The speech was devoted mainly to a summary of the Israeli, Arab and U.S. positions on the various elements that affect the Middle East crisis. Mr. Dayan stressed the fact that while Israel has to make peace with the Arab states and not with the United States, that power must play a central role in any settlement because of its special relationship with Israel and its growing friendly ties with more Arab states, a process that was accelerated since the Yom Kippur War. Mr. Dayan also elaborated the two issues on which there were Israeli-American disagreements, settlements and PLO role in the peacemaking process. Finally Mr. Dayan outlined the issues that will be discussed in his forthcoming trip to the U.S. Text:
Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,
I do not propose this time to deliver a comprehensive review of foreign policy. I wish to review only one issue, the central issue of our diplomatic activity - the peace negotiations. Technically - and I stress technically, and not in essence - the negotiating process is proceeding apace. This process commenced with the meetings the U.S. President held - at his initiative - with the Arab heads of state and with both the former and the incumbent Prime Minister of Israel. Thereafter, the U.S. Secretary of State visited the Arab states and Israel, and now we face the next round - the indirect talks between the Foreign Ministers, to be held in Washington with effect from the second half of September.
The Arab positions, as reported to us by the Secretary of State and in accordance with the Arab leaders' public pronouncements, are in the main:
(A) First, on the territorial issue - insistence on our total withdrawal to the lines of 4 June 1967 and return of the vacated territories to the Arab states. This entails, inter alia, handing over the Gaza Strip to Egyptian authority and East Jerusalem - including Mount Scopus and the Old City's Jewish Quarter - to Jordanian authority.
(B) Establishment of a Palestinian Arab state - or, in other words, granting the right of self-determination to the Palestinian Arabs, whose representative is the P.L.O. - ergo, the P.L.O. representation, with powers similar to those of other states, is to be allowed to participate in the Geneva Conference.
(C) On the issue of peace - only one Arab state announced its readiness, in the advent of peace, to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. The other Arab states contend that a peace treaty does not obligate them to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with Israel.
(D) On the refugee resettlement issue - over and above the P.L.O., the Syrian President, too, in his public pronouncements, insists that even after establishment of a Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria, the right should be reserved for the refugees to return to their homes and lands located in Israel - in addition to establishment of a Palestinian State.
As for the U.S. position - this is known to the members of the house, its main points being:
(A) Israeli withdrawal to the boundaries of 4 June 1967, with minor adjustments to be made by mutual agreement.
(B) Giving the Palestinian Arabs the right to self-determination.
(C) Peace that includes diplomatic ties and commercial relations.
This American position was determined during the term of office of the previous Israel government, and has not changed since - neither for better nor for worse.
Members of the Knesset.
I neither dwelt at length nor went into detail on these matters, since they are well-known. All the same, I should like to remark on two points of dispute that have cropped up between the U.S. and ourselves at this juncture, even before negotiations have begun with the Arabs on peace treaties.
The first is on the settlement issue:
The U.S. position regarding the settlements is that settling Israeli citizens in the administered areas is in contradiction to the Geneva Convention, hence the settlements are not legal, and that this act also creates an obstacle to peace or to peace negotiations.
The Israel government's position on the subject - which is a continuation of the line adopted by all Israel governments since 1967 - is that Israel does not and cannot accept the assertion that Jews' settlement in Eretz Yisrael is illegal. The government reiterated that such settlement does not - nor shall - constitute, in any sense, an obstacle to negotiations for peace treaties.
The Arabs' position - and this is also the. position of the United States and of the rest of the nations of the world, which emulate the U.S. - does not, on this matter of settlements, distinguish between one region and another, viewing settlement on the Golan Heights as violation of international law and an obstacle to peace just like (settlement) in Judea and Samaria. Let the honourable members take note: I should like Mapam in particular to take note: According to "Al Hamishmar," Maparn adopted a resolution stating that "The cabinet's decision to establish three civilian settlement-points in Judea and Samaria places an obstacle on the road to political negotiations." I want to reiterate that not only the Arabs' stand, but also that of the United States, is that settlements in the administered areas - regardless of whether on the Golan Heights, in Sinai or in Judea and Samaria - are illegal and constitute an obstacle to peace. The United States makes no distinction in this matter between Judea and Samaria and the Golan Heights.
