While the talks were deadlocked, Assistant Secretary of State Atherton was asked by the parties to try and narrow the differences between them, especially on the declaration of principles. He travelled between Cairo and Jerusalem seeking an agreement. On 25 January both President Sadat and Foreign Minister Dayan said that Israel and Egypt were within reach of an agreement on the declaration of principles. On that day, the Prime Minister blamed Egyptian Foreign Ministry officials for pressuring Sadat to recall his delegation from Jerusalem. In this interview, excerpts of which follow, the Premier again described the talks he had with President Sadat in Ismailiya and of his position on the security of Israel.
Robert MacNeil: Mr. Prime Minister, you told the Knesset last night that you would not resume negotiations with Egypt until the Egyptian press stopped its campaign of vilification. Can you give me some examples of that vilification?
Prime Minister Begin: I said that we hoped that the Egyptian President would not repeat the words of vilification against the Jewish people and the State of Israel and its government, and I really have such a hope. So, with that assumption, I may believe that next week we shall be able to send our delegation to Egypt to renew the talks within the fabric of the Military Committee. Of course, if that vilification is repeated, we shall have to draw the conclusion we spoke of*. But let us hope for the best.
Now about the vilification itself. First of all, suddenly, during the negotiations, I am called "Shylock" in the Egyptian press. For three centuries, this word "Shylock" has been a catchword for all the anti-semites, including the Nazis.
MacNeil: How do you explain that you would suddenly become Shylock?
Begin: This is an outburst - unwarranted, unjustified. Only three weeks ago I was the hero of peace in the Egyptian press. When I came to Ismailiya, there was a placard, "Welcome to Begin, the hero of peace." And, suddenly, somebody pushed a button - because it's a directed, a controlled press - and said: attack.
There was another article in which they vilified the Jewish people, saying that to conduct negotiations with the Jews means to conduct negotiations with the "speculators of all generations." This is Nazi language.
We now have a Jewish state. We've fought for our own liberation - at the cost of the best of our men. We, of course, want peace. We want negotiations, peace treaties. But nobody in this time of our national redemption can again vilify our people, the Jewish people, call them names, try to humiliate them, and then say: "Nothing happened. Come to Cairo. Let us negotiate."
MacNeil: Is there any chance of the Political Committee resuming its negotiations soon?
Begin: We want to renew both committees. For the time being, the situation is that President Sadat suddenly - may I say, out of the blue - recalled the Egyptian delegation from the Political Committee. And it's up to the two parties to reconvene that committee, in which both the Egyptians and the Israelis are represented. Meanwhile, we are willing to send our delegation to the Military Committee, because we want the negotiations to go on, provided we see during the week that there are no more "Shylocks" in the Egyptian press.
MacNeil: You say somebody pushed the button. Is it Mr. Sadat who pushed the button that started this campaign?
Begin: I can't say, and I hope not. But it doesn't change the situation. Surely it's a directed press. I suppose that either the Propaganda Ministry, or the Foreign Office in Egypt pushed the button. There can be no other explanation for such a sudden outburst of the worst feelings, and for the use of the worst words we have known in centuries.
MacNeil: In the eyes of which nation, or nations, is Egypt trying to discredit you?
Begin: The Egyptian people themselves. And then, probably anti-Semites, who still dwell in certain countries. But, first of all, they intended to incite the Egyptian people against the Government of Israel, and against Israel, and then they tried actually to frighten us. You know: "If you don't submit to the Egyptian demands, we shall call you names." And then there was also a threat to make war on us. In one of the articles they said that I should remember that there might be another "October." We call it the Yom Kippur War. They took us by surprise; it's true, and we had a very difficult first few days, with hundreds of casualties of our best man, who had to defend our people literally with their bodies.
But when we overcame, and I don't want to exacerbate the situation, but the fact is that our army came very close to the two capitals from which that war had started. To try to frighten us with another "October" is childish, and we can't be impressed by threats of war. We want peace but, if attacked, we shall defend ourselves.
MacNeil: When you came back from the talks in Ismailiya, at Christmas time, you said that your relations with Mr. Sadat were warm and friendly and hospitable. Are they still?
Begin: I hope so. In Ismailiya we discussed problems in the most friendly atmosphere, and President Sadat stressed the fact that, even if we have differences of opinion, we shall keep our friendship and we shall discuss our problems, as it should be. Then there were two interviews given by President Sadat to the weekly called October. The first was a good one; I read it, and I enjoyed it.
