 8-10 kilometers west of the Jordan. Such a proposal for a separation of forces does not appear feasible to us. On the other hand, other proposals may conceivably be raised. If there are any, we shall examine them on their own merits.
Q: Does Israel have proposals of her own for negotiations with Jordan?
A: There have been ideas which were raised every now and again concerning a functional rather than a geographic separation of forces - namely, that the Israel Defence Forces remain in Judea and Samaria, the Jewish settlement remains extant, and certain civilian spheres of operation are implemented by Jordan. Such proposals have been raised in the past, and may possibly be raised in future. I doubt Jordan's readiness to discuss an overall peace agreement with us at this stage. We have no knowledge of Jordan's readiness to enter at this stage into negotiations on an overall peace agreement.
Q: Do you expect the U.S. to propose that we advance negotiations with Jordan so as to precede the continuation of talks with Egypt?
A: I am not aware of such intentions.
Q: Is there at present any pressure being exerted on Israel by the U.S. with regard to the Jordanian-Palestinian problem?
A: I don't hold with the use of the term 'pressure'. How do you define pressure? From my experience in the United States I realize that the U.S. may state: Our evaluation is this and that. If there will be no move, no political activity, this will lead to a freeze which in turn may deteriorate into war. I do not consider this pressure. This may be the correct presentation of the circumstances in which we find ourselves - in which case Israel must make her own assessment. But I would not want us to create an image of American pressure on Israel. I cannot say that American readiness to aid Israel is not now and again influenced by certain conditions, although, fundamentally, the U.S. is interested in a strong Israel.
Q: Mr. Rabin - the former cabinet, as well as your own, have declared that prior to any agreement with Jordan the matter would be taken to the people'. Would you hold elections, or a referendum, on this specific issue alone? And, to follow up this question: At what point, do your believe, the people should be consulted - prior to the opening of negotiations with Jordan, or before signing an agreement?
A: As I see it, the former government, as well as the present one, have felt free to conduct negotiations with Jordan should a suitable occasion arise. As for consulting the people, and I refer to elections - I repeat: elections, and not a referendum - this will be only if and when the government will have something to put before the people. There is no point in holding elections over an idea. The time for that is when the government will have succeeded in reaching a negotiated agreement with Jordan on an arrangement acceptable to the government. Only prior to the final signature, the people must be consulted.
Q: Talks with King Hussein were conducted also under the government of national unity - even with the agreement of Menahem Begin.
A: I don't concern myself with history. Those are questions you had better put to members of the former government.
Q: There is some concern that the public may one day be facing accomplished facts in the Jordanian-Palestinian question.
A: I can see no possible reason for such concern. I should be happy if we achieved peace with Jordan. I do not believe that there are members of the government who are not guided by concern for our security. Fundamentally, the government is bound to explore and decide on ways that may lead to peace pacts. As for Judea and Samaria -there exists a definite undertaking on the part of the government not to conclude any agreement without first holding elections. It follows that there are no grounds for concern over the possibility of accomplished facts. At present, my main concern is that, in case Jordan should consider Israel's position towards her too extreme, this might push Jordan towards Syria. To my mind, this concern is far more serious than the 'concern' over possible peace with Jordan.
Q: Minister Bar-Lev stated last week, that Israel was prepared to return most of the West Bank to Jordan. Is this also your position?
A: I don't believe that now before negotiations have stated, is the time for drawing geographical lines. As far as any political subject is concerned, every minister represents a political party. The Alignment has a platform on which it went to the electorate. This platform states clearly that Israel is prepared for territorial concessions against a true peace. I personally cannot see any point in defining now the extent of these concessions, their geographical and other details.
Q: Have you lately noted a certain erosion in the American stance on the Palestinian question?
