But even before the treaty was signed, there remained still some loose points which were not yet finalized. Among them a formal Egyptian commitment to exchange ambassadors ten months after the ratification of the treaty (26 February 1980), formal U.S. commitments to supply Israel with oil for 15 years, and above all a memorandum of understanding from the U.S. to Israel spelling out the degree of American guarantees to the peace treaty and long term commitment to Israel's security needs. Egypt hoped that Israel would withdraw from El-Arish and the oilfields earlier than stipulated in the treaty. In the following interview, the Defence Minister speculated about the future of Israel-Egypt relations and other related issues:
About three days before the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt, the Defence Minister looks like a man who is happy with his lot. "I don't know whom to thank, perhaps just good luck, for giving me the opportunity of taking part in historic events such as those of the past sixteen months."
Ezer Weizman, following his trip to the U.S. and the exhausting Knesset debate which lasted till dawn, was well recovered yesterday. Before the interview, he called together senior army officers to brief them on possible developments in view of the signing of the treaty, and this morning he is due to depart again for the U.S., in order to participate in the signing ceremony of the treaty whose cradle he stood beside.
Q. How, in your opinion, will Egyptian-Israeli relations develop from now on, and how should Israeli citizens behave starting early next week?
A. Perhaps I shouldn't say what I'm about to say. I believe that one year ago there was greater readiness in Egypt for mutual relations - political, social and personal. That enthusiasm has waned, the flame is lower. I think it will be more difficult now, for reasons I won't go into now. We will have to set Emits to ourselves. I hope that if we act the right way the fire will be rekindled. A year ago Sadat still said to me, "Look, I will open Egyptian skies to 'EI AI"'. This is not the situation today. I don't believe this will happen now. We'll have to proceed more slowly, we must not go and show the Egyptians we are geniuses, not go and instruct them in agriculture, science, industry, unless we are asked to do so. We must approach this matter carefully. We've had experiences in other places. It is an Israeli's nature to be self-assured because we've done such wonderful things in Israel, and to want to show them how to do it - from the air the whole country looks like it's covered in plastic, seamless. We've succeeded at agriculture but this doesn't mean it's up to us to teach them. We have to take care.
Q. How is Israel to restore the trust between it and Egypt?
A. Perhaps the way to do this is through selected meetings among individuals. First and foremost there would be those persons charged with carrying out necessary contacts officers of the IDP Southern Command and Egyptian officers, IDF Air Force officers and Egyptian Air Force officers. These persons will coordinate flights and various other matters in order to prevent incidents. There is no need to rush. According to the treaty, on Tuesday morning ships bearing the Israeli flag may pass through the Suez Canal. But we will not rush things. We won't show up and say "here we are" - we'll arrange things slowly and nicely. We'll arrange with Port Said, Suez, Cairo, whether it will be a merchant vessel or a missile-boat. Afterwards, of course, we'll arrange visits of doctors, lawyers, students, even army men. I think that with good faith it's possible to restore the expectations we had in '78.
Q. Will you recommend that Israel visits to Egypt be restricted?
A. I think that, like anywhere else, you'll have to get a visa to travel to Egypt. It could be that the Egyptians themselves will restrict the entrance of Israelis to Egypt. I think that Israel will also restrict travel to Egypt. This doesn't mean that tourism to Egypt won't be organized, and woe unto us if we kill the movement of tourism from Israel to Egypt. We are also able to kill tourism from Egypt to Israel. We have to tread carefully here. This considered, I would very much like to see the borders opened up. One thing which happened to me, which I'm very glad happened and which I enjoyed very much, was Egypt's being opened up before my eyes. I saw an Egypt I had not known. I believe that if people see Egypt through different spectacles than up till now, the process of normalization will be shortened. What is Egypt? Egypt is people!
