A few days before the return of Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Rabin outlined his strategy for peace in the Middle East which concentrates almost exclusively on a separate settlement with Egypt. In the interview, the Prime Minister ruled out an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, "even in the context of a peace treaty with Syria," rejected the idea of a defence treaty with the United States and dismissed the prospect of any early settlement with Jordan. Text:
Q: President Sadat has taken some distance from some of the tougher questions - the Golan Heights and the West Bank - and from some of his fellow-Arabs in a way which could suggest that he would like to end the state of war between Egypt and Israel if it can be done in a way which does not look too much like a separate Egyptian settlement.
Do you see anything in all this that might produce some positive results in advance of a reconvening of the Geneva Conference?
A: You have put the whole problem in one question. If President Sadat really wants peace or to move significantly towards peace, he will find Israel a ready partner, but we are not talking in a vacuum. We are talking after twenty-six years of experience of efforts to bring about peace, after armistice agreements that were violated. We are talking after the War of 1956, in which Israel withdrew to the pre-1956 war lines without achievement of peace, on the assumption that the mere withdrawal to the pre-war lines, the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Forces, would lead in the long run toward peace. Then we had the Six-Day War, and again we were ready to negotiate peace on the basis of a territorial compromise. Then came the Yom Kippur War.
Now, therefore, let's be more specific. The mere statement, that might be for public relations consumption, that a certain Arab leader desires peace doesn't mean very much to me.
Q: Do you see anything in what Sadat has done apart from what he has said?
A: I believe that there are signs - small signs - that might reflect some changes, the decision to rebuild the cities in the Canal Zone, the decision to clear the Suez Canal, although he is evidently not ready to open it; the fact that the Canal is not opened is not a sign of moving forward. To the extent that we know the Egyptian readiness to move to a separate interim agreement with Israel - if the achievement of it would be successful - I think this creates the only slight hope that we might go from war to peace now: if Sadat is really ready to put an end to the actual hostilities, actual fighting, actual state of war...
Q: Are you not talking about political or economic warfare now?
A: No, I am talking about a commitment in the context of an interim agreement that Israel will evacuate certain key areas - the oil fields, the passes. I stress - evacuate. These areas will be demilitarized, will be supervised by either an international force or combined Egyptian-Israeli patrols. But we can do it once we will know that, on the part of Egypt, there is a commitment that whatever will happen between Israel and other neighbouring Arab countries - or whatever will be the discussions about the form of overall settlement, no use of force or threat of the use of force will be in the Egyptian hands. If the actual state of war. has not been ended, I can't see why we should give back the strategic passes or the oil fields.
Q: Do you think that there is at this point some equilibrium, some mutual self-interest, in reaching an agreement?
A: I tend to believe that the key issue in the Arab-Israeli relations is the relations between Egypt and Israel. I have said many times that there was no war between the Arab countries and Israel that Egypt has not led the Arab world into. And there was no end to the wars - the actual fighting - without Egypt leading the Arab world out of them.
Therefore, if there is any real hope to bring about a change toward peace, it depends on what will be done in the Egyptian-Israeli relations.
Q: You have indicated that you don't have great confidence in commitments or pieces of paper or pledges. What is it that Egypt will have to do to give you confidence that Egypt wants a settlement?
A: I believe that in the context of any interim agreement it should include at least three elements.
One, a political commitments on a bilateral basis; after all, the basis of the agreement should be an agreement between Egypt and Israel. For that matter, the same applies to the relations between any one of our neighbouring countries and Israel.
Second, it has. to include certain physical security arrangements on the ground because, in addition to words, we need some arrangements on the ground that assure that certain territories we have evacuated would not be used against us.
Third, the commitment - the political commitment - should be translated into a change of behaviour on the part of Egypt or the part of Israel in such a way that it will not just be a paper statement.
Q: Could you define some of the things that you would be looking for? For example are you looking for commercial relationships?
A: It can be done in many ways on the diplomatic and economic fronts. It could express itself in a set-up of direct talks.
Q: When you speak of a set-up of direct talks, do you mean that you want a continuing bilateral negotiations with Egypt similar to the talks held by military officials before the first disengagement agreement at kilometre 101?
A: A set-up of kilometre 101, but not only between military people, because, after all, a movement toward peace has to be, in the core of it, a change of the sense of confidence between the two sides. How can you bring about a change of the sense of confidence if the other side doesn't want to talk to you?
