Shortly after his return to Israel, newspaper reports from Washington stated that the Carter-Dayan meetings were very difficult and that Dayan used the word "brutal" to describe them. There were also reports that President Carter accused Israel of obstructing peace even more than Syria does. These issues and the present stage of the peacemaking process were at the heart of the following radio interview. Text follows:
Q. Mr. Foreign Minister. Was the talk with the President of the U.S.A. really brutal?
A. I don't know whether the word 'brutal' is the correct term. There were in it parts which for me as Foreign Minister of the State of Israel were hard or very hard. Particularly when the President accused Israel of delaying or preventing progress towards peace more than was the case with the Arab states. More even than Syria. And I know Syria's position. But no attempt was made in this talk to dictate to us on any issue which finds expression in the working paper.
When I said at the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee that the talks which lasted for hours contained hard parts, I also used the expression 'brutal'. I never once connected it with a demand on us to agree to something in the work procedure in what was called 'the working paper'. There was no connection between what was written in the working paper and the hard parts of the talk.
Q. The style was tougher than usual?
A. Be frank. The style was not tougher. But if it's said that Israel prevents peace more than does Syria - when the U.S. President says it - then the toughness is in the substance, not the style.
Q. Mr Dayan, from your speech in the Knesset it was possible to understand that Israel has accepted the working document as part of an understanding reached with the U.S. The P.L.O. would not participate in Geneva and that the establishment of a Palestinian State would not be discussed there. The State Department spokesman, in a statement published this (Friday) evening, said there was no such agreement. Is there some kind of misunderstanding here?
A. No. There is a clear understanding. In the working agreement which I read to the Knesset there is no item about P.L.O. participation. The P.L.O. is not mentioned there.
Q. Did you speak there about additional protocols or about an understanding concerning another agreement?
A. I said exactly that Israel had said that under no account would we sit with the P.L.O. whether it was people participating on behalf of the P.L.O. or whether it was West Bank representatives who declared that they represented the P.L.O. We said that we would not sit down with them. I did not say that the U.S. had signed anything to this effect. However, the fact is that in its original formulation in the first draft, not that which was signed but the previous one, there was a clause which stated that some low level P.L.O. men would participate in the joint delegation. This clause has been removed, and in the paper which has been agreed on by the U.S.A. and us no mention of the P.L.O. is made in any form.
Q. The State Department spokesman said that the question of Palestinian representation at Geneva was among those that had to be decided by the participants of the conference. That leaves the issue completely open.
A. It could be that it is wide open. I also said that they would go with this format to the Arabs. This is not the final format. It was formulated by the Americans and us. In this draft the P.L.O. is not mentioned. It mentions participants, Palestinian Arabs, but not the P.L.O.
Q. Do you consider that there is a realistic possibility of reaching a decision on the Palestinian issue without the P.L.O.'s participation in some form or other?
A. One hundred percent - or we will not go to Geneva. There will be no Geneva without us. I do not assume it: I am sure that the Americans and the Arabs know that we will not sit down with the P.L.O. They can decide one of two things: Either they decide to give up the idea of P.L.O. participation or there will be no Geneva.
Q. What happens if they put us in a position where we go to Geneva and someone gets up and says that he represents the P.L.O. Will the Israel delegation get up and leave the room?
A. Exactly so. As a rule it is not a matter of surprises. We are not playing hide and seek and the proof is that there are papers and protocols and delegations, etc. I don't think it is a matter of someone suddenly going out of the room taking off his hat and saying: 'Aha, I've caught you' - that's not serious. But if something like that should occur, we will simply get up and go home. I want to add something more. I heard Mrs. Meir speaking about a trap. Can they impose something on us? We are going under the clear and definite condition that we will not talk about certain issues. We will not sit down with certain bodies. We will not discuss the question of a Palestinian State and we will not sit down with the P.L.O.
Q. Perhaps it is a trap. Because under these conditions maybe the convening of the Geneva Conference is unrealistic?
A. If we do not arrive at conditions acceptable to us and the Arabs, there will be no Geneva Conference. One cannot go to Geneva without mutual agreement. So there are two sides, and let's say the Arabs announce they are not going to Geneva unless a delegation of the P.L.O. attends. And we have announced - and there is no doubt in my mind that we will not withdraw from our position - that we will not sit down with the P.L.O. - then if the Arabs do not give in there will be no Geneva.
Q. So what will there be?
A. There won't be anything. Geneva is a continuation. What there should be now is a renewal of the Geneva talks -this is not something new. Geneva is based on Resolution 242 and 242 makes no mention not only of the P.L.O. but not even of Palestinian representation. So if one wants to set up a new conference or a conference on a new basis, one must propose this. And this the Americans have not proposed, nor are the Arabs proposing it, nor is it correct to say (Mrs. Meir alluded to it) that the agreements the Americans signed with us in the past are not longer valid - on the contrary, they stated in the joint communique, on behalf of the President of the United States (and perhaps it can be said that he does not know what he is doing and others here in Israel know better) but he said that all the agreements still exist and are still valid. And so we are going to Geneva on the basis of 242 and in 242 there is no P.L.O. - the Americans have confirmed this - it does not include the P.L.O. unless we agree thereto and we do not agree thereto.
