At the conclusion of his visit to Israel, and prior to his departure for Egypt and Syria, to brief their leaders on his talks, with Israeli leaders 'in Jerusalem, Mr. Vance held a press conference in which he emphasized that fundamental differences remain between Israel and the Arab states on both procedural issues relating, to, the Geneva conference and on substantive questions. Geneva still remained the goal towards which all parties were striving. The Secretary stressed the refusal of the U.S. to impose its own terms. On that day, the U.S. embassy in Tel-Aviv released a statement denying categorically that meetings have taken place between the American ambassador in Cairo and PLO representatives. Texts of the Vance statement and answers to questions follow:
I thought I might make a brief opening statement and then I will be happy to answer any questions which you may have. We're nearing the end of a trip which we embarked upon about ten days ago which has as its objective to help the parties move towards the early reconvening of a Geneva Conference with sufficient preparation on the substantive issues to improve the chances of success of such a meeting.
In pursuit of that goal we have travelled to six countries in the last ten days. At each stop we have explained the positions of the other, parties and have presented proposals which we believe would narrow the procedural and the substantive differences. We sought the reaction of the various parties to these proposals and we have. Now at the end of this phase sought to set forth the basis which we believe should be the framework for a Geneva Conference.
On the positive side all parties remain united on the need for a Geneva Conference. All parties have defined in greater detail than they ever have, before their positions on the key issues. There is a willingness on the part of all of the parties to examine the views of the other parties on these key issues and a willingness, at least in some cases, to reflect on these other views. These developments should develop a firmer foundation for the discussions which I hope to have with respective Foreign Ministers at the time of the UN General Assembly which will meet in New York in September.
Let me say that fundamental differences remain. The parties remain divided on key issues which must be resolved if progress is to be made towards a settlement. These involve both procedural and substantive questions.
At this point it is my hope that a Geneva Conference will be convened before the end of this year. It will take good will and a joint commitment on the part of the parties as well as intensive discussions to bring this into being. Finally, let me say that it is not our purpose to impose terms upon the parties but to assist them in reaching agreement among themselves. Now I'd be very happy to answer any questions.
Q. Did you mean to suggest that there is any more examination the Israelis are giving to the idea of the Palestinian homeland and/or acceptance of PLO in negotiaitions?
A. They are very clear and firm on their position with respect to a Palestinian entity. They have said that they are opposed to a Palestinian entity and have made this very very clear to me.
Q. Mr. Secretary, have you succeeded in reaching an agreement among the Arab states and Israel to conduct proximity talks in New York next month and will this be the achievement of this trip?
A. I don't want to characterize anything as proximity talks. Let me say that I believe that each of the leaders of the countries which I have visited will send their Foreign Ministers when they are in New York. I will discuss with them issues which we have been discussing and which I hope to keep in touch with them about between now and that time.
Q. A follow up, Sir: Will you be shuttling between the Arab Foreign Ministers and the Israelis even though you may not choose to call it proximity talks?
A. I expect to go between the parties including between the Israelis and the Arab parties.
Q. The Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan said last night that Israel must not permit any foreign rule in the West Bank territory and the Gaza Strip now occupied by Israel. He specifically included Jordan as such a foreign power. This afternoon a senior advisor to the Prime Minister, Mr. Katz, said that we are not in favor of any possible governmental connections of Jordan with the West Bank territory. We are against it. And he said that Israel would not leave, would not give back any part of the West Bank. May we have your reactions to that? Do you think that is at all acceptable to the United States or to any Arab power?
A. With respect to the question of a Palestinian entity, I have indicated that the Israelis have made it very clear to us that they are opposed to a Palestinian entity. With respect to the West Bank, whether or not the Israelis are prepared to negotiate on the question of the West Bank is for the Israelis to speak to, not for me.
Q. Mr. Secretary, this afternoon, Mr. Katz also told us that if the PLO, if the Arabs insist on the PLO presence at the Geneva Conference, there will be no Geneva Conference. How do you expect to resolve that position with the position that you have heard from the Arabs so far?
A. The question of Palestinian Arab representation at the Geneva Conference remains one of the unresolved issues. This is an issue which will continue to be discussed with the various parties and I cannot predict at this point how that matter will be resolved.
Q. Would you say that there is no significant progress during the past ten days towards the basis and foundation for the Geneva Conference? Do the gaps remain as wide as ever?
A. There are wide gaps. Let me be very clear on that. I think we have made some progress in certain areas. I indicated to you the other day where I thought those narrowings of the gap were. They remain as I indicated the last time that we spoke.
Q. Mr. Secretary. The President has said the United States will open discussions with the Palestinians if they recognize Resolution 242. If the PLO in fact does that, might you conduct such discussions in New York during the round of discussions with Foreign Ministers?
