56 Directions of Israel-s Foreign Policy- lecture by Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Allon- 26 December 1974

There is nothing new in stating that Israel's policy is now at one of its most difficult and complex moments in its history. The political struggles we have faced during the last fourteen months and the struggles - political and perhaps not only political, we may expect in the next few years - may be the most difficult we have ever encountered since the start of Jewish national revolution embodied in the return to Zion.

The factors which hamper our policy are well known and therefore I shall only refer briefly to the main aspects. The differences and even the contradictions within the Arab camp have not disappeared. They also find expression in the attitude towards Israel, at least at the tactical level. However, the bargaining power of the Arab camp in general is at its peak, and in all that concerns Israel it strives for a more united front than on any other problem, Arab bargaining power is incompatibly stronger than at any other period in modern history. Several of the Arab States possess the greatest reserves of oil in the world. They have huge capital at their disposal which is continuing to grow at the rate of nearly five billion dollars a month, for the time being. This is disturbing the whole economic balance of the world. There are, of course, long-standing other factors, such as the strategic location of the Arab States, their voting strength in the UN and other international organizations and their links with the Moslem, neutralist and Communist world, which provide them with virtually automatic support.

As against the peak, which the organized bargaining power of the Arab States has reached, the industrialized democratic countries are now at a nadir. They still have the power to organize and successfully confront the blackmail which the Arab oil States threaten them with. However, the interaction of separatist interests, the lack of a clear ideological motivation, as well as weakness, not to say plain fear, have for the moment reduced the nations of western Europe to a group of weak and shaky countries. The great vision of a new, united, progressive and vital Europe, both in quality and quantity, is still in a nature of a dream. With differences, the same is true of Japan.

The United States is still the strongest, still the foremost country in the world and in my view will continue to remain so for many years. But the United States has not yet completely recovered from the trauma of the war in Vietnam and is still working to heal the wounds of the Watergate affair which undermined its national leadership. These two factors and the American economic crisis have strengthened neo-isolationist tendencies, which are not only characteristic of the two extremes of the political spectrum, but have also penetrated wide circles in the center.

In this international framework, with the West under economic threat and in political crises, the Communist bloc continues to act in a planned and consistent manner. On the one hand, it is dependent on the United States and Western States and wants to reap benefits from them. This fact has made detente possible. On the other hand, it is acting to spread dissention in the West, to widen its own expansion in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf and to deepen its penetration in the Third World. In any case, in all that concerns our region, the Soviet Union spares no effort in order to encourage the intransigence of the Arab States, both by sending large consignments of sophisticated weapons on generous terms and by placing obstacles in the path of the American effort to move the region towards peace.

Of course, mention must be made of the Yom Kippur War and its outcome when talking about the factors which are complicating Israeli foreign policy at present. From the military point of view, the victory of the Israeli Army was a great one - perhaps our greatest triumph since the War of Independence. However, our image was weakened by the fact that this victory was not accompanied by the expectations fostered in the wake of the lightning war of June 1967, and that Israel was prevented from crushing the aggressor armies completely. I want to stress - our image - and not our true strength and weight in various political arenas. Unfortunately, in our world, not only real capacity, but also image has some weight.

As far as the Arab States are concerned, the opposite occurred. Although the more intelligent among them must know that only a few days of fighting stood between them and total defeat, the Arab States as a whole ended the Yom Kippur War with a feeling of success. From the military viewpoint, they broke what they called "the barrier of fear". No less important, they suddenly discovered their political power relative to the weakness of the rest of the world.

That, in general terms, is the political, regional and international framework in which Israel has to conduct her foreign policy today. It is no easy situation and the scale tilting against Israel is weighted heavily. However, the scale in Israel's favour is far from being insignificant.

First of all, if the Yom Kippur War has proved anything, it is the fact that a military solution to the Arab-Israel conflict is not, and will not be possible. If under such starting conditions, which will never repeat themselves, and in such a favourable political situation, the Arab armies did not achieve their goal, they must realize they will never achieve it. Over the period since the Yom Kippur War, Israel has succeeded in rebuilding her Army, and applying all the lessons which could be drawn. As a result, Israel today is considerably stronger than she was on the eve of the last war. I have no wish to make provocative statements, but the Arab States must understand that if they force another war on Israel, they will suffer a much more decisive defeat than last time, despite the wealth of weapons at their disposal. As against all that, Israel's aspiration - peace and good relations with all of her neighbours - cannot be achieved by the sword.

