In this wide ranging interview, Mr. Rabin evaluated the results of his visit to Washington as well as Israel's foreign policy objectives. He also elaborated on issues such as the military balance of power, possible negotiations with Syria and Egypt, relations with Jordan and the idea of a Palestinian state. Excerpts:
Q: After 26 years of independence, Israel is dependent, more than at any other time in the past, upon arms supplies from the United States, including economic aid. What, in your opinion, is the limit of this dependence, beyond which Israel will be deprived of the possibility to resist American pressure - and do you see a chance of reducing this dependence? If so, in what way can this be done and when?
A: The system of relations between the United States and Israel is based on many components. One central tenet of the U.S. approach to Israel is the fact that the Americans see in Israel a sort of expression of freedom of thought and of the democratic way of life as they know it. In many non-Jewish circles we can also find the religious affinity. As ambassador to the United States I occasionally happened to be in regions where there were no Jews, and found a feeling of sympathy for Israel - which is not motivated by any interested considerations. There are also circles in the American public which see Israel as a brake against the Soviet Union, but also that of a totalitarian way of thought, which is diametrically opposed to the American way of thought. There are other considerations as well.
These facts prove that there is still a firm basis for friendship between the two countries. It should be borne in mind that in the United States, which is a democratic country, the politically self-interested attitude is determined not by self-interested considerations of the administration, but also by the administration's appraisal of the degree of public support for a policy of aiding Israel.
I would like to add that the U.S. has become accustomed, over the years, to extend considerable assistance and to realise that this fact does not necessarily confer upon her the right to dictate policy to those who receive this assistance. Let us examine the history of American aid since the Second World War. Had it not been for American aid and America's massive participation in the war, it is doubtful whether Germany would have been defeated. Europe was rebuilt and restored - economically speaking - with the great assistance of America. Japan was defeated almost exclusively by the United States and she was rehabilitated, both economically and socially, by the United States. Is there evidence, today, of demands being made in America to dictate their respective policy to those two parts of the world? America fought in Korea, she fought in Vietnam. I am not aware that America is totally dictating the policies of these countries. And this certainly applies where Israel is concerned, where we have no demand for any fighting to be done by America: The request is merely one for assistance, something the American nation has become accustomed to extend - accustomed, also, to greater disappointments at the hands of others they have helped than from Israel.
This is why I have no doubt that we shall be involved in a continuous struggle for financial, defence and political support, maintaining, at the same time, Israel's political manoeuverability. This is no one-time achievement - it is a permanent struggle, and should be seen as such. If we conduct our affairs wisely, I believe that this situation may continue, since we have arrived at a larger measure of understanding than ever before in the entire fabric of Israel's relationship with the United States. I do not refer to this or that detail.
Asked how Israel should react in face of the rapprochement between the U.S. and Egypt, the Prime Minister said: I do not want to return to a state of affairs where the Arab world would turn to the Soviet Union, because an appeal to the Soviet Union would mean a renewed trend towards a military option.
I believe that the U.S. has not forgotten her decisive role in the period preceding the October War, and knows that the existence of a strong Israel is the main guarantee for a continuation of this process. That is to say that, in order to ensure a positive development from the Israel - and I trust, also from the American - point of view, conditions must be created which will convince the Arab states that the solution to the conflict lies in the political approach. In order to ensure this, we must, on one hand, maintain a reasonable political process, and on the other, a strong Israel. Without a strong Israel, there is no point whatsoever in the continuation of the political process.
Q: Do you think that the U.S. sees things in the same light?
A: Fundamentally, I believe it does. As for strengthening Israel, there are perhaps discussions on quantities or timetables for the supply of arms. On the second level, the question is: What the approach should be to a political solution. That is to say, there is no dispute in, principle: We are discussing the approach and the pace of translating these principles into practice.
Q: Do you assume that the view exists in the administration that, thank to Israel's presence, or through the medium of Israel, the U.S. is strengthening her position in the Arab countries?
