20 Press conference with Prime Minister Begin- 20 July 1977

Ladies and gentlemen of the press.

I feel I must start with a personal statement. The elections in Israel were a surprise. I apologize to you for the surprise. And secondly, my name does not rhyme with Fagin.

And now into the merits of the main problem. The discussion with the President went very well indeed. The President was very gracious to me. We held discussions for nearly five hours. Three official meetings and one long nocturnal talk in complete privacy. I think I can say that we established a personal rapport which will, I hope, work not only in the next few months but for years to come.

Ladies and Gentlemen: No confrontation between the United States and Israel. Some people were apprehensive lest such confrontation arise out of the talks. I can assure and reassure all the friends of Israel and of America: There isn't any confrontation between our two countries. To the contrary, during the last few days friendship between the United States and Israel has been deepened. And that personal rapport between the President and myself will be helpful in the future.

I am very impressed by the personality of the President of the United States, by his warm heart and by his extraordinary intelligence, by his quick grasp of the crux of the problem, and by his capability to take decisions. I said during the ceremony at the White House lawn that we see the President of the United States not only as the first citizen of this great country, but also as the leader and the defender of the free world. After our conversations, I was fortified in this belief.

We shall continue to work together for the common interests of the United States and Israel and the free world.

On behalf of the Government of Israel, I brought to the President a proposal about the framework for the peace-making process. For nearly two weeks, I had to reply to all the questions about the contents of that decision taken unanimously by the cabinet in Israel: Please, out of respect for the President, he should be the first man to hear from me. Believe me, those ten days were days of very heavy pressure, but somehow I withstood it. And indeed, the President was the first man, after the Government of Israel, to hear their decision to hear about our proposals.

The proposals themselves shouldn't be any secret to public opinion, and I will now explain the contents of what we call: "The framework for the peace-making process".

The Government of Israel will be prepared, beginning October 10th, 1977, to participate in a new additional session of the Geneva Peace Conference. It should be reconvened by the two co-Chairmen on the basis of Paragraph Three of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, which stipulates "The Security Council decides that immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at the establishing of a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

The Government of Israel acknowledges that Resolution 338 includes and makes reference to Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22nd, 1967. Participation in the reconvened session of the Geneva Peace Conference: Accredited delegations of sovereign states will participate in the reconvened session of the Geneva Peace Conference, namely, representatives of Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan. And may I add that if the suggestion is made that Lebanon participates, we will agree.

The participating states in the Geneva Peace Conference will present no prior conditions for taking part in the conference. I have to dwell and elaborate on the term "no prior conditions", because sometimes it was not only interpreted, but also misinterpreted. To clarify the issue, I will give two examples on both sides.

As you know, ladies and gentlemen, the President of Egypt demands that Israel should withdraw totally to the lines of 4th of June 1967, the lines preceding the Six-Day War; that a so-called Palestinian state be formed in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and they be linked through an extraterritorial corridor. And this demand, if it should come at any time into realization - I believe it won't - would create the following situation: We would be nine miles from the seashore, ten miles from the seashore, and maximum, twenty miles from the seashore. Around Netanya, almost in the middle of the country, we would be only nine miles from the seashore. And there, by an onslaught of a tank column, the country can be cut into two in ten or fifteen minutes. Soviet artillery now has a range of forty-three kilometers eight hundred meters, so, in other words, from every point of what was in the past termed green line, the conventional artillery possessed by our neighbours can reach every city and town and township, in fact, every house, in fact, every man, woman and child. It would mean the beginning of the end of our statehood. Independence and liberty.

However, the Geneva Conference should mean an open negotiation. Therefore, I state here that President Sadat or his emissary will be entitled to bring his proposal to the conference table at Geneva. However, should President Sadat say in advance: "You, the Israelis, have to accept my demand so that I should come to the conference table. You, the Israelis, should accept my proposal in advance of the Geneva Conference" - that is a precondition, and that will not be accepted, that will not be accepted by Israel.

No preconditions by either side.

For the sake of objectivity, I will give an example on our side: We have a national consensus, in other words, all parties - except one, the communist party, which is completely subservient to Moscow, agree that Jerusalem should stay undivided and should be the capital city of the State of Israel. Such is and will be our proposal but should we ask that the Arabs accept in advance that proposal by Israel so that the Israelis come to the peace conference at Geneva, that would mean an Israeli precondition. And as it is a precondition or a prior condition, we don't put it out at all.

They are entitled to bring their proposals. We shall be entitled to bring our proposals. And the negotiation will be a free negotiation between the parties concerned, as it is the law and the practice in the relations amongst nations. No prior conditions.