Moreover, despite all her problems, Israel is a powerful factor in the Middle East. She is a strong and stabilizing element in a volatile area which is of great importance to the whole world. Her existence and function is an essential interest of the United States and Western Europe, not to speak of others, even including ones in the Middle East, whose interest in the last resort is the maintenance of relative stability and calm in the region. Although Israel was not established and does not exist in order to serve the interests of others, it is important to remember, especially during this difficult period, that her basic interests go hand in hand with the best interests of the other States and parties in the international arena, among them the most important and powerful. However deplorable the demonstrations against Israel in international organizations may be, not the whole world is against us. This is also true as regards governments and official bodies and even more so as regards public opinion. Anybody seeking proof of this should recall the tremendous wave of sympathy from leading intellectuals, writers, and socialists expressed in the wake of the UNESCO's hostile resolutions.

The diplomatic crisis in which Israel is involved will certainly continue for a considerable period. However our ability to defend ourselves by our own strength, even if all the Arab States unite against us, the fact that we are a vital factor in the maintenance of the global and internal balances of power in the region, together with our sincere aspiration for peace, provide Israel with an unchallengeable status in the Middle East. Moreover, they open up a prospect for positive change in the situation, despite all the difficulties and obstacles.

As in the past, so today, our goal and dream has not changed and will not change. It is achievement of a real peace with all our neighbours, or at least with any Arab State prepared for it. This is and will be the central goal and the primary objective of our policy. The intention is, of course, a total peace, just, stable and durable, based on contractual agreements and accompanied by mutually effective security arrangements and systems of bilateral and regional cooperation which will remove once and for all the threat of recurring war from our stormy area. This is our central goal and, distant though it may be, we refuse to despair. Our secondary objectives and the tactical measures related to them are derived from this goal.

Thus, if one of the neighbours were prepared for negotiations, towards an overall peace, without any prior conditions, we would have been glad and would not hesitate a moment before entering such negotiations. Regrettably, however, no such readiness has been shown by any Arab State and as long as this situation continues, I would formulate our secondary objectives in the following order: the prevention of war; if this is impossible, its postponement in the hope of eventually avoiding its outbreak; if this cannot be achieved limiting the war to a minimum of battlefronts. If this too is impossible, then preventing the multiple-front from becoming a simultaneous one. Of course, all these steps must be taken while doing our utmost politically and information-wise to gain maximum understanding and sympathy for our position and policy in America, among friendly nations in the West and among all those circles and peoples in the rest of the world who are disposed to such understanding.

I shall not prophesy as to whether another war can be avoided, or at what price. Though let me say that there is obviously no point in buying off a possible war in the near future at the cost of certain war under worse conditions some time later. However it is not out of place to stress once again that even when war appears more and more possible, it should not be regarded as inevitable. For as long as war is not absolutely unavoidable and so long as the count-down has not been started, there is still some prospect, even if very slight, of preventing war, or at least of postponing it, in the hope that it can be avoided.

Israel has no reason and no desire to seek war. On the contrary, she has every reason and every desire to strive for its prevention. We will not initiate war, nor be dragged into one, unless it is imposed on us against our will. Then, and only then, as the French say "A la guerre comme à la guerre", which includes taking the appropriate initiatives, as dictated by military needs and political considerations.

All this, without falling prey to illusions, pursuing pipe-dreams. Our sincere and neverending desire to prevent war must be accompanied by continual strengthening of our security and by remaining highly alert in accordance with changing circumstances. A realistic striving for peace must be accompanied by preparedness for war, just as readiness for war, should it be unavoidable, must be accompanied by a real and visible desire for peace.

Peace is generally a most important component in the system of national security, just as military power is a vital factor in the system of peace. So long as the words of the prophet "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb" have not materialized, then each State is bound to the proper balance between peace and military security. However, Israel, as the only State in the world whose very existence is threatened and which is deprived of peace, is still in a state of asymmetry between the two. Therefore we have had to place the emphasis on our military and defensive strength, although we well know that this alone will not bring peace.

