On the twenty seventh anniversary of the General Assembly resolution that recommended the end of the British Mandate and the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish and an Arab state, Mr. Rabin was guest of the editors of the Israeli newspapers in Tel Aviv. He answered questions dealing with Israel's position on various issues. Excerpts:
It was not the U.N. decision that created the State of Israel. The State of Israel was created by the Zionist enterprise, which started decades before the U.N. decision. What the Jewish Yishuv created in the land of Israel, in agriculture, industry and defence, and the faith that the establishment of the Jewish Yishuv as the state on the way constituted the solution of the problem of the Jews...
I should like to recall here the role of the first Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion, who had the wisdom, in the great decision at the time on the partition plan, to combine vision and realism, far-sightedness and the readiness, as it appeared, to make far-reaching concessions in the present. If the policy then had been to insist on everything, who can tell whether that historic combination of circumstances would have brought about the establishment of the State of Israel as it was established, and if it had not been established then, who can tell what the position would have been today?
Today we live in a different world... true, there is a much stronger Israel, but just as the leaders of the Yishuv had to understand at that time the framework within which we were living, without ignoring our own strength, so it would be a mistake today not to see to what extent this framework has changed.
It was changed in many of its components - and not only for the better. The civilized world - Europe - is, to some extent, in a state of decline - economic, moral and political. Perhaps the expression of this fact lies in Europe's attitude toward Israel. Although the inter-power struggle has been softened in respect to certain subjects, when it comes to the Middle East there is no detente. Thirdly, the Arab states have an economic and financial power of which they never dreamed twenty-seven years ago. At the same time, as far as one power is concerned, the change has been for the better. In the War of Independence the United States imposed an embargo on arms for Israel. Today the United States is Israel's principal supplier of arms.
Things have changed, but one principle must continue to guide Israel policy and that is the same principle that led to Ben-Gurion's great decision in '47 and '48, namely the combination of vision and realism, of holding fast to the dream and aspiration but knowing that a distant goal is approached by stages, and it is sometimes necessary to know how to be content with what appears to be a little but insures the building of another layer in order to advance towards the ultimate goal... If we know the truth and understand how to apply it to the new conditions, I believe in our power to advance, to overcome difficulties and arrive, some time, at the goal, which is a State of Israel that is a Jewish state, secure and living in peace.
Q: In the Prime Minister's opinion will there not be a danger that the two superpowers have agreed: (a) to convene the Geneva Conference at an early date, with the participation of a Palestinian delegation, (b) impose through the Geneva Conference a solution which will be less satisfactory to the Jews than to the Arabs, (c) to impose the establishment of a third Arab state?
A: It appears to me that there is not sufficient understanding of the inter-power trend which is taking shape in the Middle East and which is becoming intertwined with the Arab-Israel conflict. As I see it, two basic trends have been finding expression since the Yom Kippur War:
One is an extremist Arab trend, supported by the Soviet Union, the aim of which is to prevent separate arrangements between Israel and each of her neighbours, to prevent these arrangements being achieved by stages. What the Soviets, Libyans, Iraqis and the PLO are afraid of is that, through the influence of the United States, countries like Egypt and Jordan may agree to open separate negotiations with Israel - if only for partial arrangements. The aim of Soviet, Syrian, Iraqi and PLO policy has been to prevent such a development, to bring all the Arab countries to the Geneva Conference, because then it would be clear that there is only one united Arab front, and all the Arab countries would then be obliged to demand a complete Israeli withdrawal and the. establishment of a third, Palestinian state under the PLO in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. If an all Arab front is established, with the support of most of the world, if not all of it, together with the Soviet Union, against Israel, it is hoped that the U.S. will then recoil from its support for Israel. Ever since the end of the Yom Kippur War this has been the policy.
