Following the expulsion by Egypt of an Israeli military mission that has been there since February 1978, the Prime Minister still expressed optimism that peace with Egypt would be concluded, in spite of the fact that President Sadat rejected his call for negotiations on mutual concessions. Mr. Begin also suggested the possibility of what he termed "permanent partial settlement" if full scale peace was unattainable at the moment. The foreign policy portions of the interview follows:
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, about half an hour ago we heard that the Israeli military delegation in Egypt will return to Israel tomorrow. What is your reaction to this announcement which followed the meeting of the Egyptian National Security Council today.
Prime Minister Begin: ... I was told by the Defence Minister several hours ago that he had received a telegram from his friend, his colleague, Gamassy, and the telegram contains a request that we recall the delegation tomorrow. We'll do that willingly. The Egyptians have been hospitable to us, and maintained the military delegation for many months, we are grateful. If they no longer wish to have our delegation in Egypt, so be it. The delegation will come home. I can say that if at some time the Egyptians will ask us to have a military delegation of theirs here, we will welcome it and give it all due hospitality.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, this morning, the Cairo radio analyst reiterated threats of war after a long period in which no such threats were made. Does this in your opinion bode the collapse of the peace initiative?
A. No. I think these matters are unimportant, insignificant. Of course we have to be careful and we will take precautionary measures. But I do not think that war is imminent, and Mr. Sadat has not abandoned the idea of negotiations, as you have often heard from him. We want negotiations, but I would like to say: Egypt, Syria, all our enemies should know that if attacked we will defend ourselves. We do not want war. We hate war and bloodshed, with all our heart we want peace. But if attacked, we will defend ourselves, and Israel, when it defends itself, sometimes. does so by counter attacking.
Q. You have refrained for many days from reacting to the barrage of insults directed at you by Egypt. When, in your estimation will it be time to react to this attack?
A. This is a question which will have to be decided at a proper time. The time has not yet come. I imagine, generally speaking, that if it appears that the thread is broken and there are no more negotiations, I will reply. I could reply before that as well, but I think that the decision not to engage in polemics is correct. Especially not with that Anti-Semite, Mansour is his name I believe. A genuine Anti-Semite, I heard this from a diplomatic representative of a foreign country, I heard that Mansour is known as an Anti-Semite in the usual sense of the word, that is, a hater of Israel. I will not engage in polemics with him, not with Sadat either, although he has said various things. For a simple reason: we do not want polemics, we want negotiations, talks about peace, about establishing peace, about conditions for peace, about a peace treaty, about peaceful relations. So what can I gain by voicing sharp replies to vilifications from the other side. I'd rather be one of the insulted and not the insultors.
Q. Of the military delegation's return tomorrow, if I understand you correctly, you tend to view this as a matter of hospitality. They were guests in Egypt for a while and now they are coming back. But, do you not perceive this as a political signal to Israel which perhaps hints at ending the negotiations?
A. No. No. In my view this is not an event at all. The delegation did not fulfil a central political role. From time to time it would receive a telegram, and transmit one. Several excellent officers of ours were there, they didn't have much to do. Hats off to them for their patience. But this is not an event, neither politically nor military. They've been, in Cairo, and they'll come home tomorrow. "Welcome home."
Q. Do you take it lightly that a delegation of Israeli officers is sitting in Egypt? A year or two ago it was inconceivable.
A. Did I say that I make light of that? But you're talking about their expulsion. Their return is not significant. It alters nothing. Their presence was important, and while the landlords there let them stay, we were very happy. Now the landlords don't want them anymore. So thank god, they have a home of their own to which they can return, and they will be received with respect and love.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there is something I still can't understand: A delegation is expelled after many months. A Cairo radio news analyst threatens war, President Sadat and the Egyptian media are hurling abuses at you, it seems to me, are underestimating the seriousness of this situation.
A. No. I don't underestimate anything. I can only advise the people of Israel to have good nerves. That's important.
Q. It Seems that those who have met recently with Sadat, such as Weizman and Dayan, were impressed by his sincere desire for peace. Do you still share this perception?