Moreover, we are well aware that without defensive capability, not only do we fail to bring peace closer but are inviting another war. Hence at the same time as searching every path for political progress towards a settlement, a primary task of Israel's foreign policy continues to be the fulfillment of its parts in strengthening the State's military capacity. This, however, whether it be by laying the groundwork for the political conditions to enable Israel to purchase the armaments she requires, or by helping to obtain easy financial terms for these purchases, or achieving political understanding for Israel's strategy and actions in the present or future.

In view of the present combination of circumstances in the regional and international arena, the idea may spread that it would be preferable for Israel to dig in and not budge from the position in the hope of gaining time for time's sake -in other words, to adopt tactics designed to maintain the status quo for as long as possible in the vague hope that time itself will make things easier and improve our prospects. I do not believe there is any point in such tactics, which will not lead anywhere. This is not only because our enemies also know how that kind of tactic works and are capable of undermining it, but because the intentional lack of political progress, or at least the lack of readiness for reasonable political progress, will result in the loss of sympathy and support of friends all over the world, at the very moment that we need the defence, political and economic support which they provide us.

We have no intention of maintaining the status quo. We are for movement, for political progress and for scrutinising every path that will promote progress. However, at the same time, we do not see the point in rushing blind-fold into any settlement. It is the very complexity of the conflict and the fragility of the situation which dictate measured, careful and balanced steps, with patience and without haste. As the Arabs say: "Haste is a devil's device" - and there is no need for devilish speed. Only measured progress can gradually settle the conflict without leaving unsolved problems to reopen the wounds.

Therefore, we need the time factor as a healing hand can create an appropriate atmosphere for progress and a settlement. In other words, time as a necessary element for constructive dynamism, not as an element that freezes dynamism.

But with all our desire for political movement, we must not fall victim to the threats of blackmail by the other side -whether they are war threats, or the threat of another oil embargo. For if the western world or Israel adopts such a path of surrender, there will be no end to it. For the moment the Arab States, or more accurately, the extremist Arab States, feel that such threats can attain their desires, there will be no limit to the price they are likely to demand. In any event, Israel will not fall victim to such threats, and will not act under their shadow. We shall not sacrifice our vital interests for the convenience of those who are prepared to surrender at our expense. As I have said, we would prefer negotiations, if possible, on an overall peace agreement immediately, with each and every Arab State. However, it does not appear that such a possibility is realistic at this moment.

True, Syria says that she does not want interim settlements, and wishes to negotiate, as it were, on an overall solution. But this theoretical readiness by Damascus is bound up with a series of pre-conditions which in fact render talks impossible. Israel is required to make a prior commitment to withdraw to the 1949 armistice line and agree that a separate Palestinian State, headed by the PLO, be set up in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. We are informed that even if we give up all of the Golan Heights, Damascus will not agree to normalize relations; moreover, Israel is required to go to simultaneous negotiations with all the Arab countries at Geneva with the participation of the PLO. With these conditions, it is obvious that mutual discussion and real negotiation are not being proposed by Syria. What is an offer amounts to an act of surrender in advance to a series of demands that the other side knows full well we cannot accept.

In fact Syria today is the most extreme and intransigent of all our Arab neighbours. Even so, we are prepared to negotiate with her, and sincerely seek a path to a settlement with her too, on one elementary condition: that demands should not be presented by each side as pre-conditions for setting down at the negotiating table, but that these demands be left for direct and open discussion, however difficult, in the talks themselves. I am afraid, at least at this stage, that Damascus is not yet ready for that elementary condition. Damascus thus removes itself from the top of the negotiating queue to the bottom.

Jordan, in accepting the verdict of its rivals at the Rabat Summit, stepped down from representing the Palestinians living in the West Bank, who are her citizens. Nevertheless she continues to give them financial and other aid, and leaves the bridges open for free movement between both banks. Jordan has thus unburdened itself from direct responsibility for what is called the Palestinian problem. At the same time, it continues to retain a latent option on the West Bank in the more distant future, if and when circumstances permit her to return. But in the near future, Jordan is not a candidate for negotiations over the West Bank. On the other hand, the PLO which has been designated for that role by the Rabat Conference cannot fulfill it, because of its extremism in rejecting any reconciliation with Israel, and because - or perhaps principally - of Israel's total and outright rejection of the PLO. Hence, in the near future, a temporary deadlock may be expected on this delicate issue.

