Following the Sadat visit to the United States, and the decision of the Carter administration to sell advanced aircraft on a package deal to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it was deemed important that Mr. Begin meet soon with President Carter. In his statement to the Knesset, the Prime Minister announced that he would hold talks with the President in Washington in early March. He also denounced the proposed aircraft sale and explained the dangers involved in this act. Excerpts:
(The Prime Minister commenced by recalling that there had been grave situations and tension in Israel-U.S. relations in the past, and went on to say:)
We overcame, and now too, we shall overcome - and I say this with all the feeling of hurt that I do not deny. In face of those utterances to which we have already reactedsince the friendship between us and the U.S. is a phenomenon of relations of great depth...
On behalf of the government, I wish to make a statement regarding the U.S. government's partial response to our request for the supply of modern planes. The response is partial - we requested a larger number of these planes, but this partial response contains a positive element, insofar as enhancing Israel's defensive and deterrent strength is concerned. It therefore behoves us sincerely to express our appreciation to the U.S. President for the decision he took last night on the clear assumption that in the wake of clarifications between us there will be a decision on further supplies, both of modern planes and of defensive ground weapons - the question of the supply of which will be taken up by the Minister of Defence on his forthcoming visit to the U.S. commencing 5 March.
However, it is my duty on behalf of the government of Israel and - I am sure - on behalf of the decisive majority of members of the house to appeal to the U.S. President to reconsider his decision with regard to the supply of offensive weapons to Egypt and most modern planes to Saudi Arabia. (The Prime Minister drew attention at this point to threats published in the Egyptian press - in the midst of the process of negotiations - to go to war "Unless certain ultimative demands were met.") And if such a threat was sounded from the Egyptian side it must be realized that the supply of offensive weapons to Egypt at this very time cannot but feed the threat. It can serve only as an obstacle to the negotiations because it is to us that ultimative demands were presented which we do not - and will not - accept. We proposed negotiations...
Therefore offensive weapons must not be supplied to Egypt in the midst of negotiations because such supply will be an obstacle to the conducting of negotiations between ourselves and Egypt. We therefore request that these planes -which are in the nature of offensive, and modern weapons - not be supplied to Egypt.
Secondly, we request a reconsideration of the supply of the most advanced planes on earth to Saudi Arabia. If these are supplied to that Arab state it will become - by virtue of the very supplying of them - an additional confrontation state. It is a fact that geographically Saudi Arabia is not far from Israel - and at one point is very close. Planes which can reach Eilat in just ten minutes and in another few minutes (can reach) Israel's population centres - will make Saudi Arabia an absolute and immediate confrontation state.
And we have experience: Whatever the assurances, these arms will reach the (Arab) states if they go to war against Israel on the front itself. We also have a basis for saying that in fact this promise has already been made by Saudi Arabia to a certain Arab state: Namely, these planes -which are to be supplied by the United States - will, when the day comes, be employed against Israel and be at the disposal of that Arab state.
Israel cannot, therefore, under any circumstances agree to link the supply of the planes promised it with the supply of offensive planes to Egypt, or of very advanced planes to Saudi Arabia. With all due respect, then, I call upon the President of the United States to reconsider this decision, which he took yesterday - for it constitutes a grave danger, both to the process of negotiation for the establishment of Peace, and to Israel's security.
The statement of the Israel government on Sunday was the whole truth: We did not claim that the President of the United States directly approved that detail which was presented to him within our peace plan, and which refers to the leaving of the Jewish-Israeli settlements in the Rafah Salient with Israeli protection. We said - and this is the truth that we presented the entire plan, and this detail was part of that presentation, explicitly including the following three elements: The settlements remaining intact, a United Nations region. Israeli protection for them. And after the plan was presented to the U.S. President, the reaction was positive for the plan as a whole. That is what we said, and I reiterate it from the Knesset rostrum...
And only after I was able to report to the Cabinet on American moral support - we did not obligate the President and we do not even consider so doing - did the Cabinet decide that the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister and myself would go to Ismailiya and present the plan - as it was approved by the Cabinet - to the President of Egypt...