Confronting it, there was another policy, which aimed at trying out, within the framework of the Geneva Conference (and when I say: within the framework of the Geneva Conference, I do not mean a plenary session, but within the system which has been created under the name of the Geneva Conference), negotiations on a bilateral basis between Israel and each of the Arab countries. Not a single one of them is ready for an overall settlement, and in the absence of such readiness, whether it is possible to advance by stages this possibility too should be explored.
I would say that the Soviet-Syrian policy has had some achievements: First, the U.N. decision to recognize the right of the terrorist organizations which call themselves the PLO to be represented at the U.N. When they came to the Rabat conference with this achievement, it was clear that this would have an influence. Its results led to an important achievement for Soviet-Syrian policy: Jordan was neutralized. As soon as Jordan was neutralized, that cut out another possibility of advancing towards peace and made things more difficult for Egypt.
And there were other decisions which apparently made it even more difficult for any Arab country that would try to advance in stages. I think, by the way, that; on the one hand, Israel's readiness, which was shown by the taking of certain security precautions at the approach of the date for the withdrawal of the U.N. forces mandate, and on the other hand, the Soviet-Syrian feeling that their policy was achieving its ends, that the prospects of dialogue with those countries that really wanted to had diminished, were among the considerations that will apparently lead to the extension of UNDOF's mandate, for the Russians and the Syrians believe that the policy they have been pursuing is nearing the achievement of its aims: The convening of the Geneva Conference on the Soviet-Syrian pattern. Strange that there should be people in Israel who, though for entirely different reasons, are seeking the same end.
I don't want to prophesy, but I believe that Brezhnev's visit to Cairo on 15 January is, more or less, Egypt's hint to Israel, to the Western world and the United States that this is the framework of time within which an arrangement may be reached, and after which there may be a change in Egypt's policy and a return to the building up of military strength and preparation mainly for the military option. And the convening of the Geneva Conference on the inclusive pattern means preparation mainly for the military option - let there be no illusion among us on that score.
For the moment, therefore, it is not a Soviet-U.S. understanding that should be feared. In my opinion it does not exist. The activities of the two powers appear - to me, at any rate - to be opposed to each other. What will develop? I believe that by January or February we will know. I believe that if there is no progress we shall have the Geneva Conference, under pressure to invite the PLO, and we shall have to grapple with that problem. But so long as we can prevent that development we must seek every possible way to do so.
As is well known I am against the establishment of a third state. I believe there is no sense in saying that there is no such thing as a Palestinian, but I believe that the key to peace lies in the relations between Israel and the Arab states. I believe that within the framework of peace with Jordan it is also possible to solve the Palestinian problem.
Q: What does the Prime Minister think of Mr. Ariel Sharon's proposal to help the Palestinians to establish their state in Trans-Jordan instead of the rule of the Hashemite dynasty and without rejecting talks with the terrorist leaders for this purpose?
A: If the quotation is correct, and Mr. Sharon proposes talks with Arafat, then only God and Mr. Sharon can explain it. Actually, if I have understood him correctly, what he proposes is the same as the Israel government and the Alignment have been proposing all the time: Two states in the Palestine of 1918: in the Western part, without drawing frontiers, a Jewish state, in which some non-Jews also live, to the east of it a Jordanian-Palestinian state. If he proposes installing Arafat in Amman, I find that quite astonishing. I don't see why it is to Israel's interests to do that to the Hashemite regime. I know that the Hashemite regime - not for Israeli reasons - in 1970 put an end to the possibility that Jordan should serve as a base for terrorist attacks against Jews. Should the terrorists be brought back there? The Hashemite regime has prevented a Soviet presence. A change of status would start with one thing: A flow of Soviet arms to Jordan. Do we need the Soviets and their arms along the Jordan line as well? I think that the proposal is so unreasonable that it can only be described as absurd.
Q: Was the government's decision to establish an industrial centre at Ma'aleh Adumim not a demonstrative act against the Rabat decisions?