However, this need not be an absolute deadlock in the long run. After all, in spite of the enthusiasm with which the terrorist leader, Yasser Arafat, was greeted at the UN he does not represent the basic interests of the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and his strength is not based on them. It may be hoped, if not assumed, that with the passage of time, when the PLO is reduced to its proper size and its impotence becomes clear, important Arab parties will be found on this side of the Jordan who will wish to take their fate in their own hands, perhaps even with the tacit understanding of their brethren on the other side of the Jordan. Maybe then the ground will be laid for what may sound premature today, that is, a gradual establishment of some kind of home rule for the Palestinian Arabs in these territories on which we are willing to compromise, as an interim phase leading to full peace. In my view, the first steps of such a civilian government or at least the examination of the possibility of a start in the fields of education, labour, agriculture, etc. can be undertaken in the near future.

Even without the problem of Judea and Samaria, which is temporarily deadlocked, Jordan and Israel have mutual interests along Israel's longest overland border of 220 kilometers, stretching from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea in the south and along the Beit Shean and Jordan Valleys in the north. There is therefore room for a dialogue between Amman and Jerusalem aimed at normalizing relations within the framework of an interim agreement. The state of security along the common border is of interest to both countries. It is conceivable that Jordan will eventually show interest in using the services of one of Israel's Mediterranean ports for the transport of cargos. The coordination of the development of Eilat and the neighbouring town of Aqaba may also be considered. So can the idea of coordinating the development plans of the two countries along the border areas and the Dead Sea, for the benefit of both States. It may be that for internal or inter-Arab reasons, Jordan will not be prepared to be the first State to make an interim agreement with Israel, but she could certainly be the second in line. In any case the path to negotiate with Jordan, whether on an overall settlement or on an interim agreement, with or without the question of the future of the Palestinians, must be left open to take advantage of the rapidly changing circumstances in our region.

The big question remains as regards Egypt, which, in fact, holds the key to further progress in the area. How will Cairo act? Does Egypt retain freedom to act in her own interests after the Rabat Conference and the establishment of the coordination between Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO; or does every step which Egypt takes with respect to Israel require the consent of Syria and the PLO? Is she about to fall into the hands of the Soviet Union again, on the occasion of Brezhnev's visit, or will she continue to be receptive to the American approach to peace step by step? Of course, it is possible to bring quotations and declarations which may be interpreted either way - but, in the end, at this stage at least, we do not have an unequivocal answer to the question.

Also as regards Egypt, I would prefer negotiations on an over-all settlement rather than on an interim agreement. However, it appears that for reasons of her own, Egypt is not prepared at this time for a total peace settlement - and what is on the agenda - if, it is on the agenda - is negotiation for an interim agreement, based on a gradual "step by step" approach. Israel, for her part, has agreed to this approach: If the realistic choice is between an interim agreement with all the risks entailed because of its temporary nature, or a renewed diplomatic deadlock with the certain danger of war which that entails, the path of interim agreement clearly must be preferred.

This is founded on five assumptions:

A. That the agreement will be based upon mutual concessions, and will represent an additional and meaningful step towards peace;

B. That, notwithstanding the withdrawal and the re-deployment of forces involved, the Israel Defence Forces will retain strong strategic lines;

C. That the agreement will be accompanied by mutual and international security arrangements, based on stable and effective demilitarization, which will afford maximum security against its violation, and which will prevent the possibility of surprise attacks by one side on the other;

D. That Israel will continue to hold areas which are of importance to Egypt, as an incentive to Cairo to continue along the path of negotiations and peace;

E. That when the period of this agreement expires, the parties will not enter into hostilities, but into a situation of controlled cease-fire until the conclusion of the negotiations on the next agreement.

In other words: An interim agreement - if and when it is achieved - must rest upon an Israeli withdrawal, which will be considerably less extensive than that which Israel would agree to within the framework of a peace treaty, and this in return for significant strategic and political commitments by Egypt, greater than those which Egypt granted in the framework of the Separation of Forces Agreement.

