An evaluation of the Kissinger visit was made by Mr. Rabin in this interview, in which he revealed that the Israel government authorized an Israeli withdrawal of about 30 to 50 kilometers in Sinai, excluding the Mitla and Gidi passes and the Abu Rodeis oil fields, in return for limited political concessions from Egypt. Mr. Rabin, however, suggested earlier, in an interview with ABC television network, that in return for an Egyptian declaration of non-belligerency, he would be willing to consider an Israeli pullback from the oil fields and the passes which would be demilitarized. The cabinet had not authorized such a proposal, which the Prime Minister suggested in his own individual capacity. Text:
Q: This is the report seen land heard today by many American citizens about the second part of Dr. Kissinger's visit to our area. Mr. Prime Minister, did this visit of Dr. Kissinger meet expectations.
A: I should like to steer clear of American reports to Americans and concentrate on a report, as far as possible, to ourselves, to the people of Israel. Dr. Kissinger's visit this time was not meant to lead to negotiations. It was meant to examine the attitudes of the parties: To what extent there is any room or possibility, to continue to seek a partial settlement between Egypt and Israel which could constitute progress towards peace. Consequently, Dr. Kissinger was careful in the course of his talks with the Egyptians, I suppose, and certainly with us, to remain within the framework of the examination of ideas and attitudes, the presentation of the international picture, the presentation of the American picture, but not concrete negotiations. There was no place, therefore, for premature expectations in this visit. The next visit, which will take place in the first half of March, win be more concerned with the negotiations themselves.
Q: All the same, in the course of the talks a map was brought into the room. Was mention made of kilometers - 30-50? Of the passes?
A: In the first, place, the map was hanging there before the talks started as a general background. During the talks we did not engage in drawing lines. As is known, the ministerial team was equipped with the Cabinet's decisions. These specified explicitly what the team was to discuss with Dr. Kissinger, the principal target being to seek ways for progressing towards an interim settlement between Egypt and Israel. The Cabinet decision refers to the possibility of a territorial concession of between thirty and fifty kilometers, which does not include the passes or the oil fields. Obviously, for a limited withdrawal we may also expect a political return which is not a large one. In any event, it is clear that the intention is to receive a political return for any interim settlement. I do not overlook the fact that my statements on the ABC network were at the back of Dr. Kissinger's mind, and possibly also that of the Egyptian President. As is known, I made those statements in my own individual capacity, and there is as yet no confirmation in a cabinet decision that, in return for a public and binding disavowal by Egypt of belligerency against Israel, of a state of war, Israel would be prepared to consider demilitarization of the passes or withdrawal from the area of the Abu Rodeis oil fields. But this can be done only when Egypt announces openly and publicly, in the most binding fashion, that the war between it and Israel is finished, and that the disavowal of war has no connection whatever with what happens in the relations between Israel and any one of the other Arab states. In other words, complete disavowal of way will lead in the future to the possibility of the demilitarization of these areas.
Q: The problem is also of concepts, and the Israeli public has been flooded in recent months with various concepts -from peace through non-belligerence to other types of settlement. Perhaps the time has come to try to make it clear what is meant when concepts of non-belligerence are employed: What does Israel mean by non-belligerence?
A: As I see it, peace is much more than merely the non-existence of a state of belligerence or of war. I believe that peace - peace between neighbouring countries - is first of all the annulment of the state of war and, in addition, the building of a system of peaceful relationships. Relations of peace comprise a positive element of cooperation, of the readiness of one party to exchange help with the other. For me, therefore, peace is much more than just the disappearance of the state of war. I therefore distinguish, in the stages of progress towards peace, between the mere annulment of the state of war, the main significance of which, as I said before, is that there is no further use of force, or threat of the use of force, in Egyptian-Israeli relations... That, for me, is a state of non-belligerence. I assume that there are experts in international law, but basically the most important thing in any international treaty is what the one country binds itself to, vis-a-vis the other, in clear, concrete terms.
Q: When our Foreign Minister visited the United States, the press was told that Mr. Allon pointed out what was the element that Israel would like to see as a sign of non-belligerence. Are there things that Israel will insist on? He defined it in this way: On the physical plane - demilitarized areas, the size of the parties' forces, ensuring observance of demilitarization, arrangements for supervision, distance between the forces, etc. on the political plane - to refrain completely from economic and diplomatic war. On the juridical plane - a written mutual undertaking to sum up the understanding on the other components.
