After the conclusion of his talks with President Ford, Mr. Rabin held a press conference in which he described the talks and explained the developments that have taken place since the Interim Agreement talks were suspended in March. He also wanted to explain that the concessions that Israel was contemplating making in Sinai should not be seen as a precedent for similar concessions in other sectors. Text:
Prime Minister Rabin: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. As you know, I have been invited by President Ford to come to Washington with the purpose to discuss on a personal level, in a thorough way, the various options on how to move from here toward peace in the Middle East. I am glad after two meetings with the President, the Secretary-of-State and a working dinner, we had an opportunity to go into the matters, to review the situation in the area, and to discuss in detail various elements in these options. The talks were conducted in a very cordial and friendly manner and I am more than thankful to the President for giving me the opportunity and to give much of his time for these discussions. I hope it would facilitate the understanding between our countries in finding ways how to move from here towards a more relaxed Middle-East and, in the long run, toward peace. If you have any questions, I will try to answer.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, since March, when the Secretary's mediation collapsed, are there any changes in Israel's bargaining position as far as you can determine, and Egypt's bargaining position, any specific changes?
A: As you know, the Israel government has taken the position that if there will be a change in the Egyptian position, well, we will reconsider our position. I believe that in this context we have discussed the various elements of an interim agreement.
Allow me to add, that the interim agreement between Egypt and Israel was not the only option that was discussed with the President.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, I am a little confused as to what the difference is between the position you have just stated and the one that existed in March. Had the Egyptians been willing to make any further concessions in March, presumably Israel would have been also. The stalemate came about because neither side was willing to take the first step. So what has changed?
A: I can say one thing. If there will be no change on the Egyptian conditions, I doubt if an interim agreement will be reached.
Q: Mr. Prime, Minister, did the President tell you that Egypt had already indicated its willingness to modify its position and to resume the negotiations with Israel on an interim basis?
A: Well, all that I can say is that I have discussed the point that I wanted to raise in relation with the interim agreement. What would be the Egyptian position, I don't believe it is up to me to say. I believe that it is very unfortunate that Egypt, which talks nowadays so much about peace, had refused till this moment to have any direct talks with Israel, and I believe this reluctance on the part of Egypt to discuss directly as it was done on Kilometer 101, immediately after the Yom-Kippur War in 1973, has not facilitated the possibilities to move towards an interim agreement.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, did you learn anything new about the American attitude towards the Middle East in your talks with President Ford?
A: I believe that I have learned in more detail the President's thinking and others' thinking, and I believe that it was useful in these talks by trying through the talks to reach better understanding on the positions of the other one, and to find practical ways how to move from here toward settlement if it will be found possible.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, to what extent were you able to coordinate policy after an interim agreement, such questions as the Palestinians and the Geneva Conference and some of the longer range issues?
A: I believe that there are basically two options: Either to move to an interim agreement with Egypt, or to go to an overall settlement in which all the problems that are included in the Arab-Israeli conflict can be solved at once. You can't mix the two, because the essence of the policy to go by steps through an interim agreement with Egypt is to create a period of several years in which the area will be relaxed, in which certain forces, I hope, will establish themselves in more peaceful ways, more confidence might be achieved between the parties, and only later to discuss the overall settlement.
Therefore it is either way that you go, and this has been explained as the Israeli position to the President, to the Secretary and to their advisors.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, does Israel and the United States agree on the timing of the Geneva Conference, and whether the United States will support inclusion of the Palestinians only if they first recognize the existence of Israel?
A: Let me put in this way. Israel will not negotiate with the so-called PLO. We don't see any possibility of negotiating with them and there is no change on the Israeli position on this issue.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, in response to the question before this one, were you meaning to imply that if there is an interim agreement with Egypt, there would be no other agreements for several years before going to Geneva?
A: I have not said so. I believe that the course of movement toward peace by steps, the idea, the essence of it, is to try especially with Egypt - I am not saying only with Egypt - if it could be found possible to have a period of several years of more relaxed atmosphere, of building a different kind of attitude creating a change in the inter-relations between the countries, building a confidence that will facilitate the negotiations and an overall settlement. If an interim settlement will not be reached, then of course the other option is to go and to try to bring about an overall settlement which for all practical purposes will mean the convention of the Geneva Conference. I would not say that if an interim agreement will be reached there will be no Geneva Conference.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, won't you be forced to negotiate with the PLO, like it or not?
A: My answer is simple. I don't believe that the decision to go to Geneva means that we will have to negotiate with the so-called PLO. After all, in the invitation letter by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the first meeting of the Geneva Conference it is included that any additional country or body to participate in the Conference has to be agreed by the original participants. Israel's position is clear.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, before you left Israel you said in some interviews that among the main elements you wanted to find out about, were Egypt's attitude toward duration of an agreement, Egypt's attitude toward easing of economic steps and things like that which had been talked about in March, and the situation on the ground. Did you receive from the President and Dr. Kissinger in these talks any indication of any flexibility in Egypt's position on any or all of these points?
