Secretary Vance was due to leave for the Middle East on 1 August, a trip that was planned before the elections in Israel. The purpose of the journey was to discuss substantive and procedural issues with the region's leaders in order to pave the way for the resumption of the Geneva Conference. It was of utmost importance to have a well-prepared conference and to narrow the differences on various items, chief among them the participation of Palestinians at Geneva. Following are the Middle East excerpts of the news conference which indicate the U.S. thinking on the major issues:
Q. Regarding your trip to the Middle East, Mr. Begin, when he was here, outlined some procedures that he would like to have followed at the Geneva Peace Conference, and I wondered when you visit the Arab leaders whether you would endorse or promote those procedures, have ideas of your own, try to solicit theirs, or some combination thereof.
A. When I go to the various capitals, I will discuss with the leaders the proposals made by Mr. Begin. I will also suggest certain proposals which we have for the convening of a Geneva Conference, with respect to both questions of substance and questions of procedure; and of course I will seek the views of the various heads of governments with whom I will be meeting.
I hope as a result of all this process we may by the end of the trip have a clearer idea of the ability with which we have been able to narrow the differences that exist between the parties and move closer to the necessary framework for convening a Geneva Conference.
Q. Does that mean you don't necessarily endorse or disapprove on the other hand, of the Begin procedural suggestions?
A. As to the proposal as a whole, we will have some proposals that we would prefer to put forward than that, but we will put them forward for discussion.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point you said once you would be putting forth American proposals for, as I understood it, substantive settlement in the Middle East. Will these proposals from the United States be primarily related to procedure, or will you be putting terms of a settlement in the area?
A. We will have some suggestions to make to the parties both on the question of substance as well as the questions of procedure. I think I indicated to most of you at various times in the past that during this trip we would be having suggestions to make to the parties on both these sets of issues.
Q. One of the ideas that has been raised and attributed to the United States is that the West Bank would go under a trusteeship, apparently an Israeli trusteeship, for a period of several years during which time a referendum would be held determining the future of the West Bank. Is that in fact one of the ideas that you will be bringing?
A. Let me remind you of what I said before: That if we have suggestions to make during this trip, we would be making them to the parties rather than making them publicly.
We believe, and the parties agree, that if we are going to play an effective role, the best way that we can play an effective role is to make any suggestions which we have directly to the parties, in confidence, and then receive their comments on those specific proposals which can then be discussed with the other parties, rather than making them public. And we are going to adhere to that procedure.
And therefore I think it is inappropriate and would not be constructive for me to go into any specifics of what we might be suggesting to the parties.
Q. Mr. Secretary, President Carter yesterday put positively, on the issue of the P.L.O., something that in the past has been put in essentially negative terms - and that is that we would be willing to deal with the P.L.O. if they accepted Israel's tight to exist as a nation and to exist permanently.
Are you excluding, on this trip, any possible meeting with any representative of the P.L.O.?
A. I do not expect that there will be any meeting with the P.L.O. during this trip.
As the President said, there has yet been no suggestion by the Palestinians that they were prepared to do the things which President Carter outlined. In the absence of that, we feel ourselves constrained by the agreements we made in Sinai II not to have any discussions with them.
Q. To just follow that up: Recognizing that this is a hypothetical question, if such a statement were to be made during your trip, would you consider the possibility of such a meeting?
A. That is a hypothetical question.
Q. Your Arab-Israeli Desk confirmed yesterday that the United States never recognized de jure the occupation of the West Bank by Jordan from 1948 to '67, and this Desk has also designated Britain as the last legal ruler of the West Bank, even though Britain originally seized the West Bank by military conquest from the Turks.
And my question is: Do you believe that until 1922, when the British were granted the League of Nations Mandate, that the British occupation of the West Bank was legal or illegal?
A. That is a legal question on which I have, myself, not devoted the kind of attention that permits me at this point to give you the kind of technical answer that is required.
Q. May I follow that up by asking this, Sir: Since the Mandate incorporated Great Britain's Balfour Declaration of a Jewish National Homeland in Palestine, along with Mr. Churchill's designation of 80 percent of Palestine as the Emirate of Trans-Jordan, later the Kingdom of Jordan, do you believe that the remaining 20 percent of Palestine, in which Churchill limited Jewish settlements to the area West of the Jordan, was an excessive expectation for the Zionists?
A. Again, that is a technical question on which I do not wish to comment.
Q. Do you expect to know definitely by the end of this trip whether the Geneva Peace Conference can be reconvened this fall?
A. No, I don't know. It will all depend on what happens during the trip, and I think that it is possible that at the end of the trip we will not, know. If that is the case, then we would plan to have further meetings, and one of the things which we have been discussing in the way of procedure for those further meetings is to have the further meetings at the time that the various foreign ministers will be in New York for the Geneva assembly.
Q. There has been a certain amount of talk about the reconvening of the conference in October. Isn't there a danger -what are the risks of an ill-prepared conference - that there really is not enough time to prepare the substance to be negotiated at that conference prior to October.
A. We have said consistently that we believe it is important to have a well-prepared conference and I still believe that to be the case. And therefore I think we must do everything within our power to try and reach as much agreement as possible on both substance and procedure before going to Geneva.
And how much we can accomplish during this trip remains to be seen.
But, as I said, if we cannot get it done on this trip, then we are prepared to continue the discussions starting thereafter, probably with meetings in New York at the time of the General Assembly.
Q. The British decoupling two days ago the pound from the dollar was at least in part a reaction to your recognition of the fact that the United States was, in essence, attempting to set off another oil embargo as economic warfare, so to speak, against the Europeans, to disrupt the emerging relations between OPEC and Western Europe around some formation of a new monetary system.
