A year after assuming the office of the Prime Minister, Mr. Rabin was interviewed by Israel's leading editors. He was asked about the forthcoming talks he will have in Washington with President Ford, the new moves initiated by President Sadat for the opening of the Suez Canal and the relationship between domestic and foreign policies in Israel. Excerpts:
Q: Prime Minister, this week everyone is talking of Presidents Ford and Sadat. President Sadat's reaction to the step or gesture you made yesterday, the great rapidity with which he reacted, and the dynamic and elastic manner in which he is acting in our conflict, at least on the surface, arouses in me a question of principle, as regarded the manner in which things are being conducted by us - whether we are not on the defensive, merely following each move made by the opposing side.
A: No. I do not think so. As will be recalled, upon the establishment of the government, a year ago today, when I presented it to the Knesset - I already then delineated its policy lines. I said then that Israel desired peace, that she is ready to seek it both in the direction of an overall settlement, and in the direction of a partial settlement.
I said that the key country towards which the political efforts must be directed is Egypt, and an interim settlement with Egypt then appeared the best path on which to advance towards peace.
We took steps this year, in order to test, in order to advance towards a concrete examination of this possibility. The talks were suspended. I am today convinced that the government's position, immediately upon conclusion of the talks, was right. A gesture should be made from a position of strength, and not from a position of weakness.
Q: This gesture admittedly gave us something from the point of view of atmosphere and good will. But you will come to Washington and he (President Ford) will say to you: Prime Minister, what have you brought with you? - Since I have assumed that you would not provide a detailed answer here - as to what you will tell him - I shall, therefore, be more specific:
In recent days we have heard that if either a partial or an overall settlement is again discussed, the issue will concern a settlement with Egypt on the one hand and with Syria on the other. You have stated in the past, that there is indeed place for a settlement with Syria, and that we are indeed prepared for a further withdrawal on the Golan Heights - but only within the framework of a final settlement and peace. Are you reappraising this position as regards Syria?
A: As I said, I shall not detail what will be said to President Ford. First of all, there has to be a cabinet session, at which the final decision must be taken, and that session will take place only next Sunday.
But basically, the purpose of the visit, as I see it, does not necessarily have to be focused on one concrete path, but - in the course of the talks with the United States - to provide the basis for a common aim, an approach not only as regards a first step, its degree of reasonableness and its details. But to attempt to draft a direction of development that will include more than one step, as regards the concrete issue.
Q: That is to say, to visualize the coming steps in the first step.
A: At least to see what the next step is, even if not to enter into its details. The talks were paralyzed principally because we did not find satisfaction on three subjects - when mention was made of an interim settlement limited by agreement, and arrangements on the ground, and regarding several components - be they even symbolic - of development towards peace.
Q: Have you any basis for assuming that now it will be different - has something changed?
A: Not to my knowledge. We have no authoritative information on the content of the talks between Presidents Ford and Sadat, and this is one of the reasons why we all preferred to hold the cabinet session when we shall be in possession of more information.
I have no doubt that the political process will continue, even if an interim settlement with Egypt is achieved.
Q: Are you deliberately refraining from speaking of Syria?
A: It is clear to me that, as a second preference or in a negotiation with Syria, I still see virtually no path to an additional interim settlement with Syria, since Israel's possibility of manoeuvre on the Golan Heights is very limited.
Q: Do you envisage, theoretically, a possible combination of an interim settlement with one of the countries, and an overall settlement with another country?
A: There is a possibility that there will be a partial settlement with Egypt, and that at a later stage a dialogue will be attempted with Syria. ...It is possible that the stage following the interim settlement will be a lengthy process - on an overall settlement - which, in my opinion, is liable to be measured in terms not of months but of years.
Q: There is unclarity in the wake of suspension of the talks... on the issue of the duration of the agreement, proposed by us. I have heard talk that this issue was not at all the decisive obstacle in the dialogue with Egypt.
Q: The Americans are letting it be known that Egypt has ostensibly offered us five years.
A: I regret that the three persons sitting opposite me lack clarity. When referring to the validity of an agreement, there are two elements determining its duration. There is the overall formulation. The overall formulation proposed, was that the agreement should continue in force as long as it is not replaced by another agreement. But one must bear in mind that the disengagement agreement, too, is unlimited in time in its overall formulation.
At the same time, reality proves that, in practice, the duration of validity of an agreement is determined by the duration of the mandate of the U.N. forces. The U.N. forces have an important role, both in manning the buffer-zone and in implementing supervision of the reduction-of-forces agreement, which are an integral part of the disengagement agreements. Therefore, from my - from our - point of view, the duration of validity of the U.N. mandate is the concrete, real fact determining the duration of validity of the agreement. The Egyptians agreed to a year, with readiness to prolongation annually. We sought a way that would assure us a longer period of time, more than three years. We received no satisfactory reply on this issue. It was stated, that it is anticipated that the process to begin upon the signing of the agreement provides expectations for 18 months or two years. But again, this is in the nature of expectations, and not a commitment.
Thus, during Dr. Kissinger's recent shuttle diplomacy, nothing clear was stated beyond one year.
Q: If you link it to the U.N. force - that force receives its mandate from the Security Council, in which neither of the two parties to the agreement, nor even the Americans, have absolute control. And again, this is liable to lead to complications well before the end of the time period agreed upon.