To the same effect, I will add: No prior commitments by either side. Prior commitments will not be asked by either side. Prior commitments will not be given by either side. This is the basis for a free negotiation.

At the public session of the reconvened Geneva Peace Conference, the representatives of the parties will make public statements. When the session, the public session, comes to a conclusion, we suggest that the instrument for negotiations of peace treaties between Israel and the neighbouring countries be established. And we call that instrument three - or four, if Lebanon is added - mixed commissions. One an Egyptian-Israeli commission, a Syrian-Israeli commission, and a Jordanian-Israeli commission, and there may be a Lebanese-Israeli commission.

The chairmanship of these commissions will rotate between the Israeli emissary and the emissary of the neighbouring country. In the framework of these three or four mixed commissions, peace treaties between the parties concerned will be negotiated and concluded.

I have to dwell and elaborate on the term "peace treaties." I was glad to hear some two weeks ago the spokesman of the State Department who states that there should be peace treaties between Israel and the neighbouring countries. Our concept is that this is, as every authority on international law will prove, the usual, the accepted way to bring about the termination of a state of war and of war itself, through a peace treaty.

There are a few exceptions, admittedly. For instance, Germany after the Second World War did not yet sign a peace treaty, for reasons which in themselves are exceptional. There are two Germanys, with Russia in Eastern Prussia, the Allied armies on German soil, etc. But this is an exception which proves the rule, because both after the First World War and after the Second World War, peace treaties were signed between the parties concerned.

The United States of America and her Allies also signed peace treaties with Japan after the Second World War. The Soviet Union signed a peace declaration with Japan in October 1955 in Moscow, which is declared by the signatories not to be a peace treaty. And the Soviet Union promises in that document that when a peace treaty is signed between the two countries, they will return the Kurile Islands, Shikotan and Habomai to Japanese sovereignty, but the first article, even of that document, is that the state of war between the two countries has come to an end.

Now when we say a peace treaty, we actually include all the elements of the essence of peace, which are lately being discussed. The first article of any peace treaty is to the effect: "the state of war has been terminated." Then come the territorial clauses. A chapter of a peace treaty in which you determine - also with the help of a map attached to the peace treaty - the boundary, the permanent boundary, between the countries involved. Then comes the chapter about diplomatic clauses, and there you give a solution for diplomatic exchanges. Then comes the chapter about economic clauses, and other chapters, sometimes about tourism, sometimes about fisheries, about specific problems concerning, as they put it usually, "the high contracting parties."

So when we say a peace treaty, we mean mainly the termination of the state of war. The determination of permanent boundaries, diplomatic relations, the economic clauses, etc. And when the three or the four mixed commissions will work out the conditions and the details of those peace treaties and they will conclude them, then another session of the Geneva Peace Conference will be reconvened, and the peace treaties so concluded will be signed by the parties concerned. And then, with the famous stipulation about ratification at a proper time, they will come into force, and there will a commitment by all the parties concerned.

Such is the framework proposed by us for the peacemaking process. I believe it can be used. I believe it can bring us nearer to real peace in the Middle East.

And now, ladies and gentlemen, my final remark in the opening statement. Even before you put this question, I will realistically assume that the problem of participation will arise. Namely, that the Arab countries may ask or insist on the participation, in addition to the state delegations, of the organization called P.L.O. We cannot accept participation of that organization. They declared in their Covenant or Charter, in Article XIX of their Charter, that the State of Israel is null and void fundamentally. They also declare that only those Jews (preceding the) "Zionist invasion", as they put it - in other words, until the proclamation of the Balfour Declaration - will be regarded Palestinians, and all the others, as the assumption goes, will have to leave the country. And other articles whose contents are quite known.

So we do know what is their design. What they strive for. To put it bluntly and simply: Their design is to destroy our country and to destroy our people. Therefore, they cannot be a partner to any negotiations with Israel.

If, therefore, the Arab countries will make it impossible to reconvene a full-fledged additional new session of the Geneva Conference, through insisting on the participation of the organization called P.L.O., then we must look for alternatives. And we suggest two alternatives:

One, that the good offices of the United States be used to bring about the establishment of the three or four mixed commissions through diplomatic contacts with the respective capitals. That's one possibility, and it is based on the method used in 1949 during the negotiations for the armistice in Rhodes Island. It is a well-tried method which brought about very good results. The Armistice Agreements - the three Armistice Agreements, with Syria, with Jordan, and with Egypt - are documents of great national importance. In one of their articles it is stipulated there that those Armistice Agreements are an indispensable step towards the establishment of a full peace in Palestine. Twenty-nine years, twenty-eight years elapsed then. So we are late. And during the intervening years there were four wars. It is very regrettable.