A. I'll tell you exactly what I think: President Sadat wants peace with Israel on his terms. But his conditions imply the destruction of Israel. Every Jew should be aware of that. I take very seriously President Sadat's desire for what he calls peace with Israel. Open borders, diplomatic relations, economic relations, everything he says. I accept this. But what are his conditions? Total withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 boundaries, to the boundaries preceding the Six Day War. The boundaries described by Abba Eban as "Auschwitz lines" (you have never heard such an extreme term from me). By the way, it is entirely wrong: we will have no Auschwitz here. Not Auschwitz, not Massada. If attacked, we will defend ourselves, and win always. We do not want these wars, but after all the other side too can make a bad decision, and we must take that into account.
This is the kind of peace he wants: That Israel be reduced, shriveled, nine kilometers from the seaside, surrounded by armies, while Soviet artillery today has a range of 43.8 kilometers. This did not exist eleven years ago, and this artillery can reach every home, every city in Israel. And there is the "Strella" with which one can bring down a plane from 30.000 feet. An instrument you can pack in a suitcase. There were no such weapons, and President Sadat very quietly aspires to an Israel of this kind. Tiny. Vulnerable to attack. He himself may not be planning to attack, but someone can come in his place. Someone else will do it. But that is what he wants. He wants peace on his own terms. But his terms mean non-peace. They mean a danger to the very existence of Israel. Therefore, we cannot possibly accept his terms. We can accept his readiness for peace, and we must insist on conditions for peace which will ensure our security. And not only ours, but our children's as well.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister. You have often said that President Sadat wants Israel to return to the pre '67 lines and you see in that a danger to Israel's existence. Are we to conclude then that in your opinion President Sadat's long term strategic aim is the obliteration of Israel?
A. I've already said what he wants. He wants peace under conditions that would endanger the very existence of the State of Israel. Why say more? I have no doubt of this. And the proof: He constantly refers to what he calls "The Land" - Earth. The great Arab nation has 12 million square kilometres of land. In our case this refers to 5,600 square kilometres Gaza, Judea and Samaria, but these 5000 square kilometres mean our very lives. They are at our doorstep. And therefore, that is the central problem. Not the soil, but our security, our existence, and, these, as Dayan told Kamel in London are linked to a certain area. But it's not true that we want territories for the sake of territories. We are concerned for the safety of the nation. Were the enemy in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, we'd have no security, not for a single day and our very existence would be in danger both as a state and a nation. That's the argument. And we will persist in this argument with Sadat and with those greater than him.
Q. Mr. Begin. The Foreign Minister said during the Knesset political debate 2 days ago that "Im" the Egyptians would put forth a...
A. That is not what he said. He said "Lu", were the Egyptians to put forth... Please be accurate.
Q. Yes "Lu". Were the Egyptians to put forth a concrete proposal for a peace treaty based on a territorial compromise, the Government would be prepared to discuss it. Does this imply a change in the Government position vis-a-vis a territorial compromise?
A. The Foreign Minister said this with my consent. He had said this once before, several months ago in the Knesset. He said "Lu" (were Egypt to) not "Im" (if Egypt would).
Q. What is the distinction?
A. The distinction is very simple. The Arabs do not want any territorial compromise. This was said explicitly by Kamel in Leeds (A beautiful castle). And Dayan asked him explicitly, "Are you ready to make peace on the basis of a territorial compromise." His original answer. In English was "Of course not."
We cannot pretend to be deaf to not hear what the Foreign Minister says. Under no circumstances. No territorial compromise. And for this reason, when the Alignment people walk around the Knesset, saying "We can make peace based on a territorial compromise" they are deceiving the public. They are telling the opposite of the truth. For after all, from whom can we find out whether there is a readiness for territorial compromise. He said so in the Knesset. But you forgot. If I had the records I'd read it out. When they say 'territorial compromise' it sounds very nice but it misleads the people. The people of Israel should know the truth. What did the Foreign Minister have in mind? Fairness: Were they to bring such a proposal we would discuss it. A very fair attitude. But the truth is that they do not present such a proposal. On the contrary, they reject the whole idea from the start. They refer to any change whatever as 'Expansion'. Some 'Expansion'.
