The position taken by the Israel Government was supported in the Knesset by the coalition parties as well as by the Likud opposition. This was evident in the debate held in the House following the report of the Prime Minister on the reasons that led to the breakdown of the talks. The Knesset resolution was adopted by a majority of 92 in favour, 4 against and 6 abstentions. Texts follow:
Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,
The Government has felt it advisable to convene this extraordinary session during the Knesset vacation in order to present to the House a brief statement on the suspension of the negotiations for an Interim Agreement with Egypt - and on this subject alone. In the course of the discussion with the U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, I maintained contact with the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, supplied its members with full information, and listened to their views.
In view of the need to explain our position to the world, I found it necessary to meet the representatives of the local and foreign press and communications media yesterday, before the Knesset could meet, I summed up the position in a general statement with a view to preventing misunderstandings or even inaccuracies, which generally go hand in hand with political developments.
Members of the Knesset,
To our great regret, the government of Egypt broke off the negotiations for an Interim Settlement, which was intended to advance the cause of peace between the two countries, The negotiations were suspended because the Egyptian government rejected significant Israeli proposals and presented extreme and exorbitant demands.
The Egyptian demands were aimed at facilitating war deployment. Had the Israel government accepted the Egyptian proposals, it would have been exposing itself to unjustified risks, while making no progress towards peace.
Israel made far-reaching proposals: We were ready to take risks, we did not stick to the beaten path. But there was no response to our initiative. It is the Egyptian government that has brought about the present situation, and it bears a very heavy responsibility for it.
This government, true to the State of Israel's aspirations since its establishment, regards the attainment of peace, and of interim settlements on the way to peace, as a central goal of its policy.
After the Yom Kippur War, we tried to ascertain whether Egypt was willing to enter into negotiations with us for a lasting peace. On our side, there was a total readiness to conduct intensive negotiations for a complete solution to the problems and differences between the two countries, without postponing the making of peace until future generations. But we found that Egypt was not yet ready for such a step. We regretted this, but, in order not to perpetuate the present situation in no peace, we suggested progress by means of interim settlements.
On the signing of the arrangements for the Separation of Forces between ourselves and Egypt, both sides declared that the agreement was to be regarded as a step towards peace. We were, therefore, prepared for an additional step. We insisted that this step not be a further edition of the separation of forces, nor a mere military arrangement, but an agreement involving progress towards the political solution, towards peace.
I have often pointed out that Israeli policy does not aspire to turn the territorial situation existing between ourselves and Egypt into a permanent situation, but regards it as a stage in the transition to peace, by way of cancellation in actual fact of the state of war. Israel on its part is prepared to do what is required to achieve this aim.
In the framework of concrete progress towards peace, we showed readiness for a withdrawal of the IDF to other lines. We demanded that, in return for such withdrawal, concrete steps be taken to effect a change which would express a new situation. New from the political standpoint, steps that would attest that progress towards peace was indeed being achieved. We made it clear that the extent of the IDF's withdrawal would correspond to the steps taken to promote peace in actual fact.
It was this approach that was the basis for the proposals we submitted in the course of the negotiations. We proposed to Egypt that it agree to non-belligerency, and that in return Israel would vacate the Mitla and Gidi passes in Sinai and the Abu Rodeis oilfields.
I first raised this proposal on my own responsibility. I did not hesitate to make it public, as I was convinced that the Israeli government wanted to make a breakthrough and get something in return, even if it meant taking risks. Subsequently, the cabinet approved the proposal. If the Egyptians had accepted it, we would have been blazing a trail in concert to an atmosphere of confidence, and I am certain that we would have succeeded in achieving a turning point and accelerating the attainment of peace.
Unfortunately, Egypt rejected the proposal without even finding it necessary to clarify its main components. The Egyptian government precipitately proclaimed that it had no intention of agreeing to put an end to the state of war. It is astonishing that the Egyptian government finds it possible at one and the same time to reject out of hand the renunciation of belligerency, that is, to persist in maintaining the state of war - and also to demand the evacuation of the Sinai passes and the entire coastal strip from Suez to A-Tur.
Egypt's rejection of the proposal, however, did not cause the Israeli government to abandon any further attempt to break the deadlock. After much deliberation, we presented further proposals, which were not one-sided and which included Israeli concessions in parallel to the steps demanded of the government of Egypt.
Without non-belligerency we did not consider that we had the right to agree to a total evacuation of the passes and the transfer of most of the East Bank of the Gulf of Suez to the Egyptians.
The proposals we made during our discussions with the Secretary of State included:
A. De facto non-belligerency between Egypt and Israel. Both states must commit themselves to abstention from any resort to force without any reservations or limitations whatsoever.
B. Egypt must undertake to abstain from any hostile activity in the spheres of economic boycott and propaganda. There should be an initial expression of cooperation with Israel, such as permission for the passage of tourists between Egypt and Israel, the passage of Israeli crews through the Suez Canal when it opens, and other similar matters.