Yet, let us start now, at least now, with the delay of almost a generation, and let us carry out the mutual pledge given by the parties concerned that we shall establish a real peace. So, we suggest as one of the alternative possibilities to have such mixed commissions established through diplomatic contacts in the respective capitals. And they may sit either in their respective capitals or on any neutral soil, as the decision will be taken by the parties concerned.

The second alternative possibility is what is termed proximity talks. In 1972 the United States Government suggested that proximity talks be held in New York. In other words, an Israeli delegation and an Arab delegation, and the United States delegation giving their good offices to bring the parties together. We will be willing to adopt such a method as well.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Government of Israel adopted this decision to bring to the knowledge of the President, and of public opinion at large: our proposal for the framework of the peace-making process. Now it depends on the other side whether it will be put into realization.

We want peace. We yearn and pray for peace. We want real peace based on security, without which peace becomes devoid of real meaning.

We should start negotiating seriously peace treaties, and here we give the instruments which are necessary for such negotiations to be conducted and concluded successfully. We hope it will mean progress towards real peace in the Middle East.

Q. Ladies and Gentlemen, with your permission, I would like to present my question in Hebrew on behalf of Israel television.

Prime Minister Begin: Speak Hebrew with an English accent.

A. I was asked the following question in Hebrew, without any accent: After we brought the proposals before the President, what was his reaction? Of the President? Out of respect for the President and his closest advisers, I must answer that such a question should be put to the President and his advisers. I cannot speak for them. I can only say that our conversations were very cordial and there was understanding for the proposals we made as a possibility to have the momentum for the peace-making process.

Q. The last Israeli Government - and I hope I'm not misquoting - said that they would not check the credentials of any Palestinians. Of course, who might turn up in a Jordanian and/or an Arab Delegation. Do you take the same position? Indeed, obviously you want to bar Yasser Arafat, but can Palestinians be part of a delegation, even P.L.O. officers? And if so, have you told the President that?

A. According to your information, may I ask you a question? A Jew usually answers by asking another question. May I ask you a question? - Did the former government accept Arafat as a Palestinian within the Jordan delegation? I never heard about it... Therefore, I would like, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, to say that as the previous did, so we will do: Namely, if Palestinian Arabs participate in the Jordanian delegation, no objection. And we are not going to search for anybody's credentials. But the organization called P.L.O. cannot participate in that delegation. Palestinian Arabs can.

Q. Israel television last night broadcast a story attributed to a briefing given by Mr. Dayan which outlined more or less what you have just told us. Today we have reaction to that from Egypt calling it unacceptable. Based on that reaction, do you feel that there is really a realistic chance for reconvening the Geneva Conference?

A. First of all, I would like to ask whether you don't know that I've always troubles with Israeli television, and don't rely on any so-called disclosures. I'm not so sure whether the information given - I didn't listen to it - was accurate. If it was given from the session of The Foreign Affairs Committee. The so-called leak - with the experience we all have, a leak may be dangerous. It is never accurate. Now, there are reactions you quoted. Perhaps it is the first reaction. We shall be patient and we shall ask for reconsideration. We do believe that this is a good basis for starting the peace negotiations.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, the American Government is on record in the United Nations as interpreting 242 to require Israeli withdrawal - some Israeli withdrawal: not total Israeli withdrawal - on all three fronts, including the West Bank. In your statement, in your plan, is any withdrawal at all contemplated on the West Bank?

A. I will gladly answer that question, but you will have, I believe, indulgence when I say that this problem of the territorial issue, which is part - an integral part - of the peace treaty, will be brought in Geneva to the Conference table. I suggested, before I left my country for the visit to the United States to all the Arab rulers that we should have until the Geneva Conference is reconvened a so-called political truce. We have a military ceasefire. We shall have also a political truce. Let everybody withhold statements concerning these or other details, including the territorial issue. This issue will be brought to the Geneva Peace Conference table. This is our approach. And therefore, until the Geneva Conference reconvenes, I will not go into any details concerning the territorial issue.

Q. If I may follow that up - the reason I asked is you have been quoted, either correctly or erroneously, as having said that the Israeli government would not give up a single inch of the West Bank, and I understand you now not to be specifically excluding some compromises, territorial compromises, on the West Bank. Can you clarify at least your earlier statements?

