In his news conference, Mr. Allon repeated the reasons for Israel's refusal to negotiate with the PLO; he also discussed the Rabat summit decisions and the invitation extended by the General Assembly to the PLO to participate in its discussion on the Middle East. Other questions raised dealt with the prospects of early negotiations with Egypt for an interim agreement. Excerpts:
Mr. Allon: Israel will not negotiate with the so-called PLO, not because they claim to be Palestinians, but in spite of that. I can say that the only credit which one can give to the PLO is that they never hide what they have in mind as to what the future of Israel should be. In the so-called Palestinian Covenant they deny Israel's right to existence and pledge themselves to destroy the State of Israel. They repeated these aims many many times in the past and they are repeating the same statements even today after they scored two great victories: one, at the United Nations Assembly and the other one at the Rabat Conference. Ever since attempts began to take place in the Middle East to achieve a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict the PLO expressed its opposition to these initiatives. If to remind you only of the latest events they oppose bitterly the disengagement agreements with both Egypt and Syria. I think that the PLO leaders decided to force through their issue this year, now, both in the United Nations and at the Arab Summit Conference is first and foremost in order to undermine any possibility of political progress in the Middle East. And indeed they achieved, to some extent, maybe even to a great extent, this end too.
Finally I would like to say that there were states and politicians who explained their vote in favor of the invitation to the PLO at the United Nations by saying that this may help the extremist organizations to get more civilized, more domestic, that they will live up to the expectations of their moderate supporters in the world.
I explained to my colleagues all over the world, in writing and speech, that they simply don't understand the psychology of this militant terrorist organization. This will not moderate them, it will encourage them to pursue their terrorist methods and to stick to their negative destructive policy vis-a-vis the State of Israel.. Because they believe that they received this sort of recognition as a direct result of their declared ends and acts of violence of all sorts and kinds.
I can support this judgement by quoting Yasser Arafat's own statement made to the ABC in America yesterday where he said, among other things, he said that such a state, I'll quote a bit earlier so that it will be better understood. "A Palestinian Government in exile would soon be formed as a step towards the establishment of Palestinian sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip territories now occupied by Israel" He said that such a state would be the nucleus of a future Palestinian state, including the present territory of Israel, etc., etc. Who needs more convincing evidence to my argument that any appeasement of the PLO leads to much further and more extremist demands? Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the situation has worsened a lot since these two events took place, the United Nations resolution and the Rabat Conference resolution, Israel is determined to honor the ceasefire and the disengagement agreements on a mutual, reciprocal basis, and is still ready to negotiate with her neighbours whether on an overall settlement or on a step-by-step settlement. This depends now upon our neighbors more than upon ourselves.
Q: Mr. Allon, Prime Minister Rabin was quoted this morning as saying that the Rabat Conference has opened new possibilities for Israel vis-a-vis the population of the West Bank, and I believe that about a week before the Rabat Conference you said in the Knesset that if the extremists won out in the Rabat Conference, Israel would find its own way to talk to the West Bank population. Do you expect an Israeli initiative on this subject?
A: As you all know, the government of Israel thought that the solution to the self-expression of the Palestinian identity should be found within the context of peace with our neighbors to the east, namely Jordan.
But since the Rabat Conference dismissed Jordan as a party to negotiate for the Palestinians, and since the real Palestinian Arabs, who are not identified with the PLO, are living in our midst in the administered areas. We have to do some thinking and planning how to promote their self-expression by different systems, but this I think is premature and too early to make a statement on.
Q : What is your opinion on the constitutional changes by King Hussein on the West Bank?
A: He is honoring his pledge to the Rabat Conference to withdraw from any claims in the West Bank and the Palestinian community in the administered areas, and he is trying accordingly to re-establish his government in Transjordan.
But I would like to remind you, ladies and gentlemen, that Israel's relationship with Jordan should not be confined only to the problem of the Palestinian community or the West Bank. We and the Jordanians are sharing a very long, common border, much longer than the border which is dividing between East and West Bank according to the known terminology.
The entire length of the border from the Red Sea in Eilat up to somewhere in the Dead Sea in the north, is an old demarcation line which is more or less parallel to the mandatory border which preceded the establishment of the State of Israel. The same by the way applies to another section of the border, from the Beisan Valley along the River Jordan up to the Yarmuk River, from the Yarmuk River as far as Alhammah.
So, Jordan remains our neighbor, we have common frontiers, and I see no reason why Jordan should withdraw from any future negotiations with us, even if they refuse to negotiate other aspects of our problems along the border.