Q: Would one piece of evidence be a change in the way Sadat talks to his own people?
A: It is one of the signs. Unless an Arab leader comes out and says specifically to his own people what he says to the outside world, in the process of the negotiations, at least, I'll remain suspicious.
Q: When you say a 'larger agreement' you are talking about an agreement which would include the passes and the oil fields - to set up this series of things you just talked about?
A: At present, there is a Cabinet decision about what I consider to be a limited interim agreement.
Q: You are talking about a 30 to 50 kilometre pullback?
A: I am talking about the 30 to 50 kilometres pullback that excludes the passes and the oil fields and, of course, I expect that for such a limited withdrawal we will get a more limited political return.
Now I have described on my own a second option for an interim agreement, that is to say, the larger one that includes the passes and the oil fields. But for that the political return has to be the end of the war, the end of belligerency. I don't believe that there is room for more than one interim agreement in the context of Egyptian-Israeli relations. Then we will have to move to a final peace and, when I talk about real peace, for me peace is more than the elimination of the war, for me peace includes positive and constructive elements in the relations between two neighbouring countries. Therefore, I see a difference between an end of belligerency, which is just the elimination of the state of war, and peace. That should include elements of cooperation between the two countries - especially open boundaries.
Q: So what you are saying is that there have to be some preliminary accompanying moves in the direction of real peace in connection with the larger settlement.
A: Yes, I don't believe that any Israeli would agree to have an interim agreement unless it were on the assumption that this is a step toward an overall settlement.
Q: On what basis would that assumption be made?
A: Well, the whole idea of having an interim agreement is because Egypt, in the context of Egyptian-Israeli relations, is not willing to conclude a separate peace agreement with Israel. Since they don't want to have a separate peace agreement, we are ready to take the risk and to have, an interim agreement. Why? Because we believe that, for the sake of movement toward peace even an interim agreement, a risk should be taken.
Q: Do you think this is something that could happen within the framework of the Geneva Conference, or is it something that should be preliminary to it in order to define the issues and bring the problem to Geneva in a way that is more manageable?
A: For me the Geneva Conference is seen differently from how I think (it is seen) by the Arabs and the Russians. The Geneva Conference for me is a framework within which many methods of negotiating an agreement can be used as long as the purpose is to move toward peace, to reduce tension and to postpone a war.
I believe that, basically, judging from the experience of the past, no real agreement was achieved unless it was done on a bilateral basis between Israel and each one of our neighbours. It started in 1949 with the armistice agreements and ended in the disengagement agreements in 1974.
Now the disengagement agreements were negotiated, in my opinion, within the framework of the Geneva Conference. The fact that Egypt preferred and, I stress Egypt preferred, to sign at kilometre 101 and not at Geneva was just a technical arrangement. For example, the final stage of the negotiations of the disengagement between Syria and Israel was conducted in Geneva and was signed in Geneva. Therefore, what we conduct today with Egypt, or what we might conduct under the good offices of the United States, to me is part of the Geneva Conference. It has gotten to the first stage of indirect talks. It will have to be followed by a second stage, a phase of direct negotiations that can be conducted either in the area between Egypt and Israel or first there and later to be concluded and signed in Geneva.
Now, there is another concept - of trying to convene the plenary session of the Geneva Conference to bring in all the participants, which means Syria, Israel - I understand that the Jordanians have declared that they refuse to participate, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Nations. To start to negotiate on a multilateral basis, in the open, without any preparations I think will lead nowhere. Therefore, we have decided first to explore to what extent it would be possible to reach an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel. One of our conditions for the interim agreement will be that, whatever will happen in the Geneva Conference, the interim agreement stands on its own and should not be interfered with. Both sides will have to give their commitment that the interim agreement will be kept, regardless of what will happen in Geneva, unless there will be an agreement in Geneva acceptable to both sides. If it doesn't work, we will go to the Geneva Conference without any illusions because, after all, I think that by now Israel is stronger and more capable of withstanding the political implications of an impasse in the Geneva Conference.
Q: You talked in an interview in December about seven lean years ahead of Israel and of the necessity to buy time. What did you mean by that?
