In this important interview, the Prime Minister, having been in office almost six months, outlined his concept of the future as well as the road to its attainment. He called for continued negotiations with Egypt for a military agreement, short of a declaration of non-belligerency that would split off the Soviet Camp from the Arab one, he stressed the important ties with the U.S. and called for prior consultations with Washington on the major moves ahead. Text:
"An Inauspicious Constellation"
The six months that Yitzhak Rabin has served as Prime Minister is not a short period of time. Has the Prime Minister crystallized a concept? Does he know where he is going, and where he is leading us?
Yes, says Rabin, he has a concept as well as a road. The concept is a long-range one, and is based on the fundamental assumption that the struggle for the consolidation of Israel is a process of historical dimensions. There are no immediate final solutions, and shortcuts to the final process are unrealistic. We are facing a long road, in the course of which emphasis will have to be placed on one issue or another.
Twenty-seven years ago, we enjoyed a stroke of fortune, and witnessed what Rabin calls an historical "fissure in the sky". This happened when the world's guilty conscience concerning the Holocaust was joined with the desire of the USSR and USA to put an end to British colonialism in the region. It was a rare combination of interests and conscience which created the international constellation enabling the establishment of Israel. Anyone who did not understand the influence of that international constellation on the attainment of our national objective will not understand that the difficulties confronting us are the result of an international constellation which is one of those inauspicious in Israel. Rabin does not say "bad". The emphasis is on "inauspicious".
"Israel Must Gain Time"
This constellation was created by three factors:
* The differences between the Great Powers, which have remained acute in all that concerns the Middle East, despite detente. Rabin believes that this was the only issue about which there was no agreement at Vladivostok.
* The decline of Europe because of her economic dependence on oil. Historians will write, says Rabin, that the repercussions of the Yom Kippur War in the Free World politically, economically and socially - were of far greater proportions that were warranted by the scope of the military campaign which took place here.
* The rise in power of the Arab world, due to its possession of oil and the financial resources with which oil provides it. The acquisition of 15% of the Daimler-Benz company is only the tip of the iceberg. Mr. Rabin estimates the Arab investments in Europe and the US at about $27 billion.
That is the international situation, and in Rabin's opinion our point of departure should be that our power to change international reality is negligible. We must consider how best to emerge from this grim constellation.
How can this be done?
Rabin answers: The possibility open to Israel, and therefore her central objective, must be to gain time. By this he means a period of up to seven years - what Rabin calls "the seven lean years". Why that particular length of time? Because this will be the time required by the Free World to shake loose of its dependence on Arab fuel. England and Scandinavia will attain this independence within 6 years; the US will diminish its dependence within 4-5 years. Not only must Israel survive this period safely, but she must also adapt her way of life to the international situation, to utilize to the maximum the Russian immigrants, and to adapt Israel's economy and the country's way of life to the new reality.
Mr. Rabin regards the economic issue as one of the challenges facing him. He speaks of the need for people to regard their place of employment as an assent, rather than a place to secure benefits. He speaks of the need to shock the public, in order to restore sanity to our consumer society.
What must the Government do, practically speaking, so that we can survive the seven lean years? Says Rabin: Since the Yom Kippur War, two concepts have become crystallized in our region: On the one hand, the Russo-Syrian concept, the aim of which is to prevent an overall settlement, and to prevent negotiations directed towards partial settlements, in order to frustrate America's desire to consolidate her position and curb the gradual USSR takeover of the region. On the other hand, there is the American-Israeli-Jordanian-Egyptian concept, according to which progress towards peace is possible by means of staged settlements, thereby minimizing Soviet influence in the region. Following the victory of this concept, in the first round, the Russo-Syrian line scored a victory at the Rabat Conference. The neutralization of Jordan further reduced Egypt's freedom to maneuver and follow the path she has chosen.
Our immediate, practical interest should be, in Rabin's opinion, to prevent Egypt's return to the Soviet sphere influence. The fact is that Egypt's absence from the Russo-Syrian alignment resulted in Russian sanctions against her, in the form of limiting the supply of spare parts. As a result of this limitation, Egypt's readiness for war has been adversely affected. Had we followed the hard line suggested by several Likud members, would this not have led to our being on the brink, or already in the thick, of a new coordinated Syrian-Egyptian war?
"Syria Will Resume the War in 1975"
Rabin is aware that the continued stalemate is not convenient for Sadat. He knows that by inviting Brezhnev to Cairo, Sadat wishes to signal the Americans that he would change camps if no progress was made. We must prevent this change over, says Rabin. What will we gain thereby? If we reach the point of war, we shall be in a better position, as regards timing, the scope of fighting and our relations with the US.