Q. Your critics say that in the U.S. Israel conceded its positions on the issue of the unified Arab delegation and on the introduction of the Palestinians as a separate factor in the Geneva Conference without receiving anything in return. Whereas in the past, when Israel was required to yield and did, it received something in return for its concessions.
A. I don't know what we have conceded. The Prime Minister agreed to the joint delegation back in his first talk with Carter, i.e. that at the opening session there could be a joint Arab delegation, but that we would not conduct any negotiations with it. This was stated in the working paper between us and the Americans. And there are absolutely no grounds to what is being said (and I find hints to this effect in what Mrs. Meir said as well) to the effect that Israel has undertaken or agreed to conduct negotiations with a joint Arab delegation. They can sit down and consult among themselves, and in the previous session of the Geneva Conference as well the Syrians sat within the Egyptian delegation - they were the only two states that participated and they sat together but this time we will not conduct negotiations with a joint Arab delegation. And it is stated in the working paper that the negotiations will be conducted separately. I do not see that there is any concession on this. As far as the Palestinians are concerned we proposed that they be part of the Jordanian delegation. The Jordanian delegation, so the Americans told us -does not agree to this on any account and the question that confronted us was whether on that account we should reject outright the participation of the Palestinians in the discussions over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, or not reject it but define the topic as one that is to be resolved between (sovereign) states - we are not going to sign a peace treaty there but merely to discuss things. In my opinion we should do so. This may be the opinion of a minority of one, but even if others do not propose it I myself would. I would not propose that we seriously sit down and talk about a joint mode of life or the country's partition - it could be the Allon Plan or Mrs. Meir's plan or anything else, but I would not propose that we decide on what will happen in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the million and a quarter inhabitants there, without their taking part in that discussion.
Q. Your critics say that Israel is thereby in effect recognizing that the Palestinians are a party to the conflict almost like states, which is tantamount to recognition of their political status.
A. That is not correct, because what we defined on that subject is different from the subjects which were discussed with the other states. With the other states there will be negotiations and the signing of a peace treaty, and here the discussion will be on the (complex of) topics concerning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In this matter they will participate - and in my opinion they should participate - not in the creation of an independent state - and I say this very clearly - not in the creation of an independent state, but in the discussion of matters connected with Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip.
Q. Mr. Dayan. You said during the debate in the Knesset that no political platform of any of the parties is acceptable today to the Arabs as the basis for a peace settlement and that the Arabs have in effect rejected all the peace plans that Israel tried to put forth. The Alignment therefore decided at the time to forgo an overall settlement as a tactical aim and chose instead the course of partial settlements. Now, the Government in which you serve rejects partial agreements and speaks of a contractual peace and an overall settlement. Is there some sort of a contradiction here between the assumption that the Arabs are not prepared to accept Israel's concept of an overall settlement and the posing of an overall settlement as a tactical political move?
A. First of all, the Government in which I serve does not say all or nothing, but we do say that we want to arrive at a full contractual peace with all that this implies, and when Mr. Rabin returned from his visit to Carter full of excitement it was precisely on this subject. Namely that at long last the President of the United States in defining the nature of peace, had spoken of diplomatic and commercial relations and so on. Is this something we should reject? It may be that in the course of negotiations we will not arrive at this, but is it serious, or Zionist, or in Israel's best interests that when the U.S. President says that peace must be full, including diplomatic relations and cultural ties etc. etc., for us to come and say we want anything less? I, at any rate, don't recommend it. What do we say? We say, let us arrive at a full peace agreement, if possible with all the states.
But we are not saying that if one state, or the majority of them, do not want this then we will not make a separate peace with one of them, nor have we said that if we do not succeed in arriving at a full peace agreement then we will not have achieved anything. At this stage we are saying what the objective should be, and we would be well advised not to present anything less than what the U.S. President says when he speaks of the nature of peace being that of a full peace with full normalization.
Q. Members of the Likud faction said this week that the working paper is the outer limit of the concessions to which Israel can agree, which means in effect that the Arabs must accept the document as it stands?
A. I do not know if they have to accept it as it stands. If they propose changes we will have to consider what these are, maybe they will be changes that are acceptable to us, i.e. not changes of withdrawal or advances but a change in substance. But if they propose any change that we do not want to accept, we will not accept it. The entire approach which speaks of a trap and of what will be at Geneva is to my mind totally invalid. If we say in advance that in some situation or other they demand something of us or the Arabs propose different formulations for the working paper, or if we come to Geneva and sitting opposite us are the great - Russians and the Americans and all the Arab states and they demand something - how will we dare say no? He who says that, should not embark on negotiations in the first place. One can always say no.
If we will not be in a position where we can refuse - then it is not possible to enter any negotiations even today, as it were. They can (dictate to) us. What will happen if the UN Security Council decides to impose sanctions on us? If they throw us out of the UN? All these questions are not hypothetical ones, but real possibilities, and the question is whether Israel can and believes that it can at any stage, beginning with changes in the working paper to be proposed by the Arabs and ending with Geneva itself - refuse to accept what others propose. In my opinion the answer is one hundred percent yes. Certainly they will come up with proposals that we will refuse to accept, and what we don't want to accept we won't accept.