Now I'd like to tell you something I've learned only today: Hussein, who was considered moderate, met with Atherton and it became apparent that he is even more extreme than the Egyptians. He is not prepared to accept even minor modifications. In Egypt, Sadat, not Kamel, talked about what is called mini-modifications. 'Latrounish' modifications: a divided field, a village. Well. This can be considered and this is what is known as 'Minor modifications'. And yesterday Hussein told Atherton "Not even minor modifications". Total withdrawal by Israel to the '67 lines. Certain Modifications but reciprocal changes only: If Israel gets something, I too will demand something from her. But Hussein won't consider even minor modifications. A 'Moderate' King.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, but even if Egypt were to present such a proposal for territorial compromise, you are not prepared to hand over part of Judea and Samaria to foreign sovereignty.
A. ...To reiterate what the Foreign Minister said: If Egypt were to make such a proposal. Yes, we will discuss it. I will neither add to nor detract from what the Foreign Minister has said.
Q. That is, you would not be prepared to discuss the transfer of part of Judea and Samaria to Arab sovereignty.
A. I have already said. If "The Arabs were to suggest a territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria and Gaza, we would be prepared to discuss it. They propose no such thing. And not only that, they reject is outright. And I cannot day dream. I must tend to the affairs of state.
Q. In this context, Mr. Begin, what prospects do you see for the peace process?
A. I consider the prospects excellent. The peace process has not come to an end. Look, Atherton is in the area. On 3 August Mr. Vance will arrive. He was firm about that. The Americans are not certain but they assume that another meeting could be arranged. Possibly not. I cannot guarantee it. There will be many meetings. Yes.
I said in the Knesset... There's a Talmudic saying definite or possible-certain is preferable. But in the search for peace, the possible is preferable. Don't be impressed by vilification. Continue to aspire to peace. There may be ten negative meetings, and the eleventh will be positive. And therefore, I am truly optimistic. I believe that out of all this peace will come. There are some who stand with a stop watch, and ask. "Haven't you signed yet?". Sixty years of conflict, the direct talks have been going on for nine months altogether. Nine months of pregnancy. And indeed a baby has been born. But this is a sixty year conflict. And that's why I call on the people of Israel to be patient. Don't Iose your senses. Don't jump at every shadow. Don't be afraid of every irritation of Sadat's or anyone's caprice. Stand with both feet on the ground, insist on secure peace for Israel. It shall be.
Q. Do you see at present any possibility for another meeting between President Sadat and yourself.
A. I will tell you exactly what I said: If he would invite me to Cairo I'd be prepared to come. Just now I read that Kamel claims that I expressed a wish to come to Cairo. Correction: I did not say that I want to come to Cairo... a very large city with large problems. Sadat told me a lot about Cairo. That time when he said "You are my friend". At that time I was his friend. I had a bird's eye view of Cairo. I said that if I was invited to Cairo as I had invited Sadat to Jerusalem I'd be ready to come. I am still willing to come. But, I recall that Sadat here in Jerusalem told me the following: "Actually, you are now entitled to come to Cairo and speak before the Parliament there. Since I, by your invitation have spoken before your Parliament. But I am not yet able to invite you to Cairo. Give me a little more time." And I comforted him. I said Mr. President, don't worry, whenever you wish to invite me to Cairo I will come. I was invited to Ismailiya. I came. Therefore I'm saying. If Sadat were to invite me to Cairo. I'd accept the invitation. He claimed that he took a great risk in coming to Jerusalem. I'm prepared to take on all the risks entailed in visiting Cairo. I have no doubts. If invited to Cairo I shall come. I will not invite myself, but I am still willing.
Q. Mr. Begin. Back to the subject of negotiations: You said last week in reference to the El-Arish 'Gesture' that there is no gesture without compensation. What is Israel asking in exchange for the resumption of Egyptian civilian administration of El-Arish.
