56 Statement to the Knesset by Foreign Minister Dayan- 13 October 1977

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

I attach much importance to this debate - not its rhetorical aspect, nor the barbs it will engender, but the substantive, fundamental issue, for the entire House. All the parties have said and are saying not only that they want a peace agreement but that they wait to attend the Geneva Conference or, more precisely, to participate in the resumption of the sessions of the Geneva Conference, and I am certain that they are sincere in saying this and the question is: How do we get there, what may we do, what must we not do, when the resumption -of the Geneva Conference is proposed?

I should first of all like to get rid of one subject - an important subject, which in fact was the reason the Alignment requested today's special Knesset session, although we hardly heard a word about it: Namely, the American-Soviet statement of 1 October 1977. This was a very grave statement. It was grave for two reasons. Both because of its content and, especially, because for the first time the U.S. announces that it is coordinating, and will continue to coordinate (with the Soviet Union) its policy as regards the Middle East and the solution of the conflict. In the past there were two co-chairmen at Geneva, by agreement between the powers, and it was almost impossible to avoid this at the international forums. For any resolutions at the Security Council could be passed only if the two superpowers agreed to it - otherwise one of them would impose a veto. Therefore the decisions of the U.N. must receive the approval of both powers and two co-chairmen were appointed for Geneva for the same reason. But between this and an American statement (also a Soviet statement, but what is disturbing is the American attitude), between this and the American statement that they have coordinated with, and will continue to coordinate their policy with the Soviet Union, there is a great distance. This is very hard for us, and it was also received with indignation by certain circles in the United States - not only by Jews, but also by certain Americans like Senator Jackson and others, and I want not only to express our attitude in principle on this subject, but also to read here the text of the memorandum we presented to the United States on the subject (unofficial translation from the Hebrew of Mr. Dayan's speech):

Israel protested to the President of the United States about the joint American-Soviet statement and expressed its indignation at this step in an official letter. The official letter stated:

"We categorically reject the statement for several reasons:

"A) The statement does not mention Resolutions 242 and 338 which are the only basis agreed by all parties for a settlement in the Middle East.

"B) The statement distorts the content of Resolution 242, referring only to one of its components, namely, an Israeli withdrawal from territories and almost completely ignores the other components.

"C) It contains a reference to the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, while in resolution 242 there is no mention of the term Palestinians and no reference to legitimate rights.

"D) The statement refers throughout only to a settlement and not to a just and lasting peace as appears in the Resolution 242.

"E) The United States and the Soviet Union cannot co-opt additional parties to the negotiations for peace. This can be done only with the consent of the original parties who took part in the session of the Geneva Conference in 1973. We agreed that in the discussion on Judea and Samaria and the affairs of the Gaza Strip, Palestinian Arabs should be enabled to take part. But the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. cannot decide on their own who will be the participants in the Geneva Conference.

"F) From the statement it appears that a special session of the Geneva Conference will be convened for the purpose of discussing the problems of the Middle East. We made it clear to the United States that the Geneva Conference in which we will agree to take part is only a conference based on the foundations laid down on the eve of its first session. Namely, Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the letter of invitation sent to us by the Secretary General of the United Nations. The statement is in contradiction to the commitments of the United States towards us, as expressed in the memoranda of understanding signed with us and in the exchange of letters between the government of Israel and the government of the United States. The United States informed us of the content of the joint statement only 48 hours before its publication. The Prime Minister expressed to the U.S. Ambassador on September 30 our unequivocal reaction to the content of the statement, but on the following day, on October 1, 1977, the statement was published."

To sum up this subject, I wish to state:

1. The legal basis for the Geneva Conference is Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We shall take part only in a conference convened on this basis, as also expressed in the letter of invitation sent to us by the co-chairmen, and there will be changes only if the changes are accepted by us.

2. As pointed out in the joint statement of the President of the United States and myself, the agreement of the parties to the American-Russian statement of 1 October 1977 is not a pre-condition for participation in the Geneva Conference, nor is it a basis for the conduct of the negotiations.

3. In the joint American-Israel statement the United States stresses once again that all the existing understandings and agreements between ourselves and the United States continue to be in force.