A. No, I cannot. I cannot becloud the issue through further statements. All the quotations arc. legitimate. But I must tell you that I'm ready to, in the limits of my financial capability, to pay any sum if you prove that in any of my speeches or my articles I ever used the words "not an inch." And as far as the real issue is concerned, I stand by my previous answer.

Q. Do you think that there can be real peace, in your terms, as long as Israel continues to occupy the West Bank and other portions of Arab Land?

A. Mr. Valeriani, isn't it a leading question?

Valeriani: I hope so.

Prime Minister Begin: You hope so? So, I hope to be able to answer you as I did to your colleague. All the questions on this issue I will answer in the very (same) way: everything concerning the territorial issue will be brought - I believe by both sides - to the conference table at Geneva.

Q. Did President Carter ask you or press you for what your positions might be if and when a Geneva Conference convenes. And if so, what were your answers?

A. No pressure was exerted by the President of the United States. It was a free discussion.

Q. Did he ask you what your positions might be at the Geneva Conference?

A. We had a discussion. There were questions. There were answers. Sometimes the President asked a question. Sometimes I asked a question. The questions were good and the replies were even better.

Q. On the question of participation, once again, at a Geneva Conference, could any known member of the Palestine Liberation Organization participate as a member of the Jordanian delegation at such a conference? Your answer was not clear enough the first time around.

P.M. Begin: It was not clear?

Kalb: No.

P.M. Begin: Now it will be clear.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, the President this morning after your meeting, said he thought the groundwork was now cleared away for the convening of the Geneva Conference in October. Most of us, who are, of course, ignorant of the contents of your discussions, have been assuming that the question of the Palestinians in or out of Geneva was a major problem that had to be resolved before there could be a Geneva Conference. Did you learn something from the President that we don't know about the Arab position on Palestinians being at Geneva?

A. The President as I told you, I was very much impressed by his personality and I listened to him very attentively, as I said, for nearly five hours, and we had a free discussion, as befits free men, friends, and, as I believe, also allies.

Gwertzman: You didn't answer the question.

A. Well, I was interrupted by a colleague, so what can I do? Your colleague is waiting for the end of my remarks. So I repeat. It was a free discussion. The President touched on many problems. If he said that now the groundwork was laid for the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference, I am very glad. I didn't hear that statement. You quoted it. I am very glad about it.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, I'd like to follow that up by asking if you have any indication from any source that the Arab states will accept the position that no person who is known as a P.L.O. official can be permitted to go to the Geneva Conference, and yet such a conference can be...

A. I don't speak for the Arab countries, sir. I can only say this: we stand by the statement made by the previous government and by me, namely that Palestinian Arabs can participate in the Jordanian delegation. We will not look for their credentials. But if the question was: "A known member of the P.L.O. should participate," then it means that the P.L.O. participates, and therefore I answered in the negative, for the same reason the previous government did so. We cannot negotiate with the organization called P.L.O.

Q. We have been told by American officials that there are three major areas that are necessary to a Middle East settlement, and they've stated it in different ways. But they've said one involves the nature of peace and another involves territories and another involves a Palestinian entity. We were told at the White House yesterday that President Carter repeated these principles in his discussions with you as part of the conversations that you had. Will you accept the American position that these three matters are necessary to a Middle East settlement?

A. My dear friend, you want to cause a slip of my tongue. Please forgive me: I am myself a journalist. I understand your curiosity. You would like more and more to know about this and that problem before the Geneva Conference convenes. But, my friend, besides being a journalist, I am also the Prime Minister of Israel. I have a responsibility. I conducted very serious and sincere talks with the President and his advisers. And everyone now - let me say: the United States Government, Israel. I hope other governments as well - wants to go to Geneva. We stand on the principle that there are no prior conditions on any issue. That no prior commitments can be asked or given on any issue. Let me stand on that principle. And in Geneva, it can be convened - the proposal is for the Geneva Conference to be convened quite soon, in a few months' time. I don't think it is an exaggeration in this delicate situation to ask friendly journalists to be indulgent and to have some patience. Look at me. I had patience. Some patience. Have patience for a few months, and then all the proposals will be brought to Geneva.

Q. In your June 21st speech to the Knesset; you specified as the basic outline of your Government's policy: "Equal rights for all citizens and inhabitants, regardless of religion." And my question, sir, is... does this mean, at long last, that in Israel Reform rabbis will be given equal rights with Orthodox rabbis? and has Minister Josef Burg - I believe I'm pronouncing his name right - agreed with this?