A: You are right in saying that the three major issues that are related in the direction of the achievement of the interim agreement between Egypt and Israel are duration arrangements on the ground and other issues the kind that you have mentioned. I have made my position-Israel's position very clear. What will happen? We will see. Since we talk to the United States, to the President, to the Secretary-of-State, and not directly to the Egyptians, I don't believe that at the present I could have all the answers.
Q: In other words, they did not have the answers for you before you came?
A: Well, I don't believe that at the present I have received all the answers that I want to know.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, the Secretary-of-State said earlier today that he detected a certain parallel approach at this stage between Israel and Egypt, and he also said that since March there has been an evolution in the thinking of both sides. Would you agree, that there has been an evolution in the thinking of Egypt since March, and do you yourself believe there is now a kind of parallel approach?
A: Well, I can't talk in the name of Egypt, but judging what has happened since the suspension of the talks, I would say that many fears that many people expressed when the negotiations were suspended did not materialize. First, Egypt decided to reopen the Suez Canal even though it was said that unless there would be another Israeli withdrawal the reopening would be impossible. It did happen. There was extension of the UN mandate even though for a very limited period. There was an extension of the mandate of the UN by Syria for the full period of six months. I believe we can state today that there is a more relaxed Middle East than it was three months ago.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, one thing you could get from the United States is some sort of assurance on the $2.5 billion military and economic package that you have proposed. I wonder if you get any satisfactory assurance at all.
A: Well, all the bilateral matters between Israel and the United States have been discussed and I don't believe at the present it would be advisable to go into details, but allow me to say that the main purpose of the talks with the President were on the political issues, on the options that are open in the effort to move towards peace.
Allow me also to add, Israel is not interested in stagnation, in stalemate or in status quo. I believe it is in the interest of Israel as well as in the interest of the Arab countries to find ways to resume political activities with the purpose to achieve a settlement, either an interim settlement or an overall settlement if and when it will be possible.
Q: You say, Sir, at present you do not have all the answers you want. What is the next step now? Do you expect the Americans to go back to the Egyptians and try to get answers or what do you want now?
A: Well, since you know that we work on the question of an interim agreement with Egypt through the good offices of the United States, it is up to the United States to decide what would be the best way after weighing the positions of the two sides to continue its role in bringing about the resumption of the talks about an interim agreement.
Q: Well, you said earlier, Sir, that if Egypt's position changes that your government would be prepared to consider that. Does that mean that you are waiting for their initiative and that your government does not plan to take any further initiatives at this time?
A: I think the definition of the Secretary-of-State as put by Marvin, is right in talking about a parallelism. When there is parallelism on the part of the two sides then only it will be possible to make any judgment if an agreement is possible.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, the Senate extended by a very wide margin - I think it was 68 to 22 - the Jackson amendment on military credits to provide ample military supplies for Israel. After your meeting the past two days, do you sense that the President is still trying to withhold military aid as part of bargaining process?
A: Well, allow me to say that I found great understanding on the part of the President to Israel's needs. I know the President from my staying here as an Ambassador, and I have no doubts that the problems of Israel's security will find a proper solution in the proper time.
Q: To follow up on that, Mr. Prime Minister, have you found out whether President Ford is committed to getting Israel to go back to the '67 borders?
A: I have not discussed in detail the question of an overall settlement, even though we have presented our basic concepts about the problems of an overall settlement and I can't say that what you have said is right, judging from my conversation with the President.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, you seem to be suggesting that Israel would prefer direct negotiations with Egypt instead of the good offices of the United States. That seems to represent a shift in Israel's policy and perhaps some less confidence in the role of the Secretary-of-State. Is it true?
A: Not at all. Let's put it this way. Israel has always preferred direct talks. We have never made it a condition. Realistically, at the present the continuation of the talks are to be carried through the good offices of the United States. We have all the confidence in the United States in doing so.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, is Israel still insisting on a public declaration of non-belligerency from Egypt as part of an interim settlement?
A: I don't know what you are talking about. Allow me to remind you that during the shuttle diplomacy of Dr. Kissinger in March, most of the time was allotted to a limited interim agreement in which there was no demand on the part of Israel for non-belligerency on the part of Egypt. Therefore this issue was not an issue that brought about the suspension of the talks in March.
It is true that we offered two options of an interim agreement. We offered a wide interim agreement in which there will be withdrawal of Israel deep into the Sinai and what we asked for then was the end of the state of war or non-belligerency. It was rejected.
Therefore most of the time of the Secretary's trip in March to the area was focused on the limited interim agreement and there was no demand on the part of Israel for non-belligerency. It is a pity that you don't know it until now.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, in your earlier remarks, Sir, in your introductory remarks, you said that you hoped that the talks between you and the President would facilitate understanding between our two countries. This leaves an area where there is no understanding between the two countries, because the talks should facilitate understanding. What is this?
A: Well, I believe that there is an understanding. It does not mean that always we think alike.