As is known, the agreements between the United States and ourselves on the subject of the Geneva Conference were brought to the attention of the U.S. Congress and are binding upon the American administration. Therefore, not only did we receive confirmation from the President of the U.S. and the Secretary of State, but in the joint statement published at the end of my talks in Washington, an express statement was made to this effect.

I only want to mention, in connection with Mr. Peres' remarks, that he somehow or other connected the working paper agreed upon between ourselves and the United States with this statement. There is a complete separation between the two.

I want to emphasize that, not only is there no connection, but the understanding we have reached with the United States is based on the fact that we categorically reject this statement, and the United States has stated that it does not demand that we accept this paper.

Another remark on a minor question, so that we may remove it from the agenda:

In connection with the unified delegation - and I shall return to the working paper on which we agreed, and which, in my opinion, is a good paper - not that we were compelled - in my opinion. It is a good paper for the purpose of this discussion. But I shall explain this later. But in regard to the unified delegation, I want to point out that in previous discussions at Geneva, in May 1974, Israel agreed to negotiate a disengagement agreement with Syria together with negotiations with Egypt, with Syrian officers sitting in the Egyptian delegation. The Alignment did this, and I did not object to it, because the Syrians did not want to appear in their own name at Geneva and sign the disengagement agreement with us. They wanted to appear under the cover of the Egyptian delegation, and none of us rejected this. There were no other states there and we accepted them as a joint delegation, and we were concerned only with the content and not with the principle.

Now I want to say in connection with our agreement. In my opinion, the first condition for the agreement on procedure that has now been achieved, or for any agreement on procedure, is that on no account shall it contain any provisions that could afterwards hamper us in implementing those matters of substance that we want to implement. That is, we must not on any account agree to a procedure that will later prevent our implementing the principles which we want. When the time comes, to incorporate in the peace agreement itself, this is the condition, this is the test. The question is whether there is anything in this agreement which is liable to prevent or hinder our achieving what we want to achieve in the peace agreement, if we arrive at it, and there is not, in my opinion, anything like this in these provisions.

But if Mr. Peres seriously - and I'm sure he is not doing it seriously - asks whether Syria will agree to peace with us according to the Likud's programme, which does not include a significant withdrawal, or whether Jordan will agree to peace with us when we don't want to withdraw from Judea and Samaria, I certainly cannot give an answer in the affirmative. Why do I say, Shimon, that you are not talking seriously? Will Syria agree to what you propose? Did Jordan agree to what you propose? Can anyone say that the Alignment's programme, or the D.M.C.'s programme, or the programme of the parties except Rakah - can anyone say he is sure that the other side will agree to it? Is the intensification of settlement in the Ophira area a basis for agreement with Egypt, or settlements on the Golan Heights...? None of us - either in the Likud or in the government - can say for certain.

All the members of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee - among them Knesset member Peres - are well aware of the proposals we submitted after Secretary of State Vance's visit to Israel, as a draft - and I have no reason for thinking the Arabs will agree to it - of a peace agreement. We were asked to submit substantive papers and, as regards this issue, which is today the nub of the debate here, we wrote - we informed the U.S. - that the basis we proposed for an agreement on peace between ourselves and Jordan is:

A) In Judea and Samaria equal rights and peaceful co-existence for Jews and Arabs must be assured.

B) No part of this region will be placed under foreign rule or sovereignty.

C) Every settlement must take fully into consideration Israel's security needs.

In this connection, our position is that Israel's security on the Eastern border must be based on the River Jordan.

That is the basis, that is the paper we submitted to the United States in preparation for the Geneva Conference, upon which we want to base the peace agreement between ourselves and Jordan. The document did not state that we wish to apply Israeli sovereignty to Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. It did state that we refuse, reject (the idea) that that region be subject to foreign rule or foreign sovereignty. It stated that we want equal rights and full coexistence between Jew and Arab in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. And I say this in order to put to the test whether, in the agreement we achieved, in the working paper on procedure, there is anything liable to be an obstacle should we in fact wish to effect these things and should the Arabs wish to move towards us.

I shall read the working paper in its entirety, for it is better to read it here in full before the House than to read tendentious distortions appearing every day in the press purporting to be parts of it, and in particular following the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee session (of yesterday):

"Working paper on suggestions for the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference

"1. The Arab parties will be represented by a unified Arab delegation, which will include Palestinian Arabs. After the opening session, the conference will split into working groups.

