Secretary of State Kissinger spent a day in Israel in mid-October in anticipation of forthcoming diplomatic moves. After talks in Jerusalem he announced that he would be returning to the Middle East in November to work out, a "concrete and definite" groundwork for further negotiations. His October visit was assessed by Mr. Allon in the following interview. Excerpts:
Q: What were, and are, the expectations about Dr. Kissinger's last and next visits?
A: Dr. Kissinger is a very able Foreign Minister, but he is not a performer of miracles. It was not his intention to achieve dramatic or immediate results. He came in order to find out what the chances are for an agreement between the parties, and to establish the procedures and principles according to which the negotiations will be held.
He also came in order to lend encouragement to those who prefer negotiations to war, with a view to the coming Rabat conference, due to convene at the end of this month.
Q: Has anything been summed up as to how this last visit went off?
A: No, because the Arab states would rather wait until after the summit conference, so a further visit is in the offing. I hope that during this next visit we can decide on procedural matters, provided of course that the Arab summit conference does not obstruct the chances of the political process.
Q: If it is a question of procedures and not of content, then why are matters so dependent upon the outcome of the conference at Rabat?
A: All of us remember the Arab summit conference at Khartoum in 1967, and how it blocked any chance of political negotiations. It is my hope that this will not happen as a result of this coming conference. However, there are extremist elements in the Arab world who are anxious to block the road to such negotiations. We shall therefore have to wait patiently until the summit conference is over.
Q: Are there any other trends that you can detect in this conference?
A: Definitely. Just as there are more extremist Arab countries, there are also less extremist Arab trends. The PLO encourages the outright extremists, and it is quite possible that Dr. Kissinger's visit having come at this particular stage, will lead encouragement to those who would prefer to negotiate rather than see all changes of a political solution blocked, and remove the danger of a renewed outbreak of war.
Q: What happens after Rabat, after Dr. Kissinger' s visit? Must we assume that the option of renewing the war still stands?
A: The option to renew the war exists, because the military forces exist and the negative motivation in the Arab states exists. However, the I.D.F. also exist. The enemy was not the only one to receive arms. The I.D.F. have greatly added to their only one strength, by any yardstick, and their striking power has increased.
On the other hand, if we should really hopefully see the first sign of progress in the political negotiations then it is possible that the danger of war might be averted. If there is no such progress in the political sphere, the likelihood of war increases, we must bear in mind that Arab states often go to war even when they cannot be sure of winning, but only to bring up the problem anew, and drag the powers into imposing a solution to their liking. All this on the assumption that - helped by oil and other factors - they will succeed in obtaining an imposed solution favouring the Arab states and against the interests of Israel.
Q: Mention has been made of the only real chance for any political progress namely by achieving interim settlements.
A: Israel is interested in signing peace settlements with each and every one of the Arab states, without any exceptions. We have been told that Syria is obdurate in her opposition to any interim agreement, demanding an overall settlement containing a long life of prior conditions - and these prior conditions are unacceptable as a prelude to negotiations.
There are those who feel that Egypt and Jordan - provided the summit does not bar the way - might be inclined to negotiate a settlement amounting to less than a peace treaty, but far more than a cease-fire. In other words, an agreement of political significance and important from the security aspect.
We shall, of course, have to be prepared, in the event of such negotiations, for a reasonable territorial compromise in Sinai, which would be less than the compromise that we would have made if a peace treaty would be negotiated. An interim settlement in exchange for non-belligerency - which is less than peace, and less promising must be based on a signed treaty including supervision arrangements and a series of paragraphs anchored in a legal-political agreement, to prevent war and prepare the way for a further step towards peace proper.
Q: Are you prepared to anticipate the next stage, at least from the aspect desirable for Israel?
A: I can hardly anticipate the outcome of the Rabat conference. I am very much afraid that the move in favour of the PLO at the United Nations will lend added strength to the extremists, whilst making matters worse for those at the conference who may be less extreme. Therefore we shall first of all have to wait and see what the outcome is.
I myself support the opinion that - in exchange for an interim settlement which is acceptable to us, a reasonable territorial compromise must be made, which will however, leave in our hands portions of land sufficient to spur Egypt on to make an additional and final move towards peace, at a second stage.
Q: Do you mean Jordan too, or only Egypt?
A: In principle we have not ruled out the possibility of negotiating with Jordan. But, whilst we have already held a comprehensive cabinet debate regarding Egypt, such discussions still remain to be held where Jordan is concerned.
Q: Following the Arabs' success in mobilizing a large parliamentary majority in the U.N. Is there not a danger that this majority anti-Israel measure such as Israel's expulsion from the U.N., for sanctions?
A: I was not surprised by the outcome of the voting, and made that clear in my address to the Assembly. There was no reason for surprise at the vote of France, for example, whose attitude for some years now has been one-sided and unfriendly to Israel, and there can be no mistaking the fact that her recent vote in the Assembly has been very unfriendly to Israel. The votes of Norway and Sweden, on the other hand, grieved me deeply, because of my positive feelings towards them. These are friendly countries who have recklessly permitted themselves to lend their support to a vote which in the eyes of the extremists in the Arab world means supporting the demands of the PLO, which are founded upon one issue: The annihilation of the State of Israel, even if this is not Sweden's or Norway's intention.
There is no issue on which the Arab League cannot obtain a majority in the Assembly. Any subject, no matter how insane, will obtain a majority there. For on the one hand they are negotiating from a position of strength, that of oil and that means vast capital, and on the other - you have a number of countries, amongst them some that are very enlightened but characterised by the spirit of appeasement and cowardice.
I have never made light of the U.N. and the weight this organisation carries. I shall always remember that in 1947 the United Nations paved the juridical and international road to the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel. On the other hand, this importance should not be over-rated. And the more unrestrained it becomesas has been the case in recent years - the more the U.N. organisation loses its efficacy.
The U.N. cannot impose upon us any policy with which we do not agree, if it is against our interests. At most, this would have considerable propaganda value - positive or negative as the case may be, the U.N. is not a court of law, but one more arena for political struggle.
Q: May we change the subject? You are known as the author of what is termed the "Allon Plan". What is your stand on the issue of settling various areas, when those same settlers claim that the government is preventing the very act of settlement in the administered territories today?
A: I endorse the opinion of my colleagues who reject attempts at settlement which do not have the approval of the government and are not carried out in accordance with its decisions - at times even in defiance of its decisions. But this reply in no way exhausts the issue. Demonstrative attempts at settlement such as these - which are nothing but demonstrations - are viewed by me as the beginning of a manifestation of rejection of national authority, and this must be combated with all the means at our disposal. Is everyone entitled to do as they please in spheres which are the government's responsibility? But I shall not content myself with legal explanations. I am against settlement at the sites chosen by the demonstrators, and this on political grounds as well.
I am in favour of settlement carried out in accordance with political and strategic considerations and in accordance with the decision and assistance of the competent authorities.
Q: Why should this question not be decided upon by the public?
A: A decision by the public is made when the public elects a Knesset and the Knesset votes on confidence motions. But democracy cannot be turned into anarchy, plebiscites, signatures on petitions, and so on.
In the last elections the public was faced with the decision: not one inch (of land) on the one hand, or the possibility of territorial compromise in exchange for peace. And the public made its decision for compromise.