Q: Well, what are the points that we have to facilitate an understanding toward?
A: Well, I believe that there is an understanding about each country's position. I believe that during these talks with the President I have been given the opportunity to put Israel's position into the considerations why Israel has taken such positions in a way that I think will make our position more understandable and I am not saying accepted.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, at the risk of oversimplifying as things stand now, is there any basis for negotiations or not? You seem to be saying no.
A: I believe that there is a basis for negotiations. I think that it is my assumption that Egypt is still interested in an interim agreement and it seems to me that the United States is ready to cooperate with Israel and Egypt in trying to bring about an interim agreement. There is the hope that an interim agreement will be reached. But knowing the Middle-East one has to have little bit of patience. One has to bear in mind that he has to overcome obstacles and therefore don't expect anything to work or it might be that it would not work.
Q: Are you saying that we should not expect to be going to the Middle East next month?
A: Let us ask the Secretary, not me.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, can I take Larry's question a step further and ask you, as you leave Washington, in which mood do you leave, in the sense of optimism, a sense of disappointment or did things work out more or less as you had expected them?
A: Well, what I expected when I came - when was it - two days ago, is to have thorough talks with the President and the Secretary. I think we had very good talks in which I was given the opportunity to go very thoroughly into explaining Israel's positions, not to deal with the past, but to deal with the present and the future, and I found good atmosphere and friendliness.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, I wonder if I could ask an internal question about Israel. You are undoubtedly familiar with the repeated charge in the Arab press that there are inhumane conditions in Israel's prisons. Several of us who write for secular papers have asked repeatedly to visit Israel's prisons and we have been repeatedly turned down. And yet, a church editor in San Francisco was not allowed to get into Ramleh, but, had an exclusive interview with Archbishop Capucci. Since your Embassy has been inquiring for over a month, I would like to know, did the Vatican have anything to do with this, and is this a policy of your government?
A: Well, I don't know the exact answer to your question.
Q: Would it be possible to find out, Sir?
A: But I will try to find it out. I think that you have to bear, in mind that Capucci is a Catholic and therefore we have, when we consider something of this kind, to bear it in mind.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, did the President tell you what he meant the other evening at his press conference when he said that he would make a comprehensive recommendation at Geneva if Geneva were to convene?
A: I believe that the way that I have understood what was said is, that at the present the United States weighs, the President weighs, the two options: An interim agreement if it is possible or to move on to an overall settlement. This is what I have understood. Until it is found what is more practical, what is more obtainable I don't believe that there would be any decision on the part of the United States government.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, does Israel really consider it feasible at this stage to go to a Geneva convention and face all the problems in an overall settlement at once - borders, Jerusalem, Golan Heights?
A: Well, if the Geneva conference will be convened, Israel will go there and Israel will put its position on all the issues related to the achievement of peace. If you will ask me do you think that in such a meeting especially if it will not be prepared will there, is there a possibility to have something different than many UN General Assemblies, I doubt.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, if you have an interim agreement, would not the law of seven years return you to a period of stalemate and stagnation?
A: I did not mention the number of years, but I believe that there is a possibility, may be the most practical possibility, to move toward peace not by trying to assume that you can have a sharp change from war to peace by one act. We are ready to try to, but I believe that especially between Egypt and Israel there is a possibility of gradual change from active hostility on the part of Egypt towards Israel toward moderation which might have its impact all over the Arab countries. And to this possibility we aim when we are ready to participate in the achievement of interim agreement. For us it is not just another military withdrawal. For us the essence of an interim agreement is a step towards peace. This is the way that we look at it. It has never been otherwise in the past. All the efforts in eight years since the end of the Six-Day War in '67 to bring about an overall settlement have failed and I think Israel's flexibility is shown by our readiness to take a risk of giving something without getting the real peace for it, but through encouragement of change in attitudes with the hope that it will bring about change of realities that are essential if real peace is to be achieved. Therefore I think by our readiness to have an interim agreement we show a real flexibility in the efforts to move towards peace.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, did President Ford convey to you any assurances about the passage of the Israel tankers through the Suez Canal and do you intend to test this in any case before making any further steps on negotiations between you and Egypt?
A: Allow me to answer you directly. We in Israel assume that every agreement has to be carried out in all its parts before any additional agreement can be reached.
Q: Mr. Prime Minister, earlier you seemed to suggest that no new Egyptian concessions were made known to you during these meetings with President Ford that had not been known to you previously. Is that correct?
A: I haven't said so.
Q: It's not correct then?
A: I haven't said so.
Q: There were no Egyptian concessions?
A: I haven't said either what you said or I didn't negate what you said.
Q: Are you aware of any new Egyptian concessions in that case?
A: No. I would say that there is a possibility, I hope for change of Egyptian positions. Unless there will be change, there will be no change on our part.
Q: Would you say the Administration is leaning more towards the Arabs at this point than toward Israel?
A: I don't judge inclinations. I judge everything by positions. Thank you.