A: Permit me not to go into details. As I said before, the ministerial team presented the decisions of the cabinet. The cabinet's decision is known: The return for the cabinet's decision must be in significant political terms. As I said before, I assume that my statement to ABC was also at the back of President Sadat's mind and Dr. Kissinger's - namely, two possibilities were created, as it were: A limited possibility and a broader possibility. Obviously, for the limited possibility the political return is limited, For the broader possibility, the return is unequivocal: A declared annulment of the state of belligerence, the state of war between Israel and Egypt.
Q: Will Israel insist under all circumstances on a written agreement?
A: The basis for any interim settlement between Israel and Egypt is first of all an Egyptian-Israeli agreement that will be in writing, signed by both parties, as a part of the Geneva Conference - for sometimes we confuse the concept known as "The Geneva Conference," and I have no doubt that an interim settlement between Israel and Egypt is also a part of the Geneva Conference, just as the disengagement agreements were also in the framework of the Geneva Conference.
Q: You will agree with me that there is a fundamental difference between the Kissinger talks and the Geneva Conference, namely, that where the Kissinger journeys are concerned, the Russians are not party to the matter.
A: My approach to the concept of the Geneva Conference apparently differs from yours, or from the accepted - but at times inexact - concept. The Geneva Conference resolved to bring about peace, or progress towards peace, between Israel and the Arab states. Within the framework of the concept known as the Geneva Conference, the parties can adopt various types of negotiation, since Egyptian-Israeli relations do not necessarily resemble Syrian-Israeli relations. What may be appropriate on the Egyptian-Israeli plane does not necessarily have to be identical with what is appropriate on the Syrian-Israeli plane, anything achieved as a bilateral agreement between an Arab state and Israel has to be crystallized, to be given a legal declared, juridical status, within the framework of the Geneva Conference. In the first stage, these were disengagement agreements. Should it prove possible to attain an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt - that, too, must be summed up as part of the Geneva Conference. If, at a later stage, it is desired to achieve a contractual peace agreement with any one of the neighbouring Arab states - that, too, will have to be summed up at the Geneva Conference. For some reason, the public have formed the idea that the Geneva Conference is a sort of symposium, a gathering of all the parties, in the presence of the powers and U.N. representatives, for discussions in the style which was once the custom at the U.N.
I suspect that such a convening of the Geneva Conference, without prior preparation and without knowing what is in store, will ultimately lead to an exacerbation, a sharpening of positions, a deadlock, with all that that can bring about. We have no reason to be afraid of it, but we have every reason to seek in directions that may possibly produce better results, that will advance us towards peace.
Q: You said that we have nothing to be afraid of - or something of the kind. Is there no fear that we shall also find representatives of the P.L.O. there?
A: As is known, in the terms of reference of the Geneva Conference it was definitely agreed that the cooption of any organization, body or state which were not among the first invited to the Geneva Conference is conditional on the agreement of the participants. There is, therefore, no possibility of inviting, without prior discussion with us, any factor that was not included in the list of invitees to the first Geneva Conference, or its first session. The terrorist organizations were not invited, and Israel's position is clear and unequivocal: With them we shall conduct no negotiations.
Q: About the agreements, the time element has not been mentioned here. There were reports that Israel is prepared to compromise on a term of a year-and-a-half for the agreement.
A: So many inaccurate reports have been published about the details, that if I had to deny every one of them I think I should have to keep the TV screen busy for a long time. But since you asked I will reply: About the report of 18 months. From the Israeli point of view, as for the Israeli position, there is no basis for it in reality.
Q: We started this talk with your expectations of this visit by Dr. Kissinger, and you extended your reply to include part of what is expected in his forthcoming visit. Do you expect any movement in the negotiations then?
A: I have learned that after the destruction of the temple, the gift of prophecy was entrusted to certain categories - to which I do not belong. I prefer, therefore, to make up my mind in what direction we ought to aim and work. I am not sure we shall achieve it. We are looking for an interim settlement at any price and under all conditions. The Israeli positions are clear today: Only a settlement that will serve Israel, that will promote peace and not injure Israel's security, will be acceptable to us. Since it is a question of a meeting that will take place in three or four weeks, there is no point in prophesying what will happen then. We shall wait quietly, confidently, knowing our strength and knowing what we want, and we shall see what the results will be.