Further elaboration of the reasons that led to the suspension of the talks on the interim settlement were provided by the Prime Minister. He discussed, inter alia, the options now opened for Israel and stressed especially the need to coordinate any efforts with the United States, in spite of the "reassessment" policy ordered by President Ford. Text:
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, after having served for one year in your post, how do you feel as the Prime Minister of a state whose enemies are many and friends few?
A: When I assumed the task of Prime Minister, I knew that Israel was in for a period which would not be easy. I knew that we were facing a difficult political struggle, a struggle which Israel desired in order to progress towards peace, and if not to attain it in one move then at least to create conditions, through an interim agreement, first and foremost with Egypt, which would bring about greater calm and promote a process which in the long run, after years, would bring about peace.
I knew that there would be a great many difficulties in this sphere. I knew that we would also face difficult security problems, whether in the field of the resumption of war threats by the Arab states or in that of sabotage activity perpetrated by terrorist organizations.
I also knew that we would face complex economic and social problems, and yet I undertook the task and in this realization I acted to the best of my ability during the period since my appointment as Prime Minister, in order to further peace prospects, bring about the strengthening of Israel's military might and seek ways for greater efficiency, improvement of the economic network and the promotion of social issues.
The period that has elapsed, about ten months, was short although filled with decisions that were far from easy. The most difficult decision was the one taken by the government upon completion of the last round of talks with Egypt, through Dr. Kissinger. All cabinet members realized the significance of the decision. We did not reach it lightly, but with firm resolve.
In the course of the year, the government has taken grave decisions in the economic field, decisions which further aggravated the burden borne by the public, the citizens of Israel, decisions taken in the endeavour to achieve an added measure of economic independence, as a means towards further political independence.
Summing up the past ten months, I believe we shall muster the strength as well as the ability to cope with all the challenges we shall be facing in the political, security, economic and social field.
Q: A question regarding the decision taken some ten days ago, on the suspension of the talks - how was this decision taken, how does the Prime Minister feel after so difficult a decision? Was this resolved by you personally, or by the cabinet?
A: First of all, a correction: The suspension of the talks was not our decision. We decided upon our positions. We did not accept the Egyptian stand. I am convinced we went out of our way in proposing to Egypt a flexible position, expressed in a variety of proposals, with a view to advancing towards peace - in steps big or small... I am glad to say that the decision on the recommendation to the cabinet reflected the resolve of the entire team.
My other colleagues in the cabinet, during that fateful Friday night session, weighed matters in thorough discussion, fully aware of their grave responsibility. And I am glad the decision was taken almost unanimously.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister - these past few days one gains the impression that signals are being received from three capitals: Washington, Cairo and Jerusalem, indicating the possibility of renewed American mediation regarding an interim settlement, even prior to the resumption of the Geneva Conference. Is that prospect, at this juncture, a real one?
A: As I am, at this moment, reading Egyptian policy, it appears that Egypt did not block any avenue, any option, starting with war - and I do not propose to play down what was said in this context. I conclude from this that the Egyptians are keeping the three possibilities as open options: War, interim agreement, and resumption of the Geneva Conference, i.e. a debate on an overall agreement.
I should like to note that the Israeli position is as expressed in the talks we conducted with Egypt through the intermediary of Dr. Kissinger.
All three proposals submitted by Israel were rejected by Egypt. I can see no reason or justification for Israel to deviate, even one iota, from these positions.
The fact that Egypt would on no account accept the Israeli proposals, must not be allowed to bring about a change in the Israeli position.
We have here a wide spectrum of proposals, and the opening of detailed discussions of those proposals, or the discussion in detail of these proposals, may make possible a move towards pacification of the region, and would reduce the threat of war.
I believe, therefore, that there were numerous Israeli initiatives, and the fact of their rejection must not be permitted to influence us.
Q: Mr. Rabin, you spoke about the Egyptians until the suspension of the talks, and now, we heard Sadat on Saturday night. Does he also give an Egyptian option for a renewed mediation attempt?