A: First of all, it is possible to approve a mandate for a U.N. force which is unlimited in time, for example: The mandate for the U.N. forces that were set up after the Sinai Campaign was unlimited in time. The budget is allocated annually. We made this Proposal as well, and it, too, was rejected...
Q: Aside from these grave and difficult tactical issues, how do you really visualize things from the point of view of Egypt, which, as you have said, is the keystone of the conflict...
A: In settlements with Egypt, I do not tend to rely only on the fact that by means of Israeli removal from regions the Egyptians consider sensitive, we shall in this manner and in this manner alone - create the motivation for Egypt to dissociate itself from the conflict...
Q: A question that is fundamentally very critical: Does Israel desire peace? are we prepared for peace at the price all the Arab states are now demanding, on the assumption that they are ready for peace, and in fact want a withdrawal to the 1967 borders, more or less - which would leave a map not essentially different from the map of 1967?...
A: In the first place, in my opinion, Israel truly desires peace. I find it difficult to believe that there is anyone among us who does not desire peace.
Q: The question is whether we want the price of peace.
A: First of all, we are not being offered the same peace you are referring to. Even when a particular Arab leader -President Sadat, let us say, or, to a lesser degree, President Assad - says "peace" on the condition of withdrawal to the lines of 4 June 1967 or, more precisely, to the 1949 Armistic lines - he adds: Legitimate rights of the Palestinian People, and Arafat is given power-of-attorney to say what those rights are. That is to say, we are not talking about the same peace, what they mean is: A return to the lines of 4 June 1967, and particularly the establishment of an Arafat state in Judea and Samaria and Gaza - and this is not a formula for peace but for war lines, and under the gravest conditions possible for Israel.
Q: What do you regard as the central elements of Israel's security?...
A: If we get peace, we have to guarantee ourselves security arrangements which might even occasionally be expressed in deployment of forces beyond the Israeli sphere of sovereignty, or find expression in border adjustments that alter sovereignty...
Q: Beyond the border - is it essential to establish bases in a neighbouring country?
A: No, but I will provide an illustration: At a certain stage in 1973, the senior official in Dr. Kissinger's entourage approached us with an idea: Would Israel agree to a formula with Egypt which would also provide the possibility of a solution - sovereignty versus security? That Israel should recognize the (Egyptian) sovereignty over virtually all of Sinai, and that Egypt should recognize the fact that Israel has a justifiable concern for security, and would therefore permit Israel to deploy forces in territory which is under Egyptian sovereignty for a period of time which could be twenty or fifty years. There have been such precedents. Israel gave him an answer - please check, try. He in fact returned with a negative reply.
Q: Would you apply this also to Judea and Samaria specifically?
A: I would not totally rule it out.
Q: Would you also integrate in this scheme guarantees of one or more countries?
A: I see no need for guarantees wherever the IDF is positioned.
Q: Let us consider the economic issue in the broadest sense, namely, Israel's security as an economic problem.
A: ... I have no doubt that without external financial aid for a long period - and I refer first and foremost to financial aid from the government of the United States - it will be difficult for us to hold our ground in the confrontation. I believe there is a reasonable prospect for continuation of this aid.
Q: Let us return to the original question, the gesture: Do you envisage it as part of the political process, and what, if anything, do you expect in return?
A: This step was undertaken as a unilateral step by Israel, without any expectation of getting an immediate reaction in the practical sphere. The step was undertaken in order to create a more tranquil atmosphere, to express Israeli readiness for this not only verbally, but also in deed - be it only limited - which also carries with it a certain element of risk, as background for the continuation of political activity.
I want it made clear: This does not absolve us from substantive entry into discussion as to what is to be done politically - whether we should advance towards an interim settlement with Egypt, or proceed towards an overall settlement. This gesture is not in lieu of dealing with a political situation.
Q: On another subject: We have read recently of contacts between us and the USSR. Do you think that it is possible to speak of, or anticipate or logically assume that there will be a resumption of relations between the USSR and Israel, before there is any settlement in the region?
A: On the basis of information I have today - it is very difficult for me to make that assumption.
Q: Where do you visualize the point of balance between recognition of the importance of Israeli and foreign public opinion, and the policy of the government? That is to say, if you reach the conclusion that for various reasons - especially because of the American balance of power, and at a moment when we find ourselves in need of it... - we might have to make a certain concession which would be extremely unpopular in Israel, would you be prepared to fight for this position, even to the extent of risking the government's survival?
A: Not an easy question...
Q: I want to put the question into sharper focus - and I put it in political, not personal, terms. The Americans - and especially that certain senior official - have more than once thrown out hints to the effect that it is Israel's internal policy that is preventing or interfering with the government's taking decisions on foreign policy. I shall ask you point blank: Let us suppose that you are confronted with internal policy considerations and we all know what that means: the party - as opposed to a situation which you, as Prime Minister, consider positive and vital for foreign policy, which will lead towards that same peace or settlement. Can one expect, foresee in this sphere, that you will choose the principle of what you envisage as vital in the sphere of our foreign policy, even if the price should be a stiff one in internal policy?
A: To the extent that I see that a certain path provides a prospect of reaching a solution... which I believe is correct, I shall do everything to secure the solution - whether it concerns an interim agreement, and certainly if it relates to an overall settlement...