A. I'm sorry. I cannot reveal this to you. And now perhaps Mr. Yaakobi will know that the Prime Minister can keep state secrets... It is no accident that we formulated our letter as we had. We said the following: Politics is not a matter of gestures. It's not 'Gesticulation.' We will not agree to a unilateral gesture. But negotiations on the question of an agreement is always possible. And we in effect gave a positive, not a negative answer. We said. Let us sit at the table. Submit your request for Santa Katarina or Mount Moses. There's a tale that the Ten Commandments were given there... you would like to have administrative Egyptian control over this place. We are prepared to consider this. But we ask for quid pro quo. There are no unilateral gift. But what will we ask in return? This will be decided by the Government in the event that we get a positive answer from Mr. Sadat, that he is ready to discuss our handing over El-Arish in exchange for what we would ask from him. Only then will the Government decide. It's pointless to make a decision so long as we have not received an answer to the reply on the meeting itself.
Here I would like to add that this concerns a general political idea and not only El-Arish specifically: A distinction must be made between peace relations and a peace treaty. We want a peace treaty. And we are saying that a peace treaty means an end to the state of war, diplomatic relations, open borders, tourism, and all the rest. This is a very real concept in international law. There are models for peace treaties. But if it becomes apparent that this will take time it's difficult to attain, then we can establish peace relations. Approximately like in Germany. Germany has no peace treaty. It has not signed a peace treaty since Potsdam. Close to 40 years. No, for 33 years it had not signed a peace treaty. We are prepared to make bi-lateral agreements, reciprocal agreements, permanent reciprocal relations. Note: Not interim agreements for three or five years. And not unilateral agreements about Israeli withdrawal but reciprocal permanent agreements.
Q. Could these be called partial agreement?
A. Yes. You could call them partial agreements, But in the context of interim agreements, this term may be misleading. Therefore I call them "Permanent reciprocal" and not "Temporary unilateral."
Q. Perhaps achieving peace in stages.
A. Yes. You could say that. Even if it takes a very long time, we can arrive at peace relations and after that sign a peace treaty. We would a peace treaty. We'd like the serious negotiations to go on for several months, I repeat, and we'll sign a peace treaty and grant peace to our people in this generation and for generations to come. That is our wish. That is what we aspire to. If this be given by the other side as well we will warmly welcome it.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister. In an attempt to explain what seemed like a change in the Government position, MK Glass (NRP) said this week at the Cabinet meeting that you avoided passing a resolution concerning Israel's readiness to discuss sovereignty over Judea and Samaria because of your concern for the Government's wholeness, and in consequence of your state of health at the time.
A. I am surprised at Mr. Glass but this what I have to say. I had from the very start supported the answer that said "Ready to discuss sovereignty." On the basis of clause 24 of our peace agreement. What was said in para. 24? "Israel has a right and a claim to sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. It is aware of other claims. And for sake of the agreement and peace, it is ready to leave the question of sovereignty open, and discuss the people rather than the area. To give the Israeli Arabs autonomy and the Israel Jews security." I believe I've quoted it accurately. Based on this clause, or clause no. 26 which states that all these arrangements can be discussed again five years later. I was originally prepared to agree. But the issue -was difficult and I was not sure there would be a majority for such a resolution. And on the other hand there were alternate proposals which were unacceptable to me. Now, the problem I was facing was complicated: The situation was that either my proposal would be voted down or a different proposal would be accepted against my will. This is no trivial matter. Because in that case, according to all parliamentary procedure, the Prime Minister has to resign. And I did not want to create a situation in which this Government would fall. Because given such a situation it would have been possible that someone in whom the nation expressed no-confidence would have attempted, by various means, to put together a Government. That would have been unjust, anti-democratic and against the will of the people, and I wanted to prevent it from happening. And that is why the resolution has passed as it was. The resolution was actually proposed by me. Let is be known that it was 1 who proposed the formulation "The nature of future relations" and it was passed by a big majority. This was the compromise. The majority was guaranteed and the Government did not fall. One must sometimes take these things into account. In an external sense, the formulation is one hundred percent right. Although the term is general, it includes sovereignty as well. What is "The nature of future relations?"
Q. It is an all inclusive term then.
A. It is all inclusive. The Americans were not satisfied. With all due respect. The State of Israel was not created in order to please the Americans at all times. They were displeased, now they are more satisfied, but they won't say so.