A: In the field of settlement, I believe in first priority for the consolidation and strengthening of Jerusalem. Around this question, I can foresee - when, at some time, we get to negotiations for peace - one of our most difficult struggles... The question of Ma'aleh Adumim has been investigated and considered for a long time and the government took a decision when the matter was ripe for decision. We did not plan it as a reaction to Rabat and I do not regard it as a reaction to Rabat. We are not engaged in reactions. We are engaged in a policy of consolidating areas which we deem it important to consolidate and strengthen.
Q: Is it possible that Hussein may still be a partner in peace negotiations?
A: I don't think that we should disqualify anyone too early. We have had many changes and upsets in the Arab world. In any case, Jordan exists and there is a long border between us: From the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Eilat, a section that has nothing to do with Judea and Samaria. I believe that there can be no peace unless we are also to live at peace with the Jordanian state. We should hold fast to one principle: Not to conduct any negotiations with those who call themselves the PLO if this policy is proved right - and we must persevere with it for half a year, a year or two years - there will be no alternative, and I believe that our partner in dialogue to the east will again be the Jordan kingdom.
Q: What does the Prime Minister think about establishing a national emergency government? Was there any pressure or friendly advice by U.S. leaders not to enlarge the government?
A: There is not the slightest foundation for any allegation that a foreign factor has any influence on our considerations in this matter. No one approached us. No one spoke to me, whether directly or indirectly, either from the United States nor from any other place, on the subject of the possible composition of the government of Israel.
I see no reason why the government could not continue with the policy it has enunciated in its platform and its public statements. The composition of the cabinet should be such as to enable it to carry out this policy. I am not aware that the Likud or any other body is prepared to join the government on the basis of its basic principles, the coalition agreement and the government statements and policies, and to agree to such a composition of the government as will enable it to continue this policy. If it should transpire that the case is otherwise, then the party body to which I belong will have to consider the matter... I feel no need for this government to summon the Likud to deliver it. We are capable of conducting the government's policy, as we believe in it, with the present composition of the government.
Q: What has the Prime Minister to say in a reply to arguments expressed by, among others, Mr. Sharon, that the government is not displaying enough resourcefulness in a war to the death against the terrorists?
A: Ever since the establishment of the state it has faced two military threats: A major, central military threat from the armies of the Arab countries and, in addition, the activity of terrorist elements - at one time they were called gangs, later fedayeen, later Al Fatah, today Hawatmeh, George Habash, Jibril and so forth. So long as the Arab countries can give backing, support and protection, it is impossible to wipe out this phenomenon of terrorism. If anyone tells you different, I suggest that you don't believe him. The ending of this phenomenon will involve settlements between ourselves and the Arab countries.
So the question is: What can be done to frustrate their operations and reduce our vulnerability? So far as concerns measures taken on our own territory, the I.D.F. has greatly increased its efficiency, but there is no absolute security even against the repetition of events such as those at Beit She'an. We must strike at the terrorists, but anyone who imagines that the terrorists have headquarters where they can always be located is living under an illusion. There are headquarters in Damascus, but does anyone propose that in order to liquidate Al-Saiqua or Hawatmeh we should capture Damascus? We must keep a sense of proportion. If anyone suggests that he has a formula for solving the problem finally and absolutely, that is not a correct presentation of the facts.
Q: Why was no initiative taken to get an agreement with Hussein before Rabat? Will the Ma'aleh Adumim project not put a final end to any prospect of agreement with Hussein?
A: The obstacle to any progress with Jordan was the fact that Jordan's position was that there was only one possibility under existing conditions: A Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Jordan, according to the well-known Jordanian proposal, namely a unilateral Israeli withdrawal 8 or 10 kilometres all along the Jordan. We did not know of any other proposal, though various other proposals have been submitted by Israel by various means since the Yom Kippur War. There was no sense in a separation of forces, which is a military arrangement, in which Israel only made concessions and received nothing in return. That was what prevented any progress before Rabat. I do not think that the Ma'aleh Adumim project will hinder prospects of peace. It might well be said that the Arab world will realize that the Rabat decisions created a situation in which there is no one to negotiate with over Judea and Samaria. If this situation continues, there may be a reconsideration in the Arab world - not today or tomorrow, or in a year's time. I suggest, therefore, that we should not be too impressed by the applause for Yasser Arafat at the U.N., but see things in the light of possible developments in six months or a year or two. I propose that we should exerciser patience in our expectations for a change in one direction or another.