Before the President of Egypt, too, I presented the peace plan including the detail - or the general rule - of the leaving of the settlements in the Rafah Salient and along the Gulf of Eilat with Israeli protection. What was President Sadat's reaction? I shall conceal nothing. He did not accept this proposal. In fact he said that he rejects it. That is his right. But the main thing is that when he and I summed up the Ismailiya meeting we both asserted - in public too, at the joint press conference - that henceforth serious negotiations are to get underway. We made a proposal. The Egyptians will put forth their own proposal, and the give-and-take will be on the two Proposals: Free negotiations, without ultimative demands, without setting dates for their termination as is proper between two peoples two nations of ancient civilization - who want to attain peace... and in order to conduct such free negotiations President Sadat accepted my suggestion - at our first talk - to set up the two committees...
The logical question to be asked is: Just because the other side did not accept a certain proposal did those who praised the plan as a whole have to say, 'We, too oppose this proposal'? According to the history of peace negotiations and governmental declarations it cannot be said that this is the logical conclusion. On the contrary: The negotiations must go on. If someone says, ultimatively, 'You must remove all the settlements from here' what kind of negotiation is this? For both of us - the President of Egypt and myself agreed that there would be negotiations: A counter-proposal may be put forth but not an ultimatum. With an ultimatum there is no longer a dialogue.
And the same applies to overseas: If the plan as a whole was agreed to then just because one side does not accept a certain proposal that agreement cannot be cancelled, on the contrary: Both sides must be pushed to continuing to negotiate.
Hence, the government's reaction, it was open, clear and also correct...
I shall provide another illustration. I read the Egyptian President's remark that he told me in Jerusalem, and I quote what he said while in Washington: "The main Egyptian military force will not cross the line of the Giddi and Mitleh passes." I am one of the most veteran members of the Knesset. I have been serving in it for 29 years - and there are many members who know not just what was stated from this rostrum or in committee. But also on a personal basis, I call them to witness - and not just my Cabinet colleagues who heard the story of the talk between myself and President Sadat in Jerusalem just minutes after it concluded. I call them all to witness, and I state that President Sadat did not utter those words, in no manner, not even by hint, did he say: "The main Egyptian military force will not cross the passes."
He told me only this: "My army will not cross the passes." That was the explicit promise without any addition, without any qualifications. Minutes after the conclusion of our talk, I related it to the Deputy Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Agriculture Minister - that very evening after I left the room where President Sadat and I had spoken.
This is a central point in our plan. When we constructed our plan we said explicitly that on this promise by the President of Egypt we are building our plan. Verbally, when we presented the plan to him in Ismailiya, and in writing when just one day later we sent him the written plan. In the presence of President Sadat himself I reminded him of what he had said to me in Jerusalem. He had no reservations to make, not even one word. He could, ostensibly, have said: 'This was not what I said to you. I told you that the main Egyptian military force would not cross the passes.' But he said not even one word when I explained that this was one of the key elements of our peace plan. That is to say: here is the Suez canal, here are the passes. Between the canal and the passes there are limited forces in line with the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Beyond the passes: Total demilitarization . This is what all of us heard...
(Interjection by Knesset member Yitzhak Rabin, Alignment: Total demilitarization up to what point?) up to the international border, to which point, we stated, we would withdraw our military forces after a transition period of a number of years - with this total demilitarization, as I have explained it....
On the question of the settlements, there is but one proposal: The government of the United States and the government of Israel agree to disagree. The United States government says our settlements contradict international law. The Israel government says: We have examined international law, we have perused it - including Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention -'and we assert that the settlements are fully in accord with international law. The United States government says: The settlements are illegal, the Israel government says: The settlements are absolutely legal... that is the fact: There are between the government of the United States and the government of Israel differences of opinion on this question, and we must agree that, on this issue, we disagree.
As the government communique stated, we reacted to a certain expression uttered in Washington a week ago. I do not conceal that this expression was very painful for us. Lately, we have heard interpretations of it - and it is good that there are such extenuating interpretations - but the expression itself was very serious. We reacted to it, and we hope that by this means we shall be able - out of a clear knowledge of the differences between the two governments on the specific matter of settlements - to continue, with understanding and friendship.
(The Prime Minister concluded by announcing that he had this morning received an invitation from President Carter to visit the United States for three days next month, for talks. The date was to be set through regular diplomatic channels.)