A: I used the number seven years because it goes back to the Bible, to Joseph's dreams of seven fat years and seven lean years. It doesn't mean that I had in mind exactly seven years. It could be four or five or ten. But I wanted to tell the people of Israel that we face a period of many difficulties. Just this week the Cabinet had to put additional taxes - indirect taxes - on the population.
Why? Because we have to cope with growing prices in raw materials, we have to cope with the increased defence budget, and somebody has to pay for that. The only source that the Government has to cover its expenses, is to get it from the people. In the long run, I believe that there will be a change and for the good. The question of energy will have to be solved. After all, the world cannot be dependent on sheikhs and sultans and kings for a long time.
Q: You have also talked about Soviet relations with Egypt - saying that Egypt has taken some distance from the Soviet Union. That this has impaired Egypt's readiness to some extent, and that this is a tendency worth encouraging.
A: What I have said is that, in the long run, close cooperation between an Arab country and the Soviet Union has brought an addition to the Arab countries' desire and capability to go to war. In all cases, the outcome was more shipment of arms, more extreme positions, more demands in the political area, and, normally as a result of it bringing the area closer to war. Therefore, wherever and whenever I see relations between an Arab country and the Soviet Union growing looser, I consider it to be a contribution towards peace.
Q: Do you think that Egypt is capable of waging an offensive war now?
A: I believe that the Egyptian armed forces are in such a position that they can carry on limited warfare against Israel. It could be that, after the Yom Kippur War experience, the whole purpose of the Arabs would be to prime a political process by military means in the hope of exploiting what they consider to be an advantageous political environment.
Q: Some concern has been expressed here about the durability of American support for Israel, given a whole gamut of factors - our economic problems, our post-Vietnam frame of mind - some of this has been reflected in some of the things said by visiting US Congressmen recently.
A: After serving for five years as Israeli Ambassador to the United States, I know that it would be a mistake to take US support for granted. It is a kind of relationship that has to be cultivated all the time. It will continue to be exposed to many forces that will try to change it. But basically, I tend to believe that, when it comes to the crucial issues in the relations between the two countries, the basis is solid.
I think that there is a realization on the part of the United States that by strengthening Israel, you do what is necessary to prevent resumption of hostilities.
I don't believe that anybody would negotiate with a weak Israel. Second, I believe that, basically, there is a general understanding along which approach to move when it comes to the diplomatic area. I am not saying that on details we agree all the time.
Q: One possible way of supposedly strengthening Israel that is being floated around Washington is a defence pact of some sort between Israel and the United States. Has this been discussed much with you?
A: First, no proposal was made to us by any official of the United States Government talking about either a defence pact or American guarantees. I am not aware of it. I must admit also that Israel had never put any request to the United States for a defence pact.
And why? I think it would basically change the meaning of Israel if, in the context of the Arab-Israel conflict, Israel's defence would be dependent on the United States to intervene directly by its own forces in the defence of Israel. I think it is not needed.
It is wrong on the part of Israel even to bring up such a proposal. When a country cannot cope with its neighbours by its own forces its fate is going to be obscure. We want a political settlement that will give us defensible boundaries so that we can defend ourselves by ourselves. We will not go back to the vulnerable pre-1967 lines.
Q: Then why is it being discussed in Washington at all?
A: I am not aware of any proposal except one speech that was delivered years ago by Senator Fulbright that amounted to a very complicated arrangement - a total Israeli withdrawal, practically to give to the Arabs all that they specified in their demands, and then to reach understanding with the Soviet Union. And after that to sign a defence pact.
Q: Do you think that talk about guarantees or defence pacts as a substitute for substantial concessions by the Egyptians or the Syrians or whatever?
A: Well, I think if this is the main stress in the American way of thinking in their effort to bring about a settlement it is not a good sign, because I think the whole concept should be how to bring about a settlement by which, as the late President Johnson put it, the parties to the conflict should be the parties to the peace.
Second, I think - and this in my opinion is the essence of the real solution to the problem - we have to bring about a settlement that would not drag the major powers into being more involved in a local conflict. It adds to the tension rather than reduces the tension. That is why Israel's way of thinking all the time was: Let's base the agreement on an agreement between the parties. The parties should be responsible - to negotiate, to sign and to maintain the agreement.
Q: Do you see any possibility of another kind of American role, which Sadat described as 'guarantor', at least until Geneva - of understandings or undertakings between you which might be difficult to recall bilaterally?