A: As I have said, I am more interested in the Egyptian policy than in this or that speech by this or that Egyptian leader.
The Egyptian policy is to leave open options at least at this stage... the opening of the canal was first and foremost an Egyptian interest. Egypt earns or will earn large amounts from the opening of the canal, and I believe that Egypt is in great economic straits and is looking for any way to increase her revenue.
At any rate, I feel that any attempt to present the opening of the canal as a gesture towards Israel is thoroughly mistaken. Furthermore: In Sadat's speech, Egypt has not revealed anything new regarding her policy, maybe I shall add only one more thing: In my opinion, Egypt is bound to maintain her readiness to continue the existence of the U.N.E.F. The U.N.E.F. is part of the entire disengagement agreement between her and ourselves... I consider the existence of the U.N.E.F. an important part of the disengagement agreement.
Any attempt to cancel it, or not to extend it for the accepted period of time is - at any rate this is how I see it - a negative indication for the disengagement agreement, and Egypt had better bear this in mind.
Q: I wish to go back for a moment to your reply to the former question about the possible resumption of the mediation talks. Could your words be construed to mean that Israel will not initiate the resumption of the mediation for an interim agreement through the good offices of Dr. Kissinger?
A: Israel is maintaining her position. Israel wants progress towards peace, whether by way of an overall agreement or by way of an interim agreement with Egypt... We did not bring about the suspension of the talks... There might be other, more suitable, ways to proceed where the negotiations were severed. I, for instance, believe, out of the experience gained during Dr. Kissinger's mission, that the absence of a direct contact between Egypt and Israel is sorely felt.
Contentions have been raised about misunderstanding. But the reason for misunderstandings lies mainly in the absence of direct Egyptian-Israeli contact. Throughout the talks, we proposed clarifications, whether on military or political levels, between Egypt and Israel, in respect of certain issues related to the various proposals for an interim agreement. All our proposals for direct contact were rejected by Egypt. In other words, as far as Israel is concerned, all possibilities for the continuation of negotiations exist. The moment and more suitable ways should be found for the resumption of negotiations.
Q: Do you expect any move before the convening of the Geneva Conference?
A: I feel that it is important, from Israel's point of view, to present the directions in which we are prepared to go, and to wait and see to what extent the Israeli proposals evoke a response. There are times, especially in the light of the rejection of all the Israeli proposals on Egypt's part, when undue haste might be construed as an expression of weakness. Israel is interested in progressing towards peace, convinced that by the only chance of making progress towards peace lies in negotiating from a position of strength.
Q: You spoke of our friends in the United States, and U.S. President Gerald Ford has said that if the Israel had been a little more flexible this would have been the best guarantee for peace. Is there a feeling that this criticism denotes a change in the administration's attitude towards Israel, or has this feeling already undergone a change as is indicated in the press?
A: As we know, there are currently two American resolutions. One is to effect a reassessment of the situation in the Middle East in the United States positions. The second decision, or what appears to indicate a decision, as communicated by the Secretary of Defence, is that during the reassessment stage no discussion on demands for additional Israeli procurements would be held.
It is my belief that the United States, when it holds a considered discussion on the reality that has come about, will respect the fact that her friend in the Middle East is independent both in, her decisions and in her readiness to bear the consequences of these decisions.
Q: Nevertheless, according to announcements made by the various communications media, an atmosphere of crisis was created. That was how the media described relations between Washington and Jerusalem immediately after the talks were suspended. Now, some two weeks later, has this crisis atmosphere passed?
A: There have been differences of opinion in the past as well: To my belief the basis of friendship, understanding and common interests of the U.S. and Israel remains firm, and will make it possible to come through the present period and the differences of opinion which perhaps exist at this time.
Q: We have learned, lately, that a great power such as the United States withdraws its support, at least its material support, of its allies in South-East Asia. Do you not believe that this might switch on certain red warning lights where we are concerned?
