On the motion of the Likud, the Knesset on 28 August held a debate on the joint U.S.Jordan communique of 18 August and over rumours about possible Israel-Jordan negotiations for a separation of forces agreement. Replying to the motion, Mr. Allon, who had visited the United States in late July, explained the position of the government and reported on clarifications which were sought and received from Secretary of State Kissinger. Text:
Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,
Some recent statements by several opposition spokesmen, including Mr. Landau's remarks today, are liable to create the impression that there is no government more hostile to Israel than the government of the United States, and that we have no greater enemy than the American Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger. Permit me, therefore, to emphasize once again the simple, solid truth, which ought to be obvious to all: There is no power more friendly to Israel than the United States, which we all esteem for its faithful support in our most difficult hours.
I said "friendly to us." But, as you no doubt noticed, I did not say "subordinate to us." Strange as it may seem, the United States, too, apparently enjoys a certain measure of independence in its thinking and action, and it too, it appears, may be permitted to have some interests and views of its own. The close and ramified system of relationships between the United States and Israel must, therefore, be understood, grasped and judged in realistic political terms and not in terms taken from some other world which does not exist at all. In other words, there will no doubt be, in the future as in the past, differences of opinion between the United States and Israel on this question or that, there have been, and no doubt there will yet be, arguments between us on certain subjects, some of them not easy ones.
But these phenomena are an inseparable part of every system of relationships between sovereign nations. The main thing is that they do not affect that foundation of friendship, that most firm and friendly foundation, upon which the relations between the strongest power in the world and ourselves are based. When it is necessary to argue, we will argue, when it is necessary to insist on our own view, we will insist upon it with all our determination, as we do. Let us not turn side issues into the main thing. Let us not turn a fault, a misunderstanding, even an argument between ourselves and the United States into something -that is supposed to threaten the essence of the friendship and goodwill that characterize the relations between the two countries.
The same applies to Dr. Kissinger, whom, I believe, there are some who try to describe, for some reason, as an enemy of the people of Israel. Despite all the criticism, indignation and fury - shocking in their lack of proportion - in regard to some of the American Secretary of State's recent moves, he is a true friend to Israel, who has shown this friendship in practice in hours of trial.
Here, too, it may not be superfluous to recall that Dr. Kissinger is still the foreign minister of the United States and not of Israel, and that he represents American aspirations and interests as they appear to him, and not ours. Even with him, therefore, there have been subjects, and no doubt there will yet be subjects, on which we do not see eye to eye, and there will be debates between us. Even with him we shall no doubt yet have differences of opinion and arguments, some of them acute, but I am perfectly confident that these will take place on the solid foundation of loyal friendship and with the utmost goodwill and good intentions towards us.
As a brilliant statesman, a great statesman, with an original style of his own, there may be some of Dr. Kissinger's moves and tactics which some of us may not like from time to time. I too, as I shall explain later, am not always happy about some steps he takes or some statements that he sees fit to make. This is, perhaps, in the nature of creative statesmanship, which pries to find constructive meeting points between opposed interests enveloped in suspicion. It is political wisdom, therefore, not to bestow blind trust even upon the best friend and to scrutinize even his moves in the light of our vital interests, but not on any account to suspect and denounce any of his moves in advance and not to try to turn him from a friend into a so-called enemy.
After all, if we want to exhaust every prospect of a political settlement and peaceful processes in the region, we shall not find for this purpose a more faithful ally than the United States or a more talented and friendly personality than Dr. Kissinger - just as if heaven forbid - we are fated to have another war, we shall find no better and firmer friends at our side than they.
Members of the Knesset, it is no secret that the use made of the term "separation of forces" in the joint statement of President Ford and King Hussein on 18 August 1974 did not meet with the approval of the government of Israel. This term, with the meaning attached to it by the government of Jordan - namely, Israeli withdrawal along the length of the Jordan valley - has been categorically rejected by us.
This was made clear to the government of the United States in the most unambiguous fashion - inter alia at the time of my visit to Washington at the end of last month. Israel, therefore, had good reason to be surprised at, and to object to, the mention of this term in the joint American-Jordanian statement, in case it might be incorrectly interpreted by Arab factors, even if it was done in the indirect and noncommittal form in which it was done. And the government, indeed, acted accordingly as soon as the text of the statement was known - both in my message to the American Secretary of State and in the public statement of the Foreign Ministry spokesman.
As has already been reported, the American Secretary of State sent me a message in reply. For obvious reasons I do not feel entitled to repeat the content of this message in public in plenary session of the Knesset. But truth compels me to say that there were direct, important and satisfactory clarifications. It is these binding clarifications which count as far as we are concerned in regard to the continuation of the political moves, and as such they are satisfactory.
Furthermore, on the following day, 19 August 1974, appearing at a public press conference, Dr. Kissinger made it clear in connection with this question that there are many versions of separation plans between Jordan and Israel and the American-Jordanian statement does not indicate support by the United States for any one of the plans. We should also take note of these words.
In brief it may be regretted that the United States saw fit to mention the term "separation agreement" at all in its joint statement with Jordan. But on no account should the matter be blown up out of all proportion - certainly not after the positive clarifications that we have received. And I can only wonder at the superfluous hullabaloo that some people have tried to raise around this subject.
There is still more reason to wonder at the tumult of criticism inordinately exaggerated which has been heard in connection with the invitation to the Prime Minister to visit Washington. Let us examine the facts as they are. The subject itself, the Prime Minister's visit to Washington has been on the agenda, as is well known for some time. As far back as in the joint statement made by President Nixon and Prime Minister Rabin on 17 June 1974 it was stated: "The President invited Prime Minister Rabin to pay an early visit to Washington." After the change in the United States presidency, President Ford as is known sent a letter to the Prime Minister in which the invitation was renewed in these words: "I expect to see you personally when you come to Washington later this summer." By the way according to American concepts the summer comes to an end at the beginning of September.
We made no objection to the text of these invitations. We approved them, and with a little goodwill it may be assumed that the United States government felt entitled to understand that the time of the visit was indeed acceptable to the government of Israel. It is true that before Dr. Kissinger replied as he did on this subject in answer to a question put to him at a press conference namely that the Prime Minister of Israel had been invited to Washington for talks with the president of the United States in the first half of September, it would have been proper for the exact dates to be agreed with the government of Israel before being mentioned in public. But to transform this marginal matter into something of fateful importance, as it were in American-Israeli relations or in the American Secretary of State's attitude to us - that is worse than a blunder. That is a harmful folly. God alone who understands human complexes can explain it.
Furthermore, in the circumstances created with the change in the American presidency and after the visits by Arab statesmen to Washington it would be possible to enumerate a long list of serious reasons purely from the Israel point of view in favour of the holding of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington at this time.
To sum up: Even if it is possible to find some inappropriate features in the two cases referred to things are very far - very, very far from the dark picture that Mr. Landau has tried to paint.
We are in the midst of a long difficult and complex political struggle, when the threat of war also hangs over our heads all the time. It is very possible that we are living now in one of the most complex and difficult periods in the history of Israel. In order to confront the challenges of this period we shall have to follow the utmost emotional stability, clear thinking, strong nerves and a sober and balanced view of reality: Neither rosier than it is nor darker than it is. To my regret in the opposition's attempt to terrify the public, as if the United States were on the very brink of selling us down the river so to speak, we cannot find a single one of these essential qualities.
Members of the Knesset, since several of the facts and details involved in this debate cannot be publicly revealed and discussed, I move to refer the subject to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee.