Mr. Dayan set out for the United States in the wake of the Sadat visit, in an effort to counter the many Sadat appearances there and to explain the position of Israel. Appearing on "Meet the Press", the Foreign Minister answered questions on the settlements, military arrangements in Sinai, the Sadat demands for Israeli commitments prior to negotiating and the Palestinian issue. Text:
Monroe: Our guest today is Moshe Dayan Foreign Minister of Israel. He is an Israeli General and former Defense Minister. He emerged from the Six Day War of 1967 an Israeli hero. After the 1973 War he was blamed by some for lack of preparedness but an official investigation cleared him of blame. Last May General Dayan caused some controversy in Israel when he deserted the long dominant Labor Party to join the newly elected Government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin as Foreign Minister.
Mr. Minister, the Israeli Cabinet today issued a sharp attack on Secretary of State Vance for having said a day or so ago that Israeli settlements in Arab occupied territory were illegal and should not exist. The Cabinet said that Mr. Vance's statement was contradictory to previous US policy or to statements from President Carter.
Why is Mr. Vance's statement contradictory considering the fact that President Carter three times during January criticized the policy of intensifying Israeli settlements?
Dayan: Because our Peace Plan was presented to President Carter about Sinai and that plan included the settlements staying where they are and we believe that the President found the plan satisfactory - and I can't quote his wording exactly - but we went to the Egyptians with this plan only after the President really in a way accepted it and found it satisfactory.
Monroe: Could the Cabinet be going a little too far in interpreting President Carter's reception, of the Israeli plan in general, as satisfactory, as a negotiating basis, to say that it amounted to specific approval of continued Israeli settlements in occupied territory?
Dayan: Well, what the Cabinet criticized now was this specific point that while we are negotiating with the Egyptians about a Peace Plan and the President knows that our Peace Plan is based on the settlements to stay where they are then that Secretary Vance should not have come out now at this moment saying that a settlement should not exist there, or that the President should have said that to the Israeli Prime Minister Begin at this time before we presented our plan to the Egyptians. Monroe: Do you feel Secretary Vance is taking sides with Egypt against the Israelis, or do you feel the whole US Government is taking sides?
Dayan: Well, I don't know for us and for me, Secretary Vance is representing the Administration and on this specific point about a settlement of the Sinai and about the West Bank, I am afraid that he is taking sides now, which won't make his job as a mediator any easier for us.
Monroe: When you say he is taking sides, you also mean the Government is taking sides?
Dayan: If he represents the Government, then the Government takes sides. I suppose he did not speak for himself but that I can't judge. If he speaks for the American Administration, then the American Administration is taking sides. If he spoke just for himself then he, himself took sides.
Gwertzman: Mr. Dayan, continuing on the question about taking sides, the United States, for years has been linked with Israel as Israel's ally in some people's minds. Why would the Carter Administration take side against Egypt?
Dayan: I think that just now we are facing the problem how to get peace and here was President Sadat and he met-with the Administration and presented his case and maybe that the Administration thinks that they should give more support to President Sadat or otherwise he won't be able to continue with the negotiations for peace.
Gwertzman: But the question I think American officials are asking is in particular with the Sinai, if Israel is willing to give Egypt sovereignty over the entire Sinai, how can Egypt - how can Israel - excuse me - how can Israel ask to keep defended settlements as well as three airfields in that region?
It seems to be making a mockery of returning the whole territory.
Dayan: We did not just say that we want to give back the entire Sinai, period. We presented a plan which we think -and I still think so - is the best that could satisfy both the Egyptians and Israel as far as security is concerned.
Now, this plan consisted of some parts where the forces of Egypt would be about demilitarization in the central part of Sinai and about a belt of security along the Israeli boundary to include Sharm El-Sheikh.
And the area between El Arish and Israel, that is part of the plan and the plan is a package deal. It can be taken, accepted it can be argued about, but you cannot say "Well, if you agreed that the Sinai should be under the Egyptian sovereignty then that is that, and let Egyptian soldiers take over Sharm El-Sheikh and they will take care of the Israelis."
This was not our plan.
Gwertzman: Is it negotiable - for instance the withdrawal of forces is that negotiable? Is it negotiable that Israel , will leave the airfields?
Dayan: Everything is negotiable and when we were in Ismailiya, President Sadat said that he would present us with a counter proposal, which we of course, were ready to negotiate, and this is the way to deal with that.
We presented a plan. What I am trying to say is that the plan that we presented was a complete one, including the settlements, the UN control and Sharm El-Sheikh and demilitarization.
If the Egyptians don't like it, they can present another plan and we shall negotiate over it.
Evans: Mr. Minister, you used a word a moment ago to describe President Carter's reaction to Mr. Begin's plan that I believe is inaccurate. You said he called it "Satisfactory". I think Sir, he said it was a "Constructive" approach as a first step. He never really approved your plan for the Sinai. Did he, sir?
Dayan: Well I did say that I am not free to quote the Presidents exact wording or otherwise I would have repeated exactly his wording.
Maybe you are free.
I said we went to the Egyptians with the feeling that we have the President's blessing for this plan.
Evans: You referred last Wednesday Mr. Minister to Sadat's so called peace initiative. Why did you say "So called"?
Dayan: I don't remember what I said last Wednesday, but I can tell you what I think now about Sadat's Peace Plan. If President Sadat really insists on Israel withdrawing from all of the Arab territories and that Israel would accept the right for the Palestinians for self determination, which would be eventually a Palestinian state, and if he calls for Israel to withdraw all the settlements and the Israeli forces and to give back East Jerusalem, then I don't think this is a Peace Plan. I don't think it will ever be accepted by Israel. I don't think this can serve as a basis for a Peace Plan.
Evans: Mr. Minister, let me try this a different way. Thanks to the generosity of the American taxpayer, every man, woman and child in Israel receives the equivalent of about 700 dollars every year, and we have unemployment in this country and of course we have problems in great cities like New York, they are all screaming for Federal money.
Given the US generosity to Israel don't you think that Mr. Begin could go along with out President on the issue of these settlements particularly in the Sinai?
Dayan: I think our problem, particularly in the Sinai, is of security and I don't think that we ever asked you to fight for us, that you ever fought for us, or that we should rely on you taking care of us. So when it comes to our life and security we have to decide how we are going to defend our country and if you interpret it into dollars, that won't be the answer.
The question is, are American soldiers going to defend Israel and to protect it and if not, won't we be the ones to decide where are the lines that we must hold in order to defend Israel?
Newman: Mr. Minister, about a week ago when President Sadat was in Washington, President Carter described him as the world's foremost peacemaker.
Do you accept that characterization of President Sadat?
Dayan: Personally I think that he is - I believe that he really wants peace and in comparison with all of the other Arab leaders he is really a distinguished person. Personality in this respect. When it comes to the terms for peace that he calls for, especially asking that King Hussein will come in because otherwise he can't - "He" President Sadat -can't make a separate peace and King Hussein says that he can't come unless we commit ourselves for full withdrawal and all the rest, then I am not quite sure that President Sadat's plan for peace is the best one. So I am distinguishing between the characters of President Sadat - which could be a distinguished presence for peace, and the Peace Plan of President Sadat.
Newman: Would Israel be in a better position if President Sadat had not gone to Jerusalem in November?
Dayan: No, I think it was very important for all of us and it was an important step towards promoting peace, his coming to Jerusalem by all means.
Newman: Do you feel you are being outmaneuvered in the sense that an impression is going around that Israel is unyielding will not make necessary concessions?
Dayan: I think that we are doing everything that we can and should do and I would be very sorry if this is not understood by the others but I think that is what we are really doing.
Monroe: Mr. Minister, the New York Times in an editorial said a day or so ago, if only to-diminish the damage they are doing to themselves in their current propaganda contest, the Israelis would be wise to halt all settlement activities as a contribution to peacemaking.
In the light of that editorial and in the light of expressions you have heard in this country since you have been here for several days, do you have a feeling there is widespread criticism in this country of the Israeli policy of settlements in occupied territory, especially, adding to them during peace negotiations?
Dayan: Yes, I think that there is a widespread criticism here about the settlements but I really don't think that this is the obstacle for the progress of peace. And when it came to President Sadat when he had to explain why he called back his people from Jerusalem, from the political committee, he said it was because Israel did not agree to commit itself to withdraw from the Golan Heights and he said look here for me, President Sadat, the Golan Heights come first before Sinai, and so on, so I don't really think if we had seized all, establishing all new settlements, that that would have made things as far as the peace process is going. I don't think this is the obstacle.
Monroe: President Sadat of Egypt was here until perhaps 4 or 5 days ago and you have been here since then, you have had time to study the impact of his visit. Do you have a feeling that his visit here changed anything?
Dayan: I really don't know. I really don't know. I can't answer what I don't know. I am not that much involved in the American life. I can tell you.
Monroe: Do you have a sense of considerable American admiration for President Sadat and do you feel that is a factor you need to content with?
Dayan: I am told so. I don't have this feeling. I don't have the instrument to measure the feeling but I am told he is very popular and that Israel is coming down as far as popularity is concerned. I was told so by some people here.
Monroe: Does today's Cabinet statement reflect the feeling that Israel must do something to counterattack in the field of public opinion in this country?
Dayan: The Israeli Cabinet? Not at all. It has to do with Secretary Vance's statement which we took very seriously especially about the West Bank and the Palestinian question.
