In this wide ranging interview, the Prime Minister discussed the possibility of negotiations with Jordan, the role of the U.S. in such talks, the effect of the separation of forces arrangements with Egypt and Syria and the intensive re-armament of the Arab countries and in particular of Syria. Excerpts:
Q: Mr. Rabin, what are the expected repercussions of the change of presidents in the U.S. for that country, and for the State of Israel and our region - do you anticipate changes in U.S. policy, and if so - what changes, and when? Let me also ask you, as one who knew the new president, President Ford, personally in his capacity and Republican minority leader in Congress, and you as Israel's Ambassador in Washington - what were your personal impressions?
A: I do not believe that the change of presidents will cause significant changes in American policy in various spheres, including the U.S. stance on the Middle East.
I believe that U.S. policy is being shaped first and foremost according to the needs of the United States - the attitude that reigned during the period of President Nixon's administration. A policy of "what is good for the U.S. from her point of view" and, of course, the understanding and friendship of the American people towards Israel.
This is why I expect that, essentially, U.S. policy will undergo no change, at least during the early phases, and probably even later. A change of U.S. presidents is an internal American affair, resulting from internal political causes, as such does not call for Israeli comment.
On the occasion of 'President Nixon's resignation we should remember without any connection with the reasons and circumstances that have lead to his resignation, his powerful support and the understanding he showed for Israel's needs during his term of office as U.S. president and on this account Israel owes him a debt of gratitude also at this fateful juncture in his life.
As for the new President. He is no newcomer on the American political scene. I had occasion to meet him, and I am aware of his opinions, at least at that time. I think his statements at various period speak for themselves, and I need not add to them.
We must remember that, for the past thirty years, it has been our experience that with the appointment of each new president of the United States the Soviet Union would pose some test, some challenge, in order to test his mettle, stability, his power of decision and so forth. This is another factor we must take into account, also with regard to the Middle East.
Q: Is your forthcoming visit to Washington likely to be postponed as a result of latest developments in the U.S.?
A: My planned visit was initiated by the outgoing President, who invited me following his tour of the Middle East and his visit to Israel. I cannot say whether it will be postponed
in any case, no fixed date has been set for my visit.
Q: To go by statements made in recent weeks by the Secretary of State, some kind of time-table for American initiatives has evolved - first, the visits to Washington by foreign ministers from our region, then the visits of heads of states - and finally, the forthcoming Geneva Conference. Do you expect that, as a result of the latest developments in Washington, there may be postponements, a slow-down in the envisaged American initiative?
A: I cannot answer that with any certainty. The first phase of foreign ministers' visits is proceeding this month. As you know, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yigal Allon, visited Washington. Presently, the Prime Minister of Jordan and her Foreign Minister are there and, as far as I know, also a representative of Syria. Next week, or within a fortnight, they are to be followed by the foreign minister of Egypt, so this phase, at any rate, is going forward according to plan.
As for the future, I suppose the U.S. objective will be to maintain the process of dialogue, although we cannot say today what time-table that process will follow. The first phase will probably be followed by one of further clarifications, nor do I think the U.S. has a clearly defined time-table. Much depends on the outcome of various developments.
Q: Still on the subject of the United States - though not the topical, but a more basic subject: That of American aid. What should we expect, what can you tell us about things that are to materialize in the near - or perhaps in the more distant - future, what do we want and what are we asking for?
A: Israel has in fact requested American aid in the following spheres: First of all, to ensure the supply of arms, the arms required by Israel in the face of continuing large-scale Soviet arms-supplies, especially - but not exclusively - to Syria. I believe the U.S. will continue its policy of supplying arms to Israel, and obviously I do not intend to go into details on this subject. The second sphere (of U.S. support) is financial aid, which is, first of all, intended to enable Israel to purchase the arms required for her defence - and this involved considerable amounts.
Decisions to grant financial aid are, as you know, approved by Congress, and according to normal procedure, these decisions are based on an annual budget. Our efforts to arrive at long-range plans are encountering objective difficulties which are unconnected with U.S. - Israel relations, but rather depend on accepted legal procedures such as govern also the United States' own budgets.
The third sphere is the field of economic cooperation. Israel must enlarge and strengthen her industrial infrastructure, and during President Nixon's visit, our joint statement made mention of this need. Then followed the visit of the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, and I believe that agreements reached during these visits will grow in substance. I visualize joint American-Israeli action in the extension of economic cooperation regarding U.S. support of investments in Israel, know-how agreements and, in equal measure, I trust, also the development of commercial relations.
The fourth sphere is that of U.S. political support. We do not have many friends, and great importance attaches to continued rapport and understanding between the U.S. and Israel regarding future moves in the political arena.
Israel has at present no way of arriving at direct dialogue with the Arab countries, and experience has shown that the best way to indirect dialogue is through the good offices of the United States. Of course, direct talks are always preferable to talks via a third party. It is important, therefore, to maintain intimate contact with the U.S., even though, now and then, there are differences of opinion.
I trust we shall succeed in the continuation of dialogue, which will ensure that the U.S. will not follow its own initiative regarding the contents of arrangements, but rather make available its good offices for the maintenance of contacts between us and those Arab states that will agree to bilateral dialogue with Israel.
Q: Referring to initiatives, there is a feeling, deriving chiefly from the news-media, that in talks with the Americans there is a continuing emphasis on the need to initiate contacts with Jordan. The Jordanians, it is said, are suggesting a separation of forces agreement whose main point is a ten kilometer withdrawal from the Jordan. What is the Israeli stand regarding these contacts, and regarding the sort of agreement possible with Jordan?
