Testifying before the United States House of Representatives International Relations Subcommittees on International Organizations and on Europe and the Middle East, Mr. Atherton reiterated previous American position regarding the Israeli settlements in the territories. He called them an obstacle to peace because their establishment could be perceived as prejudging the outcome of negotiations. He also said that new settlements are inconsistent with international law. Text:
I am here to respond to your request for the State Department's views on the subject of Israel's settlements in territories occupied in the 1967 war. With your request, you forwarded a number of questions dealing with the legal, political and factual aspects of this subject. In this statement, I will review briefly the legal and political considerations that form the basis of our policy and touch on those questions relating to the relationship of the settlements to the future status of the occupied territories. Following my statement, I am at the sub-committee's disposal to answer today, or subsequently in writing for the record, your questions on these and other aspects of this subject.
The U.S. position
The U.S. position on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories has been consistent since this subject first became an issue in 1968.
There are two elements to our position:
First, we have viewed those settlements as an obstacle to peace because their establishment could be perceived as prejudging the outcome of negotiations dealing with the territorial aspects of final peace treaties.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 establishes the principles that peace must be based on withdrawal by Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict and the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. In brief, Resolution 242 envisages Israeli relinquishment of occupied territories in return for Arab agreement to recognize Israel's right to exist and to live in peace with it.
The Arabs perceive Israel's settlements in the occupied territories as indicating that Israel intends to retain permanent control in the areas where the settlements are located and therefore as prejudging agreement in the negotiations on the location of the final secure and recognized boundaries called for in Resolution 242. The Israeli government has taken the position that all issues are negotiable and that the settlements will not be an obstacle to negotiations and peace. In our view, however, once settlements are established, they inevitably create psychological and political conditions which will make it more difficult to negotiate the final disposition of areas where they are located. This is especially troublesome at a time when one of the main problems in launching peace negotiations is to persuade each side that the other intends to negotiate a settlement within the framework of Resolution 242. Thus, the settlements complicate the work of beginning the negotiations because they raise questions in Arab minds whether the negotiations, once begun, have a reasonable chance of succeeding.
In this respect, they are analogous to statements from some Arab quarters which raise questions in Israeli minds whether the Arabs are really prepared to make genuine peace.
Second, we see the Israeli settlements as inconsistent with international law.
The fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, which contains many of the internationally recognized rules under which military occupation should be conducted, states in article 49 the following: "The occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territory it occupies."
Both Israel and its Arab neighbors are signatories of the convention, although Israel maintains that it does not apply to any of the territories it has occupied since 1967, and that, in any case, it does not prohibit the establishment of settlements in occupied territory. We do not agree with this view of the convention. In addition, we believe that under international law generally a belligerent occupant is not the sovereign power and does not have the right to treat occupied territory as its own or to make changes in the territory except those necessitated by the immediate needs of the occupation. In general, an occupant may only use the resources of the territory including public lands to meet the expenses of administering the territory and the military needs of the army of occupation and for the direct benefit of the indigenous inhabitants.
The settlements and the future of the territories
You have asked me to comment on the relationship between the settlements in occupied territories and the right to self-determination of the people of those territories.
To begin with, it is essential to understand an important difference between the Sinai and the Golan Heights, on the one hand, and the West Bank and Gaza, on the other.
- Territory in the Sinai and the Golan from which Israel withdraws as a result of a negotiated agreement will clearly revert respectively to Egypt and Syria, whose sovereignty is not disputed. The issue of self-determination is therefore not germane in these two cases.
- In the West Bank and Gaza, however, the situation is different. Both of these territories were part of the British Mandate of Palestine. While the legitimate existence of a sovereign Israel in part of Palestine is recognized, the question of sovereignty in the part of Palestine remaining outside of Israel under the 1949 Armistice Agreements has not been finally resolved. Jordan in May 1950 declared that its annexation of the West Bank was without prejudice to the final settlement of the Palestine issue, and Egypt did not make any sovereign claim to the Gaza Strip during the time it was the administering authority there. Israel similarly notes the undefined nature of sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza.
The relationship between the settlements and the principle of self-determination cannot be discussed in isolation, because the settlements are but a single factor involved in negotiating peace treaties that will provide among other things for the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the view of the United States, the important thing concerning the future disposition of the West Bank and Gaza is that the arrangement be acceptable to the parties concerned. There is no clear consensus with respect to the question of whether, and if so how, self-determination might be expressed, or to the timing of such an expression. Whether such a consensus can be achieved in the negotiating process that lies ahead remains to be seen. This question, however, together with all the other complex issues of achieving peace in the Middle East Peace Conference so that the negotiating process can be resumed as soon as possible. We are now engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts to that end.