The nature of the growing ties between Egypt and the U.S., and the increasing role that the United States was playing in Egypt, were cited as the main reasons for the decision of the Carter Administration to sell Egypt additional military transport aircraft as well as other equipment. The close cooperation between Egypt and the U.S. since the end of the Yom Kippur War was also noted as was the "historical leadership" role of Egypt in the Middle East. Mr. Atherton's full remarks to the House International Relations Sub-Committee on Europe and the Middle East follows:
September 16, 1977
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
I am pleased to appear before you this afternoon to discuss the administration's proposal to sell certain items of military equipment to Egypt.
In early August, following a number of informal consultations with members, the Department of Defense sent letters of prenotification to the Congress outlining the Administration's intention to sell to Egypt C-130 transport aircraft and pilotless reconnaissance drones. On September 7, formal notification pursuant to section 36 (B) of the act was sent to the Congress relative to the proposed sales.
Although this formal notification pertains only to the sale of transport aircraft and reconnaissance drones, these items are part of a package which also includes camera equipment for reconnaissance use, a hydrographic survey of the approaches to the Suez canal and a program of military training for Egyptian officers. I will address my remarks to those items requiring section 36(B) consideration, but I will be glad to answer questions you may have concerning the rest of the package.
Before discussing some of the specifics of the items proposed for sale to Egypt, I would like to say a few words about the historical and political background of this program.
Egypt, under President Sadat, and the United States have cooperated closely in the peace process initiated in the Middle East almost four years ago. Egypt continues to play a key role in the efforts currently under way to make significant progress in the near future to move the area towards peace. Egyptian policy serves the interests not only of Egypt, but of the Arab world, reflecting Egypt's historical leadership role in the region. In this context, President Sadat and his government are seeking to provide a better life for the Egyptian people, and economic development is at the very top of the Egyptian agenda for action. During the past few years, Egypt's contacts with the United States and Western Europe have expanded as various friendly countries have responded to the opportunity dramatically to improve relations with Egypt on all levels, including economic and commercial relations. A centerpiece of President Sadat's commitment to the future of his people, and the response of Egypt's friends, is the consultative group which, under the leadership of the World Bank, is coordinating the international response in support of Egypt's development plans.
This dramatic shift in Egyptian policy has opened new prospects for peace in the Middle East as well as new hope for future generations of Egyptians and for the Arab world generally. This policy, however, has had its cost, particularly in the field of military supply. In this respect, the Soviet Union has ceased its role as supplier of major equipment and, to a large degree, has also ceased its maintenance support for the equipment which was previously provided. In these circumstances, the government of Egypt has sought to diversify its sources of supply for certain military equipment, as it seeks to meet perceived requirements for its own security. We believe that the proposals currently before you represent a measured response to some of these requirements, and are also a sign of confidence in Egypt's peace policies.
We firmly believe these sales are in the national interests of the United States. If we did not believe that, we would not be proposing them. The reasons are clear. Egypt since 1973 has opted for a negotiated peace in the Middle East and, as part of this policy, for improved relations with the United States. In doing so, it has sacrificed an assured source of military supply and assumed a risk to its immediate national security for the longer term gains of permanent peace. This is not a tenable position for any protracted period for any government. In the absence of demonstrable alternative sources of military supply, Egypt will be faced with the difficult choice of permitting the deterioration of its defense posture, diversifying its sources of supply, or returning to the Soviets as its sole source of supply. It has opted for seeking alternative sources. Given American interest in supporting Egypt's cooperation in our search for a genuine peace in the Middle East, we clearly have a major interest in helping Egypt meet its legitimate defense needs.
Now I would like to turn to a more detailed review of the items which are the subject of today's proceedings.
The Administration proposes to sell 14 C-130 aircraft to Egypt. The approximate value of this sale would be 184.4 million dollars. Together with the six C-130 aircraft sold to Egypt in early 1976, this will provide Egyptian air force with two ten-aircraft squadrons of modern transport aircraft; it may permit the retirement of some older Soviet-supplied transports that are known to be uneconomical to maintain and operate. The additional C-130 aircraft for Egypt would support the logistical and scheduling flexibility of the Egyptian armed forces - an important consideration given Egypt's strategic position as an African as well as a Middle Eastern power. It is anticipated that the First aircraft can be delivered in December 1978 with delivery to be completed in mid-1979.
The Egyptian air force has the ability to absorb the additional transport aircraft. The recommended program provides for training, adequate ground support equipment and spare parts for the first two years of operation. Accordingly, we anticipated no significant operational or maintenance problems in increasing the Egyptian air force level of this aircraft to 20.
With respect to the sale of remotely piloted vehicles (RPV's), this proposed sale is valued at approximately 66.5 million dollars. President Sadat requested RPV's as a generic system rather than identifying his preference for a specific model. Therefore, we are not certain which system the Egyptians eventually will select, nor have we discussed this with them pending congressional consideration of the proposed sale. However, in order to provide you with representative data, we have developed information for a program consisting of 12 Teledyne Ryan model 124-R (Firebee) remotely piloted drones. Such drones would enable Egypt to meet requirements for an ummanned airborne camera platform for reconnaissance to the midline of the Sinai buffer zone as authorized in the Sinai II accords, as well as to carry out reconnaissance missions along other frontiers.
The "Firebee" is a subsonic, radio-command controlled, single engine vehicle. The first of twelve such RPV's could be delivered approximately 14 months after agreement to a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA), and the remaining 11 vehicles would be ready within the following four months.
The program envisaged includes maintenance, training and spares support sufficient to permit introduction of the system into the Egyptian Air Force inventory.
None of the equipment proposed for sale to Egypt materially will affect the regional balance of power. Rather, by improving EgypVs capability for collection of information and for movement of troops and supply, the items should enhance regional stability. The arms control and disarmament agency has examined the proposed sales and interposes no objections.
Both of the items I have discussed with you today will be sold to the Egyptians on an FMS cash basis.
I would be glad now to respond to any question you may have concerning either of these items or other matters related to the sale proposed by the Administration.