Although Mr. Rabin refuses to make any public prophecies about the chances of war, I understand that he regards the possibility of renewed warfare by Syria, in the course of 1975, as a real one. In any case, Syria will wish to exploit the military option and the question is, how she will enter the war? Will Egypt share in the planning, the intent and the enthusiasm? Or will Egypt become involved in war without enthusiasm, and possibly in a state of insufficient readiness? A Syria which will open war on her own, without the enthusiasm of Egypt, leaves us with one front only, at least during the first fateful days of fighting.
The question is, what price is Israel prepared to pay so that Egypt will remain outside the Soviet camp? Rabin does not regard this dilemma as an easy one. We have six weeks in which to decide how to keep Egypt in her present alignment, at a reasonable price.
What is meant by "a reasonable price"? I ask Rabin. The meaning is - another partial settlement with Egypt. Tension between Israel and the US may rise over the form of the settlement, Mr. Rabin assumes. In the course of the coming years, President Ford will want to succeed in the economic sphere. This means that relations with the Arab States will have to be spared any disruption, since this will be vital to him in view of the pressure by Europe, which is worried about the effect of any further oil upheavals. We shall have to tread softly in our relations with the US for a year. If we survive 1975 safe and sound, and reach 1976, we shall have gained not one year, but two.
Optimism and Caution in Relations with the US
We must take care not to destroy our relations with the US. Mr. Rabin is angry at statements concerning the mobilization of American Jewry for this purpose or that. General Brown was one of the persons most sympathetic towards Israel. If we continue expressing ourselves and prattling away in terms which have long since become obsolete, his statement will not be a transitory incident. There is as yet no understanding in Israel of the effect of the change in political funding in the US on "Jewish power". It should not be forgotten that the Jews only constitute 3% of the American population. If once it was said in the US that the image of Jewish power in the eyes of non-Jews is too strong, and too weak in the eyes of the Jews, now care must be taken that this situation is not reversed. At the same time, Mr. Rabin is optimistic with regard to the US. He believes that he will receive additional arms, even if it is necessary to fight to obtain them. What we will receive will be funded by the Americans, but we shall have to tread with care.
"I Will Not Say That I Am Not Ready to Accept the Path of Military Agreements"
What, then, is the price we shall have to pay? We shall be required to enter into a further military agreement with Egypt. Egypt wants to circumvent the Rabat resolutions in this way. This does not mean that such an agreement would not have political implications. But they will be covert; that is, they will affect the US rather than ourselves. How have the Egyptians fulfilled the commitments they whispered to the US during negotiations for the disengagement agreements? They have fulfilled them all, emphasizes Rabin. As regards the re-opening of the Canal, there was no commitment that this would occur before an additional move was made. Our dilemma, says Rabin, is whether to insist on the principle of political talks only. Will we reject a military settlement which will have hidden political implications? If our concept is that a breathing-space of several years must be attained, I will not say that I am unwilling to take the path of military agreements.
Rabin's statements gave me the impression that the Government would not turn down, a priori, Egypt's demand for a round of talks on a military level, on the condition that its practical significance would be political. In this case, Rabin makes clear, Israel's essential military position must not change, that is:
Egypt must not advance into the territory vacated by Israel.
The Sinai passes must remain in our hands, so that our territorial concessions will be a bit further south and a bit further north, but not in the central area.
Stage B will on no account begin to be implemented before the mandate of the UN forces is renewed. This is to make sure that no physical movement occurs, in the event that Egypt and Syria do not intend to renew the UN mandate.
We shall no longer agree to a renewal of the UN mandate every six months; there will be need of far longer intervals.
Mr. Rabin no longer speaks of a declaration of non-belligerency. My impression was that he does not regard such a direct public commitment as realistic under the given circumstances. But if there is political progress, Egypt will be less interested, practically speaking, in joining the war. The PLO does not worry Mr. Rabin. It is an "instrument" in the inter-Arab struggle, the shadow of the Great Powers. The PLO will not exist if a certain number of Arab States decide that it no longer serves their interests. We must prove that there is nothing to talk about with the PLO, and that we will not talk to them. Within a year, this may restore Hussein as a partner to the positive course of progress in negotiations.
As noted above, Mr. Rabin is wary of prophesying, and is not willing to speak of the chances of success in traversing the seven lean years. He refers only to what must be done: to recuperate, absorb immigration, change our way of life, and sensibly counter the actions of an inauspicious political arena. If we get through these seven years safely, we shall be able to lengthen our stride, says Mr. Rabin. The major difficulty, which the Prime Minister did not refer to, is, of course, the fact that the other side is also aware of the fatefulness of these seven years.