Then came the second October interview. What a difference! And yesterday our parliament asked theoretically: perhaps there are two Sadats? I don't know. Because he was a completely different man. For instance, saying that out peace proposal means to say to the Egyptian people: sleep, and I will kill you.
Well, that is, to use an understatement, an hyperbole which is absolutely incomprehensible. This is our peace plan. We suggested that Egypt would be in the Sinai Peninsula. It will be demilitarized, of course, so it will not become a base of aggression against us as it was until 1967, but we will leave the Sinai Peninsula. This was our suggestion. And then, to say that this peace plan means to lull them into sleep, and that we shall then come and kill the Egyptian people - well, this is not a rational statement, with all due respect.
MacNeil: Is Sadat completely in charge of these negotiations? Or is there some tension, or difference of opinion, between him and the Egyptian Foreign Office?
Begin: I'll tell you something of my own experience: President Sadat is the rules of Egypt; if he takes a decision, that's that.
For instance, I remember there was a discussion in the conference room at Ismailiya, when the representative of the Egyptian Foreign Office suggested that we should conduct negotiations about peace agreements. I said: we should negotiate "peace treaties," because a peace agreement is a very abstract concept. A peace treaty is concrete, under international law. The first paragraph in all peace treaties stipulates that the state of war has been terminated, and then follow the territorial issue, diplomatic relations, etc. And the man representing the Foreign Office of Egypt did not agree. "No," he said. "We cannot write 'peace treaties,' only 'peace agreements'."
President Sadat listened to the discussion, and he turned to the man from the Egyptian Foreign Office and said: "Write peace treaties." And that was the decision. The document we agreed upon included the term "peace treaties."
However, we learned that when it comes to formulations, to judicial problems, President Sadat is influenced by the people of the Egyptian Foreign Office. Because, as he says himself, he is not interested in details.
Details, may I say, are quite important. Napoleon Bonaparte used to say: "Care about the details. They are very important." But he, President Sadat, has got the general outlook, and he pursues a general policy.
MacNeil: You told the Knesset last night that President Sadat, when he was in Jerusalem, promised you that the Egyptian army would not advance beyond a certain line in the Sinai. But when it came to negotiations in the military committee, the Egyptian War Ministry had quite a different line. How do you explain that?
Begin: I will only explain this: in Jerusalem, President Sadat told me that the Egyptian army would not cross the line of the Gidi and Mitla Passes. The distance between this line and the international border to which, in accordance with our peace plan, the Israeli army should ultimately withdraw, as we agreed in advance, is between 180 and 200 kilometres. That was the pledge made by President Sadat.
Then, our Defence Minister, Ezer Weizman, goes to Egypt with the Chief of Staff. He presents a map in accordance with the pledge given to me by President Sadat, and General Gamassy, the War Minister of Egypt, presents his map and says: "there will be a demilitarized zone only 40 kilometres from the international border." In other words, a difference of 140 to 160 kilometres, as you can see, between the two lines. To us, that is a world of difference. It is the difference between the Sinai Peninsula being remilitarized or demilitarized.
MacNeil: But do these differences emerge just from Mr. Sadat's carelessness with detail or lack of interest in detail? Or does it represent some change of heart on his part?
Begin: I wouldn't go so far. But the fact is that he agreed with me on that line, and then, probably, when the plan came up for consideration before the generals of the Egyptian military staff, they reached a different conclusion. I cannot imagine that they would have proposed their plan without President Sadat's consent.
He probably had second thoughts on the subject, but he never denied the pledge given to me in Jerusalem. I brought our peace plan to Ismailiya, and read to him from the written text: "We base ourselves on the promise given by the President to the Prime Minister in Jerusalem, to the effect that the Egyptian army will not cross the Gidi and Mitla Passes." He didn't say one word. Neither he nor his advisor denied it.
Yesterday I called on President Sadat from the rostrum of the Knesset to keep his pledge; that is necessary for his own credibility. I hope he will.
MacNeil: How do you explain Mr. Sadat's charge that you deceived him over the Israeli settlements in the Sinai?
