A note of optimism regarding the future of the negotiations was sounded by the Foreign Minister on the eve of the visit of Secretary of State Vance. It was clear that only President Carter could break the deadlock and save the negotiations from complete collapse. In this interview Mr. Dayan also discussed the U.S. role in the past two years. Text:
Q. Mr. Dayan. Do you think the peace initiative begun in November 1977 is reaching its end?
A. I don't think the peace negotiations are coming to an end. I also don't think the negotiations for peace began with Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. In effect, the process started after the Yom Kippur war after the Arabs accepted the decision - there is no wonder in our having accepted it - that peace is to be established on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338, on the Geneva conference in order to reach peace. And then the various agreements were reached - the separation of forces, and others. It's possible that Sadat's present position which negates a meeting of the three sides - this position will lead to the Americans seeking another way. But I don't think the peace process has ended or even been temporarily stopped.
Q. Mr. Dayan. Before you left for the Leeds conference and also after returning from there, you said that in your opinion there were common points between the positions of Israel and Egypt and with all the declarations from President Sadat heard lately, the impression is given that these positions are drawing farther apart. Isn't the gap so wide that in truth it will be impossible to bridge it?
A. After returning from Leeds and I think also before I left for there, but in the main when I returned and reported to the Knesset, I cited the common points, but said there were points of contention that decisively outweighed the points of agreement, and there are the preconditions that President Sadat demands that Israel commit itself to in advance in the matter of sovereignty and the matter of territories. Meaning, withdrawal from all the territories except minor border modifications, and his opposition to any Israeli presence settlements and certainly the army in the territories evacuated. I said there were points in the dispute which outweigh the common points...
Q. But will it be possible to bridge these points?
A. No. This is what I wanted to say. That on the issue of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza strip, in my opinion, if Sadat really insists the people of Israel, the Government of Israel should in no shape or form withdraw to the previous boundaries abandon its right to settlement, in this form or another, but the presence of Israeli settlements in the territories up to the Jordan river, and the presence of Israeli military forces it is forbidden to yield on this. If Sadat's condition is that these things should disappear within a given time framework in this form or another, in short, it's forbidden that such a thing happen. In my opinion, Israel should in no way accept this and then we will not reach an agreement with him.
Q. In order to preserve the peace momentum surrounding the Leeds conference, President Sadat asked Ezer Weizman to make an Israeli gesture of returning El-Arish to Egyptian civil administration. Israel refused. There are those who argue that this refusal and the way it was made, in effect, caused a hardening of Sadat's position. What is your opinion?
A. First of all. This was not during Leeds but before it - the meetings with the Defence Minister, and second of all, Israel didn't refuse. Israel said that if President Sadat wants to receive sovereignty over - and it makes no difference if the rule will be civilian and not military - EI-Arish and Santa Katarina, Israel is willing to enter into negotiations on it. That they would be regionalized negotiations just on these places, and to search for a way of doing this. But in the framework of negotiations and not in the framework of what was called then, a "Gesture". Not only didn't Israel refuse, Israel didn't negate the basis of this proposal, that if for a particular reason Sadat feels more comfortable carrying on negotiations of this sort, not overall negotiations, but he, Sadat, proposes a regional agreement, settlement, and also in respect to El-Arish and Santa Katarina, we'll sit and discuss it. But not in the form of a unilateral gesture, but in the framework of a settlement, and we didn't detail the offer.
Q. On the Israel-Egyptian bilateral issue. Was there a stage at which Sadat agreed to a separate settlement, or separate agreement with Israel?
A. In any case, he didn't agree to it. I don't have to guess here. There was no stage at which Sadat agreed to it. We were ready for it. We prefer an overall settlement, but we are ready and this was our first line of thought. To bring about, to reach an agreement with Sadat. A peace agreement. A peace treaty on Sinai, and it would suffice him. This as our first thought, our first inclination. A general declaration of principles on the Palestinian issue - Judea, Samaria, Gaza, the refugees, and all the other subjects. And at a certain point in Ismailiya Sadat, himself, said it would suffice him a general statement that there would be a 'just solution to the Palestinian question'. Period. After that, his advisors suggested to him and dissuaded him from setting for this, and so on, after that, from that moment onward, more and more, Sadat attached the preponderance of the weight on the Palestinian issue, and no longer wished to speak on the subject of Sinai bilaterally between Israel and Egypt.
Q. Only his advisors or are there inter-Arab factors here? What happened in effect, in Ismailiya, or more correctly, after Ismailiya?
