While the Ford administration expressed its disappointment over the suspension of the talks by ordering a policy of reassessment, by cancelling the scheduled visit to Washington of Defence Minister Peres and by omitting any requests for Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the foreign aid requests to Congress for fiscal years 1976 and 1977, President Sadat announced on 29 March that the Suez Canal would be re-opened on 5 June. Mr. Rabin meanwhile said that Israel was prepared to renew contacts with Egypt for an Interim Settlement in Sinai, although the basis would be the offers made in March. This and the reassessment policy are discussed in the interview whose highlights follows:
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, ever since the suspension of the talks on an interim settlement with Egypt, it seems as though we have been in a position of waiting, from the aspect of political initiative. Is that the case? And if so, what is it we are waiting for?
A: The government's policy has been, and remains, not a policy of "sit still and do nothing." In the course of the talks with Egypt, through Dr. Kissinger, we also brought up a wide spectrum of proposals. I will note the three main ones:
1. In the course of the talks we asked, through Dr. Kissinger, whether Egypt would consent to a separate peace settlement with Israel, and in return, can expect to receive the greater part of the Sinai Peninsula. The answer was a decisive negative. That is to say, Egypt is not prepared to discuss a separate peace with Israel.
2. The second proposal was an essentially broad interim settlement, in return for an abolition of the state of war, with all that this implies, to withdraw to east of the passes, south of the Abu Rodeis oil fields, without specifying a clear line. The Egyptians evinced no interest in this proposal and we did not embark upon a detailed discussion, that is to say, a drawing of maps in connection with the return for an abolition of the state of war on Egypt's part.
3. The third proposal raised by us was a more limited interim settlement, which does not include an abolition of the state of war, but resulting therefrom, Israel's preparedness to forgo positions of military importance was more patent. To this, too, Egypt replied in the negative.
In other words, we proposed a wide range of possibilities in bilateral dialogue between Israel and Egypt.
Naturally, there is the possibility of going to Geneva. We shall see. Israel has expressed readiness to go to such a conference, even though our expectations on this score are not great.
Q: You have mentioned three proposals that were brought up by us. The question was: What now?
A: As things are today, our proposals stand, and I shall think it a mistake if, as a result of rejection by the Arabs (in this case, by Egypt) of the Israeli proposals that will be taken for an initiative to change them.
Q: Meaning that we stand by our proposals and still put forward the same three proposals already made by us?
A: Basically, the proposals stand. They have been rejected by the Egyptians.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, there are reports that Egypt has requested the convening of the Geneva Conference. What is their policy?
A: Egyptian policy, as I see it, is to leave an opening for any contingency. The Egyptian president in his speech said that there was a possibility of using force. I do not suggest that this should be ignored. There is a possibility of continuing to work for the achievement of an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel. The request that the Geneva Conference be convened was in fact made without setting a date, or stressing the urgency of the convening of the conference.
I would suggest that we consider Geneva with open eyes. We are prepared to go there. This will not be the conference that was held in December 1973, because in 1973, even before the conference was convened, it was agreed between Israel, the United States and at least one other Arab state, that the outcome of the conference would be to deal with the separation agreements. Therefore, this, was in the nature of a process which everyone knew could not be expected to yield results. The convening of the Geneva Conference without prior preparation is a difficulty. We shall cope with it. I would not suggest that we consider the Geneva Conference (if it is indeed convened in this way) as an international quiz on the problems of peace.
Q: The statements made so far, if you add to these the Egyptian declaration on the opening of the Suez Canal, etc., the process of reassessment in Washington, this would seem to create the impression that we are not, actually initiating anything new in the political sphere.
A: I do not believe that Egypt has taken any new initiatives. She made a gesture which is, in fact, first and foremost aimed at Egypt herself. The opening of the canal contributes nothing of benefit to Israel. It benefits first of all Egypt, for whom it ensures a source of sorely needed revenue. It is also a gesture towards a number of European countries as well as Soviet Russia - but I should not suggest we consider it a contribution to the promotion of relations between Egypt and Israel. This is an Egyptian affair and nothing more.
Q: Many voices, at various tangents, can now be heard from the U.S. the most outspoken words came from the U.S. Secretary of Defence, yesterday, I believe. Will you comment on this statement that Israel's requests would have to wait for the re-assessment of the U.S. (position) in our region?
A: We are engaged in a struggle, a struggle on the Israeli-Arab level, and its implications on Israel's relations with the world at large, and with the U.S. in particular. We must insist upon our vital interests, and if we shall do so, I am convinced that we shall overcome also the difficulties expressed in Defence Secretary Schlesinger's statement. Nevertheless, his entire statement is worth remembering - he rightly mentioned that the U.S. has supplied Israel with large quantities of arms up to 1 April. We received these arms, and they added considerable muscle to Israel's armed might.
His second statement was that, during the period of re-assessment, the U.S. would not enter into new obligations -which is only natural. This must not be taken for granted, but I am certain that Israel will succeed in receiving her defence requirements from the U.S. also in the future.
Q: What does Israel expect from the re-assessment in Washington?
A: Israel expects that certain elements in the U.S. will turn the re-assessment into a means of pressure on Israel. I believe we shall be able to stand up to this, because in my opinion, Israel has shown herself flexible in the negotiations, stopping to say 'no' at the right time.
Q: On this point, permit me to ask you a question, and I address it to you as "foremost information exponent" (this was the definition given by the Minister of Information in his letter of resignation, when he wrote that the Prime Minister is the foremost exponent of information). There are complaints, there have been complaints with regard to information. I think the complaints have intensified of late. Do you have any solutions?
A: It is my feeling that the public is inclined to turn the concept, the instrument called information, into a magic formula for the solving of problems. The basis of information is policy, statesmanship. I believe that Israeli policy, which has shown flexibility in working towards peace by many and varied means, but also drew a line from which Israel has not returned, is the best possible information.
Q: Do you believe that this flexibility is apparent, say, in the United States as well?
A: I am convinced that in the final outcome a more comprehensive view should be taken of this, not taking into account one article appearing in a newspaper or one particular appearance on television. I feel certain that with an eye that takes a more comprehensive view, I am sure that we shall be able to successfully explain our position in such a way that the majority of the American public will support us, the majority of their elected representatives will support us. I have no doubt that the very lack of achieving a settlement is a disappointment to the administration, especially to a certain number of its members, and they will have to digest the fact that in U.S.-Israel relations - with due allowance for Israel's size, she is an independent sovereign state - her security is the responsibility of the government of Israel and the people of this country. There is a limit to flexibility when security is severely affected, without any exchange being given in return bringing out hope for a significant advance towards peace.