A: I trust and believe the U.S. is sufficiently realistic to realize that this process is still in its beginnings, and that without a strong Israel, and an Israel prepared for negotiations (but not at all costs), the Americans cannot strengthen their position either, even in the Arab world.
Q: Do you believe the Israeli public is sufficiently aware of our dependence on the United States?
A: I dislike the term dependence. The correct term is: Receiving aid from the U.S. As I already mentioned, U.S. support in terms of arms and financial aid is steadily increasing, and the reason for this is Arab rearmament and wealth. I do not believe the Israeli public appreciates and realizes the full extent of U.S. support required by Israel. An attempt is being made, mainly by the opposition parties, to persuade people that this support is assured, irrespective of any steps Israel may take. This is an error, a basic error. Israel is free to act in striving for peace, but to cause a deadlock by taking a rigid stance of "not one inch" may affect the foundations of the U.S. readiness to support Israel.
Another aspect is touched on in the question, namely: You cannot strive for and foster political independence without, at the same time, doing everything to ensure that the need for U.S. support will not increase to such dimensions as to arouse doubt whether it will be met. Secondly, the Americans also feel, to some extent, entitled to press their points more forcefully the larger the extent of their support.
Q: Would you agree that your attitude towards American mediation is less yielding, and more sceptical, than that of the government which negotiated the disengagement with Dr. Kissinger?
A: We must distinguish between those negotiations and the talks we are facing now. The separation of forces negotiations concerned mainly an agreement which the Arabs, at least, could define as a military agreement. This is also why Egypt and Syria in sisted that the agreements should be signed by army officers. The forthcoming negotiations - with Egypt, Syria, and I believe also with Jordan and Lebanon - are political by their very nature because I see the negotiations for the future as political talks, aimed at bringing about peace. Various territorial questions will be examined in the context of general progress towards peace.
Such negotiations are, by their very nature, more difficult, more complicated and involved than disengagement talks. The problem is not Israel-U.S. relations, the difference is in the subject, the nature of the negotiations, and not the way in which they are to be conducted.
Q: Does the occasional difference between public feeling and aspirations on one hand, and what the administration considers at a given moment to be in the national interest - does this (gap) exist also in Israel, and does it constitute a serious impediment for the government in one sphere or another?
A: I believe that no democratic regime can ignore public opinion. As soon as an administration feels that there is some conflict - big or small - it must do everything to prove that the line it believes to be right is the correct one, and must try to influence public opinion (to that effect).
Q: When, in your estimate will the Arab countries be ready from a military point for another round?
A: I do not believe there is such a military term as absolute readiness for war. I know no army anywhere which goes to war in the conviction that it is completely prepared for war. The decision to fight, in the Arab countries too, is taken at the political level, which evaluate the military prospects as well as the political considerations involved. This is why I do not believe anyone can say: At this and this date, the army will be ready for war, and we must therefore prepare for the moment when war will break out.
Q: Since the October War, there has been a process of rearmament on both sides in Israel as well as in the Arab camp. Is the military power balance today more favourable, from Israel's point of view, than at the time of the Yom Kippur War? Perhaps you could also give a long-range estimate of the military balance of conventional forces.
A: The IDF's plan for building up its forces is aimed at maintaining the balance of forces and, in certain fields, improving it. As for equipment, I shall certainly not go into details here. In order to realize the full programme, we shall have to assert ourselves in the U.S. and make demands on ourselves by allocating manpower and resources so as to turn equipment into strength. When all these are realized, we shall be in a favourable situation.
Q: How much of our security situation would you ascribe to the component of borders?
A: Undoubtedly geographic depth and topographical features are of the utmost importance, even in a situation of sophisticated conventional armaments in the region. However I have no doubt whatsoever that, in order to remove or reduce the danger of a military confrontation, it is important to advance towards peace - and there can be no progress towards peace without territorial compromise.
Q: Do you think that a border which is more advantageous for Israel's defence could be a better motivation for an Arab attack?