A: This is the situation on the main confrontation fronts in the Israel-Arab conflict: The main sectors of confrontation -Egypt, Syria and Jordan - are quiet. Such acts of hostility as are committed against Israel at present are carried out by the terrorist organizations. The result is the optical illusion of terrorist activity as the central problem. I have no evidence of an erosion in the American stance on the Jordanian-Palestinian question. I also believe that the U.S. feels concern about Jordan because of the affinity that exists between both nations, and I am certain that the U.S. does not wish to undermine the foundations of one of the friendly regimes in the Middle East.
Q: Mt. Prime Minister, without committing yourself - would you say there are fair prospects for reaching any kind of agreement with Jordan?
A: My experience in the army and the foreign service, as well as my brief experience in my present office have driven me to the conclusion that one should not engage in prophesies. I prefer to seek ways to progress in directions I consider worthwhile.
Q: Can you tell us something about the way the promises given at the time of President Nixon's visit to this region were kept? I refer, of course, to promises in the military and economic field.
A: We should be exact about this: At the time of President Nixon's visit to Israel, no promises were given as to quantities of arms. What was discussed were long-range equipment targets. It was agreed to deal with these subjects by a certain method. In this connection: Shortly afterwards, the Minister of Defence visited the U.S., and an Israeli military mission is soon to follow. Even the President of the United States cannot decide on details without preparatory work, without checking possibilities, conclusions and supply dates. Long-range supply targets were agreed upon. As for the budgetary-financial aspect, it must be borne in mind that the U.S. President is not authorized to confirm allocations without approval of Congress, which bears the responsibility for financial allocations. Even after the visit of the Secretary of the Treasury, there is still no certainty that our financial requests will be fulfilled. In this field, in particular, we shall have to conduct a political and an information campaign, since the amounts concerned exceed by far the scope of past allocations. Those are large amounts even by American standards.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, do you believe that Israel is threatened with all-out war, and if so - what is the critical period?
A: During my term of duty as Chief of Staff I learned not to make any predictions regarding the timing of war in this region. My initial assumption is, that the danger of renewed hostilities is ever present. We must always be prepared to activate the existing military force, and must invest extraordinary efforts and means to increase our military strength. Our preparedness for war must continue quite apart from all efforts for progress through peaceful means. Peace or political arrangements must be pursued with energy and initiative, without any connection with our preparations for the eventuality of war. I would put it this way: The better we are prepared for war, the better our prospects for preventing it. The stronger we are in our readiness for war, the greater our chances for avoiding war -and we certainly shall not find ourselves in a situation where we'll be taken by surprise. This is why I consider the effort to maintain that preparedness our principal objective for the near future. There is a timetable for the extension of the mandate of the U.N. Emergency Forces posted between Israel and Egypt, and the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force stationed between Israel and Syria. Obviously, tension will mount towards that date, but we must be ready at all times. It is true that there are specially critical periods, and it is always possible than an attempt will be made to catch us unawares. This is why I said that we must never think in terms of dates or periods of time - just as we must not ignore them. Our military effort must be maximal, and we must be fully alert at all times.
Q: Mr. Rabin - what is the purpose of the mission to Washington of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Does he carry with him any new ideas?
A: The Foreign Minister's visit to Washington was agreed upon at the time of President Nixon's visit to Israel. At that time, we also decided on a number of steps for the realization of matters agreed upon in talks with President Nixon. The purpose of this visit will mainly be an exchange of views and opinions. We also expect that the U.S. will have a clearer concept of the Arab countries' position on various political subjects.
Q. And what about your own visit to the U.S.A.?
A: As for my visit, no date has yet been set, and I do not at Present, see any reason for advancing it. At this point, I believe it will be preferable to await the results of the Foreign Minister's visit, and of events in Egypt, Syria and Jordan. A Prime Minister's visit is justified only inasfar as there are practical decisions to be taken.
Q: What are the prospects for a resumption of relations between Israel and the U.S.S.R.? Recently, rumours have been circulating again on this subject.