A. I don't know, and I'm not of Sadat's inner circle to such an extent. But in the first stage of what was called the Cairo conference he prepared chairs - and really thought it would happen for additional representatives. He prepared for P.L.O. representatives, for Soviet representatives - but he at least hoped, at least it seemed that way, that Jordanian representatives, maybe others too, Saudi Arabia, would come and participate. And it became clear after a while that this was not going to happen. I assume there was Arab pressure to deal with the overall Arab interest. In other words, on principles which applied to the Golan heights, and to specify solutions for the Palestinian issue - and I emphasize that the Palestinian question is not only the territorial problem of the Gaza strip and Judea and Samaria. It's the question of refugees and the return of the refugees and all it entails. I think it became clear to Sadat that if he didn't give priority to this issue then he would create such a deep rift with the Arabs, such a deep rift with the Arab world that he could really not agree to a separate agreement with Israel.
Q. Mr. Foreign Minister. The American Secretary of State is arriving in Israel tomorrow. Will a breakdown, if a breakdown ensues, in your opinion, lead the Americans to advance their own plan?
A. First of all. I'd like to repeat again that I don't think that in the basic Process of the peace negotiations a breakdown is imminent. This is not an extraneous situation for the Arabs, which brought the Arabs both to carry out Resolution 338 and open the Suez canal and Sadat to come to Jerusalem - these motives have remained in effect and the thing will not die. The Arabs will be compelled and try just as we must try and want to find ways to settle the problem.
Q. Maybe with the help of the Americans the thing won't die.
A. I don't know about an American plan, but I want to say it's the right of the Americans - besides one thing which I really didn't like and this is placing Israel in the accused's dock in a persistent manner over many months and the portraying of Israel as hard-lined and the addressing of all kinds of hypothetical questions to Israel: 'What would you say if such and such'. Kinds of questionnaires. But in reality, to the present, the truth of the matter is that they didn't take any one side between the two. They didn't urge us to accept any plan which was contrary to our will. They have a plan - and in the days of Rabin, on the day Carter assumed the Presidency, much before what is called 'The Sadat initiative' - a plan which is based on withdrawal to the previous borders with minor adjustments, and the giving of expression to a 'Palestinian homeland' the well-known plan which does not answer, does not correspond to our plan. They didn't try imposing it on us, or to pressure us to say 'Amen' to it and accept it. So I have no argument with the Americans about the way they are carrying out their mediation - except for the point I mentioned on how they portray us. And in my opinion, unjustly accuse us and place us in the accused's dock. I assume that this will continue with the coming of Secretary of State Vance - that he will not come with an American plan and try to impose it on us.
Maybe he will make suggestions and we will accept them, or not. He never tried concealing the differences of opinion and urged us from time to time to change our position and accept the American position. This or the other, maybe he'll do it this time, too, but not in the manner of imposing it.
Q. But if it becomes clear that direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt do not work, is there a possibility of a return to Geneva and the participation of the Soviets in the negotiations? Maybe a request to have the PLO participate in the negotiations?
A. This will be such a radical change and so far-reaching that I don't expect it now. What might happen if the Egyptians absolutely refuse to meet with us is that the indirect negotiations will be renewed...
Q. By way of the Americans...
A. By way of the Americans. But in order to bring Syria - we will not sit with the P.L.O. in any event - and the Soviets to the deliberation table - this requires such a change in the policies of America, Israel and today also the Arabs, that it seems to me very far from reality.
Q. Mr. Foreign Minister. In conclusion, about ten months have passed since the visit of President Sadat in Jerusalem. Where does the situation stand today? Has the situation reverted to what it was previously, meaning, as it was before November 1977? Has a change come about? What is the nature of the change?
A. in my opinion, we are much closer today to peace if only because the points of the conflict were clarified. In this I have differences with my friends from the opposition. It seems they're of the opinion that it's better for us to avoid knowing the truth, to see the truth. To avoid putting the finger on the points of the dispute and on the points to which we are agreed. I don't think so. Now we know much more, in a detailed and clear manner, what the points of the dispute are. I'll tell you from my own vantage point: After the first contacts with Egypt, I had the impression, and I explained the basis for it, that the Egyptians would accept our proposal for peace after Sadat's arrival - the contacts we had after his arrival - our peace proposal for Sinai. Now I doubt it. I doubt the Egyptians are ready for it, because over the time it became clear, maybe became clear to them too, not only to us, that things he thought he could pass through the Arab world are subject to greater difficulties today. But also the opposite, there were many openings made that I previously didn't expect the Arabs to accept to. I'll just give one example: I believe and also know to an extent that the Egyptians, and not only the Egyptians - and they state this clearly in their proposal - but also the Arab residents of the territories, the Palestinian Arabs, their leaders, do not have a negative attitude to the fundamental principles of the autonomy plan - abolishing the military administration, and the establishment of a Palestinian leadership which will administer their affairs - and I think that in their heart of hearts they would want to see this realized and in this matter and in seeing a period of five years during which no final form will be determined, including sovereignty. In this matter there is an opening to an agreement.