A: One must differentiate here between two spheres. In the more limited military sense, the present lines are better than any other lines that we might perhaps have to take if we attain peace. But since the striving (for peace) is the fundamental solution to the problem, there is no alternative but to take a reasonable risk in order to attain peace.
Q: Is the establishment of settlements on the Golan Heights of value in terms of security or is it only of political value?
A: Settlement of the Golan Heights was undertaken on the strength of government decisions in the assumption that it expresses the decision to maintain the Golan in our hands.
Q: How do you evaluate the chances that extremist Syria, which ostensibly has nothing to gain from Israel, will drag Egypt, which today is more moderate, into a war?
A: What Syria stands to gain from Israel is peace, if she wishes to go into peace negotiations with Israel. We have always said that we are prepared to hold negotiations for peace, without prior conditions, with any of our neighbors.
I should not be surprised if one of Syria's aims at a certain stage will perhaps be to drag the Arab states into another war. Again, I do not want to say when this might be. I do not believe that it will be before it is proved that there are no chances for political progress. I hope that the Syrians do not think this. But I am not sure, I would like to believe that the Arab states will make the most of the chance to advance towards peace before they are tempted by Syria, if indeed Syria is thinking along those lines.
Q: What could Syria receive from Israel?
A: Peace.
Q: What kind of peace? They are not satisfied with peace. They want peace and something more.
A: If the Syrians said: 'We are prepared to enter peace talks' - it would be possible to negotiate, even though I see no possibility of our giving up the Golan Heights. I believe that even under a peace treaty, the Golan Heights should be within Israel's jurisdiction. I stress: the Golan Heights.
Q: Do you think it possible that the Egyptians will not be drawn willingly by the Syrians into war, if they fail to get what they want from us in the south?
A: In my view, though we must bear in mind our evaluation (of what the Arabs want) it must be put to the test in negotiations. As we are not in a position to do so directly today, I prefer that it be done through the United States. I cannot think of any better substitute for direct negotiations than to go through the United States. I believe that we should continue to examine which of the Arab states is prepared for what, but bear in mind that the basis today is -political negotiations with the purpose of attaining peace or attaining an important stage in the advance towards peace.
Q: What is your evaluation of relations between the USSR and Egypt? Will Moscow acquiesce with having its influence reduced in Cairo, or is it devising new schemes to undermine the gains -temporary gains perhaps - of Dr. Kissinger?
A: I shouldn't be surprised if, in the inter-power struggle for influence in the Arab world, the USSR continues to seek ways to restore its leading role in Egypt too. It is only natural to assume that it will do so.
Q: Is there an order of priorities in the political negotiations with Jordan or Egypt?
A: We want peace - where it is possible to reach a total agreement, this is to be welcomed. But I know that the Arabs would reject that today. There are several countries with which it is possible to make progress in stages. Where Syria is concerned, I don't see any possibility of advancing in stages. But where Egypt and Jordan are concerned, it is possible to advance towards peace in stages, as part of negotiations and a political settlement.
We are prepared to negotiate with both. Naturally, America's interest (which in my opinion coincides with ours) in the continuation of Egypt's isolation from the USSR, would lead to efforts towards negotiations with Egypt. Israel is prepared for negotiations without preconditions for a peace agreement, with any Arab country, under existing conditions. I think it is possible to advance towards an overall settlement - or in stages, without going into detail -with Egypt and with Jordan. As far as preference is concerned, we are ready for either one.
Q: Is Jordan's rejection of the proposal of a functional settlement final?
A: As far as we know, the Jordanians are currently insisting on disengagement. Disengagement, as they define it, means 'unilateral Israeli withdrawal without concessions from the other side. As part of a military, and only military, settlement, there is no reason for Israel to agree to this.
Q: Do we have any general agreement with the U.S. on the question of peace or timing?
A: This will require a long period of clarification, and I would be happy to be proven wrong. Negotiations between Israel and any one of the neighbouring Arab countries must be conducted on a mutual basis. At present, I consider this the best course. However, if it transpires that all the Arab states are prepared to enter mutual negotiations with Israel at the same time, I do not think Israel will say 'no'.