The second sphere in which there are differences of opinion between ourselves and the Americans is that of U.S. recognition of the P.L.O. as a partner for dialogue with the U.S. There has of late been a change for the worse in the position of the U.S. on this issue, as compared with its stand some time ago. The present position is that if the P.L.O. accepts Resolution 242 - albeit with a reservation to the effect that Resolution 242 should refer to the Palestinians as a people entitled to a homeland, and not as refugees - if the P.L.O. accepts the resolution with that proviso tagged on, the United States would be ready to maintain contact and dialogue with it. Though the U.S. has not told us, I believe it is correct to say that the P.L.O. - if not as an independent body then at least as a partner (to another delegation) - participate in one of the delegations to the Geneva Conference or in a unified Arab delegation to Geneva.
I do not think that the current dealing with this subject of the P.L.O.'s legitimation or legalization for the purpose of dialogue between it and the U.S., has any purpose other than the linking and inclusion, in one form or another, of the P.L.O. in peace negotiations. The stand of the government of Israel vis-a-vis the P.L.O. is clear and explicit. We oppose both U.S. dialogue with the P.L.O. and that organization's participation in the peace conference, and this for two reasons: First, its murderous essence and nature and its rejection of Israel's very existence. Second: The Geneva Conference is one conducted between states and its objective is to bring about the signing of peace treaties between States and not with any organization which is not a state.
I should like to add a few remarks at this point. The U.S. position vis-a-vis the state, homeland nor self-determination - different expressions designed for the Palestinian Arabs - is that that same entity which we shall call, in plain language, "The Palestinian State", should be connected with Jordan. But that position and that assumption utterly contradict the other, the second, tendency of the United States to present the P.L.O. as representing the Palestinian state - a conception by which the P.L.O. might head the Palestinian state.
First of all, as regards Jordan: There might one day be a different regime in Jordan, there might one day be a revolution in Jordan - with the P.L.O. then taking over Jordan and the situation being different. But the present Jordanian regime totally rejects any link with the P.L.O. That regime holds no dialogue with the P.L.O., places no faith in it, and regards it as a subversive element against the regime: Jordan is not ready to maintain any connection with a Palestinian state - should such a state be established in the West Bank - if it is headed by the P.L.O. Hence, these two views cannot be reconciled: One cannot want to see a connection between Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip and Jordan, and at the same time want to see the P.L.O. heading that West Bank-Gaza Strip entity, heading those Palestinian Arabs.
These two contingencies are impossible under the present Jordanian regime, and anyone who wants proof need only look at what is happening at this very time. When the King of Jordan invited the Mayors of Nablus, Hebron, Jenin and Ramallah to pay a courtesy visit to Jordan to bring their greetings on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the regime in Jordan, the four Mayors - of Nablus, Hebron, Tulkarm and Ramallah - refused to go to Jordan: Every one of those Mayors is a Jordanian citizen, and representatives of their towns are members of the Parliament in Amman. They would not have refused had it not been for the tendency to place the P.L.O. at the head of the Arabs of these areas. And the instructions they received to refuse the invitation - and it was an insult to refuse the King's request - came from the P.L.O.
The American trend from the time of the Rabat Conference, of legitimizing and raising up the P.L.O. as representative of the Palestinian Arabs, totally contradicts the line which sees a link between the Jordanian government and the Palestinian Arabs who are residents of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip.
In connection with the American stand, I should like to draw the attention of the House to one further matter. In the course of the ongoing public discussion in Israel - in the press and in various political parties - there have been from time to time talk and suggestions concerning American guarantees for our security, as part of a peace settlement between ourselves and the Arab states. Well - neither in any American initiative nor in their replies to our queries have we, in my opinion, found any basis whatsoever upon which to build our security in such a context. In my view, we have heard nothing of the sort, nor do I see any basis for our security which could reply on any serious, fundamental American tendency or readiness - operationally and concretely with its own forces - to guarantee Israel's security as part of the vaunted settlement. The United States would not refuse and would not hold back from giving guarantees, along with other states - its position is very similar to that of the USSR - if requested by all the parties to append its signature to a peace agreement after it has been attained. But it is a very far cry from that, to regarding this as a concrete-operative element upon which we can rely as one of the security components.
And, finally, I should like to present Israel's position, in general lines, anticipatory to the talks to be held in Washington. Israel's proposals and aims vis-a-vis the issues to be discussed in Washington - on the substantive, not the procedural, issues - are divided into two sections: The first is a draft text for a full peace treaty, in all its articles. The second indicates our approach vis-a-vis discussion and negotiation on the various issues. The second section is subdivided into two components: First, a presentation of the questions involved in a peace agreement between ourselves and each of our neighbours, such as: Israel's security, guaranteeing freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Eilat and in the Suez Canal, expression given to Israel's national and historic affinity to Judea and Samaria, securing of the Jordan river sources in the north, and other topics of like nature. That is: Presentation of the questions which we believe we must contend with when we are to arrive at a peace agreement between ourselves and each of the neighbouring Arab states.
The second element in this approach is our stand and our proposals for resolving these questions. A third component is the principle that the negotiations be conducted without prior conditions. This principle says not only that neither side obligates the other to agree in advance to any condition whatsoever, but also that all issues and areas are open to negotiation, and that we shall be totally open and sincere in listening to, discussing and examining the proposals of the other parties. To illustrate this: We believe that the settlement concerning Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip should be based on our living together with the Palestinian Arabs in these areas, and not on partition of the territory. But should the Arabs propose partitioning these territories between ourselves and them, we would discuss and examine their proposal and afterwards conclude whether we were ready to agree to their proposals or not.
In connection with this example, I should like to tell the Members of the House that we have re-examined the positions of Jordan, of the Palestinian Arabs and of the United States, and we have found no inclination on the part of any of them for a solution based on the partition of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip between ourselves and them. We have found no hint of this on the part of Jordan, of the Americans or of any of the Arab states.
I should like to propose to the factions and the parties that think otherwise, that if they find any indication at all of such readiness on the part of the Arabs, they raise the matter before the public, and then we shall know what the debate is about: About things that exist or things that do not exist.
In conclusion, I want to say that while there is of course no telling if we shall succeed in reaching an agreement with the Arabs, we must nonetheless make a supreme effort to attain that goal. There is no need to enlarge on the overriding need for its attainment. The entire nation accepts that attainment of true peace with our neighbours is the cardinal objective of our policy. However, in this connection I should like to underscore four facts due to which, I believe, the prospects for reaching a settlement in this period are better than those that existed in the past:
(A) The increased influence of the United States on the Arab countries, and their reduced dependence - particularly that of Egypt - on the Soviet Union.
(B) The Arab leaders' readiness in principle to terminate the state of war with Israel. I have never suggested, and do not now suggest, that Israel relax its alertness and its military and political preparations and in the eventuality that the Arab states - headed by Egypt - launch a war against us. We must view that possibility as a real one at all times, and particularly if the peace talks reach a dead end. Nonetheless, we must not ignore the difference between Nasser's policy - a policy of "What was taken by force shall be restored by force," and of "No negotiations with, no recognition of and no peace with Israel" and that of Sadat, who seeks to attain his goals by political means and declares publicly his readiness to accept Israel.
I do not think we should treat his words as deception and fraud. I do not think so. We must try to put those declarations to the test of reality while, as noted, at the same time taking into account the possibility that Egypt will -Sadat's statements notwithstanding launch war on us.
(C) The third fact is our military and civilian control of the administered areas. Not even the Yom Kippur war, with all its difficulties, led to a change in that situation. We can, therefore, conduct peace negotiations without requiring any Arab territorial concessions whatsoever. We are in a position to give territories without asking for others in exchange for them.
(D) And lastly, the way of life of "alongside one another" which has prevailed for ten years now between ourselves and the Arabs in Jerusalem, in Judea and Samaria, in the Gaza Strip and in Sinai. The present way of life is not the ideal one - though it should not be viewed as the final aim in this regard, either - but so long as we do not arrive at a better arrangement we will be able to continue with it, and we - and our neighbours - must be aware of this.
Members of the Knesset,
These are the observations I have found proper to bring before you at the opening of this debate. I presume that there will be place for further debate at the next session of the Knesset, following the talks to be held in Washington.