C. Even in a limited interim settlement we could not accept a commitment not to use force which in actual fact was a limited commitment for a short time only. We attached special importance to the length of time for which the agreement was to be in force. The main feature of our approach to this way of advancing towards peace was that we were setting out on a prolonged process which had to stand the test of reality. Not only in the military sense, but also in its political results. This approach was rejected by the Egyptians. The absence of any willingness on the part of the Egyptians to commit themselves to an agreement that would be in force for a long period of years nullified any possibility of achieving the central goal which justified the taking of the risks involved in withdrawal from the defence lines that the Israel Defence Forces now hold in Sinai.
In the framework of a limited interim settlement, some of the provisions. which I have mentioned, Israel agreed to withdraw to the centre of the area of the passes, and that the territory evacuated by Israel would be demilitarized. In the buffer zone which would be created, United Nations forces would be stationed. The oil-wells at Abu Rodeis and the immediate vicinity would be handed over to Egyptian civilian control. In making this proposal, Israel took a great many risks, but she was prepared to do so. On condition that this would ensure progress, however limited, towards peace.
Without going into details, I have to say that the Egyptian reply to each of these proposals was negative or inadequate.
Members of the Knesset,
We have confidence in the deep-rooted friendship between the United States and Israel. The cooperation between us is a cornerstone of Israel's policy. At the same time, we did not find it possible to agree to the proposals transmitted to us by the U.S. Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Egypt. It need be said that we paid very close attention to the view and advice of the United States representatives, since consideration for the attitude of the United States is a central factor in our political thinking. But it is we who have to make decisions on matters which will determine our fate, and we must do so as the result of our own sober and independent judgement. I am convinced that the American administration understands not only Israel's needs, but also her duty to act as a sovereign, independent state.
I believe that even differences in views and evaluations will not disturb the relations between Israel and the United States. We have been working for years in mutual understanding and Israel will continue to do so in the future. Israel feels profound esteem and gratitude to the American people, to the members of Congress and to the President of the United States. I believe that the United States has an interest in supporting an independent, strong and peace-loving Israel.
During the past few weeks, we have witnessed the indefatigable efforts of Dr. Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, to bring about an interim settlement between ourselves and Egypt. His unvarying diligence and skill are worthy of respect, even though he did not achieve the goal at which he was aiming.
Despite the suspension of the talks, I still hope that Dr. Kissinger will play an important role, as Secretary of State of the United States, in the advancement of our area towards peace.
Members of the Knesset,
From every side we are asked whether the suspension of the talks forebodes an outbreak of war. I am not in the habit of prophesying, nor will I take a gamble by suggesting percentages of probability one way or the other. I am convinced, however, that:
A. The suspension of the talks intensifies the gravity of the situation, and the Arab communications media are emitting noises foreboding war. Nevertheless, it is wrong to treat war as a fatal and inevitable necessity. So long as war has not broken out, every effort must be made to prevent it.
B. Israel is convinced that resort to force is not likely to further a solution. We shall observe the Cease-Fire and Separation-of-Forces agreements on a basis of reciprocity. It is the duty of all the signatories to these agreements to act in accordance with their official obligations.
C. Progress towards peace is a vital need for all the nations in this region. Israel has been, and still is, prepared to play her part in the effort to achieve peace by any possible means, including the Geneva Conference. Israel's willingness to make an interim settlement with Egypt remains unchanged.
D. The threats of war voiced by the Arab states will achieve nothing. It is futile to try to intimidate us. Israel is alert to the peril. She is prepared and strong.
Members of the Knesset,
Now, as in the past, we shall have to face manifestations of hypocrisy and attempts to censure us, with the aim of laying on us the blame for the actions of others, who are actually those who have obstructed all these years any serious attempt to progress towards peace. We shall have to make an effort to reject and refute these false accusations, and to explain the justice of our position. We must not ignore the gravity of the situation or underestimate the possible consequences that may follow the suspension of negotiations. At times like these, as in the past, the Jewish people reveals its unique unity, beyond social distinctions and differences of political outlook. At times like these, we must concentrate on essentials, believing in the rightness of our cause and relying on the inner national fortitude of our people, which is manifested in the times of test and struggle which we have to endure.
I have implicit trust in our capacity to overcome difficulties, and to face the future with sharpened alertness, confidence and unshakable faith.
On the eve of the festival of Passover, the festival of freedom, I send my greetings for a happy holiday to all Israel and the entire Jewish people.
Knesset Resolution
The Knesset notes the statement of the government submitted by the Prime Minister. Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, on March 24th 1975, regarding the suspension of negotiations for an interim agreement with Egypt.
The Knesset holds the government of Egypt responsible for the suspension of negotiations for an interim agreement.
Israel will continue to strive for a just and durable peace with each one of her neighbours.