Q. What relations do the Egyptians want? Close relations or the absolute minimum?
A. I suppose that at first they will want minimal relations. Israel should understand that today Sadat is alone in the Arab world as never before. I wouldn't say he's totally isolated, that's not correct, Morocco is with him, Sudan is with him. I judge and hope that Saudi Arabia will not abandon him. All in all, the Egyptian people support him. Sadat is one of the few world leaders who travel in the streets of Cairo in an open convenable. That's not easy! The Shah of Iran never travelled around by car in the streets of Teheran. He was cut off from the people. There are those who say that the situation in Egypt today is like that which existed in Iran. The truth is that Sadat is not cut off from the people, so far as it is possible for a leader not to be cut off from them. No one can say what the impact of the signing will be. But Sadat knows that from now on he will be under closer watch by the Syrians and the Iraqis, for instance, and it will be very important to him how he represents himself. The Arab world will be keeping track of him and therefore I believe that the relations between Israel and Egypt in the near future will be minimal. I hope that the relations between the two countries will improve with time.
Q. Will the Syrians and the Iraqis try something?
A. I hear that they are going to embargo Egypt. Sadat will not be in an ordinary position. Nonetheless he is the Arab leader who has come forward to make peace - I don't like to say a separate peace - the first treaty between Israel and an Arab state.
Q. On what do you base your assessment that the Egyptian people and leadership truly want peace?
A. I base this assessment on the contacts I've had with them. I've met with them in Egypt, in Salzburg, at Camp David, at the Madison Hotel in Washington. I like to say that I've had many "Sadat hours" and "Egyptian hours". It's impossible to sit down once, twice, three times with Egyptians like Sadat and Gamasy, to have a good time with them until the small hours of the night, to five with them 12 days at Camp David, to be secluded with Gamasy 48 hours, and to feel that this is all one big game, to feel that they are deceiving you all the time. What an ultra-super deception that would have to be! I also saw the difference among the individuals in the Egyptian leadership. Some are warmer towards Israel, some less so. Some are more sympathetic as persons, some less, some are more open, some less, some more nationalistic, some less - as in every society. There are those who identify more with the Palestinian problem, while some identify more with Egypt's internal problems. But the Egyptian leadership, in contrast to that of the other Arab countries, is also very close to the Egyptian people. It's not a democracy like in Israel, but the leadership is sensitive to what the people say. Even though it was more than a year ago, and the fire had gone down somewhat, I remember how Danny Weinrich (Defense Minister Spokesman) and I went into the shops, went about the streets of Cairo. The people cannot deceive you! This was especially so, since they often didn't know in advance where we would go and what we would do. I told them, "Stop - I want to get off here!" The people were greatly excited. So if the people of Egypt want peace so much, I think that their leaders want it too. What bothers me now is whether that spirit of '78 is the same as the spirit of '79. 1 have no doubt that the good flame can be rekindled.
Q. Does any one discussion during the negotiations stand out in your memory?
A. No, for I had so many interesting discussions and I don't even remember the details well. I don't know if I will ever be able to describe the special wonderful, tense feeling of the first flight to Egypt; we passed over Bilabays, Inshass, Western Cairo and Gamasy was waiting for us below. In my opinion he is special among the Egyptian leaders. All in all, I'm very sorry that he was pushed aside. I get there, and what happens? I sit with him, the enemy, one of the brains who planned the Yorn Kippur War, a nationalist, a proud Egyptian, a professional officer, a Moslem, for the first time in 30 years - and what did we talk about? The army, Egypt, King Farouk, the Egyptian revolution, the Palestinian problem, America, Russia, we talked about everything. We sat up two nights. Everyone went to sleep. It was an extraordinary experience to sit with a man who to me had been as though from another planet, a man who had been an intelligence file. What do you do when you meet someone whom you don't know? You exchange a few words. There we sat on the same sofa in an isolated house south of Alexandria, and we spoke about a whole period, we went over what had happened over an entire generation. Whatever happens, I believe that Gamasy and I will remain friends.
Q. And Sadat?
A. He is much more emotional, more political than Gamasy. His own brand of nationalist. He has no misgivings that he has killed, he's proud that he has fought. I think that I became close to him because he admired the efforts I made to come to see him during his visit to Jerusalem, despite the cast, the pain, after the auto accident just a few days before. The trust that arose between us did not mean that everything between us was always peaches and cream. And how! We had a very rough talk at Aswan a year ago. An in all, he is a man whom you cannot but admire for the deed he did, for his courage, for his attempt to lead Egypt on a completely different path.
