In the weeks before the resumption of Dr. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, rumors circulated in Washington concerning an Israel-America defence treaty and American guarantees to bolster an Arab-Israel peace settlement. In this interview Mr. Rabin discussed these ideas as well as the Soviet role in the Middle East and the decision-making process of his government. Text:
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, in your opinion is there room for considering the possibility of a defence treaty between Israel and the United States.
A: First of all, I should like to make it clear that Israeli governments in the past have not - and to the best of my knowledge the present government has not - applied to the United States with regard to a defence treaty between the U.S. and Israel. This was also borne out in the statements made by the U.S. president, Mr. Ford, some three weeks ago.
The central reason was, that in our understanding we have always seen the necessity, the need, for the state of Israel to defend herself under her own power. Hence our demand for defensible borders, hence our demand that the United States assist us in obtaining the weapons required for Israel's defence. Hence, also, the request for aid in financing the purchase of such weapons.
In other words, Israel has always considered and continues to consider herself as the principal and sole bearer of responsibility for her own security, within the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Q: Is this not contradictory to the possibility of a defence treaty between ourselves and America?
A: I do not wish to state what is contradictory and what is not. Only, I would on no account want a situation to be created, which those proposing the defence treaty intend: A substitute for defensible borders.
Q: Is it not a substitute?
A: It is by no means a substitute. I would say even more: The fundamental issue must remain for Israel to be responsible for, and capable of, defending herself by herself, and not to lean upon someone else's readiness to despatch an army to her assistance, in any matter concerning her defence vis-a-vis the Arab states. Furthermore, I would say that if there is a morally valid basis which the majority of the American public - Jews and non-Jews alike -accept with understanding and sympathy in Israel's stand, in her demand to attain a peace settlement between herself and the Arab states it is that in this peace settlement the frontiers are founded upon defensible borders, that there will be no withdrawing to the lines of 4 June 1967 - all this is based upon Israel's fundamental stand that she is continuing in accordance with the understanding that her defence depends upon her own capacity to ensure her own protection.
And even more: the moment that Israel's destiny in anything relating to the defence of her very existence is taken out of her hands, then this becomes a different Israel at the mercy of others. There is no reason, no justification, no need whatsoever, to deviate from the line currently being taken by the government, viz: That Israel's defence relies upon her own strength and her own strength alone.
Q: And American-Soviet guarantees for a settlement between Israel and Egypt?
A: As far as I know, nowhere does an arrangement exist that goes by the term guarantees by the two powers for any kind of settlement between states, or a regional settlement. I know of no such thing in any part of the world, nor do I believe that it could have any practical validity.
Q: Why not?
A: Because, usually one power neutralizes the other. This is not a Russian-American settlement we are speaking of. As for the conflict in the Middle East, I mean the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is known as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Guarantees by the two powers are meaningless because, first and foremost, Israel's defence, as I have already said, must rest. upon Israel's shoulders alone.
Here, too, guarantees are mentioned as a substitute for defensible borders. Let us not confuse matters for ourselves, at least. No one is proposing or initiating any guarantee, or international guarantees, or defence treaty other than as a substitute for defensible borders, as a substitute for Israel's capacity to defend herself under her own steam.
Therefore, these two proposals must on no account be accepted by Israel if they affect her capacity to ensure her own protection even in the slightest.
Q: Has there been any representation by an official American factor to the government of Israel regarding a defence treaty?
A: No.
Q: Do you believe that a final settlement could be reached in the Middle East without the participation of the Soviet Union?
A: I believe that the central problem is to reach an understanding between Israel and the Arab States or, at least, between Israel and one Arab state. I believe that the key for progress from a state of war to a state of peace depends first and foremost on the attitude of the Arab states, on the rulers of the Arab states. In the absence of a fundamental change, by an Arab state or Arab states, towards Israel, no change will occur.
This is the reason why I support efforts for progress towards peace, even by way of an additional interim agreement with Egypt, through the U.S. or through the good offices of the U.S. because I believe that, when all said and done, the key lies between the Arab states and ourselves.
So far, I have not seen in the approach, in the positions, in the actions of the Soviet Union any policy which promotes peace. Since the Six Day War, the Soviet Union has not maintained any formal dialogue, any serious significant dialogue, with Israel.