I think really that this is the problem and this is the obstacle. It is not the Israeli settlement in Sinai. It is not even the other problems between us and Egypt in Sinai. I think the real issue is the West Bank and the Palestinian problem and the future of that areas and the call on Israel to withdraw there and eventually to remove the Israeli settlement and Israeli forces from there, things that Israel I believe will never accept, just will never accept.
Gwertzman: Mr. Dayan, the United States is putting forth a plan for the West Bank which eventually calls for some kind of linkage between what is called a Palestinian homeland and Jordan.
Does this fall under your category of unacceptable to Israel?
Dayan: If it will bring to a Palestinian State, then it does. If it is not, if it is just kind of a linkage between the Palestinian Arabs who live on the West Bank and who are Jordanian citizens and those for the Parliament in Amman, then it does not fall within this category.
Gwertzman: But can you conceive of Israel ever withdrawing its military presence from the West Bank?
Dayan: No, not entirely. I can see reducing some of the forces at a time of peace but not really - I don't think that we can withdraw or should withdraw all our forces, military forces from the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Gwertzman: Does not it seem strange for Israel with only a few thousand settlers on the West Bank to in a sense dominate the lives of almost a million Arabs?
Dayan: Yes, this is wrong and that is what we want to change. We don't want to dominate their lives. What we want on the West Bank is to keep some of our forces, not in order to interfere with the lives of the Arabs there but to take care and to defend Israel on the West coast, the early warnings system against air attacks or tanks in camps in military installations just in case that the West Bank would be invaded by enemy forces from Iraq. But the forces there on the West Bank should not interfere with the lives of the Palestinian Arabs, they should stay outside and should have nothing to do whatsoever with the lives of the Palestinian Arabs there.
Evans: Did you or any responsible officials in your Government tell President Carter, or any responsible American that there would be no new settlements for a twelve month period?
Dayan: I did.
Evans: Why then have there been four new settlements announced in the last two weeks?
Dayan: No, I think that we are living up to my promise exactly, we are not doing anything against my promise. What I did promise President Carter, I think it was in September last year, was that the new settlements that we would establish, something about one year, twelve months, would be, would take place within military camps and that is what we are doing. We did not say we shall not have any new settlements. We did say we will go on with more settlements, but they would take place within the military installations, within military camps.
Evans: What is the difference between a new settlement populated by your military, or a new settlement populated by non military?
Dayan: I think that everybody agrees that in the occupied territory the occupying force has got the right to have military installations military camps, whenever and wherever he feels it is necessary, so no one is asking, questioning the right of Israel to establish military camps, military installations.
So as long as we do that and if the civilian settlements are inside the military camps, we think, and to a certain degree - not entirely, I think - that is what is the feeling of the President, it is a second best rather better than having a civilian settlement outside just on top of the hill somewhere.
Evans: What is so angering, I think is a fair word, Sir, to the Carter Administration, is about that, that ten years, almost eleven years after you acquired this territory, you still find it necessary on the ground of military requirements to set up new settlements, military posts. But, in fact there is no problem on the West Bank that I am aware of. Are there any battles there, or any rebellions? Do you need those settlements for military reasons?
Dayan: I did not say we need the settlements for military reasons. I think - this is my view, that we are not foreigners in the West Bank and that the right that every Beduin has got there to buy a piece of land and to build his house is also our right there.
We do not think that the West Bank is a foreign, strange country for us, so we think that even if not for security reasons, but just in order to satisfy our feelings, we should have the right to settle down in the West Bank.
Newman: When Golda Meir was the Israeli Prime Minister she used to say there is no such thing as a Palestinian people. Is there such a thing as a Palestinian people?
Dayan: I think - yes, I think there are Palestinian Arabs and I am sure that they feel about their cities and villages that this is their homeland. I am sure that the Palestinian Arabs born and living in Nablus feel this is their country and this is their homeland, we shall respect it.
Newman: How do you respect it as their country? How would you go about making it their country?
Dayan: Well this is a question that you cannot, for each village or even for half a million people, establish a new state. Supposing the people in the Gaza Strip were about 200,000 of original settlers there and about 190,000 refugees. They feel at home there, that that is their country, that is their homes and so on and so forth. That still does not mean that you can make a Gaza Strip state. You can't make new states everywhere. So I think that we have to distinguish between the feeling of the individuals about the place and how many states you would have in the area, and where these states would be.
Newman: I notice you use the word "Country", they think it is their country and you appear to accept the word country, what do you mean by country?
Dayan: I think they feel at home there everywhere, not just in their village. They were born there, they feel they are at home just as I feel they are at home.
Newman: And if they want to have a state, they are not entitled to have it?
Dayan: They want to have state, and the question is how many states should be there and what would be the outcome of that state. Supposing they do want - and I think they really want - to have separate state, we have to think, what would be the result of such a state, of an independent Palestinian state? Will that be good for everybody, for them, for us, for the peace for the area, or that we should find ways to satisfy their feeling without establishing a new additional state.