For obvious reasons, I will not go into details as to topography and conditions. But the over-all principle is clear: The depth of Israeli withdrawal must be directly proportional to the scope and significance of the Egyptian commitments, including the time period for which the agreement is to be effective.

From the objective point of view, both Egypt and Israel have an interest in an agreement of this sort. Egypt is interested in the return of further territory in Sinai and in seeing the I.D.F. farther away from the Suez Canal and its cities; while Israel is interested in the beginning of a process of cooling-off and normalizing relations with her neighbours, in particular, with Egypt.

Thus, if an interim agreement can be reached with Egypt in the spirit of the principles outlined above, then, in addition to the importance of the agreement itself, it may help to produce a new situation, both from the political and the psychological point of view. A fair number of years without war, without acts of belligerency, and without fanning the flames, may well temper hostility, and foster a climate of confidence as the basis for peace and reconciliation. However, there is no certainty that, even if an interim agreement is reached, the result will be precisely as I have described, just as there is no certainty over the outcome of any political step. But on no account should the existence of this possibility be discounted in advance. In my opinion, it justifies braving the dangers, since anyhow peace is, in the final analysis, in Egypt's interest as much as in Israel's, and its achievements will be a blessing to Egypt, no less than to Israel.

At this point, a short comment on the Geneva Conference is called for. In principle, Israel has no objection to the Geneva Conference and she does not fear it. We are members of this Conference and we took an active part in its previous sessions. But, for the very reason that we are interested in real progress of the political process in the area, we must take care not to draw this body into functions which it is not capable of fulfilling. It is understandable that multilateral negotiations, such as would take place in Geneva, will not foster a spirit of moderation and compromise, but serve as an additional incentive to all the Arab delegations to align themselves with the most extreme one, even if they do not wish to. Under these circumstances, of an international conference fraught with drama, nationalistic rhetoric will get the better of logic and common sense. Moreover, after the Arabs have tied their own hands at Rabat, it is almost certain that they will demand that representatives of the PLO be invited to the Conference. We, of course, cannot agree to this.

Since every State which attended the Conference from its inception has the right to refuse admission of additional participants, the Conference, if convened prematurely, will inevitably reach an impasse very quickly.

Furthermore, the position of the Soviet Union, as one of the two sponsors of the Geneva Conference, raises a complex problem, for in contrast to the United States, the other sponsor of the Conference, the Soviet Union adopts a one-sided approach in the Israel-Arab conflict, and even refuses to renew diplomatic relations with Israel. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union is unlikely to be a moderating influence, seeking constructive compromise, as required by her role as a co-sponsor of the Conference. It is much more likely to be a stubborn influence, seeking to impose its position on the other side.

In saying all this, I do not suggest that the Geneva Conference is non-existent. It exists - as a framework, an idea, a spirit, but not necessarily as the only setting or procedure, through which negotiations between the parties can be carried out. The separation of forces negotiations with Egypt, for example, took place at kilometre 101 and were signed there. The negotiations with Syria were carried on through Dr. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy and were only signed in Geneva. And for all that, these agreements are integral parts of the Geneva Conference.

Therefore, the Geneva Conference must be preserved for functions which it can fulfill; that is to say: It should be convened only after the groundwork has already been laid for the concluding stages and signatures, Any premature attempt to re-convene it, can only result in damaging its declared objectives, and even in its destruction.

In any case, at this stage, and perhaps also in further stages to follow, quiet diplomacy is far from desirable in the interests of peace than vocal and formalistic diplomacy. Moreover, the less we engage in preliminary discussions of reciprocal conditions, the fewer such conditions there are likely to be. When the way is opened for substantial negotiations, it is best to enter into them without delay, in the hope that reciprocal demands and claims will be better resolved during such talks.

If quiet diplomacy succeeds, then the place of the Geneva Conference is guaranteed. If they do not succeed, Geneva cannot help at all.

I cannot conclude without some observations on the role played by the superpowers in our area. In the realm of imagination one can conceive of an ideal situation in which the peoples of an area determined their own fate without any outside interference. If we lived in such an imaginary world, it is certainly possible that the Arab-Israel conflict would have been solved long ago. However, the powers have been involved in the Middle East at all times and at present the two Super-Powers are strongly entrenched in the area.

