On the first anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, Mr. Rabin discussed some of the lessons of the war and touched on subjects that included the possible peace map, the Palestinians and the future of the negotiations. Excerpts:
Q: Could you define our relations with Jordan - when you say we are going to suggest "non-belligerency"? Are we in a state of belligerency with her?
A: Your question can be answered in a number of ways. My point of departure is from the fact that there are no political conclusions related to this question. As for political conclusions - different people draw different conclusions. When I speak of making efforts towards peace, I mean that Israel owes it to herself, as a state - so that friendly countries can understand her policy and in order to mobilise the support of public opinion in democratic states- to make her intentions clear.
I don't think there is any dispute amongst the public over the fact that our aim is peace - a peace that will give Israel genuine security. This is the aim we must strive to achieve.
The question is, under what conditions and by which means? Up to the present, although there were certain changes in 1971, the custom was one of an effort towards peace in one step. In other words, directly to peace from the present situation. Naturally, anyone with a head on his shoulders knows that Israel must make territorial concessions. When I say territorial concessions, I mean not adhering to the present lines which are disengagement lines, cease-fire lines - but withdrawal from at least a part of them. At the same time, I do not mean an automatic return to the lines that existed prior to the Six Day War. Naturally, there are variations as to the extent of concessions. In my opinion, it is hypocritical to speak of peace on the basis of the present lines.
Since 1971 - but let's not dwell upon the past - we proposed a partial settlement with Egypt. Linked with the opening of the Suez canal. However, analysing things today, I believe there is no reason why we cannot attempt to advance by stages - on one condition
that we will no longer be speaking of military agreements but of political negotiations whose aim, contents and substance are of a political nature - in other words, progress towards peace.
I can't say we will be able to implement this in every sector. But I prefer to discuss things in a positive vein: it cannot be implemented on certain fronts involved in the Israel-Arab conflict. For example, let us take the "non-belligerency" proposal. "Nonbelligerency", in my opinion, is an agreement whereby the parties concerned waive the use of force as a means of settling political or other differences between them - and undertake to exercise political means.
I have a clear conception of the concessions, and I shall not specify them. I shall not specify them in the sense of map drawing. Some claim: what are you doing? abandoning the State of Israel to the "salami tactic". Why? because you are giving something for less than peace. You are weakening the bargaining position, at least military. Consequently, you might face, after some time, a new reality in less convenient circumstances. What is my reply? Anyone who thinks that the other party will not abide by a non-belligerency commitment may, to the same extent, hear somebody else say: "And. if this is the starting point, who would guarantee that he will keep a peace commitments?" The commitment is a political commitment by that factor, so that you may say that if a peace agreement is violated you will face an even worse military position, because evidently you will pay for peace, in territorial terms, more than for non -belligerency. If the starting point is "they will violate agreements" - and the world knows many instances of violation of agreements then if the starting point is "I don't believe them" - why does it apply only to nonbelligerency and not to peace? And then the risk in concluding peace is greater than in concluding agreements for progress in stages. Because you do not return all those areas which you intended to return had you concluded peace, people will say: But the mere declaration of, peace constitutes some changes". If a readiness exists for a declaration of nonbelligerency, doesn't it have a political, psychologic, significance?
Therefore, this contention of "salami tactics". if based on distrust of what the other party says, is all the more right when it applies to peace. The question is, therefore, more fundamental. I believe that it incurs a risk, but there exists no situation which incurs no risk, and a failure to proceed to a political agreement also incurs a risk. I prefer to undertake the risk of going to peace, either in the first way or in the second. I believe that Israel owes it to herself, in case of an outbreak of war, to be able to say: We have sought every possible way and we have really done everything to progress towards peace, and not only possibly in secret, but openly so as to impair this realization to the nation and to the world.
I don't know whether it is realistic or not to accept from them a declaration. But at least, I present two conceptions on the way to progress towards peace. And is it realistic to accept peace today? It is less realistic, in my opinion, if you read what they are saying: If you hear their demands: and if I were to judge only from what the other party is ready now to say on what it is prepared to conclude peace - then I must agree to complete surrender.
Q: What I mean to say is whether this is not an exaggerated demand likely to frustrate any agreement, say at a lower level.
A: What is a lower level?
Q: Maybe, in the "scale" leading to "non-belligerency", there are some things which they can give us.
A: If they come and propose something which is a significant progress towards peace, then what I have said in connection with the previous subject applies just as well. I have been asked about some "Jericho Plan" of which I am not aware. The papers write about it. As regards non-belligerency, I said: If some proposal is made about concessions on something in Judea and Samaria, against non-belligerency, I shall consider it favourably. What should I say? "No" to everything? After all, wisdom too is needed in conducting negotiations. Negotiations are a contest, a struggle. They include strategy and tactics alike. I don't believe that "no" should be the answer to every suggestion.
Q: You will consider it favourably in respect of Syria too?