2. The working groups for the negotiation and conclusion of peace treaties will be formed as follows:

A. Egypt-Israel
B. Jordan-Israel
C. Syria-Israel
D. Lebanon-Israel*

"3. The West Bank and Gaza issues will be discussed in a working group to consist of Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Arabs.

"4. The solution of the problem of the Arab refugees and of the Jewish refugees will be discussed in accordance with terms to be agreed upon.

"5. The agreed basis for the negotiations at the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East are U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

"6. All the initial terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference remain in force, except as may be agreed by the parties.

What, then, does this agreement contain? It states that there will be a unified Arab delegation at the opening sessions. No negotiations will take place with the unified delegation on any subject whatsoever, that is what is written in the protocol, and it refers to two aspects: First, as regards the opening, and, secondly, following the opening sessions when the conference will split into working groups which will conduct negotiations for the establishment of peace treaties between the various countries. Any attempt to present the matter differently - and I heard that this was done last night on television - is simply untrue.

For this paper does not exist on its own: It is attached to a protocol to which the President of the United States is also a party. One can split hairs as much as one likes, but what it says and what is agreed upon is that we are not being asked to conduct negotiations with a unified delegation. It says that there will be a unified delegation which will later split into working groups, and it is the working groups which will not only conduct negotiations, but will sign peace treaties between Egypt and Israel, Jordan and Israel, Syria and Israel, and Lebanon and Israel. That is the first point.

The second point concerns the participation of the Palestinians in the Geneva Conference as a whole, and that in two forums: The first forum is the united delegation at the opening of the conference, and the second is the working party that will deal with Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Palestinians will take part in the first forum. But not on any account a single one of the men of the PLO, and on this there is complete agreement. In a previous draft proposed to us by the Americans, and which Mr. Peres read out, the PLO is mentioned - whether known, unknown or half-known - but all that is now null and void: The agreement is that not one PLO person will participate. We stated that we assume that the Palestinian representatives will come from among the residents of the administered areas. But let us assume that one of those residents of the areas - not a representative from Lebanon, but one of the Mayors here (from the areas) - gets up and states that he represents the PLO, then he cannot take part, because it would be in opposition to the agreement, and we will not participate in opposition to the agreement. The issue is not just that he cannot be a representative from Lebanon: Even if he is one of the residents of the areas, he is acceptable to us as long as he does not state that he represents the PLO. If he states that he represents the PLO, we will not sit together with him. That is the first point as regards participation of the Palestinians.

I shall now discuss the solution of the problem of the refugees: Clauses (3) and (4) of the working paper are not bilateral. Clause (4), which deals with a solution of the refugee question, states that "The solution of the problem of the Arab refugees and of the Jewish refugees will be discussed in accordance with terms to be agreed upon." We want to discuss solution of the problem of the refugees, which, in our view, should be solved by their resettlement in the countries where they now are. And I do not just say this here in the Knesset: We said this to the President and in all the discussions in the U.S. but in order to discuss their resettlement in Lebanon, in Syria, in Jordan, we must hold discussions with those states, and with the Palestinians themselves. Because the matter is a complex one

as there are countries where they now reside which we do not want to take part in the discussions (200,000 refugees in Kuwait, or in Iraq, or even the matter of reparations to the Israeli refugees from Iraq - and we would not want to introduce all that into the Geneva framework) - therefore we said that the solution of the problem of the Arab refugees and the Jewish refugees would be discussed in accordance with rules which have to be agreed upon separately, as a complex question. It is possible that this question will have to be discussed in accordance with rules which have to be agreed upon separately, as a complex question. It is possible that this question will have to be discussed as a whole outside the framework of Geneva, but to say that the Arab-Israeli conflict can be resolved without even touching upon the refugee question would not be correct.

As to the issue which appears in clause (3), "The West Bank and Gaza issues will be discussed in a working group to consist of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Arabs." I should like to give my opinion as to why I think that this clause, even as set down here - for the government would have liked a different formulation, without altering its content - is acceptable.