A: I would not like to draw any parallel between the United States' attitude towards South-East Asia and her attitude towards us. I believe that there is a distinct difference in the approach of the American people to South-East Asia, and to Israel.
From my knowledge of the American people during the five years of my service as ambassador to the United States, I have learned - as an American, a Southerner, not especially close to Jews or to Israel once said to me: - As an American I can identify fully with Israel. It is difficult for me to identify with the nations of South-East Asia. For me, he added, Israel is a state whose life style is the life style I practise in the United States, which I consider to be the example for which the United States should fight and which it should protect. You live in a free country, a democratic country. You are a nation which has proven itself and which continues to be capable of defending itself under its own steam. And therefore I believe it would be a mistake from the Israeli point of view, to effect any kind of parallel between American-Israeli relations and American relations with South-East Asia.
Q: In the process of the decisions within the American administration to hold up supplies to certain states in South-East Asia, we have seen that the other arms of the administration play a considerable role, that is to say, Congress. Do you envisage the possibility of Israeli influence on Congress, in addition to attempts at a rapprochement or resumption of normal relations between ourselves and the American government?
A: I find it difficult, even more than difficult, to assume that Congress would withhold aid from Israel. For the very reasons I stated earlier, Congress is made up of the elected representatives of the American people. It faithfully reflects the feelings and attitude of the American people towards Israel.
Q: Do you envisage the possibility of a convening of the Geneva Conference coupled with military tensions or actual fighting?
A: I find it difficult to believe that one can hold a peace conference while military activity is in progress.
Q: What will Israel's position be in case the terrorists should be attached to one of the Arab delegations?
A: I do not want to deal in hypothetical questions. As for Israel's position regarding participation of the terrorist organizations - this has been clearly stated: We shall not negotiate with the terrorist organizations. Their policy is presently based on three concepts:
Judaism is a religion, and a religion only. The Jews have no right to nationhood. The Jews have no right to a sovereign state of their own.
Besides this, these organizations carry out criminal acts of terrorism. Thus there is no room at all for a dialogue between Israel and the terrorist organizations. With them - we shall not sit (at the conference table). As for the other alternatives - we shall see.
Q: Still, you stated, Mr. Prime Minister, that the re-convening of the Geneva Conference required advance preparation. Perhaps you could define, at least in general terms, the kind of framework, of pattern, that Israel would expect to transform this conference into a constructive (parley)?
A: I would say that advance preparation is essential on two levels: First of all - the conference should be conducted in a framework of bi-lateral contacts between Israel and each of her neighbours. I do not consider the problems existing between Israel and Egypt as identical with, for example, those between Syria and Israel. This is why, first and foremost, peace agreements, peace treaties, must be bi-lateral - otherwise, a political settlement is meaningless.
The second level is the necessity for co-ordinating positions, as far as possible, between the U.S. and Israel. The Soviet Union undoubtedly will adopt at the conference, if and when convened, an extremist stand in support of the Arab countries. It is essential, therefore, in order to make a stand opposite the hostile position of the Soviet Union, to arrive at co-ordination with the United States.
Inasfar as these two assumptions should not materialize, I have no doubt that the convening of the Geneva Conference will lead to the very same pronouncements we are so used to hear at the U.N. General Assembly, and at Security Council sessions. Obviously, such a conference will contribute neither to peace nor to pacification of the Middle East.
Q: You have mentioned before the American Congress as an institution which is rather sympathetic towards us. And here we see an important Senator, MacGovern, meeting Yasser Arafat this week, or in that spirit which was sympathetic towards us in Congress?
A: I am convinced that most Senators still persevere in their stand against the terrorist organizations. I would like only to say that Senator MacGovern was among the Senators who signed a declaration in support of Israel's stand and against the inclusion of the PLO, or the body called PLO as an observer, in the U.N. If the Senator has changed his view, this is his privilege. I believe that the remaining signatories will not change their mind, and I would not like to consider the stand of one Senator, among 100 Senators, as reflecting the trends in the Senate itself.