My question is this: The Arabs, even before the decoupling move, before the Libya-Egypt situation, had called an emergency OPEC meeting for August 4th to discuss whether or not payments should still be made in dollars.
In view of the worsening situation-and it seems as though our policy in North Africa has provoked
A. The worsening situation between what?
Q. The worsening situation right now in terms of dollars, internationally, that is to say, the Arabs have even more incentive now in trying to go with some alternative to the dollar, which was ironically provoked by policy by this Administration that was trying to set the opposite thing going. But anyway, my question is are you orienting anything in your trip toward that OPEC meeting, and what is the estimation of the State Department about what might come out of it?
A. The answer is no. I am not orienting anything in my trip toward that particular problem which you raise. I am going to be concerned exclusively with the subject of trying to resolve with the parties the necessary procedural and substantive matters which would be required in order to move toward Geneva solutions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the previous Administration displayed some reluctance to go to Geneva because, apparently, there was the feeling that the Soviet Union might not be too helpful. That was during the full bloom of detente. And I wonder, now that some of the blush is off that rose, what makes you believe that the Soviet Union would be more helpful than before.
A. We have kept closely in touch with the Soviet Union on the question of a Middle East Conference. We have not only regular meetings which we agreed to at my Geneva meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko, but I quite frequently discuss the situation of the Middle East with Ambassador Dobrynin, bringing him up to date with the most recent events, and he does the same insofar as we are concerned.
This has been, I think, very useful. We feel that, as co-chairmen, we have a joint responsibility with the Soviet Union to try and bring the parties to conference, and we plan to work together and to cooperate in this endeavor.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what specifically do you think the Soviet Union is inclined to do to help, not just to come to Geneva, in the process toward peace?
A. They have indicated they are willing to use their influence with some of the parties to urge them to exhibit flexibility, which will be necessary if we are going to be able to get to Geneva.
Q. Mr. Secretary, have you received any kind of signals from the Palestine Liberation Organization, short of meeting the American requirement of recognition of Israel, in which the PLO is suggesting a way in which they may have a role in the Geneva Conference?
A. We have received nothing directly from them. Other countries have passed to us information which they say comes from the Palestinian Liberation Organization with respect to the Geneva Conference and their desire to participate in a Geneva Conference, but we. have nothing in terms of first-hand information.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us some of the shape of what the PLO signals are like? What are they prepared to do, even told to you through intermediaries, to gain a seat at the Geneva Conference.
A. Let me say that is it sufficiently, unclear at this point, Mr. Kalb, that I would hesitate at this point to indicate what they are, and I want to check first-hand with those who have communicated this information to us, namely some of the states which I will be visiting, to find out exactly what is it that has been said.
Q. May I just take the liberty of asking you whether you relayed any messages through the intermediaries back to the PLO?
A. No.
Q. Following up on the business about the Russians and the Geneva Conference which you mentioned a moment ago - They are co-chairmen - in view of that and the close relationship, have you outlined to them the suggestions and proposals that you plan to take to the Middle East? And, if you have, can you tell us whether they are in agreement with it?
A. The answer is, I am going to. I have not yet; I will before I leave. And, obviously, the answer is there are no responses as a result of that.
Q. Do you foresee a time in the near or distant future when the United States will or may cut military and economic aid to Israel in order to pressure for concessions?
A. I don't see that, no.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Begin is reported to have agreed to President Carter's suggestion that U.N. observers be stationed in southern Lebanon or on the Israeli-Lebanese border. Is this the sort of suggestion you might be carrying into your talks with Lebanese, Syrian and other leaders in the area?
A. That is obviously a question which will be discussed. I have discussed this previously with the Lebanese when I was last in Beirut. I think it's a constructive suggestion, one which should be pursued.
It will require agreement among a number of parties, but I am very pleased that Mr. Begin has taken a positive attitude with respect to that because I think it is pretty important to find ways of increasing stability in southern Lebanon and the preservation of law and order there.
Q. I am puzzled by what seems to be a difference in view as to the prospects for success in Geneva between yourself and the President. Last week, after his meeting with Mr. Begin, the President was very optimistic about going to Geneva. He repeated that optimistic view yesterday. And, if I understand you today, you're not only uncertain about where this thing is going to shake down on your trip, but you're talking about further talks after this trip.
Now, is there a difference in view between yourself and the President on the prospects for this conference?
A. The answer is no, and let me explain why. The President has said that he is very hopeful that we can go to Geneva at an early date. I share that view completely. He indicated that the basis of that view was that all of the parties have said that they want to go to Geneva, they want to go to Geneva promptly, and that they are prepared to go without preconditions.
Therefore, I think that there is a basis, based upon what they have said, which indicated a desire on the part of all the parties to move to Geneva at an early date.
There are, as the President pointed out, however, some difficult issues that have to be resolved before that can be done. That's the purpose of this trip. And what I pointed out merely was that if we couldn't accomplish it on this trip, then we'd continue the process to try and find ways to get over these hurdles.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you say there are some difficult issues yet to be settled. Are they the same ones that were there in February? Has this process of consultations that has been going on in Washington actually settled anything?
A. We have narrowed some of the issues, but a number of the problems which existed in January, some of the fundamental underlying problems, still exist.
Q. And those are essentially representation of Palestinians, the West Bank, and those are the same.
A. Those are still the most difficult problems.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if it is illegal for Israel to establish settlements on the West Bank, who then does have legal right to the West Bank?
A. There is, I think, an open question as to who has legal right to the West Bank.
Q. Well, if the question is open, how can it be illegal for Israel to move in there?
A. It is possible that with neither having a right, it is illegal for a third party to have a right. I think that is understandable.