A: I would not like to enter into this subject. I believe that the manoeuvring field with Syria is rather restricted.
Q: Could war with Syria be prevented? Are there any prospects for the neutralization of the Arab states, namely that war would be waged only with Syria? And, following the report submitted to President Ford which said that this would be a war far more cruel than all preceding wars - have we really exhausted all possibilities as regards Syria?
A: I am afraid that the era of brief and easy wars, of "painless wars" is over. We had better bear this in mind and not expect miracles. This is why we should keep this in mind, in our consciousness, when there is talk of war and peace. I believe that Israel will enter war when she is ready and prepared, while being fully convinced that there is no alternative.
Some things are for us sine qua non. No withdrawal to the '67 lines. No agreement which is merely military, whose only expression is territorial concession. But between these two, there is a manoeuvring field. I propose that we adopt the trend of thought: We are trying: let us see what the reaction will be. I do not wish to determine any hard and fast rules right now, about what they will react and about what they will not react, they may accept, and they may not accept. War may be postponed, war may break out. I suggest not to hold any conceptions on this matter. I do not remember anyone foreseeing the date - and for that matter, the course - of the last two wars, the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. I therefore, propose that we act in two parallel directions on this issue. One direction is striving for peace, wisely, not at any cost, not at any condition - either in one stage or in interim stages. And, seemingly without any connection with this - utmost preparedness and readiness for war.
I see no contradiction between these two lines. I would even say that the contrary is true. These are two mutually complementary and strengthening directions.
Q: We are proceeding to a diplomatic round With the confrontation countries. Could it be assumed that this round would by-pass Syria?
A: I don't know. Kissinger is going to Damascus too. He will come to us after a visit to the Arab states and will present us with the positions or the parties. He is coming for a visit here and will return to the U.S.
Q: Assuming that the Syrians feel that the present diplomatic round will by-pass them, what can the State of Israel do?
A: I do not propose to assert that the present diplomatic round will by-pass Syria. I am not sure that this is what will happen. Had Syria been ready for peace tomorrow, I would have willingly sat with them.
Q: You have said, and rightly, that the manoeuvering field with Syria is rather narrow, and yet there is reason to ask: Do we have to adhere rigidly to the assumption that we shall not return one inch of land in, the Golan Heights? What can the State of Israel do to lower the "militant profile" of the Syrians?
A: Talk less about it...
Q: Kissinger will come here, and some circles are creating the impression that Kissinger is coming over to dictate to us: They also claim that what you have brought back, aid and equipment, is allegedly "payment" for accepting the political dictate...
A: This is simply not so. First of all, there is no American dictate. Israel is a sovereign state that reaches it decisions in accordance with it own considerations. I have outlined this policy in the U.S. as well, without mentioning geographical locations or lines. Secondly, I think it is in our own and in the U.S.' interest that we be strong. Because if Israel is weak, there are no prospects for a political process to take place. Kissinger will come. He will want to hear from the Arabs, and from us. The government will decide what to tell him in explicit terms. The government has not yet decided. It is scheduled to meet this week in order to take decisions.
Q: A senior U.S. representative (I do not wish to mention his name) has said: "We are prepared to defend Israel, but not necessarily her conquests". This is a statement whose content is now beginning to carry weight. What is the meaning of a strong Israel? What are the boundaries? These things don't go together, especially with the present Arab offensive on the oil issue and all the other related problems. This warrants clarification.
Can one view the American commitments for Israel's security and existence in the context of our sovereign boundaries?
A: It was never put this way by the U.S. nor are the Pentagon commitments a treaty. Perhaps this should be clarified. The defence of this country is the sole responsibility of the State of Israel. There are American commitments to supply us with military equipment so that we may defend ourselves. Since these commitments were made, years ago, there has been and will continue to be a dispute between us and the U.S. over the transformation of the algebra into arithmetic. It is most natural for us to want to be equipped with as much military equipment as possible - and of best quality - that can be obtained, and of course quickly - not later. This is the responsibility of the government.
It is naturally easier for the U.S. to assist an Israel that strives for peace. But our concept of the means of attaining it does not have to be identical with that of the U.S.
Q: Coming back to the subject of the impact of the war in its first few days, this is a natural cause of anxiety amongst the public over the possibility of another war. As part of the lessons learned from the last war, can we determine that Israel's hands will never again be bound with regard to the first blow?
A: I don't understand your question. We took a military risk by adopting a political decision to refrain from delivering a preventive blow. Could one infer, as a result -and I am linking this with the "impact" of the first few days - that the strategy of the first blow has changed today, that we shall bind our hands and refrain from delivering the first blow? This is the answer. The State of Israel should be prepared for every eventuality. At the same time, I would add that we have signed agreements for the disengagement of forces with Egypt and Syria, cease-fire agreements with Jordan and Lebanon. We shall respect these agreements to the letter. We shall not violate them so long as they are not violated by the other side. I don't think that it is useful to say more than that.