Q: Israeli leaders have declared in the past that they were ready to meet with any Arab leaders under any circumstances, anywhere. What has brought about a change?
A: There isn't a change at all. Israel was invaded by Arab countries, commanded by Arab governments. Israel was ready, has been ready, is ready, will be ready to negotiate with those countries which are responsible for that invasion. And, in fact, any negotiations which took place during the last year or, rather, since the October war, was based at least on one principle that the Resolution 242 of the Security Council of 1967, and Resolution 338 of 1973, are recognized by the parties concerned.
If the Rabat Conference conclusion should be put to practice it means the end of Resolutions 242 and 338, and let me remind you that in both resolutions the existence of the respective countries is not put under question.
In those two resolutions there is no reference whatsoever to the PLO or to any other entity but the neighboring Arab countries.
Q: Mr. Minister, you say that the PLO is bent on destroying the State of Israel. It is not only a diplomatic threat but also a military threat and what counter -measures are you going to take?
A: It is the PLO which decided to maintain a perpetual state of war with Israel. And as long as they don't abandon their military and terrorist actions, we have to counter-act to either improve our static defences and, of course, to maintain our moral right and military might to take the initiative in order to prevent beforehand approaching terrorist attacks whenever and wherever possible. You are not expecting me to go into details.
If they would confine themselves only to an ideological warfare, of course no military actions would be needed.
Q: Mr. Minister, among your colleagues you have been in the forefront of the effort to give some expression to the political identity of the residents of the occupied areas in the West Bank. These efforts have been frustrated, and in large measure by the refusal of the Israeli government to allow such political expressions in organised fashion. Do you see any continuation of your efforts also, and you see any future success in this effort possible, and do you see any future success in this effort. Since many think that the government has missed the boat on the West Bank people.
And the second question, if I may, Israel has always contended that the Palestine Liberation Organization does not represent really the feelings and attitudes of the people of the West Bank. Would you be prepared to allow some independent measurements of whether or not that is correct.
A: It is true that in the plan which I worked out seven and a half years ago, I recommended also the encouragement of the Palestinian community in the administered areas to organize itself in a sort of a self administration or home rule not as a permanent solution, but as an intermediate arrangement until full-fledged peace can be achieved. I never excluded the idea that this solution can be also found within the context of political peace with Jordan, with special reference to the desire of the Arabs in the West Bank.
Now if we are to reconcile ourselves to the idea that Jordan is out of the game, I don't think, at least for the time being, that the only alternatives which we have to choose between is either the solution through Jordan or the present status quo.
A third possibility may arise. Maybe more feasible than in the past. But this again needs further study as the result, of course, of recent events in the Middle East. Well, I don't know who missed the boat. I will be very frank with you. I think that the Palestinian Arabs throughout their recent history managed to miss all the opportunities which were given to them, by adopting always extremist attitudes, toward possible reasonable compromises. And by following always the most extremist leaders, ever since the British Mandate was established over Palestine. They inflicted upon themselves troubles after troubles, self-inflicted troubles. And I am afraid that sooner or later the Palestinians themselves will discover that a major victim of the Rabat Conference is the Palestinian community again. Because here extremist leaders are trying to block any possible compromise which will give the right of existence to both the Israeli state and the Palestinian Arab identity. Whether such boats were missed or not, this is a matter of study, of course, for the future. I don't think that the Rabat Conference is the last word in Middle-Eastern politics, in the Middle Eastern affairs. I don't exclude the possibility that some new opportunities will present themselves in the future, if not in the immediate future, at least in the foreseeable future when more responsible and more rational governments in the area will realize that the Rabat mood cannot be a guide to a political solution.
Q: The second part of my question, sir.
A: Oh yes, I am sure that when the political situation allows us to approach resettlement the Palestinian Arabs at the West Bank will be given the opportunity to raise their voice to express their opinion. I see no reason whatsoever to invite gangs of terrorists to act as if they were representing a national liberation movement I personally was an active member of a national liberation movement, and I know what it means. And anyone who is trying to compare the so-called PLO to the Algerian FLN for instance is gravely mistaken, because the FLN truly represented a national liberation movement with a military arm to carry out and to achieve its political aims, namely to liberate Algeria from French colonialism and quite rightly so.