Q: Do you object to a third (Palestinian) state between the sea and the desert? What would be the difference between the establishment of such a state and Palestinian control of Jordan, or of the West Bank, after a settlement is reached?
A: There is a kingdom of Jordan and a state of Israel. I think that the solution of the Palestinian question must be part of the negotiations between Israel and Jordan. I think that at present, to agree to a third state would be the biggest mistake Israel could make. If and when an agreement with Jordan, including a solution to the Palestinian problem, is reached, and if something happens in Jordan (I don't think it will) after some time has passed: we are not concerned with this at the moment. Neither are we concerned with whatever happens in Egypt, Syria or Lebanon after we reach an agreement with them. Israel's policy was never aimed towards determining the regime of any Arab country, and I think it would be a grave mistake to deviate from this principle.
Q: Has Israel abandoned the possibility of entering into talks with a local Arab leadership currently under Israeli control, instead of, for example the PLO or similar? Isn't it possible to cultivate this leadership?
A: Talks with a local leadership would be limited to questions related to the daily life
of the population. Since my point of departure is the objection to a third state between Israel and Jordan, I see no point in entering into talks with a Palestinian factor seeking to achieve a political solution. As soon as one requests such talks, one must assume that they (the Palestinian factors) will ask for the establishment of an independent state. I think it would be an unfounded illusion to assume that Israel would be allowed to determine who will be the Palestinian representative. This would be a baseless assumption that has no place in international political reality. If we were to say that we are prepared for a third state (otherwise there would be no point in entering negotiations with the Palestinians), the world would say (perhaps with a great deal of justification) 'who are you to determine who will represent the Palestinians?'
Q: But aren't you determining that it will be Jordan?
A: No. I am not determining that it will be Jordan. I am conducting negotiations with states in order to achieve peace. This is what we want. One makes peace with states. The Palestinian problem became really serious in 1964, and that was on a small scale. It is not serious in the East Bank, for example, after 26 years of genuine integration of the Palestinians - and Jordan carried out a real process of integration in the East Bank - we can see that the problem is not serious. The problem is serious amongst the groups of Palestinians who reside in countries where it is made serious - Lebanon, Syria and the like. The situation in the East Bank illustrates that when a regime recognizes the necessity to bring about integration, it can be successful. In Lebanon, no progress was made. The Egyptians, in their 19 years in the Gaza Strip, made no effort, they did precisely the opposite.
Comment from the interviewer: I conclude that this problem has become more and more serious.
A: It has become more serious because the Arab-Israel conflict has reached serious dimensions. As soon as the conflict between the Arab states and Israel becomes more severe, all the relating problems become more serious.
Q: In other words, you think a settlement would not solve the Palestinian problem, yet it would settle Israel's mutual relations with her neighbours, thus gradually diminishing the seriousness of this problem.
A: Because a settlement between Israel and Jordan must include a solution to the Palestinian question.
Q: Sadat says he will not come to Geneva without the PLO. The same applies to Hussein. The declared position is one of not going to Geneva without a Palestinian delegation.
A: Our basic understanding with the U.S. and with all the initiators of the Geneva Conference is that any increase in the number of participants in the conference must meet with the approval of all those taking part. Israel insists upon her rights in this matter. That comes first. Secondly, I do not think that what you said is accurate. I don't know of any Jordanian consent to participation of the PLO, neither do I know of any insistence on Egypt's part, that the PLO take part in the first stage of the Geneva talks. As I said before: It was agreed that no additional factors would be added without the approval of all participants. Our position is therefore strong and we have the right to demand what has already been agreed.
Q: There are indications of the beginning of a process of erosion in the observation of the disengagement agreements with Egypt and Stria. Have we determined what will constitute a casus belli as far as we are concerned, and have we made this clear to the other side?
A: Israel signed the Disengagement Agreements, and she will fulfil her commitments accordingly. Israel will not violate the Disengagement Agreements as long as the other side observes them. There are of course occasional problems, as with all agreements.
