At the conclusion of Mr. Rabin's "first one hundred days in office", and having returned from the United States, the Prime Minister gave an outline of the course to be followed by his administration. Excerpts:
... The guideline of the Government today, in the period after the Yom Kippur War, the period following the achievement of the Disengagement Agreements - is to try and do everything possible in order to make progress towards peace.
It is my belief that since the State was established - even before it came into being we wanted the establishment of a Jewish State which would exist here in peace. This striving for peace, I feel, always has been and still remains the ardent desire of every Jew, of every citizen of the State of Israel.
So far, in the last 26 years, we have not succeeded in attaining peace. We are now facing a cross-roads. If we do not advance towards peace then the dangers of war will increase.
How can a peace be achieved? There are two ways: one - that from the situation as it is at present, we manage to bring our neighbours to the stage of consenting to negotiations without prior conditions so as to sign a peace treaty. I am convinced that this Government , I myself at least - I would be prepared - in order to reach a true peace - to concede, to agree to territorial compromise, which means the returning of lands as compared with the present lines, but not to return to the lines which existed before the Six-Day War.
But, if there were a real possibility to reach a true peace with one or more Arab States, I would be in favour of compromise, perhaps even compromise of a far-reaching nature. As we know today, there is no such readiness on the part of the Arab States. I was also told in Washington, and we hear this on the air, that the Arab States evince no such readiness.
On the other hand, there exists another possibility, the possibility of progressing in stages. This way is dangerous because you do not achieve peace. You achieve something of peace, while giving up part of that territory which you would have been prepared to concede for a total peace.
I am convinced that if we are not allowed to progress towards peace in the first way, we are bound to try the second way despite the dangers it incurs.
I believe that a Government which does not make a sober effort to progress towards peace, which does not incur risks for the sake of peace, is not fulfilling its task properly. I believe that we owe ourselves peace and that in the absence of progress towards peace, the danger of war increases. A Government which does not do all in its power to find a way to peace will not be able to face the people with a clear conscience if and when war occurs.
I also believe that one of the conditions for the strengthening of the State of Israel, for the maintenance of friendship towards us on the part of many countries, the United States foremost, is linked to the feeling, to the belief, that the State of Israel is really seeking ways for peace, and not only one way.
... Peace can be achieved by one move from the present state to a state of peace. There is also a second possibility of making progress in stages. In other words, that we do not give back all the territory, say, that we today intend to give back in the event that peace is obtained, and the other side does not provide a full peace. For instance, a state of nonbelligerency does not yet constitute peace.
I think, therefore, that - should Egypt, Syria and Jordan really show themselves ready to declare a state of non-belligerency, I think it would be possible, and we must also move in that direction towards peace....
... I think that we can put this to a practical test in the course of the negotiations which to our great regret are not direct negotiations but are being carried out through a third party, in this case the United States. We can test in practical terms whether the Arabs' intention is really to shift from war to peace and, secondly, according to what type of concrete programme they are prepared to do this.
... I would say that the Egyptians are also investing considerable efforts in restoring the cities of the Canal zone and re-populating them with civilians.
We are witnessing the return of about one-third of the population which inhabited the Canal region before the war and especially prior to the outbreak of the war of attrition. With the Syrians, there is an entirely different picture. Kuneitra is not being restored: on the contrary, the Syrians have announced that they do not intend to re-settle the town, nor have they repatriated the civilian population to any part of the buffer zone. There is, therefore, a difference between Egypt and Syria in the realization of the civilian part of the Disengagement Agreement. ...
I cannot foretell with certainty what Egypt and Syria will do. I should think that if Egypt and Syria really intend to conduct negotiations in order to make true progress towards peace, the renewal of the U.N. forces' mandate is essential. This, because I do not believe that it will be possible to achieve a quick resolution of the whole complex of problems involved in the negotiations without the continued maintenance of the Disengagement Agreements, and without the presence of the U.N. Emergency Forces, the Disengagement Agreements become practically empty of content.
I have no doubt that the non-renewal of the Emergency Forces mandate constitutes a serious violation of the Disengagement Agreement, with all its ramifications.... I do not presume that the Americans have promised Egypt any withdrawal as such.
One of the things which I felt bound to do in my talks with the President of the United States, with the formulators of policy and with the shapers of public opinion in public appearances, was to make it clear that from now on there are no more pull-backs. There is progress towards peace. If the Arabs are really prepared to progress towards peace, they will find us loyal partners. This is why withdrawal will no longer be discussed as a separate issue. We shall discuss progress towards peace, progress in one move, progress in stages, of which withdrawal is only one of the subjects related to progress towards peace....