Even so in some cases I disassociate myself from ugly methods which were used by even FLN people here and there, raping French women is not necessarily an effective weapon for a liberation movement, or killing innocent people in cafes. But by the large as a movement they never sought the destruction of metropolitan France. The only thing they wanted was to get rid of the French from Algeria itself. But the so-called PLO in addition to the cruel methods of terrorism their real aim is not to liberate a subjugated nation, but to adopt the people and to destroy another nation. And therefore I don't think that they have to be taken into consideration whether for plebiscite or political negotiations, simply because they are as they are.
Q: Mr. Allon, you said that the PLO is not the United States key in talking about political settlement. Could you give to us now just where the political trust is in talking about Dr. Kissinger's visit and specifically how would Israel respond if such a situation were to arise with Egypt?
A: All of us were looking forward to Dr. Kissinger's visit with hope that as a result of his visit some immediate steps would be taken in order to negotiate another step towards peace. It seems to me that during his last visit he could not yet negotiate neither with the Egyptians nor with the Jordanians and the Syrians, nor with us about a possible future step. Not only about the substance of such a step, but even not about the procedure according to which such a step should be negotiated. Nevertheless, I don't think there is reason to be too pessimistic. If the Egyptians for instance were not interested in negotiations then they wouldn't negotiate with or without Rabat. If they are interested I am sure that this interest will rise and will be shown, will be visible to everybody who is watching Middle-Eastern politics.
I can't say the same about Jordan. Because Jordan was forced to step out of this process, and no-one is going to force Jordan to do anything which she doesn't want or she can't undertake. Therefore I don't exclude the possibility that sooner or later the old idea may come up again, at least this option should be kept open, should be nourished by us, by others in order to give it a chance.
Now Egypt can negotiate, of course only on behalf of Egypt as every other country can negotiate on behalf of herself.
Q: When Henry Kissinger was here last, we were told that he will be back and that there would be negotiations.
The grounds on which Israel wants to negotiate with Egypt was said to be one in which land would be traded for political and diplomatic concessions. The Egyptians, in public at least, refused to grant any such thing, at least in the beginning. As a result of Kissinger's trip, do you have any indication that their public statements are in fact a little harder than their actual negotiating position and that worthwhile talks can take place about the Sinai with the proviso for either diplomatic or political concessions on their part.
A: I'm afraid that the announcement that Dr. Kissinger will be visiting this area in December again was a mistake because throughout our talks which lasted for a good number of hours he never indicated to us that he had in mind to come again in December, although I don't exclude the possibility, but unpredictable Kissinger visits all over the globe, but nothing has been fixed, and we have not been informed about such a visit.
As far as I know, Dr. Kissinger will accompany his President, President Ford, on a trip to the Far East, Vladivostock, Tokyo, maybe some other places, and I understand that Secretary Brezhnev will be visiting Cairo in the middle of January. The dust of the Rabat Conference is still covering the horizon, nobody can see anything realistically and nothing has been fixed.
He expressed, quite openly, when he visited the Arab countries and Israel, that he hasn't given up, and I don't think that he should give up, because I think that a political solution is needed by all the parties concerned, but no definite plans have been fixed yet. I think even that some preliminary inquiries are needed before a procedure can be decided upon.
Q: You spoke about a third possibility, a settlement with Jordan that requires study. Could you say whether that study has begun yet.
A: As far as the Foreign Minister of this country is concerned, he has been thinking about this problem for a good number of years, and I think that any Minister for Foreign Affairs should prepare all sorts of drafts, ideas and plans. I, for my part, am ready to open debate in the cabinet on this problem whenever such a debate will take place.
Q: (unclear)... they also mentioned the possibility of using Scud missiles against the civilian population of Israel. What is your reaction to this threat.
A: Yes, we can witness a considerable buildup in Syria, with the most generous help of the Soviet Union, almost unprecedented help and we are watching very carefully statements and preparations which are being made by the Syrians regarding a possible war. As far as Israel is concerned, we don't want any war, neither with Syria, nor with Egypt, nor with Jordan. But of course we have to be prepared for any possible eventuality. I still hope the Syrians will think twice, if not ten times, if needed before taking a fatal decision, because they can't expect that the surprise in which we were caught in October will repeat itself. And if we won the war despite that surprise, so much more our victory is secure if we shall be, as we will be, better prepared to face any possible military threat. As far as we are concerned, Syria does not face any danger of war, because I know that here and there they are spreading the news and rumors that we are preparing an attack. We are not preparing an attack on Syria.