Q: In view of the international recognition for the Palestinians, could not the government produce a policy on the question which may meet with more international support?
A: The Alignment did not ignore the existence of the Palestinian question in its election programme. The solution proposed by the Alignment and the government is the solution of partition in regard to Palestine of 1918: Namely, two states - one Jewish and one Jordanian-Palestinian. We should not begin to change our position whenever we come up against opposition of the Arabs (interruption: from the whole world), a large part of the world voted in the U.N. for a resolution that sets a question mark against the survival of the State of Israel. So what? I don't say that I am happy about it, but it has not made me change my mind about the need for Israel's survival and the readiness to fight for it. I believe that this basic approach to the solution of the Palestinian question is the right approach, and perhaps it is the only one that has any prospects.
I believe that if we hold our ground and continue the struggle we will succeed. I don't promise that it will end in another five or ten or fifty years. We have been struggling for 26 years for the consolidation of Israel and peace in the area, and I think we have to mobilize all our Jewish patience and realize that the struggle may take another 26 years.
Q: Are we to expect concrete measures in the near future to increase productivity?
A: I will not go into all the economic questions, but I am convinced that if things do not change in our social and economic structure, we shall also lose our power to endure in the security and political fields. This will mean a lengthy effort, composed of a thousand and one prosaic, everyday matters.
Q: Why does the Prime Minister not deny the possibility of any participation by Israel in fighting - if it should take place - which the West may start against the oil countries or against any Arab countries in connection with oil? Should the question of peace and the question of oil not be regarded as two separate questions?
A: I don't understand, does anyone expect me to charge the Western countries with wanting to do something about oil? I don't know if they have any such intentions, am I supposed to deny something I know nothing about? I think the question is not relevant and has no connection a) with any concrete matters or b) matters that the State of Israel should be concerned with.
As for the second question, I think that the problem, first and foremost for the United States, but also to a large extent for the European countries, is an incorrect appreciation of economic, political and social developments. If I were sitting in the Kremlin today I would see to the continuation of the present tension in the Middle East - if possible without war. Under these conditions, when oil gives the Arab countries economic power which is gradually undermining the economic structure of the free world, the Soviet Union has only to look on and wait. I think that Europe is on the brink of a serious collapse. If the present situation continues and becomes somewhat worse, I think that the Soviet Union can get achievements in Europe which it has never got by military threats and pressures, and all kinds of manoeuvres in the past. I think that this strange combination of Soviet policy and the attitudes of sheikhs and kings in the oil-producing countries creates a serious threat to the free world's way of life.
The sooner the free world wakes up to see this situation and takes steps to meet the threat, this strange coalition between the Communist world and the world of the oil kings and sheikhs, the better will be its prospects of grappling with the problem. This, in my opinion, is the connection between oil and peace.
As for Israel, just as she was helped by what happened as the result of World War II, with the positive side and the terrible tragedy, so Israel is politically and economically affected today by this international development. If the Western world does not stand firm, it will also injure Israel. We can already set it from the economic point of view and, to a certain extent, from the political point of view. Actually, this shows how closely connected are the fate of the free world and Israel's capacity to stand fast, with the support of the free world.
Perhaps this is the fundamental question for the United States as the leader of the free world, for Europe as the sector of the free world that has suffered most, and to a certain extent it must also affect Israel's policy in the face of the results of this international situation. This is the connection. between oil, money, the political situation, the economic situation and peace.