Begin: He didn't say so. Some of the newspapers said that I misled him. Sadat never said that I even misled him. What he said in his speech was: it is true that the Prime Minister of Israel brought me the plan, including the question of the settlements, but two days earlier I met Ezer Weizman, the Defence Minister of Israel, and I told him that I would not accept those settlements. And that statement is true in both parts: namely, he met the Defence Minister of Israel, and he told him that he would not accept the settlements.
Then, two days later, I came to Ismailiya. I presented him our peace plan, including the settlements, because that is a vital issue for us, for our security and future, and he said: we have a difference of opinion. He also repeated that he could not accept it. And we agreed, in a personal talk within two minutes, that, with this difference of opinion, we shall continue our negotiations within the framework of the two committees.
So, it wasn't a matter of an ultimatum. We had a problem. We had a difference of opinion. Now we have two committees, and our friends in the two committees will discuss it, until, as we hope, they will reach an agreement.
MacNeil: Well, if that was the atmosphere, how do you explain to yourself the sudden withdrawal of the Egyptian delegation from Jerusalem a week ago?
Begin: I can't explain it, because I was taken completely by surprise. So was the Secretary of State, and so was the Egyptian delegation; they just got an order to go back to Cairo. I can only surmise. I suppose that the Foreign Office people in Egypt, after President Sadat gave his consent to have the political committee meet in Jerusalem, told him that it was not a good idea that the Egyptian delegation should stay in Jerusalem for several days, or perhaps several weeks, because there is the so-called "rejectionist front" - those who took part in the conference in Tripoli -and the delegation's continued presence there might be construed as recognition of Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel. And then he decided that perhaps it was better to withdraw the Egyptian delegation.
MacNeil: You had an exchange, on the day the talks broke off, with some Egyptian newspaper editors, and you said, afterwards, that you had begun to understand something, and you implied that it was that, in Mr. Sadat's mind, he had made a major concession by agreeing to recognize Israel's right to exist. Is that the big hang-up in the situation?
Begin: No, not that. What I learned from the Egyptian Journalists was that they see a far-reaching change in the fact that President Sadat recognized "your right to survive" or "your right to exist." It was then that it dawned upon me that this was the assumption made by President Sadat. I explained to the Egyptian journalists: for three decades you have 'probably been so accustomed to hostility to Israel that you perceived the reexamination of Israel's right to survive as a most far-reaching change. But that is not the case. I told them: we have never asked you to give us such recognition. We have a right to survive as any other nation. I have never heard of anybody speaking about recognizing the right of Belgium, or Luxembourg, or of Lichtenstein to exist.
We recognize that the visit by President Sadat to Jerusalem was an act of civil courage. But, for that recognition of our right to live, to ask to jeopardize our security, to mutilate our country, to put the lives of our civilian population in direct danger, as the case would be should we accept the demands of President Sadat? That is a completely different story.
MacNeil: Wouldn't that state of mind explain why the peace proposal with which you responded, because it was the beginning of a bargaining position, seemed to them like an inadequate gesture in response to what they considered this very considerable gesture?
Begin: So they say. Even more so: Sadat said in that second October interview: "I gave Begin everything. He gave me nothing." So whenever we say, "but we have problems" - they say, "what do you mean, problems? We recognized your right to survive."
This recognition doesn't mean anything to us. It is the natural thing to do among all nations. All nations have a right to exist. What we ask you, and what we are going to negotiate with you, are the conditions for peace treaties, in which there will be mutual recognition of independence, sovereignty and peace.
MacNeil: Are you not concerned that world opinion might see Mr. Sadat's gesture in very simple terms, whereas your position is much more complicated, relying on the precise wording of Resolution 242 of the United Nations, and Mr. Sadat's gesture might therefore carry the day - just in public relations terms?
Begin: It doesn't carry the day, although some of his advisers would like to carry the night. I think we have already succeeded in convincing the leaders of your great nation that, to us, all these problems are not problems of formulas and words; they are problems concerning our very life.
Look at this map, please. When President Sadat asks us to go back to this green land, to the west, to the sea, and to include the mountains in a Palestinian state, then he is asking us to place ourselves in mortal danger, because then all our cities and towns would be within the range of their conventional artillery. If there should be a so-called Palestinian state, in no time it will be taken over by the PLO, which is bent on the destruction of Israel. They will get all the Soviet artillery, tanks and guns, etc., and every woman and child will be in direct physical danger. It's not a matter of formulation. It's a matter of our lives.