As far as the Scuds and other missiles are concerned, some of you know my old views. I don't think, moreover, I think that attacks on civilian concentrations, on both sides of the line, is criminal. And if a war takes place its battles should be confined to the battlefields only. But the Syrians, and any other of our neighbors, would be mistaken if they think that we shall refrain from counter-attacking if they shall attack our population. We have the means to reach any point in the entire territories surrounding the State of Israel. And by the way, they are more vulnerable than we are in such a case, and I pray that they will not start such an ugly war fighting, and therefore no retaliation will be needed.
Q: Mr. Minister, what made you give such high praise to Mr. Kissinger on his departure, if no results were achieved?
A: You know, sometimes politicians and statesmen have to be appreciated for their achievements, and sometimes they have to be appreciated because they don't give up on a great idea, in spite of tremendous difficulties. I know that after the Assembly's resolution and the Rabat Conference decisions, the prospects of a political solution have been more limited, meager and so on, and only a courageous politician would have undertaken this political risk, to try and achieve some sort of political solution in spite of all these difficulties. Therefore, I appreciate the fact that Dr. Kissinger came to the area immediately after the Rabat Conference, in spite of the Rabat Conference, with his ceaseless effort to achieve a political solution, peace, or at least interim agreement.
I believe that he still hasn't lost hope and he will continue to work in this direction, which I think is badly needed for the Middle Eastern countries and for the rest of the world.
Q: ... It has been said that the Rabat Conference has precipitated Israeli plans to establish the West Bank.
A: The policy of land settlement in Israel and the administered areas has nothing to do with the Rabat Conference, with previous conferences, and with future conferences of Arab summits. From the very beginning, we adopted a very highly selective policy, namely, we confine our land settlements only to strategic belts, strategic areas of special importance. While we refrained from settling new settlements in heavily populated areas, although as you all know, public opinion in this country is divided on this matter and I see no reason for changing our policy after Rabat and our policy will be implemented according to our capacities and plans which have nothing to do whatsoever with the Rabat Conference.
Q: Mr. Minister, in informing us that we were misinformed quite officially concerning Dr. Kissinger's return, certain inquiries had to be made prior to such return. Would these inquiries be pursued in Washington and if so, or where, and at what level do you anticipate, in the spirit of preliminary negotiations.
A: Where such clarifications should take place and by whom, as long as the clarification is being done. You see one has to find out, is Egypt still sovereign to decide her own destiny, or can the PLO dictate to her what should be her destiny. This is of course the question because there are contradictory judgments, whether Egypt is still allowed to do what she sees fit or she must get Arafat's approval before she makes up her mind.
Therefore I think some further clarifications are needed if Egypt and any other country still considers herself as a candidate, as a partner for some sort of negotiations. And, believe me, I don't care where these clarifications will take place, who will carry them out, as long as we can clarify the matter. And this is very important.
Q: King Hussein said in his last interview that Israel had missed several opportunities to come to terms with him on the Palestinian issue.
A- That's a good question. I'm sure that King Hussein is very sincere when he say's that Israel missed several opportunities. I'm not concluding an agreement with Jordan, but I'm equally sincere when I say that maybe Jordan, too, missed some golden opportunities to sign an agreement with Israel if they would have accepted the basic idea of territorial compromise which could have, I think, achieved a majority in the Knesset as well as in the country. So it's no good accusing each other who missed the opportunity, peace missed the opportunity in the area, a high standard of statesmanship should prevail in the area in order not to miss possible opportunities in the future for us, for Jordan, for Egypt and for the Syrians.
Q: It's a pity we haven't had this cleared up earlier. Negotiations could perhaps start in the interim before the end of the year. Are we now to take it that you see that negotiations are not a possibility before the end of the year?
A: No, I didn't say so, I didn't make any prediction when any negotiation will start, I only expressed my hope that negotiations with Egypt are still feasible and it seems to me that if they are feasible maybe sooner or later they may start, but I also said that some early clarifications maybe needed as far as I'm concerned, even early clarifications are an integral part of negotiations, to clear the way for such negotiations. There is no contradiction between me and Yariv on this matter, and whether before or after December I don't know, because it depends more on Egypt than on us or even the United States of America.
One more. Well, I tell you, I would like to find out that in spite of the mood which prevailed in the summit meeting of the Arab countries in Rabat, Egypt can still exercise her sovereignty over her further steps which she had in mind before Rabat whatever she had in mind. I don't exclude the possibility that when we start negotiations even on an interim agreement the gap between our attitude and the Egyptian attitude may be wide. The question which I would like to clarify is are they still ready to negotiate an interim agreement or not. And I must state without prior conditions. All the conditions should be put around the conference table.