A. Well, I cannot say that this issue will be debated at the Geneva Conference.

Q. The rabbis are concerned, sir, that you've made a lot of concessions to the National Religious Party.

A. I'm going to have in New York a meeting with Reform and Conservative rabbis, and I'm going to speak to them directly and to explain to them that issue, next week.

Q. I understand that this morning you had a chance to discuss bilateral issues with the President, and yesterday you discussed these issues with Secretary of Defence Harold Brown. On the important questions, such as co-production rights for the F-16 and funding for Israel's Chariot tank, the Merkava, did you get responses that were positive, or are you still concerned about the current state of the Administration reply to Israel's needs for continued military support?

A. First of all, I would like to explain that everything discussed with the President was of bilateral interest - the Geneva Conference is a bilateral interest to America, to Israel, to other countries as well. So we discussed many bilateral problems. As far as your specific question is concerned, I can assume that during the day, an announcement will be made by the United States Government - during the week, yes, during the week, an announcement will be made by the United States Government... on a number of items it will be a positive announcement.

Q. Carter's policy is based on attempting to get control of Saudi petrodollars by using Israel as a weapon of blackmail. Now, I'm not asking you to comment on that, obviously. My question is the following: there are a lot of moves being undertaken now within Europe, by King Hassan of Morocco, etc. to set up a situation in which a Geneva Conference could take place heading toward an overall settlement essentially over the head of what Carter is trying to do, the control that he's trying to maintain. This settlement would be based on content first, rather than just form: on a debt moratorium for Israel and Egypt in particular, and then for a reasonable development policy. I would like to ask your frank comment on what the possibilities are for moving in that direction...

A. Ma'am, there is no basis whatsoever for your assumptions. President Carter doesn't use Israel for any purpose whatsoever. President Carter is a great friend of humanity, and therefore a great friend of Israel. And there is no assumption of Israel being used by President Carter for any purpose.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, a follow-up question on that, on the role of the United States, now: do you see the United States and do you see Secretary of State Vance, in particular as performing a useful role in presenting its own suggestions and its own ideas of an outline of a Middle East settlement when Mr. Vance goes to the Middle East in early August?

A. Mr. Vance will go to the Middle East: he will visit Israel on the 7th or the 8th of August. And, of course, every government is entitled to make proposals. What we asked for - and I think it's a very reasonable proposal - that until the Geneva Conference reconvenes, that there shouldn't be any pronouncements concerning the essence of the Geneva Conference negotiations. Every government is entitled to make any proposals.

Q. Both you and President Carter are known to be deeply religious men, well acquainted with Biblical quotations. I would like to know to what extent those feelings and your knowledge of the Bible entered into your discussions, and were there any specific references to Biblical...

A. President Carter several times, beginning with the reception on the White House lawn, stressed the fact that he's a man of faith, and so am I. And he repeated that statement yesterday at the White House during the dinner. I think it's a very positive statement. I subscribe to it. I'm not ashamed at all to state that I believe in divine providence, and President Carter does believe in divine providence, and I think this is an element which brought us personally nearer.

Q. Since this is the last question, I wonder if I could ask you a two-part question. The first part, sir, is whether your plan for a Geneva Conference foresees advance negotiations, perhaps through the good offices of the United States, between the Israelis and the Arabs. The second question, sir, is: would you comment on the reports that we've just heard in Washington that the present leadership in the Arab world can be characterized as moderate, that there seems to be more of an inclination to accept the right of Israel to exist as one of their neighbours in the Middle East? Do you see the Arab leadership now as moderate, as ready to proceed in that direction?...

A. Now. We are for negotiations about the Geneva Conference, not about its merits. As I said, our approach is that the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty should be completely free from the point of view of the parties concerned. If I may quote a famous document in America, of "an externally devised formula for a settlement," are you aware of that document, Mr. Kalb?

Kalb: I'm waiting to hear the details from you.

P.M. Begin: You will get them from me. This sentence is written in the platform of the Democratic Party, which, as I suppose, won the election in the United States. Now, as far as the second part of your question is concerned: I'll tell you frankly, I would comment on your question and I would say what characterizes now the policy the Arab countries pursue, but as I want to create good will on all sides towards the Geneva Conference, I will not answer this part of the question. I will not comment whether they are moderate or not so. I have my conviction on it, but I suppose it is rather better, methodologically, to stand by the political truce.

Let us have respect for each other. Let us not blame any party. Let us have now that atmosphere of, I repeat, mutual respect which will bring us all to Geneva.