The focus of the interview was on the suspended talks of the Political Committee and the evaluations of Mr. Dayan as to the next moves. The Foreign Minister explained that Sadat has come up with a new formula, demanding that Israel give a prior commitment to withdraw from the territories before the negotiations could start. This was a departure from the discussions held both in Jerusalem and Ismailiya with Sadat and Israel could under no circumstances accept such a demand. Mr. Dayan felt that if there will be no change in the position of Egypt, the talks would be deadlocked and there could be a possibility of the U.S. applying pressure on Israel. Text:
Q. Mr. Dayan, you were mentioned in a quote. I am not sure of its accuracy, at the close of Mr. Sadat's speech, when he was questioned by our correspondent about the matter of arrogance. Is this situation in which we find ourselves, a competition in arrogance and haughtiness?
A. I don't think so, and neither can one conclude that from what Sadat said, as I heard it. He wants an Israeli promise to remove our settlements from Egyptian land, the Rafiah Salient, before renewal of the political committee discussions.
Q. There is a question of clarification on this point, which seems very odd. The Egyptians, if I am not mistaken, demanded that the subject of the Rafiah Salient settlements be transferred to the Military Committee.
A. No. Perhaps I should go back to what I had wanted to say. When the Political Committee was established, when the meeting in Ismailiya was held, or before that. Sadat never said 'I have nothing to discuss with you before you announce that you are prepared to remove the settlements.' According to the conception which he now puts forth - 'First of all, before the discussions you must announce that you are getting off our land, that is to say, removing the settlements' - then he should have said that before Ismailiya, before the political committee in Israel - and not, as we assumed, and though that he too assumed - that there is a reality. The result of a war, the '67 war which the Egyptians started (Nasser was President then). There are various problems, military, civilian and political, and we will discuss them. Of course he can, during these discussions, demand the removal of the settlements, and we do not deny his right to make such a demand. We are not saying that we will not discuss this matter, but if he wants us to say before the discussions, that we commit ourselves to that - first, he should have said so prior to Jerusalem and before Ismailiya and so on. And second, in principle - and I say that to this credit, and we said that in writing as well - this principle applies to the Golan Heights and to Judea and Samaria and Gaza, and - he emphasized that in the Knesset - it applies to Jerusalem as well. According to his logic, what the Arabs took from us by force in 1948 (when they defeated us in the Old City), Mount Scopus and the Jewish Quarter. We must return because that is the line which they had held until '67 and that is the same Arab sovereignty, and they deserve it. How do they deserve it? They took it by force.
Let us return to the main question: What is to be, and what does he propose. If he is really proposing prior commitment on subjects about which a discussion must be held, then it looks to me like a dead end.
Q. Let us say, if his demand remains unchanged, and, of course, the Israeli Government's position also remains unchanged. Is that the end?
A. If in fact he will want the Israeli Government to announce ahead of time, without discussions, that she is removing the settlements, and military airfields as well - and according to the paper they presented, the same applies to the Golan Heights and to Jerusalem as well - I assume that the Israeli Government's answer will be negative. If he says 'In that case we have nothing to discuss' then our answer will be 'that is what should be discussed. That is what we must discuss, and if he then says 'we have nothing to discuss' - it is possible that there would be no discussions.
Q. In your opinion, was his last step influenced to a certain extent by pressure from the other Arab countries?
A. I think so. But it is somewhat difficult for me, in my present position, to interpret, and to say for him, what it is that motivated Sadat to hold such a position. His position has changed measurably since the period of the first contacts. And the contacts prior to the meeting with Sadat, with his advisers, when we presented them with our programmes, including settlements, and we haven't changed a thing in them for the worse since then. At that time their approach was that this could be a basis for negotiations, not that they agree with it, but they said 'there is a reality. There is an Israeli army in Egypt and in Sharm el Sheikh. There are settlements. There is a notable difference between his approach at that time and what I have heard now, fact is that their delegation here, which we asked them what happened, did not dare to interpret because they didn't have the information and they said 'Media, Media' that is to say, pressures from the press. I had a, sort of seminar with them, very enlightening, 'till 05.30, in Lod airport, in which they spoke more freely, where I asked them 'what's pressuring you?' And it really was a combination of the two: Other Arab states and the media.
Q. To be, perhaps, more specific on this point: Do you think that the interpretations which was given in the Arab states to the fact that Egypt accepted the U.S. compromise suggestion on the issue of the agenda for the Jerusalem Conference, which seems to them a humiliating Egyptian surrender. Did this, specifically, have any influence?
A. This too had an influence, that is an example which was quoted. Today they published not the published proposal, but the paper which they had presented, from which we had long ago progressed towards a compromise. They published the paper which demands from us a withdrawal from the Golan Heights and so on. They said that there is a harsh and negative reaction in the Arab countries to the fact that they had agreed, let us say, that instead of writing in the agenda, as they had demanded. 'Israeli withdrawal from the territories conquered by her' it shall be written 'discussion of the principles of 242.'