A: As you will recall, it was not Israel that cut off relations with the Soviet Union, Israel has always followed a policy of maintaining diplomatic relations with all nations throughout the world. Israel believes that maintenance of contact is preferable to severance of contact. At the same time - should the Soviet Union wish to resume relations, it is no doubt aware of how to go about it.
Q: In your opinion, has there been any change for the better in relations between Israel and France since the rise of power of Valerie Giscard-D'Estaing?
A: I think that is something which it is still too early to evaluate. But I hope that in Europe there will be a slow development in Israel's favour. The changes in personnel, and political changes, which have come about in a number of European states may offer a prospect for progress and improvement, albeit not rapid. I am looking forward to a change in the political stance of Europe, which today vis-a-vis Israel is negative. The declaration of the nine members of the E.E.C. last November in effect accepts the Arabs position on the political issue in everything regarding the Israel-Arab conflict. I see no prospect of a formal amendment of this document in the near future. I do expect less European adherence to it as well as a lessening of political activity in an attempt to put it over. I am convinced that Europe will show more understanding of Israel's economic requirements, because Europe after all is the main market for our products. Our balance of trade with Europe amounts to a billion dollar deficit on our part. I would consider progress in the sphere of economic relations with Europe an important aim of Israel policy.
Q: Let's get back for a moment to the subject of relations between Israel and the Soviet Union. Would you say that lately there has been no probe on the part of the Russians towards renewing relations with us?
A: I would say that on the part of the Russians there has been no serious probe.
Q: Do you believe that Egypt genuinely and sincerely wants some sort of settlement with Israel?
A: As far as I know Egypt is willing to arrive at a settlement with Israel on the basis of a complete Israel withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967 and the creation of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza strip. Now, if you ask me - won't such an arrangement bring peace and permit Israel's survival? - My answer is clearly no. If you ask me - isn't Egypt today prepared to arrive at a settlement with Israel, one which will give us peace and security? - my answer is again no. Therefore the course which we are seeking is to ascertain the extent to which there is a prospect of bringing about a change in the Egyptians' position, in their attitude to an overall settlement, and to what extent it will be possible to advance towards an overall settlement which we could accept in stages. In general: If we accepted the standpoint of Egypt and perhaps that of other Arab states, as transmitted in diplomatic contacts, we could easily conclude that diplomatic efforts are pointless. The gap between their positions and what I myself can accept - and I do not belong to the Land of Israel Movement - is too large to be bridged by the usual diplomatic process. But I think that along with recognition of this fact, Israel cannot allow itself not to seek out every path nor to probe time and again to what extent the gap can be bridged all the same. And the fact that we know that the gap is so great must under no circumstances induce us to drop our activity aimed at seeking solutions - even if the process of seeking solutions and contacts is long drawn out. I think we need this first of all for ourselves. I believe that we want peace and that merely declaring that we want peace is not enough.
Another thing: I think that a total standstill in diplomatic activity increases the prospect of renewed hostilities. It may be that despite all our efforts we will not succeed in preventing renewed hostilities. But we must be convinced that we have indeed made every effort to advance towards a settlement.
A third thing: We must earn good will and understanding even on the part of our friends in other countries, the United States in particular. I think that our diplomatic activity has a practical effect on promoting our ability to become stronger. Therefore, as long as we see to it that such diplomatic activity does not lead us to decisions we cannot accept - and there is no reason why this should come about - we must carry on with it despite what we hear about the standpoints of our enemies.
Q: What is the government's policy on the issue of settlement in the Administered Territories? Where is it permissible to settle, and by whom?
A: The government, on the basis of its published platform, is continuing with a policy of settlement in accordance with the possibilities and needs that arise from time to time. I think the areas which will have priority in the future will be the Rafiah salient, the Golan Heights and certain places in Judea and Samaria. At this stage I am not in favour of settlement in Nablus, nor is it by accident that settlement in that area has been prevented for the past seven years by the various different governments.