Q. Were there moments when you despaired?
A. Wow! Of course! Even a number of times!
Q. When?
A. At Camp David, for example. I think that at Camp David every one of us packed his bags a number of times and wanted to go home. First of all, I suspected that Sadat would pack up and leave. I saw him every day during the 12 days at Camp David. One day I rang him up. He said to me: listen, this whole business is falling apart and I'm going home. I said to him, "I'm coming with!" That evening I had the feeling that everything was going to fall apart. I went to him and said: look we've gone so far together. You did such a great and important and historic deed, let's try again. I believe that I (and not just I) contributed to his staying there. What were my moments of despair? For instance, there was a moment during Carter's visit to Jerusalem. They say that I threatened to resign. That's not precise. I certainly said, "I'll have to consider the political path I must take" if nothing comes of the Carter visit. I'm surely glad that the Foreign Minister said: the President of the United States cannot be allowed to leave Israel empty-handed, and did what he did. That was the height of heights! Why? Because the key was so close to the keyhole and all that had to be done was to put it in the lock. I've had many experiences in my life. I'll soon be 55. I've been in uniform since age 18 and even now I'm in something like uniform, although I happen to be wearing a green (civilian) shirt. I went through the War of Independence and Operation "Kadesh", the Six-day War, the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War and I can only bless my stars that I was fated to take part in the process of the last 16 months. If that process succeeds, then we will have secured the future of the people of Israel.
Q. You once wrote to your son, Saul, "How have we gone wrong that you also have to fight?" Are you perhaps wrong about this, this time?
A. I hope not, very much. Maybe some things could have been done a tiny bit differently, but none of the essential things could have been changed. Perhaps only the technical aspect of the negotiations could have been done differently.
Q. Was it perhaps possible to get a better peace treaty?
A. That's not relevant. What's important is whether we've made a mistake in the agreement we did reach, not in what we could have agreed. Did we make a mistake in the actual agreement? On the military issue, where Israel agreed to return the '67 borders, it seems to me that we did not make an error. Israel got a good military agreement, but it may err in the future by not paying attention to a deterioration of the situation such as the Egyptian movement of missiles during the War of Attrition in 1970. I'll say to you what I said to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, in this very room: "Before the agreement Egypt has 230 tanks in the Sinai. In another 3-4 years the Egyptians put in another 300 tanks and I come to you and say, scoundrel! the Egyptians have 300 more tanks. If they don't remove them, I'm going to do such-and-such. What will you say to me then? You want to blow up the world on account of 300 tanks?" On the military issue Israel has not erred, but Israel can err in the future. I hope not. On the political issue Israel has not erred. Israel took a great but calculated risk in vacating the entire Sinai including the settlements. Uprooting the settlements is - for everyone! - like amputating a hand or a leg. It's not an easy thing to go to 600 or 6000 Jews, the number doesn't matter, and say to them, "We said to you to build your homes here. You have lived here for 10 years. Now pack your bags and move 10 km. inwards!"
I've already said that if the Jews have made sacrifices in war, then these settlers are the sacrifices for peace and they should view themselves as the vanguard in this battle for peace. It's easy for me to say this, since I didn't build my home in Yamit or Neviot. I have a niece who built her home in Neviot, who has two sweet children and a field of sweet melons. I understand their heartbreak. We took an enormous risk but did not err when we went with the Sadat-Begin initiative towards peace.
Q. Why do you, as against most of the cabinet, support handing over the oilfields sooner?
A. I told this to the Prime Minister only, and it's interesting how it already got to you, but this is one of the wondrous things happening to us. There is no doubt that the Prime Minister did not tell a soul. I say, we've come down to the finish, five days before the signing of the peace treaty. It's already agreed that Israel will return the oilfields to Egypt at the end of nine months. Also agreed is that the U.S. will guarantee Israel's oil supply for 15 years. The American Secretary of State said about this: would that the U.S. had a guaranteed oil supply for 15 years. It's clear that Israel will be able to buy oil from Egypt just like any other purchaser. Moving up the date by two months will cost around $20 million. I think that Israel's supply is guaranteed and the whole matter amounts to $20 million - at this stage of the game in order to wrap up the deal we should call up Vance and settle the matter.
Q. What is the significance of the evacuation of the Sinai for the IDF?
A. The significance for the IDF is that it will have less space. There will be problems but these will not be insurmountable. The IDF will have to be in a higher state of preparedness during the first stages. But if the situation deteriorates then the 150 km. of thinned-cut area will give Israel easier access to the Sinai than it had in '56. What could happen? You're asking me? Perhaps there will be a total revolution in Egypt, we get the news that they've closed the straits of Tiran, closed the Suez Canal, expelled our ambassador, killed someone - in that case Israel will have to go into the Sinai! I hope this will not happen.