The other factor, which is no less important, is the accumulation of time. Two months have passed, the Arab countries, and the press which attacks them are saying how far did you get? Actually, how far did you get since Sadat's visit to Jerusalem? Are you any closer to achieving those aims, from which you, Sadat, said you would not withdraw: an independent Palestinian State and withdrawal from all the territories?' This too caused them to, as they put it, restudy the political committee method, something which drags on and meanwhile bears no fruit.
Q. It was frequently said that Sadat counted on a harsher U.S. attitude toward Israel, on a more active collaboration of the Secretary of State. In your opinion, have the Americans these days, either in a practical or a formal way taken the role of mediator which they once held but no longer do?
A. The Americans were definitely very active. More than ever. They also said that in the past they had tried only to mediate between the sides and now they bring their own proposals as well, when it becomes apparent to them that there is no way to bridge the differences between the sides. They say that they have a suggestion of their own. Really, they play a crucial, in my opinion, constructive role.
Q. Are you not afraid of U.S. pressure on Israel?
A. Yes indeed I am. The question is whether we can make more progress in reaching peace arrangements with Egypt in another way, on this globe. The Super Powers, the USSR - even the European position is not more comfortable for us - and they have no influence on Egypt. And the U.S. does have influence on Egypt. I am afraid that without the U.S. we should not have succeeded, in the direct talks, to overcome the gap between our positions and those of Egypt. It is possible that we will face a conflict with American demands which we will not be able to accept. Then we will be in conflict with them, and we will say 'This we do not accept.' I suppose that this is a possibility, and I assume that we can withstand it. But along the way, without U.S. mediation and her suggestions, and the weight which her suggestions carry in Cairo with Egypt, without those I find it difficult to imagine how we will make progress with Egypt.
Q. Earlier you said that Sadat is actually referring to this matter of declarations, the battle of declarations, as a central thing which motivated him. At the same time, when you look back, don't you, to a certain extent, regret the public announcements which you and the Prime Minister have made, which may have, allegedly or in fact insulted the Egyptians?
A. It is easy to regret someone else's announcements, and that I do not do. But of all people on earth, President Sadat has less right to make such objections: Calling the Prime Minister Shylock, giving the sort of interview he gave to the periodical October. He does not mince his declarations. Listen to what he said today: Arrogant, and so on. I do not think that the quote from Mr. Begin which he used was accurate. I started officially to work as Chairman of the political committee upon the arrival of the Egyptian Foreign Minister. I spoke pleasantly only, but he said what he said, words of attack. That cannot be one sided.
Q. He looks really insulted. Do you think he is acting?
A. I am no expert on acting. I think he really has that kind of conception, his understanding says 'Yes, I come to you Jerusalem, and in return you must give me a simple declaration which says 'Yes, President Sadat, we are prepared, in exchange for the peace which Egypt is willing to make with us, to withdraw from all the territories, including the Golan Heights and Jerusalem, and to grant the Arabs the right to establish an independent Palestinian State'. By the way, when he says 'In return for peace.' he sometimes means complete peace, with diplomatic relations. But in the papers which they introduced in the political committee, and in his Knesset speech, he was much more cautious, and spoke only of the U.N. charter, in which no obligation to maintain diplomatic or economic relations is mentioned., And he is not promising these in return. I think that is what he really wants: 'In exchange for this give me that.' I think, begging his pardon, that his demands are somewhat absurd: To say, 'Rely on me, as far as your security is concerned' considering the relations between him and the President of Syria... let us assume that he can guarantee, in the name of Egypt, that we abandon all the air-fields, the settlements and Sharm el Sheikh, and then have security on the Egyptian border. But to say leave the Golan Heights, rely upon me for your security on the Northern border as well'? Can he speak in Assad's name?
Q. Mr: Dayan, do you not feel some discomfort because for the past two months. Anwar Sadat is the man who determined almost all the moves and their timing? He determined how many breaks there will be between one procedure and the next, and object to things dragging out, and sets up the next moves. Don't you feel uncomfortable with that?
A. For thirty years I have felt discomfort because we have sought peace, and have announced each time - and with each Prime Minister - that our hand is outstretched with honest intentions. Every Prime Minister has announced that he was willing to go anywhere, anytime to discuss peace. He was usually answered with silence, or with a contradiction. In this situation, where Israel has a permanent willingness for peace, when do talks take place? When one of the Arab leaders is ready, of course.
Q. This explains the first step, but since then two months and many moves have passed.
A. The Prime Minister was prepared to go to the Egyptian Parliament. They were not interested.
Q. I'm talking about initiatives, not invitations.
A. To force ourselves on them? We can take simple initiatives. We can stop.
Q. Can we do that vis-a-vis the Military Committee?
A. As far as the Military Committee is concerned, a decision will be made in the Government on Sunday, following President Sadat's speech and more importantly, Atherton's report about the talks between Vance and Sadat. That is when we will decide. We are an experienced and wise people, and the question is, what's next, will we progress further toward peace without talks? I think he too will face this question. He will call back the political committee, and then Egypt will attain her goal more easily, without discussion. If she were able to attain them by military means, he would have come to these talks.