This problem (of oil) is not directly connected with Israel. Among those pressing for higher oil prices are countries which have no quarrel with Israel, such as Venezuela and Iran. The basic problem facing the world today is a confrontation with the indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources by the oil-producing countries.
This is how the world is now beginning to see the oil problem. Of course, there is a second problem - the threat to stop oil-supplies. On this matter I believe Americans have made it unequivocally clear to the Arab States that they will not put up with this and will take steps accordingly - in the event that the Arabs threaten them with this oil weapon.
Thus we are presently going through a stage of transition in world thought vis-à-vis the oil problem, towards an over-all comprehensive and full view of the situation and the need to meet it and of the lack of affinity between this issue and that of the Arab-Israel conflict....
... If we are not prepared for war, if we are not prepared for a possibility of war too, we shall never attain peace, because nobody will negotiate with a weak Israel.
We should, therefore not ignore threats, certainly not in the light of the experience of the Yom Kippur War, because in the Yom Kippur War the Arabs undoubtedly failed militarily. Despite the surprise, the course of the war changed and at its completion, the position of the Arab military forces was bad.
Nevertheless, the Arabs have reached the conclusion that through the mere operation of military force, regardless of their military achievements, they have succeeded in bringing about a political change.
This is why the possible tendency to activate military forces exists and we should see to it that we are strong, that we are prepared.
... One should know the facts even when they are unpleasant. Even before Yom Kippur, we were isolated to a considerable extent in the international arena. When I say isolated, I mean that our position as to a political solution, as to the way to attain it, as to its nature, was not acceptable in most countries in the world. I would almost say that it was the other way round: most countries in the world identified themselves with the Arab approach for the solution of the conflict. As far back as December, or November, if you take into account the resolution of the U.N. Assembly on the Palestinian subject at the time, you will realize that already then the resolution was adopted by a tremendous majority of 86 per cent or even more. This resolution called on Israel to evacuate the areas occupied during the Six-Day War. It called on all countries not to assist any Israeli action carried out in the administered areas and called for a recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
In another words, already two years ago we witnessed an expression of identification by the greater part of the world with Arab approaches in this field.
I consider the possible addition of recognition of the "P.L.O." a most serious matter. In fact, it demonstrates cynicism by most countries in the world. The nature of the "P.L.O." is known. It is known that, in practice, the "P.L.O." is a framework about which there are doubts whether it expresses the Palestinian people, but it certainly perpetrates acts of terror from which the world apparently dissociates itself or at least pays lip-service in anything pertaining to denouncing them. Nor do they always do this, and here they give them, or offer them, the right of observers.
I think that the history of the Jewish people has known many periods in which we have witnessed expressions of hostility towards the Jews. I consider this step the most cynical expression of hypocrisy and hostility on the part of the countries who will vote for them. At the same time, 1 fear we shall not be able to alter this resolution since the international political situation is now one that assures every Arab topic the support of four global blocs: the Arab bloc - with 20 nations, the Soviet (Communist) bloc, the Afro-Asian bloc and the European nations which have fallen victim to the extortions of Arab capital and Arab oil.
... Without engaging in a historical dissertation, 1 would say that in my opinion the conflict is, at the present stage, one between the Arab States and Israel. The Palestinian problem does exist. I am convinced that if the Arab nations truly and sincerely wanted peace, the Palestinian problem, too, could be solved.
It is possible to find a place where they shall be able to give expression to their own identity. But I believe the central difficulty is whether the Arab States can cross the line they have not crossed yet: the line of readiness to live in peace with a sovereign, independent Jewish State which has such powers of survival that assure it the ability to defend itself.
At this juncture, I can see no reason why we should consider a dialogue with the "P.L.O." I think we must make it clear generally that the "Palestine Liberation Organization" is no partner for any dialogue. Those who directed the acts of murder such as Kiryat Shmonah, Maalot, Shamir and all the other attempts that have failed, cannot be a partner for peace talks. Furthermore, the world in fact wants Israel to negotiate with the Arab countries, and I have not witnessed any change in this attitude in the world. At the moment, the "P.L.O." is no factor to be taken into account in political consideration....
... I think that we are approaching a situation in which our political independence and our defensive power will be determined by our ability to produce to no lesser extent than by our political manoeuvring capacity. The State of Israel has not yet entered a social-economic emergency situation. It is bound to enter it because of the need to produce more. We must step up our production.
A second thing in respect of which we must move to a national emergency situation, is the question of manpower. To utilize properly all the equipment at our disposal, to really fully exploit it, we must invest manpower. And better manpower in the regular army, and with an increased national service complement, so as to fully exploit our security capacities.