A: I believe that the basis should be mutual agreement in a legal form between Egypt and Israel. One cannot talk about a peace treaty unless it is between Egypt and Israel. In addition to that, I believe that the United States can play a role as it played a role in the disengagement agreements. There can be certain bilateral arrangements between the United States and Israel, and Egypt and the United States, as a result of the agreement. Just to give you an example: When we decided about the disengagement agreement with Syria, the United States understood that we took upon ourselves certain risks in our security by giving up territory. We are compensated in terms of adding to our security through certain kinds of arms. The same can be applied - I am not saying specifically, in whatever agreements are made in the future. But when it comes to Egyptian-Israeli relations, what has to do with Egypt's relations with Israel has to be done on a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli basis.
Q: Assuming that you do reach some kind of agreement with Egypt. What about Syria? And what about the West Bank?
A: I have explained that I think that the method of the interim agreement is mainly applicable with Egypt. I am not saying that the same method can be used vis-a-vis Lebanon or vis-a-vis Syria or vis-a-vis Jordan. We have to adjust the methods of negotiating to the various problems in our relations with our four Arab neighbours.
I think an interim agreement with Egypt is fine.
With Syria, I doubt - I more than doubt - if there is any room or if it is politically advisable to have an interim agreement there. I think that the only way is to move by one act of war to peace. When it comes to peace eastward of Israel, we have got a problem. You know that Jordan has excluded itself from the peace-making processes. You know Israel's position, that we are not going to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Front. Therefore, there is no partner to negotiate a settlement with eastward of Israel at the present.
With Lebanon we are ready to sign a peace treaty without any demand for one inch of its territory.
Q: Do you envisage an arrangement with Syria that yields up any significant part of the Golan Heights? A: As I have said, I don't believe that there is a possibility of an interim agreement with Syria, and I can't see Israel even in the context of a peace treaty going down from the Golan Heights.
Q: Pulling back a little?
A: I would like to stick to my definition. I said, even in the context of a peace treaty with Syria I don't see Israel going down from the Golan Heights.
Q: If this current effort by Kissinger does not yield a result, does that mean that Geneva has to be convened earlier because of the deadlines imposed by April and May by the expiration of the United Nations mandates in Egypt and Syria?
A: It seems to me that the Geneva Conference will be convened anyhow. The question is what kind of conference we will have. If it will be after the kind of interim agreement between Egypt and Israel that I have described, it will be a different kind of conference, because one of the most crucial detonators will be pulled out. If it is going to be a Geneva Conference without any prior interim agreement and understanding before it is convened, I don't see much hope for peace from it. Regardless of what is going to happen, we will not change our demands for what we consider essential for Israel in an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel.
Q: What is your assessment of the flow of Soviet arms to Egypt?
A: It has been resumed. There are no doubts that Egypt gets today more arms, more modern weapons and spare parts than after the disengagement, If it is called 'old deals' or 'new deals', I could not care less. As long as shipments of arms are reaching Egypt.
Q: You have talked about Egypt generally leading the Arab world - towards war or away from war. Other people talk about the need to turn the Egyptians inward and away from pan-Arab ambitions, and you are talking of separate agreement with Egypt. Is there not a contradiction here?
A: There are some signs that can be interpreted as signs in the right direction. This is why, regardless of certain opposition within Israel, I am trying to reach an interim agreement with Egypt.
Q: Let me ask you whether you think that the Israeli public in general shares your sense of the need to take some risks.
A: It is very difficult for an Israeli to assume that there is a change of heart on the part of Egypt. The public is suspicious, and I can't say that the speeches of the Arab leaders, including President Sadat, encourage the public to believe that we are moving in the right direction, but if their positions are seen to be as they are stated publicly, the Israeli public is justified in being suspicious. If these are Sadat's conditions, the Government will not accept them.
Q: Do you think the speeches of Israeli leaders encourage the Egyptians to take some risks?
A: Allow me to draw your attention to what I have said. I think it is much more reasonable. For example. I have taken it upon myself to say in an interview with an American television network that I could give more concessions if Sadat would be willing to put what he, once said publicly about his commitment not to attack - that is to say not to use military force in the context of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict - in a legal, specific, public form with Israel. I think if Sadat will do so, it is going to be a beginning of what might be a new period.
Q: Does he have to put it in writing?
A: It has to be given in the most committing legal way. Otherwise, what do we get?