A. The President has indicated that, if the Palestinians accept clearly 242 (and, just to make it clear, that includes specifically that provision of 242 that relates to the right of Israel to exist) that we will talk to the Palestinians.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that you had been able to narrow the gap on the question of the nature of a major peace resulting from a peace settlement. Did you narrow the gap on any other core questions while you were here in Israel?
A. Would you repeat the first part of the question? I'm sorry.
Q. ...You had been able to narrow the gap between the parties on the question of the nature of peace. Were you able to narrow the gap in Israel on the other core questions? Or on any questions?
A. In the discussions here in Israel we did not narrow the gap any further than at the time that I left.
Q. Mr. Vance, inasmuch as the co-chairman of the Geneva Conference will be represented in New York while you hold those discussions with the various Foreign Ministers, could you tell us how you might help the Soviet Union keep up with the momentum that you have been fostering in this process?
A. I expect to meet with the Ambassador from the Soviet Union when I return to Washington next week, I have asked him to meet with me. He has indicated that he will I will give him a general fill-in with respect to what has happened on my trip to the Middle East and we will talk about how we as co-chairmen should proceed from here to continue the process of preparing ourselves for a Geneva Conference.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if the Palestinians will not recognize Resolution 242, will you take the initiative to change this resolution?
A. No.
Q. At the time of the Likud party election back in May the question was put to the Administration whether they thought it would be a setback for their plans for peace in the Middle East. The attitude then was 'Let's wait and see." Now given the lack of progress at meetings here in the last two days, I wonder if you would agree with that assessment that some people had made in May that peace would be more difficult to achieve because of the election of the Begin government?
A. I don't want to make any characterizations of the political situation in any country. Let me say that we as an intermediary will continue to work between the parties. We have received cooperation in our discussions with all of the parties. I do feel the conversations that we have had have been useful and will continue to follow out that process.
Q. Mr. Secretary, before you set off on this trip, you were asked the question about the sovereignty of the West Bank area. At that time you said you did not have an answer to this question. In the light of your trip, do you have an answer?
A. You're going to have to make your question more clear.
Q. Before you left...
A. Before I left where?
Q. Before you left for this trip, before you left Washington, you were asked as to who has sovereignty over the West Bank and at that time, if I am not misquoting you, you said that this was a difficult question to which you did not have an answer...
A. I have nothing further to add at this time.
Q. Mr. Secretary. You were told that the PLO was out to make some sort of a change in its public position. Are you satisfied that they have made that change because they have announced several things or do you expect them to say something further based on what you heard in Saudi Arabia?
A. I have seen no change so far that indicates that they accept 242.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect any further announcement from them based on what you heard in Saudi Arabia?
A. We shall be watching and waiting.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the question is on the PLO questions, the American government seems to be ready to talk to the PLO if they will accept 242. We have heard rather impassionately from Mr. Begin both here and in Washington that simply accepting the PLO on the basis of some words is the equivalent of the world not taking "Mein Kampf" seriously in the 1930's. Does the United States feet that the PLO is a different body than Mr. Begin does or does it simply feel that for the sake of negotiations it's worthwhile to deal with the PLO if it takes the right negotiation step?
A. With respect to Mr. Begin's characterization of the PLO, I don't choose to comment on that one way or another. I don't think it would be appropriate for me to do so. Let me say that we have for a number of years said that we would not talk to the PLO until they change their position to recognize the right of Israel to exist. The implication of that was and remains: If they change that position and recognize the right of The State of Israel to exist, we would talk to them.
Q. You spoke about narrowing the gap. Can you give one concrete detail where the gap has been narrowed?
A. Yes. I think that in the question of the nature of peace, the gap has been narrowed.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you are near the end of your second trip to the area now and you still report that wide gaps remain between the positions on both sides. What is it that you think is going to happen between now and your meetings with the Foreign Ministers in September and even at those meetings that's going to make a Geneva Peace Conference possible this year?
A. As I have proceeded through these discussions during this last trip, we have been able to get into more detail. Much more detail on the substance of the various issues and the position therefore of the parties on these issues. In doing that we have found that in some cases what appeared to be irreconcilable differences have disappeared. My hope is that we can continue to deal more in peace treaties among the parties, that we will find it possible to further narrow these differences and isolate those remaining key issues where it is impossible to close the gap and then we will have to decide whether on that basis it is appropriate then to proceed on to Geneva - but that is up to the parties.
Q. Where were you able to narrow the gap on the nature of peace? What were you able to bring the Israelis from the Arab side which suggested that...
A. I'm not going to get into details on this. As I've indicated, I'm going to stay away from the details on this. Let me say that I have found more flexibility on the question of the nature of peace on the Arab side than I had seen before. That's all I think I ought to say.