In theory, at least, the United States and the Soviet Union may fulfill a key role in bringing peace to the Middle East. But their competition for influence in the area, is just as likely to undermine a settlement, whether on purpose or by accident.

As the situation is today, there is no symmetry between the two. The United States maintains relations with all the States in the area, and particular close ties with Israel on the one hand, and a number of important Arab States on the other. By virtue of these relations and in accordance with her aim of leading the area towards normalcy and peace, the United States can, and in fact, does, fulfill a role which has no substance, by providing good offices as an intermediary between the parties, through the talents of the Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is connected with only one side of the dispute, and even within the Arab camp she prefers the most extreme and obstinate elements. I doubt whether the Soviet Union is really interested in a renewed conflagration in the area, from the point of view of her own global considerations. However, her behaviour so far suggests that she is genuinely interested in establishing true peace.

So long as the Soviet Union continues this particular policy, she is not able and will not be able to fulfill a positive role in promoting peace in the area. Israel does not oppose the Soviet Union as such. We still remember the vital military and political aid which the Soviet Union granted us in the bitter days of the War of Independence. But we cannot accept her predisposition against us and the stance she almost automatically adopts, in support of our enemies. Like many others, we have reservations about the Soviet régime, and are deeply troubled by the rulers treatment of our brothers in their country. But this is nothing new, and is in no way connected with diplomatic relations. If I believed that a call by Israel would encourage Moscow and the nations of East Europe to renew their relations with Israel, I would issue one without hesitation, even from this rostrum. But unfortunately, I suspect, and what I have to say is not based on pure guess-work, such an approach is not likely to succeed at this moment. The Soviet Union knows very well that our doors are open to renewal of relations with her, despite all the difficulties which that would entail.

Despite the criticism, some justified, some less so, the international system at present is characterized by détente. If the principles of this détente were applied to the Middle East as well, they would probably make a significant contribution to creating an atmosphere more conducive to reconciliation between the Arab States and Israel. On the other hand, if the spirit of détente does not prevail in so vital and sensitive an area as the Middle East, harm is likely to be caused, with the passage of time, in other areas of the world as well. Whoever genuinely wants detente, in a complete sense, is obliged to apply its principles to the Middle East as well. The State of Israel, both for its own sake and as the State of the Jews, has no interest whatsoever in worsening the relations between the two world blocs, and has every interest in the relaxation of tension - on condition that its principles shall also apply to the area in which we live. Failing this, détente, in the long run, will be no more than an empty slogan, devoid of strategic or political meaning.

In conclusion, I will, with your permission, return to the main subject at hand - the possibility of negotiations for an interim agreement.

Assessing the prospects of these negotiations, is not a matter for a subjective approach, whether optimistic or pessimistic. Objectively, at least, agreement is possible: The mutual interest exists; the physical conditions make it feasible. Israel's readiness is assured, of her own free will, and authorized Egyptian leaders, including President Sadat, have also lately been heard to speak - even though not sufficiently unequivocally - in favour of a step-by-step approach. Complete pessimism, therefore, which declares that such negotiations are utterly impossible in the near future, seems exaggerated. At the same time, there is room for serious concern that the gap between the Egyptian and Israeli demands will prove to be wide and deep, perhaps too wide and too deep. But, again, when the negotiations for separation of forces began, the gap was no less deep and nevertheless a road to compromise was found.

Therefore, it would be better to give the political process a chance and to leave the question of probabilities to the real test of negotiations, for which there is no substitute. Both sides should be guided by a readiness to try; by a desire to understand and take into consideration the needs of the other party - while not overlooking their own vital interests; and by a courage to take the risks entailed in making progress by the political route. The alternative for both sides is cruel and sterile.

As for Israel, these considerations are decisive. If we arrive at an interim agreement, in the spirit of the principles which I have outlined, this may gradually pave the way to peace. But if the other party refuses to negotiate, or if it demands one-sided concessions without displaying readiness to make an appropriate contribution in return, we, our children and our friends all over the world, will at least know that we did everything in our power; and that the other side is responsible for the stalemate and its consequences.

I need not explain how important this is to us morally, politically and, not least, from the security point of view.