A: Israel is primarily interested in creating a possibility of dialogue between us and each of the neighbouring Arab states. We have always said that we are prepared for peace negotiations with every Arab state, without prior conditions. Therefore, we would be happy should an Arab state arise and declare: We are ready to talk with you.
I do not think that the U.S.A. is presently trying to influence us as to which state to choose. However I think that if we study the possible alternatives in a sober and realistic manner, it is difficult to imagine that we can start peace negotiations with Lebanon, even though no territorial disputes are involved. This is not because we are not willing, but because it is doubtful whether an approach to Lebanon would be an approach to the right address.
Concerning Syria, her stance is the most extreme among the Arab states bordering on Israel, and what with recent Syrian statements and accelerated military build-up, it is doubtful whether Syria is the right address for a realistic approach, as the state that would lead the Arab world towards peace.
There remain, therefore, two states: Egypt and Jordan. It is too early to assess with which state we will negotiate first, and prefer to defer this decision until we shall know the results of American clarifications with those countries' representatives.
Q: By the way - have you changed your public assessment that (in this connection) the Americans have in the past preferred Egypt to Jordan?
A: No doubt everyone is aware of the fact - borne out by experience - that Egypt would be preferable as a leader in any serious advance towards settlements with the Arabs states but history does not necessarily repeat itself, there may be changes.
With regard to the publicized Jordanian suggestion concerning separation of forces that would involve an Israeli withdrawal - I have already said more than once: Israel does not regard this as a suggestion that can serve as a basis for negotiations.
Q: To continue on the subject of the negotiations that have begun - or have not begun - with the Syrians and the Egyptians. Do you consider that the Syrians and Egyptians at present are maintaining the spirit and the letter of the separation of forces agreements? Are they, for example, settling civilians in the territories that they have received -Kuneitra, the Suez Canal areas?
A: There are two parts to the separation of forces agreements: There is the military, and the civilian part which, although not included in a detailed manner in the agreements themselves, was understood at the time to form part of the separation of forces agreements, I would say, in general, that the military part has been carried out in accordance with the spirit of the agreements. Here and there, there are breaches of the agreement. We are dealing with this by submitting complaints, etc., but, in principle, the military part of the separation of forces agreements is being kept. There is a difference between Egypt and Syria with regard to the civilian part. The Egyptians are engaged in clearing the Suez Canal and preparing it for international shipping. They are also working on the rehabilitation of the canal towns and their repopulation.
Concerning Syria - everything connected with the civilian part is being executed in a limited fashion. Those sections that were part of the enclave captured by the I.D.F. in the Yom-Kippur War are in the process of resettlement. This does not apply to Kuneitra. The Syrians have, themselves, on various occasions announced that there is much doubt as to whether they would put civilians into Kuneitra again. They would defer their decision until they could assess developments following the next stage of political negotiations.
Q: If the picture, as presented by the government, shows a military strengthening by the Arab states, could you perhaps comment on the strategic and geo-strategic significance of the enormous rearmament of the Arab states east of Israel which you have emphasized recently - i.e., their turning into a military power of Egypt's size.
A: The picture that evolves shows that Syria has increased her military strength. Syria is also working for the integration of Iraq's and Jordan's military power into a single framework. Also in the past, there existed an eastern front which was abolished after Syria's attempt to invade Jordan in 1970. This most certainly also affected developments in the Yom-Kippur War, when Jordan did not join the war at her line of confrontation with Israel. The picture that evolves shows, that a military force has been created that is increasing and growing in strength, and could eventually surpass that of Egypt. One should remember that this force is situated closer to Israeli population centres, and the distance between the dividing lines, between those forces and Israel, is less than that between the lines separating Egypt and Israel today. This is why we had to take this difference into consideration, which will influence Israeli policy and defensive deployment. We will do everything within our power to prevent the establishment of an eastern front and, in addition, we shall have to take into account the possibility that this front will come into being in spite of all our efforts.
Q: In your speech in the Knesset this week you emphasized that the Israeli government does not favour a continuation of the 'no peace' situation and that Israeli policy is to speed up negotiations with each one of the Arab states. Perhaps you could specify what the government is doing in order to accelerate the process. Do you see any real time-table for the start of genuine contacts?
A: In my opinion there is no contradiction between the Israeli objective - to work on every prospect that leads towards peace - and, on the other hand, accelerated preparation for the possible event of war.
I consider this two sides of the same coin, which symbolizes the reality in which we live. Israel is ready and eager to exploit every approach in order to reach a dialogue with the Arab states. Lacking the chance for such dialogue, we are trying to test the possibility of dialogue through a third party. We cannot pursue peace if there is no parallel desire for it on the other side. Therefore, through a third party - in this case, first and foremost, the U.S.A. - we try to find out in which states, and to what degree, there is a parallel readiness to advance towards peace.
This is what can be done. This is what we are going.
Q: It appears that once again ambivalent voices are heard in Egypt - almost a turnabout: Recent Egyptian statements concerning the West Bank during the meeting with Hussein and afterwards, show evidence of this. The Egyptian president has lately alternated between moderate and extreme speeches. What is your assessment of the exact and true intentions of the president of Egypt?
A: I would not say that I am certain of his true intentions. I assume that Egypt is ready to follow the road of political negotiations.
I do not want to define today with certainty whether this readiness will be such as to achieve an understanding with Israel. Egyptian demands may be unacceptable to Israel. Therefore, I see a chance in the Egyptian direction. I see a possibility and a reason to seek a dialogue with Egypt, despite the recurring ambivalence in the statements of Egyptian leaders.
In addition, we must also be aware that a political reality may develop in which we could not reach a settlement with Egypt, and then anything could happen. That is why we must also make speedy preparations for that eventuality.