Members of the Knesset, fundamentally the question is a simple one: Do we, in 1977 or 1978, want to talk about any kind of settlement in the framework of a peace agreement as regard to Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip without also talking to the Arabs who live there? I don't. I confess, I want to talk to them too. There are a million and a quarter people there. I do not want to present ourselves, the State of Israel, the People of Israel, as not being ready to sit and talk with representatives of 400,000 Arabs in the Gaza Strip, who are ready to talk with us about peace.

We also said that if the Arabs decide to make a proposal, which was previously made by the Alignment, for the division of the West Bank, we shall sit and discuss it with them. For ten years they would not agree to it, but let us assume that they come forward now and propose it - if they propose it, we shall discuss it. But whether it is the Alignment proposal, the Allon Plan, or a territorial compromise, or whether it is this proposal for living together, do you, Mr. Shimon Peres, believe that in the framework of a peace settlement, a plan like the Allon Plan can be discussed without the participation of Palestinian Arabs? And why? But I want to say more than that - what are the two alternatives that I do not accept which could be different from this. That the Palestinian Arabs should be part of a Jordanian delegation we wanted, and we still want it, but Jordan does not agree. So Jordan believes, for some reason, that it is a sovereign state like any other and we cannot force it. We proposed it and we got a negative reply, so then we face two alternatives: Either they participate in some other form, or, if they don't agree, there will not be a single Palestinian.

What we agreed, and this is stated in the working paper, is that we shall not conduct any negotiations on a peace treaty with this delegation which includes representatives of Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Arabs. And therefore not only does this not come in continuation of the same numbering, but there is a different content. On the subject to the West Bank and Gaza it does not say that there will be a signature of peace treaties, as was said in connection with the negotiations Egypt-Israel, Israel-Syria and so forth. But the subject of the West Bank and Gaza will be discussed in a working group that will include Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Arabs. Egypt participates here because it is the country that, in the past, occupied the Gaza Strip. There is no question here of a peace treaty: What is said here is that we will discuss the issue of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - not a peace treaty and not the establishment of a state.

I do not believe that, when we establish patterns of procedure, before we agree on content, it is possible or necessary to fix any other pattern of procedure beyond this. What must be done definitely, so that there should be no mistake about it, is that we do not intend to discuss the establishment of a Palestinian State in any form whatsoever. This was not only stated to the President of the United States, but in this paper, which was agreed with the United States, this subject was separated from those issues that are discussed in connection with peace treaties between the states - with the agreement of the Americans, not only in keeping with our own wishful thinking. This has been changed, and this version does not include negotiations, but "will discuss the issues" - and it is not connected with this other group. But to discuss the issues mentioned there - that we shall do.

We must assure ourselves of three main things, and all three are assured in this agreement. First. That our position is that we will not return to the former borders, and therefore Resolution 242 - on the basis of not only our interpretation, but also the American interpretation that Resolution 242 does not call on Israel to return to the former borders - is the sole basis for negotiations at Geneva.

Secondly. That we do not agree, in any manner whatsoever, to the establishment of a Palestinian State -independent or partial or annexed, in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip. Therefore we agreed to this procedure when it was separated from the other sections, which speak of discussions on relations between one country and another, and we did not agree that independent status be given in any way whatsoever to the Palestinian delegation, nor is there reference anywhere to such status for the Palestinian delegation.

Thirdly. That under no circumstances will we accept any working paper which implies even the slightest possibility that we will have to sit down for discussions with the P.L.O. nor is that contained in the working paper in any form whatsoever.

Therefore, as a working paper, this document, is, I believe, reasonable and good.

Finally, I want to say: Gentlemen, we are not talking about a working paper which has only to serve us. If we, if all of us seriously want to sit down with the Arabs and negotiate, and we sit with the Americans and discuss with them what is the procedure that can serve both sides without this preventing us from standing by our principles - anyone who really wants to try to get a peace settlement with the Arabs - without any certainty that we shall get a peace settlement at the end of the road, without any certainty that we can cover the same road with all the Arab states -but so that we can begin and make the attempt, then we must be prepared to lay down such procedures that both sides will be able to accept them as a framework for the examination of possibilities for peace negotiations.

Since the (Defence and Foreign Affairs) Committee dealt with this matter only yesterday, I propose that this subject be removed from the agenda.

* All the parties agree that Lebanon may join the conference when it so requests."