Q. Has peace increased the danger of war on the Eastern Front?
A. Syria, Iraq and Jordan combined constitute a most serious potential military threat. They have great military strength. The Jordanians are showing a disturbing tendency to fall in step behind the Syrians. I am worried. Even the geographic situation (on the eastern front) is more threatening than with Egypt now and even then it will be with Egypt in the Sinai after the peace agreement. Why is this? Because of the Golan Heights, because of the proximity to Judea and Samaria. The big question is whether the Syrians, Iraqis and Jordanians will dare to try something -and whether they'd do it without Egypt. Their doing something even without. Egypt must be taken into consideration, despite the fact that President Sadat said that without Egypt no one goes to war and no one makes peace. The Syrians are strong now. Syria's strength is greater now than it ever has been.
Syria's army is nearly as strong as Egypt's. The combined threat of Syria, Iraq and Jordan amounts to more than 4000 tanks, and close to 1000 planes. It could be that the Syrians will decide to put the Egyptians to the test: they can begin aggressive actions, terrorist actions or a large-scale action. I hope that the Egyptians will remain quiet if Israel has any problems with the Syrians, as they committed themselves in the famous clause 6 on the priority of the treaty. I hope that the Syrians will remain quiet. Israel is keeping alert.
Q. How do you foresee developments on the matter of autonomy?
A. As the Prime Minister, Mr. Begin said, "We will implement autonomy as we committed ourselves to do so". Of course there will be argument over its interpretation. We argued for 16 months over the peace treaty. There will also be a dispute over autonomy. I said to President Carter: you must understand that the Sinai and Judea & Samaria are different cases. I also said this to Sadat and Aharon Barak noted it in his report on that discussion. We must find a way to live together. We can live together if both sides understand that this is the best solution. It should be remembered that Israel sought full sovereignty over all Judea and Samaria. I believed in this all my life. I am glad of this. So, the lesser evil is a cooperative existence.
Q. What does the rapprochement between Arafat and Hussein herald?
A. Another mistake by Hussein.
Q. You have been criticized for not bringing back a good aid package from America this week. Is this the case?
A. The U.S. has given Israel $8 billion worth of aid since the Yom Kippur war. Israel has got fighter planes, tanks, helicopters, ammunition, light weapons. This is not something that can be downgraded. In the next three years the U.S. is going to invest $8.4 billion in Israel. Israel does not have to humble itself before the Americans. The fact that they're doing this means that it's important to them and they know this. Israel should take advantage of the opportunity to become independent. This can only be achieved through work. Please, everyone, let's start to work in this country.
Q. What about the controversy over the American grant?
A. My friend, Israel will make itself disliked by the U.S. very quickly. The U.S. citizen is having a hard time economically. And what's a hard time in the U.S.? It's when you can afford only one car and not two. But it's not important what people in Israel think about this. What's important is what the American citizen thinks of his economic situation. His expectations are what count for him, not what we in Israel feel. What's important for the American citizen is what he's used to, not what we in Israel are used to. He's the one who voted for Carter, Nixon or Ford, and he's the one who has to decide whether or not to make you a grant of foreign aid. I've already said that when one turns on the TV in America one hears familiar tunes: inflation, gas, housing. I was asked - why should I, the American citizen, have to pay for this peace of yours?
Israel has answers to this - we say: global problems, oil, Russia. Since the U.S. has such big problems, since Israel got so much money from the U.S., I will eat this newspaper if it was possible to get much more. Maybe a bit more, but not much. Israel has to live with Brown and Carter on good terms for another six years. That's my assessment - six years - and we should keep this in mind.
Q. When will you travel to Egypt?
A. When I have reason to do so for the sake of the peace treaty and if they want me to come. I hope the cabinet will allow a number of us ministers to visit there. It's a shame that only a few were exposed to what went on there. I hope that also chief executives, professors, citizens, engravers, blacksmiths and taxidrivers will go. I hope everyone will go. I am a great believer in the strengthening of relations between citizens and peoples, no less than in documents and treaties.