Q. Is that true of all the Arab governments that you spoke with or just some of them?
A. Some of them.
Q. Do you think you've made any progress in persuading Mr. Begin that basically the Arabs do want to make peace and not just establish a better position for the further war?
A. I think he was very interested in the conclusion which I expressed to him that it is my belief that the Arabs really do want to make peace and I believe that Mr. Begin wants to make peace as well. The problem however is accepting the good-will on the part of all the parties wanting to get to a peaceful solution. How do you overcome the problems that remain - That's a tough problem that's going to take time.
Q. Do you think you made progress in persuading them to listen to that goodwill on the Arab side?
A. I hope so and I believe that I may have.
Q. One of the problems in the Middle East is that it is up to the parties themselves to resolve this problem left to their own devices. They've had four wars so far. If the United States clearly has interests in this area, at what point might the United States be prepared to act solely in its own interests?
A. I don't want to speculate with respect to the future. I have said to you and I repeat again that we are now making suggestions of our own views in respect to each of the parties and soliciting their reaction to those suggestions which we are making. Some of those suggestions have met with favor, others have, as you might expect, been turned down and we will continue to make suggestions of our own. That's as far as I want to go at this point.
Q. Mr. Secretary. In the Arab world we were told by some of the leaders there that they feel it is only worthwhile to go to a Geneva Conference if in advance they can have some assurance that the general principles underlying a settlement, a comprehensive settlement, are within the range of possibility at such a conference. Do you agree with that point of view? Do you think it's one that is valid and do you feel that such a statement of general principles in advance of Geneva is a possibility?
A. I have been discussing with the parties, not only including the Arab parties, but the Israelis as well, general principles that might govern a Geneva Conference and thus operate as a framework. I find agreement among them on some of these principles. I find differences of wording on others and on one such as the Palestinian entity I find a sharp, almost total, division. But I must say that I do find some agreement and some agreement except for language on others.
Q. Might I just follow that, let's suggest that you may have drawn up a United States idea of what general principles may be for their consideration. Have you done so?
A. I have discussed with them our suggestions as to what the general principles might be.
Q. Mr. Secretary, getting back to the proximity talks, are you satisfied that the Israelis... (Vance - You keep calling them proximity talks...)
Q. Well, because I realize the reason you choose not to... Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that during these proximity talks the Israelis will continue their conversations with you even though the United States at that point may be in discussion with the PLO?
A. I have considered that.
Q. Have you received assurances from the Israelis that they will continue talks even though the U.S. may at that time be talking to the PLO?
A. That specific question has not been raised between the Israelis and ourselves. They have indicated that their Foreign Minister will be in New York at that time - I hope that he would meet with me.
Q. Did you expect to make more progress on this trip, do you regret not having made more progress on this trip?
A. You've asked me that same question before on other trips.
Q. It's still valid. (Several voices interrupt. Wait, wait, can we get a reply?)
A. You want me to answer it. I'll answer his question.
Q. "The Israelis agree that talks in New York should be about substantive matters also, not only about procedural matters.
A. Let me answer that Roy, and I'll come back to your question. Yes, they clearly should be about substantive matters. Now...
Q. Do the Israelis agree to that?
A. Yes. Now, your question, Roy, was do I feel that I would like to have made more progress. The answer is yes. I would like to have made more progress. But I feel that these visits to the various countries have been useful, even though sharp differences remain between the parties.
Q. You say America is not initiating any change in 242? Would America veto any attempt to either change 242 or bring in an addendum to 242? Or could a situation arise where America would support moves to change 242?
A. Let me say, I hope there will be no attempt to amend 242.
Q. But will you veto any attempt to change 242?
A. When the time comes, we'll deal with that question. We might.
Q. Excuse me, perhaps I misunderstand, but I thought you had rather flatly not too long ago, perhaps a day or two ago, that the United States opposes any change in 242.
A. We do.
Q. Well then why would you simply discourage it? Why wouldn't you simply stop it from happening?
A. I hope that it will not come. And I say I hope it'll never even come to the U.N.
Q. Mr. Secretary, these fundamental differences, can't they be bridged? And if you cannot go to a Geneva Conference and really make progress on the comprehensive settlement which you and President Carter have spoken about, do you think the American taxpayers and Congress will continue to subsidize with very large sums the economies of both Israel and several of the Arab countries, and to provide armaments to both Israel and several of the Arab countries, knowing the inevitable fact of a likely war ahead?
A. Mr. Oberdorfer, our commitment to the security of Israel is clear and unequivocal and we will continue to provide to Israel what is necessary to preserve its security.
Press. Thank you Mr. Secretary.
A. Thank you very much.