Q: Is there any point in renewing the dialogue or the relations?
A: The Soviet Union has severed the ties with Israel. The Soviet Union knows where to find Israel, and it is the duty of the Soviet Union, if she so wishes, to make the first representation to renew the relations. But let us go back to the first subject. The policy of the Soviet Union, certainly since the end of the Six Day War, has clearly been biased. Unreserved support for any Arab demand, any Arab stand, massive aid in arm supplies to the Arab states, economic aid, to the extent of the Soviet Union's ability and to the extent to which some of the Arab states need it. In brief: A clear anti-Israeli stand.
Hence, I doubt whether the contribution of the Soviet Union can be in the direction of peace, that peace which Israel considers imperative, minimal, so that peace really reigns in the Middle East.
Therefore, if you ask me, I doubt whether it is possible at all to reach peace with the participation of the Soviet Union, and I am afraid, therefore, that the only way to progress toward peace is without the active intervention of the Soviet Union.
Q: What you are actually saying is that the way to peace is through Washington. But the question is whether it is possible to reach the final agreement or the hoped for peace. If I may so express myself, without Moscow's agreement and participation, side by side with Washington?
A: The road to peace mainly lies between Cairo and Jerusalem. And to the extent to which Cairo decides that it wants peace, it will find understanding, readiness and considerable good-will in Jerusalem. Washington can help to the extent to which Cairo is ready to progress towards peace and so long as Cairo does not want direct dialogue with Jerusalem, to cause us to overcome the technical difficulty of the non-maintenance of face-to-face talks, at least at the first stage.
If there is no readiness on Cairo's part and if Washington fails to create the instruments, the means which will bring about a dialogue between Cairo and Jerusalem without the participation of the Soviet Union. I doubt whether any progress towards peace can be achieved.
Q: You mention direct talks, or rather indirect talks, this or that relationship between Cairo and Jerusalem, would you, personally, be prepared to meet now, without any predefined agenda, with Egypt's President Sadat?
A: I, like every Israeli leader in the past, am ready and willing to do just that. Let me add that I also agree that during the first stage of negotiations, contacts would be maintained indirectly, through the good offices of the United States. But on no account do I see a possibility of reaching any agreement, even an interim agreement, and certainly a general agreement, without maintaining direct contacts, at a certain phase of the negotiations, between Israeli representatives and that particular Arab state with which we shall reach an agreement.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, could it be assumed that the government of Israel will have to adopt weighty decisions in the not too remote future?
A: As usual, I do not try to foretell the future. Still, as far as matters can be evaluated, I assume that the issues will have to be thoroughly examined, specified and decided upon during the forthcoming visit of the American Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger. I am almost sure that during his next visit, Dr. Kissinger will begin by calling on Cairo and Damascus and only then come to Jerusalem, in order to bring to Israel clear positions - first of all, those of Egypt and, possibly, those of Syria too. Although for the time being the issue is an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel, a separate agreement which stands by itself and will on no account be related to, or depend on, what will or will not happen in Israel's relations with her other Arab neighbours.
I am doubtful whether, in the absence of clear Egyptian positions, there will be any point to Dr. Kissinger's next visit, and if he actually brings with him Egypt's clear and consolidated positions, we shall have to make decisions. Therefore, the reply to your question is: I believe that we shall have to make, decisions, any decisions will be difficult, because even the rejection of any specific positions that Egypt submits will be significant and influence the direction of developments in the Middle East.
Q: Do you think the present government is strong enough to make decisions on significant withdrawals from occupied territories?
A: As far as any Egyptian-Israeli settlement is concerned, the government has a full mandate to reach any decision which it believes would help to further the interests of peace while at the same time reducing the dangers faced by Israel, and I believe this government will reach decisions, even tough ones.
Q: In what circumstances would you recommend to the cabinet and the Knesset the dissolution of the latter and the proclamation on general elections?
A: I stand by the unequivocal statement I made before the Knesset at the formation of the present government to the effect that if and when we reach a peace settlement with Jordan which calls for territorial concessions in Judea and Samaria, no decision will be made by the government without its first referring the matter to the people for decision in elections. I can see no other circumstances in which I would recommend the holding of general elections.