Q: Do you think there is a chance or a necessity to attempt to enter into talks with the USSR in order to improve relations and perhaps balance our position amongst the powers?
A: The USSR knows our address, and knows how to bring about renewed relations. As soon as Moscow is interested in doing so, I presume it will. And if it does, we shall have to consider another element - the problem of immigration of Soviet Jews. Nevertheless, I would say that on the whole the Soviet Union will find us willing to renew relations.
Q: How will Israel look in 5-6 years, if today's predictions become a reality - if, by virtue of their oil, the Arabs become so strong economically that they gain control of the entire Western financial establishment? Have we created the tools, or the bodies capable of assessing the trend - in what situation this would place us, and what alternatives would be open to us. What 1 am referring to is long-term thinking, far beyond our urgent problems.
A: It seems to me that the world is aware of the problem, and has begun to limit this dependence as much as possible. Throughout the world, a great effort is being made to go over to power production by means of nuclear energy. Many countries are building dual-purpose power stations - for oil and coal. There has also been an acceleration in the search for oil.
The following part of the interview was conducted by Davar during the Prime Minister' visit to Washington:
Q: Has your visit to Washington changed the ideas you expressed on the eve of your departure in the interview with Davar, that it would be preferable for the Middle East negotiations to begin with Egypt?
A: My visit to Washington not only did not cause me to change my views on the order of priorities, but it strengthened them.
Q: In your talks in Washington did you gain the impression that Israel's expectations regarding military assistance, including long-term aid, will be fulfilled? Are there any grounds for assuming that economic aid will be anywhere near the scale we requested?
A: We should bear in mind that, on the subject of military aid, and of the financial aid needed to finance the arms acquisition programme, and of economic aid, we shall in the future - as in the past - have to be prepared for constant efforts and struggle in order to attain all our aims. On the whole, the situation is satisfactory.
Q: Are there any issues that have remained open even after your visit?
A: During my visit, many issues were solved. A way was found to deal with issues that have not yet been finalized, and some issues remain that will have to be dealt with further, and in an intricate way, in order to realize them.
Q: Did you get the impression that the rapprochement that has taken place recently between the United States and the Arab states, including Egypt, undermines Israel's position as an "ally" of the United States?
A: We have never asked the United States to refrain from forming the closest ties with the Arab states - so long as this is not done at the expense of Israel's vital interests.
Q: Will the United States actively attempt to prevent a U.N. resolution the Palestinian issue favouring the PLO?
A: I do not believe that the U.S. could prevent a resolution on this issue being passed by a large majority in the United Nations Assembly. It should be borne in mind that basic anti-Israel resolutions on the Palestinian issue were already passed by the U.N. Assembly in December 1972.
Any resolution passed by the United Nations on the subject of the PLO will not alter by an iota Israel's policy, which is to oppose the participation of the PLO in any negotiations on a solution to the Israel-Arab conflict.
Q: What are the Americans prepared to do to thwart the Arab boycott? In what way, in your view, do the power of oil, the wealth of oil and the threat to resume the oil embargo, influence U.S. foreign policy?
A: The fact that there is a threat to re-impose the embargo on oil supplies exerts a particular influence on European and Japanese foreign policies and in a more limited manner, on U.S. foreign policy. If there is to be any legislative action on the issue of the boycott by the American legislature, it can only be in the next Congress. In the meantime, the administration is seeking other means.
Q: After your talks with President Ford and Dr. Kissinger do you believe that the anger displayed in Israel over recent manifestations in relations between the United States and the Arab states was justified?
A: I assume that the reasons for the anger, insofar as they are known to me, are linked with the change which occurred in the pattern of U.S. relations with the Middle East after the October War. Until the war, there was a feeling among our public that we were an 'only son' to the United States in the Middle East. It is a fact that today this is not the case. Perhaps some remarks made by American spokesman may have helped to heighten the anger of the Israeli public. We must see reality as it is - and it is, that the U.S. today has a greater tangible interest in cultivating relations also with the Arab states.